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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the present criminal law position with respect to medically administered active 
voluntary euthanasia in Australia. Under existing criminal law principles, whilst there is some scope 
for passive euthanasia, active volunta.rY euthanasia is treated as murder and no account is taken of the 
special circumstances existing in such cases. Notwithstanding this prohibition, there is evidence that 
Australian doctors are involved in the practice of active voluntary euthanasia. However, police and 
prosectors appear reluctant to intervene in this area of medical practice, and judging from the 
experience in other jurisdictions, there is every likelihood that if a doctor were prosecuted in Australia 
for having administered active voluntary euthanasia, the doctor would escape the full rigours of the 
criminal law. Against this background, this thesis seeks to highlight the problems which exist as a 
result of the marked discrepancies between law and practice in this area. Attention is also drawn to the 
law's differential treatment of active and passive euthanasia and the difficulties and anomalies which 
arise from the legal characterisation of a number of other medical practices which bear some similarity 
to active voluntary euthanasia such as the turning off of artificial life-support and the administration 
of pain-relieving drugs which are known to be likely to hasten the patient's death. 
The thesis argues that active voluntary euthanasia should not be subject to a blanket criminal law 
prohibition. This argument is based on a number of factors including the principle of self-
determination, current legal and medical practice, changing community attitudes, and jurisprudential 
arguments regarding the proper role of the criminal law. The conclusion of this thesis is that the law 
with regard to active voluntary euthanasia in Australia should be reformed by the introduction of 
legislation creating· a very limited exception to the homicide laws that would confer on doctors an 
immunity from liability, provided active voluntary euthanasia is performed in accordance with strict 
criteria and safeguards. It is argued that the practice of active voluntary euthanasia by doctors in the 
Netherlands provides a useful guide to law reform in Australia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While the problem of euthanasia is an ancient one, 1 it has, in recent years acquired a new relevance 
and urgency and is increasingly the subject of public debate. The current prominence of the issue can 
be attributed to a number of interrelated factors. One of the most significant has been the 
institutionalisation of the process of dying. 2 Developments in medical technology have significantly 
increased the capacity to sustain life beyond any possible hope of recovery. Patients who would in 
the past have died from natural causes can now be sustained almost indefinitely as a result of the 
intervention of artificial life-support equipment or other medical or surgical procedures. Whilst this 
has generally been a desirable development, it has created new legal and ethical problems in 
determining when to use medical interventions to attempt to save or prolong a patient's life and 
when a patient should be permitted to die. It has also posed new dilemmas as to when death has in 
fact occurred.3 One negative consequence of the tremendous advances ,in sustaining human life is 
that, in some instances, the dying process is unnecessarily prolonged. In fact, for many people, it is 
not death that they fear, but the possibility of dying in a painful and undignified manner.4 Thus, 
concern about the quality of life for the dying has prompted renewed interest in euthanasia. 
Another factor which has contributed to the prominence of the euthanasia issue pas been the growing 
proportion of elderly people in western society as a result of the general improvement in nutrition 
and heath.5 Although the issue of euthanasia is not limited to the elderly, clearly those who are 
approaching the end of life are more likely to be concerned about the manner of their dying and to 
contemplate euthanasia. There has also been growing community awareness about patients' rights in 
the health care context, and voluntary euthanasia is regarded by many as providing the ultimate 
control over dying. 
1 
1 According to a number of commentators, euthanasia was widely endorsed in the ancient world in cases 
of incurable disease by well-known figures such as Plato and the Stoic, Seneca. For an historical 





An Historical Survey of its Conceptual Origins and Introduction into Medical Thought' (1978) 52 Bull. 
of the History of Med. 492; Gruman, G. 'An Historical Introduction to Ideas About Voluntary 
Euthanasia' (1973) 4 Omega 87; R. Russell, Freedom to Die (1977) 53-214; Steele, W. and B. Hill, 'A 
Plea for a Legal Right to Die' (1976) 29 Okla.L.Rev. 328, 330-332. 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural 
Research, Deciding to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment (1983) 18; A. Capron, 'Legal and Ethical 
Problems in Decisions for Death' (1986) 14 Law, Med. & Health Care 141; C. Campbell, 'Aid-in-Dying 
and the Taking of Human Life' (1992) 18 J.Med. Ethics 128, 129. 
Through legislative intervention, there is now fairly widespread acceptance of 'brain death' as death for 
the purposes of the law; see P. Bates and J. Dewdney, (eds.) Australian Health and Medical Law Reporter 
para. 19,200 for reference to relevant Australian legislation. 
Russell, 35; Campbell, 129. 
In 1986, 1.68 million people in Australia were aged 65 and over; 10.5% of the total population of 16 
million. It is estimated that by the year 2005, 2.4 million people will be over 65; 11.9% of a total 
population of 20.2 million. By 2025 it is estimated that 3.8 million people will be over 65, 16.1 % of 
a total population of 23 .8 million; the Bulletin April, 1988. 
2 
The emergence of the AIDS epidemic has also played a role in drawing attention to the issue. With 
many of its victims being young and assertive, well informed of the unpleasant death they will face, 
the demand for control over the time and manner of one's dying has intensified. 
Also of significance have been the gradually changing attitudes to death. For a long time, death has 
been regarded as a taboo subject, but there now appears to be greater appreciation of the issue and a 
growing demand for a 'good and dignified death'.6 The declining influence of religion has also 
contributed to the current prominence of the euthanasia issue. Whilst various religious 
denominations, most particularly the Catholic Church, have always been opposed to the concept of 
euthanasia, as a result of the increasing secularisation of society, there has been less opposition to 
the idea 
A further factor which has fuelled the current debate has been the influence of the media In recent 
years there has been increased media coverage on euthanasia reflecting, to a large extent, the growing 
community interest in the subject. Through its extensive coverage, the media has also played a role 
in promoting debate and community awareness of the issue. Another consideration which has been at 
the background of the contemporary euthanasia debate is the availability of health care resources. As 
pressure mounts to contain expenditure and ensure the just allocation of finite health resources there 
has been growing recognition of the benefits of respecting individuals' choice not to be subject to 
prolonged and unwanted medical treatment and to have the option of electing an earlier death. As a 
result of these interrelated developments, the issue of euthanasia has come into prominence and the 
movement for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia has gained momentum. 
The increasing prominence of the euthanasia issue has also revealed legal problems. Under existing 
criminal law principles, whilst there is some scope for passive euthanasia, active voluntary 
euthanasia is treated as murder and no account is taken of the special circumstances existing in such 
cases. There are, however, major discrepancies. between law and practice in this area. There is 
evidence that active voluntary euthanasia occurs quite frequently (albeit largely as a hidden practice) 
yet doctors are virtually never prosecuted, or if prosecuted, have almost always escaped conviction. In 
addition to these discrepancies there are a number of inconsistencies and anomalies in the application 
of the law with regard to certain medical acts which may hasten death, in particular, switching off 
life-support and the administration of pain-relieving drugs. 
The legal implications of doctors' participation in active voluntary euthanasia have been starkly 
brought into focus by the recent conviction of Dr Cox in the United Kingdom. In September 1992, 
Dr Cox, a consultant rheumatologist at a Winchester hospital, was convicted of the attempted murder 
of one of his patients and was given a 12 month .suspended prison sentence.7 Dr Cox's crime had 
been to deliberately hasten the death of an elderly patient who was in excruciating and unrelievable 
6 
7 
For a discussion of the changing attitudes to death, see P. Steinfels and R. Veatch, {eds.) Death Inside 
Out (1974). 
This case is discussed in detail in chapter IV, 126-127. See also chapter VI, 279. 
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agony and who had begged him to relieve her of her suffering by administering a lethal dose of 
potassium chloride. What came as a surprise to many· was not that this doctor had responded to a 
patient's request for active euthanasia: indeed, this is well-known to be a fairly common practice; but 
the fact that he was actually prosecuted and convicted of attempted murder. Prior to this case it has 
been widely assumed that a doctor, acting bonafide at the patient's request, would be immune from 
liability. The Cox case has dispelled any such belief and has highlighted the potential criminal 
liability of doctors who fulfil a patient's request for active euthanasia. Whilst many people have, in 
the past, been content to tolerate the inconsistencies which exist between medical practice and the 
strict letter of the law, the conviction of Dr Cox, a well respected and compassionate doctor; has 
forced a re-evaluation of the situation. "Tue overwhelming reaction from the public has been one of 
sympathy and support for Dr Cox, 8 and even the General Medical Council's professional conduct 
committee has effectively condoned his conduct by permitting him to continue working as a 
consultant and refraining from taking any serious disciplinary action against him. 9 Not surprisingly, 
the case has been hailed as something of a watershed in the history of active voluntary euthanasia.10 
The reality is that law does not presently distinguish between the bona fide act of a doctor hastening 
the death of a patient at the patient's request from an act of murder. The aim of this thesis is to 
examine the current legal prohibition of active voluntary euthanasia under Australian law and to 
consider whether there is a need for reform. Whilst consideration will principally be focused on the 
Australian position, where appropriate, attention will also be given to other common law 
jurisdictions, in particular, the United Kingdom and the United States. This work is primarily a legal 
analysis, but in view of the nature of the subject matter, the study necessarily involves consideration 
of wider issues, including social change, as reflected in opinion polls and community agitation for 
reform, the practice and attitudes of the medical profession, as well as consideration of religious, 
moral, and ethical arguments. In drawing attention to deficiencies in the present law with regard to 
active voluntary euthanasia, this work is intended to be of benefit to both doctors and patients; to 
protect doctors from the inappropriate imposition of criminal liability, and to protect the interests of 
patients and to promote their right of self-determination. This thesis also seeks to clarify the law and 
overcome much of the uncertainty which presently exists regarding the extent of a doctor's duty to a 
patient and the circumstances in which medical treatment can be withheld or withdrawn at the request 
of a patient who wants to die. 
It is important from the outset to clarify the terminology which is used in this thesis, particularly 
in light of the variable meanings which are often attributed to the word 'euthanasia.' This lack of 
consensus in defining euthanasia is largely due to the emotive and controversial nature of the 
8 
9 
In a telephone poll conducted by News of the World to gauge community reaction to the verdict, nearly 
10,000 readers phoned in to register their response to the question: 'Should doctors be allowed to put 
patients out of their misery?' Of the respondents, 9,468, nearly 97%, called in to say yes. Only 326, 
just over 3%, voted no. 
Dr Cox was admonished and given a reprimand by the General Medical Council, but was not struck off 
the medical register; the Australian 19 Nov. 1992. 
10 See, for example, the Independent 21 Sept. 1992; R. Smith, 'Euthanasia: Time for a Royal 
Commission' 305 (1992) B.M.J. 728. 
subject, and the fact that the definitions of euthanasia which are advanced, often reflect a particular 
moral viewpoint. 11 Etymologically, the word euthanasia means 'good death' from the Greek eu for 
good, and thanatos for death. In common usage, however, it is rarely used in this literal sense which 
emphasises the type of death experienced and is more usually employed to refer to the act of 
deliberately inducing the death of a patient who is in severe pain and distress as a result of a 
terminal or incurable illness. For example, euthanasia is defined in the Oxford dictionary as 'a gentle 
and easy death, the bringing about of this, especially in the case of incurable and painful disease. •12 
Although this definition makes no reference to the person who brings about this death, the 
contemporary understanding of euthanasia, upon which this thesis will focus, envisages a clinical 
situation where a doctor assists a terminal or incurable patient to die. This is to be distinguished 
from the more general concept of 'mercy killing', which can be defined as an intentional killing 
administered out of mercy or pity for the suffering person, often by a member of the family or a 
friend of the victim.13 In the interests of clarity, it is also desirable to dispense with the 'death with 
dignity' and the 'right to die' rhetoric. Whilst not wanting to detract from the importance of a 
dignified death, there is widespread agreement that these are ambiguous and meaningless phrases 
which do not assist in advancing reasoned analysis of the subject of euthanasia.14 
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In defining euthanasia, a distinction which in law is of utmost importance is the distinction between 
active and passive euthanasia. Although there is by no means universal agreement on the matter, the 
following definitions are proposed which are in accordance with the prevailing understanding of these 
terms. 'Active euthanasia' can be defined as a deliberate act to end the life of a terminal or incurable 
patient, which in fact results in the patient's death 15 An example of active euthanasia would be the 
deliberate administration of drugs with the object of causing the death of the patient and which does in 
fact result in the patient's death. 'Passive euthanasia'16 can be been defined as the deliberate 
withholding or withdrawing of life-prolonging medical treatment in respect of a terminal or incurable 
patient, with the object of allowing the patient to die, and as a result of which the patient dies at an 
earlier time than he or she would have died had the treatment been carried out.17 An ex'ample of 
passive euthanasia would be the discontinuation of drugs, for instance, antibiotics in respect of a 
terminal or incurable patient who has an underlying infection. 
11 For a detailed analysis of the definition of euthanasia, see T. Beauchamp, and A. Davidson, 'The 
Definition of Euthanasia' (1979) 4 J.Med. & Phil. 294. 
12 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (7th ed. 1987) 332. 
13 For a definition of 'mercy killing' see, for example, Law Reform Commissioner Victoria, Working 
Paper No. 8, Murder: Mental Element and Punishment (1984) 24; The Concise Oxford Dictionary of 
Current English (7th ed. 1987) 634. 
14 See, for example, Parliament of Victoria Social Development Committee, Second and Final Report, 
Inquiry into Options for Dying with Dignity (1987) 139; President's Commission Report, Deciding to 
Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment 24; G. Grisez and J.M. Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice 
(1979) 96-97. 
15 See, for example, British Medical Association (B.M.A.) Working Party Report, Euthanasia (1988) 3 
where 'active euthanasia' is described as 'an active intervention by a doctor to end life.' 
16 Also sometimes referred to as 'antidysthanasia'; i.e. 'the failure to take positive action to prolong the 
life of an incurable patient'; see, for example, W. Cannon, 'The Right to Die' (1970) 7 Hous.L.Rev. 
654, 657. 
17 B.M.A. Working Party Report, Euthanasia 3; R. Kaplan, 'Euthanasia Legislation: A Survey and A 
Model Act' 2 (1976) Am.J.L & Med. 41. 
Although there is fairly wide acceptance of these terms, there has been considerable resistance to 
describing the practice of withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging medical treatment as a form of 
euthanasia. According to one view which has frequently arisen in medical circles, the 
discontinuation of medical treatment in appropriate circumstances is proper medical practice, and to 
describe it as 'passive euthanasia' is misleading and creates unnecessary confusion.18 Thus, it has 
been argued, there is a distinction between intentional killing on the one hand, and appropriate 
treatment for the dying or terminally ill on the other.19 Strong objections to the prevailing usage 
of 'passive' euthanasia have also come from various religious denominations, particularly the 
Catholic Church which has unequivocally condemned the practice of any form of euthanasia. 
According to traditional principles of Catholic teaching, there is a fundamental distinction between 
'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' means of prolonging life. 20 This distinction has its origins in moral 
theology and is used to distinguish between forms of care which are obligatory (ordinary means) and 
non-obligatory care (extraordinary means). On the basis of this distinction, the Catholic view is that 
the term 'passive' euthanasia does not apply in respect of the withholding or withdrawing of 'extra-
ordinary' treatment21 whereas the omission of an 'ordinary' means of prolonging life would be 
regarded as euthanasia. 22 Apart from the Catholic Church, other religious denominations have also 
sanctioned non-intervention in appropriate circumstances claiming that this does not amount to 
euthanasia 23 Apart from these sources of opposition, other commentators have argued that passive 
euthanasia is an inappropriate label for the withholding or withdrawing of treatment. 24 Despite this 
opposition, the term 'passive euthanasia' is now commonly used in this context, 25 and is an 
appropriate label in circumstances where the withholding or withdrawing was done with the object 
of hastening the death of the patient and did in fact bring about the patient's death. 
Whilst acknowledging the limitations of this terminology, it is proposed, for the purposes of this 
thesis, to use the terms 'active' and 'passive' euthanasia Apart from the fact that these terms have 
gained widespread usage and understanding, this approach can be justified on the basis that the 
distinction between 'active' and 'passive' euthanasia is closely paralleled by the acts/omissions 
18 See, for example, B. Pollard, 'Killing the Dying - Not the Easy Way Out' (1988) 149 M.J.A. 312. 
5 
19 B. Reichenbach, 'Euthanasia and the Active Passive Distinction' 1 (1987) Bioethics 51, 72; R. 
Twycross, 'Debate: Euthanasia - A Physician's Viewpoint' (1982) 8 J.Med. Ethics 86, 87. The view has 
also been expressed that stopping treatment out of respect for a patient's wishes is not euthanasia at 
all; see S. Potts, 'Looking for the Exit Door: Killing and Caring in Modern Medicine' (1988) 25 
Hous.L.Rev. 493, 500. 
20 For discussion of the historical background of this distinction, see the President's Commission Report, 
Deciding to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment, 82-83. 
21 T. O'Donnell, 'Review of "The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients"' (1984) 51 
Linacre Q. 351; D.W. Louisell, 'Euthanasia and Biathanasia: On Dying and Killing' 22 (1973) Catholic 
U.L.Rev. 723, 730. 
22 W.B. Smith, 'Judeo-Christian Teaching on Euthanasia: Definitions, Distinctions and Decisions' 54 
(1987) Linacre Q. 33. 
23 See, for example, K. Rayner, 'Euthanasia - A Church Perspective,' proceedings from the 5th Biennial 
National Aged Care Conference of the Uniting Church of Australia, Aug. (1986) 43. 
24 For example, R. Weir, Abating Treatment with Critically lll Patients (1989) 302; E. Keyserlingk, 
Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life in the Context of Ethics, Medicine and Law (1979) 120-123. In fact, 
both these commentators argue that the distinction between active and passive euthanasia should be 
dispensed with altogether. 
25 For example, B.M.A. Working Party Report, Euthanasia, 3. 
doctrine which underlies the criminal law and which is of central relevance in determining criminal 
liability. Thus, the position taken in this thesis is that whilst it may, in the future, be necessary to 
revise the nomenclature, it would not, for present purposes, advance the analysis of this subject if 
an attempt was made to depart from this terminology. Attention will, however, be drawn to some 
of the problems in the application of the acts/omissions distinction. 
A critical feature of this work is its focus on voluntary euthanasia. Although the criminal law does 
not presently differentiate between euthanasia which is performed with or without the request of a 
patient, or indeed, against the patient's express wishes, the differences between voluntary euthanasia 
on the one hand, and involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia on the other, are of paramount 
significance. It is therefore necessary to define these terms and to spell out the precise scope of this 
work. Euthanasia is involuntary where it is performed without the consent or against the will of a 
competent patient and this form of euthanasia should be condemned in the most emphatic terms. 
There are, however, those who advocate the acceptance of non-voluntary euthanasia in some 
circumstances, whereby euthanasia is performed on persons who are incompetent and therefore not 
capable of giving a consent. 26 The aim of this work is to deal solely with voluntary euthanasia; 
i.e. euthanasia which is performed at the request of the patient. This, in tum, involves an 
assumption about patient competence and decision-making capacity. Competence is not a legal 
status except when determined by a court of law,27 and until such time as a formal judicial 
determination of incompetence is made, individuals are legally presumed competent to manage their 
own affairs. 28 In recent years, attention has moved away from the rather inflexible notion of 
competence to the concept of 'decision-making capacity.'29 Decision-making capacity is now 
generally understood to refer to an individual's functional ability to make informed health care 
decisions in accordance with personal values.30 However, the determination of patient capacity is 
extremely complex and there is, as yet, no consensus on the appropriate standard in determining 
capacity. As a minimum, it would require the ability to communicate and understand information 
relevant to the decision and the ability to reason and deliberate about the choices in accordance with 
personal values and goals.31 Capacity is not an all-or-nothing matter; there is a spectrum of 
abilities.32 The more serious the consequences of a particular decision, the higher the level of 
decision-making capacity required, and the greater need for certainty on the part of health care 
6 
26 See, for example, M. Kohl, (ed.) Beneficent Euthanasia (1975); R. Young, 'Voluntary and Non-
Voluntary Euthanasia' (1976) 59 The Monist 264; J. Rachels, The End of Life (1986); P. Singer, 
Practical Ethics (1979) 127-157. 
27 B. Dickens, 'Terminal Care, Incompetent Persons and Donation' (1986) 3 Transplantation Today 54. 
28 Hastings Center Report, Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and Care for the 
Dying (1987) 131. 
29 See, for example, Hastings Center Report, Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment 
and Care for the Dying, 131-133; President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research, Making Health Care Decisions (1982) 55-68. 
3 0 See, for example, Hastings Center Report, Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment 
and Care for the Dying, 132. 
3 1 Id. 131; President's Commission Report, Making Health Care Decisions, 57. 
3 2 Hastings Center Report, Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and Care for the 
Dying, 133. 
professionals in their assessment of that capacity.33 Thus, the issue of active euthanasia would 
require a high degree of decision-making capacity in view of the significance of the decision and the 
finality of the outcome. In dealing with voluntary euthanasia, it is assumed, for the purposes of this 
thesis, that the patient is legally competent and has the requisite decision-making capacity to 
voluntarily elect an earlier death. 
It is recognised that there are enormous ethical difficulties in making decisions concerning the care 
of incompetent patients since, unlike for competent patients, who can make decisions for their own 
health care, decisions must be made for another person, without guidance or knowledge of that 
person's wishes. However, because of the intrinsic differences between competent and incompetent 
patients, examination of this issue falls beyond the scope of this work. 
At the heart of the euthanasia issue is the question whether individuals can rightly exercise control 
over the time and manner of their death. This raises the issue of an individual's right of autonomy 
and self-determination - the idea that competent individuals should be free to determine their own 
life choices. This principle underlies this thesis and it is proposed to explore its interrelationship 
with other important ethical principles and social values, prominent amongst which is the sanctity 
of life doctrine; the notion that human life has intrinsic value and is worthy of respect and 
protection. To the extent that the exercise of an individual's self-determination is in conflict with 
society's interest in the preservation of life, this thesis will also need to examine the relationship 
between private and public values and whether these interests can be reconciled. 
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It is important to acknowledge the close relationship between assisted suicide and active voluntary 
euthanasia. Because of the similarity of the issues involved, analysis of the issues with regard to 
active voluntary euthanasia has also necessarily entailed consideration of issues relevant to assisted 
suicide. Moreover, legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia would also require reconsideration of the 
terms of the current legal prohibition of assisting suicide. However, it must be recognised that 
notwithstanding the significant similarities, the issues are to some extent distinct.34 The most 
obvious and important difference is that, unlike in the case of assisted suicide, where the death 
inducing agent is ultimately self-administered, active voluntary euthanasia requires the direct 
participation of another in bringing about the patient's death. The implications of this distinction are 
also examined in this thesis. 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. In the first two chapters, consideration is given to the legal 
status of medically administered euthanasia under the criminal law in Australia, focussing on the law's 
differential treatment of active and passive euthanasia Chapter III contains an analysis of the law in 
relation to assisted suicide. Against this legal background, the position in practice with regard to 
active voluntary euthanasia is then explored in chapter IV. Evidence of doctors' involvement in the 
33 Ibid.; President's Commission Report, Making Health Care Decisions, 60. 
3 4 See R. Weir, 'The Morality of Physician-Assisted Suicide' (1992) 20 Law, Med. & Health Care 116, 
117-118. 
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practice of active voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide is analysed, and consideration is given to 
the treatment of such cases in the criminal justice system. Building on this analysis, attention is then 
drawn to the various problems which stem from the discrepancies which exist between law and 
practice in this area. In developing this argument, the discussion extends to a consideration of the 
legal characterisation of a number of other medical practices which bear some similarity to active 
voluntary euthanasia, yet which are typically characterised in such a way as to avoid the imposition of 
criminal liability. 
Chapter V is devoted to an analysis of the euthanasia debate. This involves an examination of the 
-
arguments for and against the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia as well as consideration of 
jurisprudential arguments regarding the role of the criminal law. In chapter VI, changes in society are 
discussed which have contributed to a more receptive climate for reform. Particular attention is given 
to the evidence of growing support for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia amongst the 
medical profession and in the community generally. Consideration is then given in chapter VII to the 
reform developments which have occurred in Australia and other common law jurisdictions, including 
law reform commission and parliamentary inquiries dealing with the subject and efforts to secure 
legislative reform. In chapter VIII attention is turned to the Netherlands where, although not actually 
legalised, active voluntary euthanasia has for some years been openly practiced by the medical 
profession with very few legal repercussions. Since the Netherlands has come to be widely regarded as 
a possible reform model, an attempt is made to carefully evaluate the situation and to ascertain 
whether it is in fact a suitable model for other jurisdictions to adopt 
The final chapter deals with options for reform. The suitability of a legislative response is examined 
and criteria are considered for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. The conclusion of this 
thesis is that, notwithstanding the limitations of legislation, on balance, legislative reform is both 
necessary and appropriate. A recommendation is accordingly made for the introduction of a very 
limited exception to the homicide laws that would confer on doctors an immunity from liability, 
provided active voluntary euthanasia is performed in accordance with strict criteria and safeguards. 
There could be little dispute that the question whether active voluntary euthanasia should be permitted 
by law raises problems of fundamental importance and considerable difficulty. It is hoped that this 
thesis will assist in clarifying the issues and advancing the debate so as to pave the way for reform. 
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CHAPTER I 
EUTHANASIA UNDER AUSTRALIAN CRWINAL LAW 
Introductjon 
The object of this chapter is to examine the present state of the criminal law regarding the practice of 
active and passive euthanasia in Australia with the aim of ascertaining the potential liability of 
doctors for participation in these practices. As was observed in the Introduction to this thesis, some 
aspects of the present law are shrouded in uncertainty. This is particularly the case in relation to 
liability for the withholding or withdrawing of medical treatment which results in the death of the 
patient. As a result of this uncertainty, many health care professionals are unsure of their precise legal 
rights and obligations. I This tends to encourage doctors to practice 'defensive medicine' which may be 
contrary to the patient's interests. The examination in this and the following chapter, dealing with the 
patient's right to refuse treatment, seeks to clarify some of the prevailing uncertainties in respect of 
the rights of patients regarding their medical treatment and the legal position of doctors acting on the 
instructions of their patients. In the course of this analysis, attention will also be focussed on the 
differential treatment of the law in respect of active and passive euthanasia. Notwithstanding the 
similarities between active and passive euthanasia in terms of intention and outcome, there are 
significant legal differences between the two, which give rise to questionable distinctions. 
The distinction between active and passive euthanasia essentially rests upon the more general 
distinction between acts and omissions; active interventions as distinct from non-action or refraining 
from acting. The criminal law maintains a fairly rigid distinction between liability for acts which 
cause death on the one hand, and liability for omissions which cause death on the other. This has 
significant implications for the law regarding active and passive euthanasia. In analysing the criminal 
law in relation to euthanasia, it will therefore be necessary to examine criminal liability for both acts 
and omissions which cause death. This will be dealt with in parts I and II of this chapter respectively. 
It should, however, be noted from the outset that the distinction between active and passive euthanasia 
and the underlying acts/omissions doctrine is most problematic and unsatisfactory. In the chapters 
which follow, it will be argued that this distinction is of questionable moral ~d philosophical 
significance. Further, it will be shown that this distinction is often difficult to maintain in practice. 
The practical difficulties in drawing the distinction in particular cases has been compounded by the 
1 See, for example, the findings of the Parliament of Victoria Social Development Committee, Second 
and Final Report Inquiry into Options for Dying with Dignity (1987) 43-48 (hereafter referred to as the 
Victorian Social Development Committee Report). 
10 
widespread reluctance to characterise as criminal certain conduct regularly performed in medical 
practice. Two aspects of medical practice which are highlighted in this thesis are the switching off of 
artificial life-support and the administration of pain-relieving drugs which are known to be likely to 
hasten death. It will be demonstrated in a later chapter that this tendency to avoid labelling medical 
conduct as criminal, whilst readily understandable, has resulted in serious distortions in the 
interpretation and application of the law.2 However, notwithstanding the difficulties with the 
acts/omissions distinction, for the purposes of the present discussion regarding the criminal law it is 
nevertheless necessary to adhere to this distinction as it continues to have overriding legal 
significance. 
Although there are some significant variations in the criminal law as between the various 
jurisdictions,3 the law applicable to euthanasia performed by a doctor at the request of a patient is 
fairly uniform throughout Australia. In all Australian jurisdictions, the criminal law does not 
recognise euthanasia as a special category of homicide. Liability in respect of such conduct is 
determined on the basis of the ordinary criminal law principles. As outlined in the IntrOduction to this 
thesis, euthanasia, as defined for the purposes of this study, involves the deliberate and intentional 
causing of death either by active or passive means. We are therefore dealing with intentional killing as 
distinct from death caused as a result of negligent acts and omissions. Accordingly, the relevant law is 
that pertaining to murder.4 
In order to establish liability for murder, both the actus reus and the mens rea for the crime of murder 
must be made out. The necessary mens rea or mental element for the crime of murder includes an 
intention to kill. The actus reus of a crime has been described as the external ingredients of the crimes 
or alternatively, as all the elements in the definition of the crime, except the defendant's mental 
element. 6 The actus re us for the crime of murder requires proof of particular conduct and, that as a 
matter of causation, the defendant's conduct caused the death in question. The requisite conduct of the 
defendant can be either an act, in the sense of a willed bodily movement, or an omission; i.e. non-
action or failure to act Offiissions have a different status under the criminal law than do acts. Whilst 
the duty not to actively cause harm is virtually absolute, there is no general principle of liability for 
failure to act and prevent the occurrence of harm. An omission to act which causes death will only 






See chapter N, 150-175. 
There are a number of distinct sources of homicide law in Australia; the common law which applies 
with little legislative interference in Victoria and South Australia; the Criminal Codes of the Northern 
Territory, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia (N.T. Criminal Code 1983; Qld. Criminal Code 
1899; Tas. Criminal Code 1924; W.A. Criminal Code 1913); and the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) which 
applies in New South Wales. The Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) was made applicable to the Australian 
Capital Territory (s. 6(1) of the Seat of Government Acceptance Act 1909) subject to amendment by 
Australian Capital Territory Ordinances; see, for example, Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 2) 
1990 (A.C.T.). It should be noted that at the time of writing, a review is being undertaken of the 
Queensland Criminal Code; see the First Interim Report of the Criminal Code Review Committee to the 
Attorney-General (1991). 
The law relating to manslaughter will therefore not be directly considered. 
G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed., 1983) 146. 
J.C. Smith and B. Hogan, Criminal Law (5th ed., 1983) 31. 
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The common law has traditionally been very circumspect in imposing a legal duty to prevent harm. 
Under the criminal law in all Australian jurisdictions, a duty to act only arises in certain specified 
circumstances. One of the special relationships which gives rise to a legally recognised duty to act is 
the relationship of doctor and patient, although the extent of this duty will depend on the 
circumstances of the case.7 The omission by a doctor of his or her legal duty towards a patient may 
give rise to criminal liability for murder, provided that it can be established, as a matter of causation, 
that the relevant omission was the cause of death and that the doctor intended to bring about the death 
of the patient. 8 
These key elements of Australian law with regard to euthanasia are paralleled by the criminal law in 
comparable overseas jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, upon which the Australian law is 
largely based, and the law in the United States, Canada and New Zealand.9 
PART I 
Doctors' Criminal Liability for Acts Which Cause Death 
Introduction 
In this part of the analysis, it is proposed to examine the criminal liability of a doctor in respect of a 
deliberate act of euthanasia performed at the request of the patient which results in the patient's death. 
This area of the law, involving euthanasia by affirmative conduct performed at the patient's request, 
can be stated with some certainty. In order to establish criminal liability it must be shown that there 
was some act committed by the doctor which was intended to cause death and which did in fact cause 
the patient to die at that time and in that manner. The fact that the doctor committed the acts which 
caused death at the patient's request does not exculpate a doctor from criminal liability since a person 
cannot validly consent to his or her own death. Furthermore, for the purposes of establishing criniinal 
liability for murder, the law takes no account of the motive of the doctor or the fact that the death 
may in any event have been imminent by virtue of the patient's terminal condition. There are no 





The extent of the doctor's duty and in particular, the legal effect of a patient's right to refuse treatment 
on a doctor's duty to treat is dealt with in the following chapter. 
In some circumstances, mens rea short of intention will suffice to establish liability for murder. See 
below, 28-29. 
In the United States, criminal law comes within the jurisdiction of the States, some of which rely 
predominantly on common law, whilst others have codified their criminal law. Canada has a federal 
Code; Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. In New Zealand, the relevant legislation is the Crimes Act 
1961. (Reform of this legislation has for some time now been on the agenda; see the Crimes Bill 1989 
which at the time of writing was still before the Justices Law Reform Select Committee. The New 
Zealand Government has, however, decided not to proceed with this Bill (prepared by the previous 
government) and intends to introduce its own Bill. (Verbal communication with an official from the 
New Zealand Justice Department, March 1992.) 
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The Acts 
Although the distinction between acts and omissions is fundamental in the law of homicide, there are 
no universally accepted criteria for distinguishing between them. 10 Indeed, there is considerable 
confusion and uncertainty even in defining what is meant by 'an act.• 11 Professor Glanville Williams 
is of the view that the most acceptable language is to describe an act as a 'willed bodily movement•.12 
This description is in accordance with Justice Holmes' classic definition of an act as a 'voluntary 
muscular contraction'. 13 If one proceeds on the basis that an act involves some willed bodily or 
muscular movement, l4 it is possible to identify certain conduct as clearly coming within this 
definition. In the context of medically administered active euthanasia the most obvious example of an 
act causing death is for the doctor to administer to the patient a lethal injection. 
The Intention Requirement 
In order to establish liability for the crime of murder, the relevant actus reus, (here the act causing 
death), must be accompanied by the necessary mens rea. The mental element for murder at common 
law is traditionally referred to as 'malice aforethought•.15 This term has acquired a highly technical 
meaning quite different from the ordinary popular usage of the words themselves.16 The reference to 
'malice' is particularly misleading when considered in the context of active voluntary euthanasia where 
the relevant conduct causing death is performed out of compassionate and benevolent motives. The 
term 'malice aforethought' simply describes a number of different states of mind which will satisfy the 
mens rea requirement for the crime of murder.17 Neither malice (in the sense of ill will) or 
premeditation need in fact be established. Malice aforethought at common law clearly encompasses an 
intention to kill any person. It also includes an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm. 
10 P. Skegg, 'The Termination of Life-Support Measures and the Law of Murder' (1978) 41 Mod.L.Rev. 
423, 427. 
11 See G. Hughes, 'Criminal Omissions' (1957-8) 67 Yale L.J. 590, 597 where he notes that no agreed 
juristic concept of an act exists and then goes on to discuss some of the suggested definitions. 
12 Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 147-148. 
13 O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 91. This description has, however, been subject to criticism; 
see Hughes, 597 where he argues that this definition is not very helpful for the purposes of the 
criminal law since the criminal law has never prohibited mere muscular contractions; what is needed is 
reference to muscular contractions, in certain circumstances, and with certain consequences. Note also 
the concept of 'act' in the Austinian sense, of a movement of the body consequent upon the exercise of 
the will; J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law (1920) 174. 
14 Note, however, the view of some commentators, for example, G. Fletcher, 'Prolonging Life' (1967) 42 
Wash.L.Rev. 999 that certain conduct should be classified as an omission, notwithstanding that it 
involves bodily movement. For further discussion, see chapter IV, 152-155. 
15 See the definition of murder at common law by Sir Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 47. 
16 Smith and Hogan, 291. 
17 L. Waller and C.R. Williams, Brett, Waller and Williams Criminal Law (6th ed., 1989) 143-144. 
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Similarly, under the statutory definition of murder ins. 18 of the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.)18 and 
the various Criminal Codes in Australia, the mens rea for murder includes an intention to cause death 
or grievous bodily harm.19 
Thus, in circumstances where a doctor deliberately responds to a request from a patient that he or she 
take active steps to bring about the patient's death, the necessary intention requirement for the crime 
of murder in all Australian jurisdictions will be established, since the doctor clearly intends to bring 
about the death of the patient. 
The Causation Requirement 
A fundamental component of the actus reus for the crime of murder is that the conduct of the 
defendant caused the death of the deceased. There are two distinct aspects to the legal principle of 
causation at common law; the sine qua non test and the issue of imputability.20 
First of all, it is necessary to establish that the defendant's conduct (whether an act or an omission) is 
a sine qua non of the event; that is, one must be able to say that 'but for' the occurrence of the 
antecedent factor the event would not have happened.21 This will be a question of fact in each case, 
and must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. In addition to this 'but for' 
requirement, it will also be necessary to show that the defendant's conduct is an imputable or legal 
cause of the consequence; in other words, that the defendant's conduct is sufficiently connected with 
the consequences so as to attribute to him or her legal responsibility for those consequences.22 This 
aspect of the causation test has been variously described as the direct, proximate, substantial or 
effective cause. According to Williams, these terms can be misleading and the real question is 
essentially a value judgment, whether the result can fairly be said to be imputable to the defendant.23 
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of imputable cause is a question of law for 
the determination of the court. If the court is of the opinion that there is sufficient evidence to support 
such a finding, the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence will be left to the jury.24 However, 
there are, as yet, no clear principles regarding the appropriate direction to the jury on this aspect of 
causation.25 Various formulations have been used, including that the defendant's act or omission 
I 
18 But notes. 12(1) Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 2) 1990 (A.C.T.) which has, for the purposes of 
the law in the Australian Capital Territory, modified the operation of the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.). 
19 N.T. s. 162 (refers to 'grievous harm' rather than 'grievous bodily harm'); Qld. s. 302; W.A. ss. 278 and 
279. It should be noted that in Western Australia, the intentional causing of death is defined as 'wilful 
murder' (s. 278) and all other forms of murder are defined as 'murder'. Under the Tasmanian Criminal 
Code 1924 an intention to cause grievous bodily harm will only be sufficient to establish the mens rea 
for murder if it was done for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a specific crime; see s. 
157(l)(d). 
20 Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 379-384. 
21 Id. 379. 
22 Id. 381. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Howard's Criminal Law (5th ed., 1990 by B. Fisse) 33. 
25 Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 382; Fisse, 34-35. 
14 
must have 'contributed significantly to the death•,26 or alternatively, that it must have been a 
'substantial cause of the death.'27 Whatever the formulation used, it is at least clear that the conduct 
of the defendant must not be so minute or trivial that it will be ignored under the de minimis 
principle. 28 
The common law principles in respect of causation have been incorporated into the Australian 
Criminal Codes.29 For example, s. 153(1) of the Tac;manian Criminal Code 1924 provides: 
Killing is causing the death of a person by an act or an omission but for which 
he would not have died when he did, and which is directly and immediately 
connected with his death. 
This section clearly incorporates both the common law requirements of sine qua non and 
imputability. 30 
On the basis of the foregoing principles, in circumstances where a doctor performs certain acts which 
are intended to bring about the patient's death, and the patient's death ensues some short time 
thereafter as a direct result of those acts, the legal requirements of causation are clearly made out. The 
doctor's conduct is a sine qua non of the patient's death in that 'but for' the occurrence of the act the 
patient would not have died. The doctor's conduct would also appear to be an imputable or legal cause 
of the patient's death since it is sufficiently connected with the death so as to attribute to him or her 
legal responsibility for that consequence. 
It is clear that the act of the doctor need not be the sole or indeed the main cause of death of the 
patient.31 It is enough if, as a matter of law, it is a cause which has the effect of accelerating the 
moment of the patient's death.32 Circumstances may arise where the acts committed by the doctor 
which caused the death of the patient would not have resulted in the death of a healthy person. For 
example, the administration of certain drugs may have greater effect upon a sick person in a debilitated 
state than they would upon an ordinary person. A doctor committing such acts would nevertheless be 
liable (provided the necessary mens rea is also established) since the doctor's conduct was sufficiently 
connected with the patient's death so as to hold the doctor legally responsible for that consequence.33 
26 Smithers v R (1977) 34 C.C.C. (2d) 427. 
27 R v Evans and Gardiner (No. 2) [1976] V.R. 523; Hallet v R [1969] S.A.S.R. 141, 150; R v Bingapore 
(1975) 11 S.A.S.R. 469, 480. 
28 See Smith and Hogan, 279, referring to the case of R v Cato [1976] 1 All E.R. 260, 265. For a 
discussion of the defence of minimal causation, see Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 385. 
29 N.T. s. 157; Qld. s. 293; Tas. s. 153(1); W.A. s. 270. Note also s. 222 of the Canadian Criminal Code 
1985; s. 158 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
30 See also the reference to the requirement of causation ins. 18 Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) which can be 
taken to include both the sine qua non and imputability test. 
31 Smith and Hogan, 278. 
32 R v Cato [1976] 1 All E.R. 260, 265. 
33 The separate question of the administration of pain-relieving drugs which may hasten death is dealt 
with in chapter IV, 163-175. 
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However, the doctor's contribution to the death of the patient must not be so insignificant that it 
would be ignored under the de minimis principle.34 
Irrelevance of Patient's Terminal Condition 
It may be that active euthanasia is performed in respect of a terminal patient, whose death is 
imminent from natural causes. It is, however, no defence to a charge of murder that the death was in 
any event imminent by virtue of the patient's terminal condition. This is the position both at 
common law and under the Australian Criminal Codes. 
Position at Common Law 
As Devlin stated in his work Samples of Lawmaking:35 
The deliberate acceleration of death must prima facia be murder and I do not see 
how under any system of law it can logically be otherwise. The certainty of 
death in the immediate future cannot of itself be a defence any more than the 
certainty in the remote future. 
Indeed, since death is, sooner or later, inevitable for all of mankind, every killing can be regarded as 
being simply an acceleration of an inevitable death. Consequently it will make no difference to the 
liability of the defendant that the victim was suffering from a terminal condition. Accordingly, in R v 
Dyson, 36 the defendant was indicted for the manslaughter of a young boy who had died from injuries 
the defendant had inflicted, notwithstanding the fact that the child was at the time suffering from 
meningitis from which he would have died in any event. Lord Alverston C.J. stated that: 
The proper question to have been submitted to the jury was whether the prisoner 
accelerated the child's death by the injuries which he inflicted. For if he did the 
fact that the child was already suffering from meningitis from which it would in 
any event have died before long, would afford no answer to the charge of causing 
its death.37 
The same principle bas been formulated by courts in the United States in the following terms: 
That if any life at all is left in a human body, even the least spark, the 
extinguishment of it is as much homicide as the killing of the most vital 
being.38 
The strictness of the criminal law with respect to active euthanasia is only explicable in the context 
of the common law philosophy regarding the value of human life. Strongly influenced by 
ecclesiastical teaching, the attitude of the common law has been to uphold life as sacred and 
34 Smith and Hogan, 279-280. 
35 (1962) 94-95. 
3 6 [1908) 2 K.B. 454. 
37 Id. 451. See also R v Pankotai [1961) Crim.L.R. 546; R v Morby (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 571, 575. 
38 State v Francis 152 S.C. 17 (1929). 
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inalienable.39 The strength of the common law belief in the sacredness of life is demonstrated by the 
fact that protection of the criminal law extends to all persons, even those who are already dying. 
Thus, the fact that an act of euthanasia was performed in respect of a terminally ill patient, whose 
death was in any event imminent, does not prevent liability from arising. All that needs to be shown 
is that as a result of the doctor's act, death occurred at the time and in the manner in which it did.40 It 
should be noted, however, that the condition of the patient may still be relevant, in so far that it must 
be established that the alleged criminal act and not the terminal illness from which the patient was 
suffering was, as a matter of causation, the proximate or substantial cause of death.41 Whilst the 
mere acceleration of death will suffice to establish criminal liability, it must not be so minimal or 
trivial that it will be disregarded under the de minimis principle. 42 
Position Under the Codes 
The position under the Criminal Codes in Australia regarding the condition of the patient, and the 
acceleration of an imminent death is the same as at common law. Under s. 154(d) of the Tasmanian 
Criminal Code, a person is deemed to have killed another where, by an act or omission, he or she 
hastens the death of another who is suffering under any disease or injury which would itself have 
caused death, even though his or her act or omission is not the immediate or the sole cause of death. 
Similar provisions are contained in the Codes of Queensland and Western Australia.43 The effect of 
these provisions is to restate the common law rule that the causing of death of a person will 
constitute murder regardless of that person's condition and the fact that death may in any event have 
been imminent. Although these various provisions were not drafted specifically with active euthanasia 
in mind, 44 they clearly cover cases where the death of a person has been accelerated as a result of an 
act of euthanasia Thus, a doctor who commits such an act is, by virtue of these provisions, deemed 
to have to have killed the patient for the purposes of the law of murder. 
Irrelevance of Patient's Consent . 
Generally speaking, the consent of the victim is not a defence for the purposes of the criminal law.45 
In R v Donovan46 it was held that: 
39 State v Moore 25 Iowa 128, 135-136 (1868). 
40 Fisse, 33. 
41 P. MacKinnon, 'Euthanasia and Homicide' (1983-4) 26 Crim.LQ. 483, 493. 
42 Smith and Hogan, 280. 
43 Sections 296 and 273 respectively. Note also s. 226 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985; s. 164 New 
Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
44 I. Temby, 'Euthanasia - Is It Murder?' (1988) 21 A.1.F.S. 2, 5. 
45 D. O'Connor and P.A. Fairall, Criminal Defences (1988) 92. The common law position, as outlined 
above, also applies in the A.C.T. and N.S.W. since the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) is silent on this 
matter. 
46 [1934] 2 K.B. 498. 
If an act is unlawful in the sense of being in itself a criminal act, it is plain that 
it cannot be rendered lawful because the person to whose detriment it is done 
consents to it. No person can licence another to commit a crime.47 
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Thus, the common law position regarding the effect of consent upon the question of criminal liability 
for murder is abundantly cl~ar; a person cannot lawfully consent to his or her own death.48 As was 
stated in the Scottish case of H.M. Advocate v Rutherford49 by the High Court of Justiciary in 
Scotland: 
If life is ~en under circumstances which would otherwise infer guilt of murder, 
the crime does not cease to be murder merely because the victim consented to be 
murdered, or even urged the assailant to strike the fatal blow.50 
It is clear from this passage that it makes no difference if the consent of the victim is mere co~sent, 
in the sense of acquiescence in what another proposes, or, at the other extreme, a positive direction or 
request from a person that he or she be assisted to die. 51 
Similarly, under the Criminal Codes in Australia, it is irrelevant for the purposes of determining 
criminal responsibility, that the person killed requested or consented to his or her own death. Section 
53(a) of the Tasmanian Criminal Code 1924 provides that: 
No person has a right to consent to the infliction of death upon himself and 
any consent given in contravention hereof shall have no effect as regards 
criminal responsibility. 
Equivalent provisions exist in the Codes of the other Code jurisdictions.52 
Rationale Behind the Criminal Law Prohibition on Consent to Death 
In order to evaluate the status of this criminal law principle it is important to understand the rationale 
which underlies it The authoritarian stance of t.l;le criminal law regarding consent to death is based 
47 Id. 507. See also R v McLeod (1915) 34 N.Z.L.R. 430, 433-434. 
48 R v Cato [1976) 1 All E.R. 260. The common law prohibition on consent applies not only to death, 
but also to the infliction of bodily harm; see R v Donovan [1934) 2 K.B. 498; Attorney-General's 
Reference (No. 6 of 1980) [1981) 1 Q.B. 715. The law in relation to suicide (as distinct from assisted 
suicide) is an obvious exception to the principle that one cannot consent to one's own death. See 
chapter m. 83. 
It should be noted that in some civil law jurisdictions including Germany, Norway and Switzerland, 
homicide performed at the request of the victim is treated as a lesser offence. See chapter IX, 404. 
49 [1947) J.C. 1. 
50 Ibid. Note also the American case of Turner v State 119 Tenn. 663, 671 (1908) in which it was stated 
that 'murder is no less murder because the homicide is committed at the desire of the victim. He who 
kills another upon his desire or command is, in the judgment of the law, as much a murderer as if he had 
done it merely of his own head'. 
51 For a discussion of the definitions and meaning of consent see J.G. Castel, 'Nature and Effects of 
Consent With Respect to the Right to Life and the Right to Physical and Mental Integrity in the 
Medical Field: Criminal and Private Law Aspects' (1978) 16 Alta.L.Rev. 293, 294. 
52 N.T. s. 26(3); Qld. s. 284; W.A. s. 261. Note also s. 14 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985; s. 63 of 
the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
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upon the belief that the taking of life is a wrong, not only to the person killed, but also to the entire 
society.53 In the words of Devlin: 
The reason why a man may not consent to the commission of an offence 
against himself beforehand or forgive it afterwards is because it is an offence 
against society.54 
The common law tradition has always been to uphold human life as sacred and inalienable, thereby 
securing the general protection of human life, as well as maintaining social order and promoting the 
wider interests of society as a whole. Thus, the preservation of life has been accorded priority over the 
autonomy of the individual and consequently, as a matter of public policy, the consent of the victim 
has never been recognised as a defence to a criminal homicide.55 
Thus, the fact that the patient consented to his or her own death or even instigated the request does not 
exculpate the doctor from criminal liability. Although under common law principles, a patient has the 
right to accept or reject medical treatment, 56 a patient cannot validly consent to or authorise a doctor 
to perform an act which brings about that patient's death. The special nature of the doctor/patient 
relationship does not affect the general principles regarding the irrelevance of the victim's consent. 
Irrelevance of Motive 
A doctor who responds to a patient's request that he or she take active steps to bring about the 
patient's death would almost invariably be acting out of humanitarian motives. Indeed, the motivation 
of the doctor is one of the distinguishing features of active voluntary euthanasia which, in the popular 
mind, clearly sets it apart from more reprehensible forms of killing.57 Notwithstanding this 
seemingly obvious difference between active voluntary euthanasia and other forms of killing, the 
compassionate motive of a doctor does not protect him or her from criminal liability for murder. 
Furthermore, irrespective of the special nature of the doctor/patient relationship, it would be irrelevant 
that the acts causing death were deliberately performed by a doctor in the course of medical practice. 58 
53 See the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioural Research, Deciding to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment (1983) 33. (Cited hereafter as the 
President's Commission Report.) See also Mclnnemey J. in Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd [1976] 1 V.R. 
331, 340 where, after noting the case of R v Donovan [1934] K.B. 498 (involving charges of common 
and indecent assault arising from the accused having beaten a girl for his sexual pleasure), his Honour 
commented on the philosophy underlying the common law; 'It injures society if a person is allowed to 
consent to the infliction on himself of such a degree of serious physical harm.' See generally Castel. 
54 P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1965) 6. 
55 Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 576-577. 
56 In Victoria, South Australia and the Northern Territory, and in many of the United States jurisdictions, 
patients also have a statutory right to refuse treatment in some circumstances. For discussion, see 
chapter VII, 294-311, 326-337. 
57 W. Baugham, J. Bruha and F. Gould, 'Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative 
Considerations' (1973) 48 Notre Dame Law. 1202, 1205. 
58 P. Skegg, Law Ethics and Medicine (1984) 130 where he refers to the judgments of Devlin J. in R v 
Adams (unreported) (1957). See H. Palmer, Dr Adams' Trial for Murder' (1957) Crim.L.Rev. 365; 
Farquharson J. in R v Arthur (unreported) The Times, 6 Nov. 1981. 
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Under general criminal law principles, a sharp distinction is made between motive and intention. 
Whilst the issue of intention is clearly central to the requirement of mens rea, both at common law59 
and under the Codes, 60 motive is quite irrelevant for the purposes of establishing criminal liability. 61 
It should, however, be noted that although motive is irrelevant to the question of criminal liability, it 
may be relevant with respect to sentencing once liability is found to be established. 62 
PART II 
Doctors' Criminal Liability for Omissions Which Cause Death 
Introduction 
It is widely believed that there is an important moral and practical difference between active and 
passive euthanasia; between 'killing' and 'letting die,'63 and it is often assumed that this distinction 
has legal significance as well. The word 'killing' clearly implies some active involvement with the 
death of the patient, whilst 'letting die' is regarded as simply letting nature take its course without any 
involvement of the medical profession in the death of the patient. Although this distinction between 
killing and letting die has gained widespread usage and appears to have had a significant influence on 
medical practice, it is not necessarily a valid distinction for legal purposes. The reality of the matter is 
that q1ses of 'letting die' by withholding or withdrawing treatment may well give rise to criminal 
liability. However, in contrast to the area of euthanasia by affirmative acts (active euthanasia), the law 
regarding euthanasia by omission (passive euthanasia) is shrouded in unnecessary confusion and 
uncertainty. 
In this part of the analysis, it is proposed to examine the criminal law principles with respect to 
murder as they apply to the deliberate omission of medical treatment by a doctor which results in the 
death of a patient. The object of this exercise is to demonstrate that most of the ingredients for 
criminal liability for murder can be made out in circumstances where a doctor performs passive 
59 See Lord Hailsham in Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975) A.C. 55, 73 for a discussion of 
the distinction between intention and motive. The common law position, as outlined above, also 
applies in the A.C.T. and N.S.W. since the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) is silent on this matter. 
Compare the common law position with that of some European criminal law systems, for example 
Germany and Switzerland, where motive is a crucial factor in determining the culpability of an accused. 
See chapter IX, 404. 
60 Qld. s 23; Tas. s. 13(4); W.A. 23. 
61 Note, however, the position in some civil law jurisdictions where the motive of the accused is taken 
into account in determining criminal liability. See H. Silving, 'Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative 
Criminal Law' (1954) 103 U.Pa.LRev. 350. 
62 This, in tum, depends on whether any sentencing discretion is vested in the courts. Whilst in most 
Australian jurisdictions, life imprisonment is mandatory for murder, in New South Wales, Victoria and 
the Australian Capital Territory, the sentence is discretionary; s. 19 Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) (as 
amended in 1982); s. 3 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic.) (as amended in 1986). In the Australian Capital 
Territory, the position is governed by s.442(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) as amended by s. 23 
of Ordinance No. 11 of 1963. For an interpretation of this provision see R v Wheeldon [No.l] 1978 33 
F.L.R. 402. 
63 For consideration of the contrary view, see chapter V, 181-183. 
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euthanasia; i.e. if a doctor deliberately omits life-sustaining treatment which he or she is under a legal 
duty to provide, with the object of facilitating the death of the patient, and the patient dies as a result. 
In tum, the fact that the conduct of doctors in withholding or withdrawing treatment could, potentially 
at least, be subject to criminal liability for murder highlights the necessity of closely examining the 
precise scope of the doctors duty towards his or her patient and the legal effect of a patient's right to 
refuse treatment on the doctor's duty to treat. This will be the subject of separate consideration in the 
chapter which follows. 
The Omission 
As noted earlier, the actus reus for the crime of murder can be either an act or an omission. As 
generally understood, an 'omission' involves non-performance or inaction in circumstances in which a 
person knows he or she has the ability and opportunity to act so as to prevent a particular result, but 
refrains from doing so. 64 In the medical context, this would involve the deliberate omission of 
medically indicated treatment which is reasonably available, 65 and the administration of which would 
have prevented the patient from dying at that time and in that manner.66 
Attitude of the Law to Omissions and the Duty Requirement 
Under criminal law principles, a fairly strict distinction bas been drawn between liability for acts 
which cause death, and liability for omissions which cause death. Acts which cause death are almost 
always wrongful, and will attract criminal liability for murder if they are accompanied by the 
necessary mens rea for the crime of murder. However, liability for omissions is exceptional. An 
omission to act which results in death, and accompanied by the necessary mens rea will only give rise 
to criminal liability in those specified circumstances where the criminal law imposes a legal duty to 
act 
In contrast to the common law's expansive approach to positive acts of harm, there has traditionally 
been a reluctance to impose criminal liability for omissions to prevent harm. 67 It has been suggested 
that the basis of this distinction between acts and omissions is to be found in the belief that the 
function of the criminal law was the prevention of positive harm, and that encouragement of good 
deeds should be left to public opinion, morality and religion. 68 In addition, a number of practical 
reasons have been put forward to explain the differential approach of the common law to acts and 
64 President's Commission Report, 65. 
65 Consideration of the allocation of scarce resources is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
66 As previously noted, there is an ongoing debate as to whether some forms of discontinuation of 
treatment (such as the removal of artificial life-support) which involve active interventions should be 
classified as an 'act' or an 'omission'. This fundamental question is dealt with in chapter IV, 150-163. 
67 For a critical analysis of the conventional view with respect to liability for omissions, see A. 
Ashworth, 'The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions' (1989) 105 Law Q.Rev. 424. 
68 Smith and Hogan, 43. 
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omissions. First of all, there are very real difficulties in attributing blame for omissions as distinct 
from acts. If there is an act, someone acts, but if there is an omission, everyone (in a sense) omits.69 
The difficulty is that in the case of omissions, there are too many potential candidates for liability.70 
Consequently, there has been a natural tendency to accord criminal responsibility only in 
circumstances where there is some special relationship or situation of control which is seen as giving 
rise to a legal obligation to act to prevent harm. Second, as Williams points out, it is harder for the 
general public to learn and remember a law about hannful omissions than it is to learn and remember 
a law about harmful acts.11 Whilst ordinary persons Can readily understand that they are required not 
to cause harm to others, they will rarely properly comprehend the circumstances in which they must 
aid others. 
Another, more substantive, explanation for the reluctance of the common law to impose liability for 
an omission to act is that the imposition of a duty to act is an interference with the liberty of a 
person who wishes only to mind his or her own business and let others get on with minding theirs.12 
Whilst most people are capable of refraining from causing harm, the prevention of harm is likely to 
be more demanding. This point is well made by Williams, when he expresses the view that: 
You can refrain from doing something simply by refraining; but you cannot 
perform a duty to act without, often, going to considerable trouble, 
inconvenience, expense and perhaps even danger.73 
It has also been argued that omissions do not cause evil results in the same obvious sense that acts 
do.74 The reasoning employed here is that since the defendant does nothing, the evil result would 
necessarily occur in precisely the same way if, at the moment of the alleged omission, the defendant 
did not exist.75 This causation issue, and the attitude of the common law regarding omissions 
generally, is well illustrated in the oft cited example found in Stephen's Digest of the Criminal 
Law16 of the passer-by who sees a child drowning in a shallow pool. The passer-by could easily save 
the child without risk to himself, but allows the child to drown. At common law he commits no 
offence since he did not drown the child. If he had not come along the child would have drowned in 
just the same way. 
Thus, because of the special nature of omissions to prevent harm, the common law has rarely 
imposed criminal liability in respect of such conduct, and a duty to act will only arise in certain 
defined circumstances. A similar position has been adopted in those jurisdictions where the criminal 
law has been codified. Under the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.), liability for murder as a result of an 
69 Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 148. See also Fletcher, 1009-1010. 
10 Fletcher, 1009-1010. 
71 G. Williams, 'What Should the Code do About Omissions?' (1987) 7 Legal Stud. 92, 93. 
72 J.C. Smith, 'Liability for Omissions in the Criminal Law' (1984) 4 Legal Stud. 88. See also Ashworth, 
427-429. 
73 Williams, 'What Should the Code do About Omissions?,' 93. 
14 Smith, 88; B. Hogan, 'Omissions and the Duty Myth' in P. Smith, (ed.) Criminal Law (1987) 85. 
75 Smith, 88. 
16 (5th ed., 1894) Article 212. 
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omission will only lie where, in accordance with basic common law principles governing criminal 
liability in respect of an omission, the defendant was under a legal duty 77 to act to prevent death, and 
omitted to do so, whilst concurrently possessing the necessary mens rea. It is also clear from the 
statutory scheme under the Australian Criminal Codes that criminal liability for an omission to act 
will not be established in the absence of a legal duty to act. 78 Each of the Codes specifies the duties 
of care to which one must conform in the preservation of human life79 and imposes criminal liability 
for the consequences to life or health of an omission to perform those duties.so At both common law 
and under the Codes, where a duty to act can be established, the omission of that duty by a person 
obligated to act bas the same effect in law as an act that produced the same result. 81 
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that in all Australian jurisdictions, criminal liability for 
omissions will only be established in circumstances where there is a pre-existing legal duty to act. It 
is therefore necessary to examine the circumstances in ".-Vhicb a legal duty to act can be established. 
The Imposition of a Legal Duty to Act 
As a result of the law's cautious attitude to omissions there bas been a marked reluctance to impose 
legal duties, breach of which give rise to criminal liability. The law bas generally required the 
existence of some kind of special relationship between the parties before a duty to act arises.82 One 
such special relationship which bas been held to give rise to a legally recognised duty to act is that of 
doctor and patient. The relationship between doctor and patient is basically contractual, arising from 
an offer and acceptance. 83 The contract may arise as a result of an express agreement, or, more 
usually, it may be implied from the conduct or circumstances of the parties. A prospective patient 
may come to the doctor, seeking to obtain the doctor's services. The doctor is then free to either 
accept or reject the patient's offer. 84 If the offer is accepted, a contract comes into existence and the 
law imposes a duty on the doctor to continue treatment as long as the case requires, in the absence of 
77 P. Gillies, Criminal lAw (2nd ed., 1990) 598. 
78 J.M. Herlihy and R.G. Kenny, An Introduction to Criminal lAw in Queensland and Western Australia 
(3rd ed., 1990) 177. 
79 N.T. ss. 149-153; Qld. ss. 285- 290; Tas. ss. 144-151, 156(2)(b); W.A. ss. 262-267. 
80 N.T. s. 153; Qld. ss. 285-290; Tas. s. 152; W.A. ss. 262-267. (Note, however, that the duty 
provisions in the various Australian Criminal Codes do not in themselves create offences; see Herlihy 
and Kenny, 89.) Note also ss. 215-218 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985; ss. 151-157 of the New 
Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
81 Skegg, 'The Termination of Life-Support Measures and the Law of Murder,' 424 and the President's 
Commission Report, 34. 
82 Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 150. 
83 I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, Medical Law (1989) 129. Note, however, their view that the relationship 
between doctor and patient within the National Health Service is probably not contractual in nature 
because there is a statutory duty to provide services; Kennedy and Grubb, 98. 
In circumstances where a patient enters a hospital, the patient contracts with both the hospital and the 
treating doctor. In countries which have a national health care scheme and the patient does not actually 
have to pay for health care, questions may arise regarding the legal requirement of consideration. It is 
arguable, however, that simply submitting to treatment is a sufficient detriment which could serve as 
consideration; see E. Picard, Legal Liability of Doctors and Hospitals in Canada (2nd ed., 1984) 32. 
84 A doctor is not obliged to treat all comers; see Baugham, Bruha and Gould, 1207 and reference to the 
case of Findlay v Board of Supervisors 72 Ariz. 58 (1951). 
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an agreement to the contrary. 85 A doctor cannot abandon his or her patient by purporting to terminate 
the contractual relationship without allowing the patient to make alternative arrangements.86 Even in 
the absence of a contractual duty to provide medical care, a duty may yet arise if it can be established 
that the doctor has voluntarily assumed or undertaken the care of a patient. 87 Once a duty situation is 
found to be in existence as in the case of the doctor/patient relationship, the various legal duties 
which exist at common law and in Code jurisdictions come into play. In all Australian jurisdictions, 
there are a two legal duties which may be of particular relevance to the liability of a doctor for 
withholding or withdrawing treatment; the duty to provide the 'necessaries of life', and the duty to do 
acts undertaken, the omission of which would be dangerous to human life. 88 Consideration will now 
be given to these two legal duties. 
The Duty to Provide the Necessaries of Life 
The duty to provide the necessaries of life exists ~th at common law and under the Australian 
Criminal Codes. 89 The law imposes a duty to provide necessaries in circumstances where a person 
has charge of another who is unable to provide him or herself with the necessaries of life by reason of 
some infirmity or condition, for example, due to age, sickness or unsoundness of mind. Under s. 146 
of the Tasmanian Code, necessaries of life are specified to include medical and surgical aid and 
medicine. Whilst no equivalent provision exists in the Queensland, Western Australian or Northern 
Territory Codes, the courts have interpreted necessaries of life to include medical aid and treatment for 
the purpose of establishing liability under the Codes.90 A similar view has been taken at common 
law.91 There has, however, been no exhaustive statement, either at common law or for the purposes 
of the Codes of the meaning of the phrase 'necessaries of life' and the kinds of medical treatment that 
it covers. It is, for example, not clear whether the duty to provide the necessaries of life would 
automatically extend to all forms of artificial life-support such as respirators, dialysis and artificial 
nutrition and hydration. One view, which has considerable merit, is that th_e scope of the doctor's duty 
would depend on the circumstances of the case and on the question whether the failure to provide 
medical treatment was reasonable in the circumstances.92 
85 Baugham, Bruha and Gould, 1207 referring to the case of Ricks v Budge 64 P. 2d 208, 211 (1937). 
86 Baugham, Bruha and Gould, 1208 citing Murray v United States 329 F. 2d 270, 272 (1964). 
87 For example, R v lnstan [1893] 1 Q.B. 450; R v Stone [1911] 1 Q.B. 354. Note, however, the view of 
H. Beynon, 'Doctors as Murderers' (1982) Crim.L.Rev. 17, 24-25 that this category does not 
encompass doctors since the cases in support of it either concerned relatives or persons having some 
financial incentive for providing services. 
88 Note also the potential relevance of the additional duties contained in the Northern Territory Criminal 
Code; see ss. 154-155. 
89 N.T s. 149; Qld. s. 285; Tas. s. 144; W. A. s. 262. Note also s. 215 of the Canadian Criminal Code 
1985; s. 151 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. · 
90 R v McDonald [1904] St. R. Qd. 151. (The common law duties continue to be relevant in New South 
Wales and the Australian Capital Territory for the purposes of liability for murder by omission under 
the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.).) 
91 R v Brooks (1902) 5 C.C.C. 372; Oakey v Jackson [1914] 1 K.B. 216. 
92 For example, P. Macfarlane, 'Death and Dying,' paper presented at the Australian Medico-Legal 
Conference, 22 Sept. (1990) 9. Note also B. Dickens, 'The Right to Natural Death' (1981) 26 McGill 
L.J. 847, 871; P. Gerber and A. Vasta, 'Criminal Law' (1984) 58 A.L.J. 291, 295. This was the view 
taken in a recent New Zealand case involving a patient who had virtually no brain function (although 
not actually brain dead) and who ventilator dependent. Justice Thomas of the Auckland High Court, in 
interpreting s.151 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961, said that the question whether a ventilator 
should be regarded as a necessary of life must depend on the facts of each case. Thus, it may be regarded 
as a necessary of life where it is required to prevent, cure or alleviate a disease that endangers the health 
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Before the duty to provide a patient with medical treatment and other necessaries of life can arise, the 
doctor must 'have charge' of the patient. Whether a person has charge of another is a question of fact. 
A patient may be under a doctor's charge as a result of a contract or some other relationship. Thus, 
doctors, who have contracted to care for someone who is helpless by reason of age or illness, have a 
duty to provide that person with necessary medical treatment. Alternatively, in the absence of 
contract, if a doctor has otherwise undertaken the care of a patient, the law imposes an obligation to 
provide that patient with necessary medical treatment. 
Where a doctor is under a legal duty to provide a patient with the necessaries of life including medical 
treatment, the doctor will be held criminally liable for any consequences which result to the life or 
health of the patient by reason of the doctor's omission to perform that duty, provided the requisite 
mens rea is established. 93 If a patient dies as a result of the doctor's deliberate breach of that duty, the 
doctor could be charged with murder at common law and under the Codes. 
The Duty to Do Acts Undertaken 
Both at common law and under the Codes, a duty is imposed to do acts undertaken, the omission of 
which may be dangerous to human life. The relevant provision in the Queensland and W estem 
Australian Criminal Codes reads as follows: 
When a person undertakes to do any act the omission to do which is or may be 
dangerous to human life or health, it is his duty to do that act and be is held to 
have caused any consequences which result to the life or health of any person 
by reason of any omission to perform that duty.94 
Although the duty under the Codes is similar to that imposed at common law, it is slightly wider in 
that it extends to acts undertaken, the omission of which may be dangerous to human life or health .. 
whereas the common law duty is restricted to acts which may be dangerous to human life. The duty to 
do acts undertaken clearly applies to a medical practitioner who has undertaken to provide treatment, 
or life of the patient. If, however, the patient is surviving only by the mechanical means the provision 
of a ventilator cannot properly be construed as a necessary of life. In Mr L's case there was no prospect 
of improvement and Justice Thomas held that in these circumstances, it served no purpose and could 
not properly be regarded as a necessary of life; New Zealand Herald 28 Aug. 1992. 
Some indirect support for this view can also be gleaned from the Canadian case of Nancy B. v Hotel-
Dieu de Quebec et al 69 C.C.C. (3d) (1992) 450, 458. Although essentially a civil case concerning the 
right of a competent patient to direct that a life-sustaining respirator be removed, the Quebec Superior 
Court also examined the criminal law implications of a doctor's compliance with the patient's request. 
In examining the relevant sections of the Canadian Criminal Code the court was of the view that s. 217 
(dealing with the duty of persons undertaking acts) potentially applied. No reference was made to s. 
215 dealing with the duty to provide necessaries of life. This could be taken to suggest that the court 
did not think that the provision of artificial life-support was a 'necessary of life'. For further discussion 
see chap II, 78-79. 
93 For the position under the Codes, see N.T. s. 153; Qld. s. 285; Tas. s. 152; W.A. s. 262. Note also s. 
215 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985; s. 151 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
94 Qld. s. 290; W.A. s. 267. The provisions in the Codes of other Australian jurisdictions are in similar 
terms; N.T. s. 152; Tas. ss. 151 and 152. Note also s. 217 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985; s. 157 
of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
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(for example, artificial life-support) the omission of which would be dangerous to the life or health of 
the patient.95 
The Causation Requirement 
As we have seen, a doctor may be liable under the criminal law not only for his or her actc; which 
result in death, but also for omissions, in circumstances where there was a duty to act. For the 
purposes of the present discussion it will be assumed that the doctor was under a duty to provide 
treabnent to the patient, and his or her failure to do so was accompanied by the requisite mens rea for 
the crime of murder. In addition to these elements, in order for criminal liability for murder to be 
established against the doctor, it will also be necessary to prove that the failure to provide treabnent 
was causually connected with the death of the patient. In the majority of homicide cases, there is little 
doubt as to the cause of death of the victim, and consequently, the issue of causation does not 
specifically arise.96 Occasionally, however, difficult problems of causation do occur and one 
particular area where this issue may gain prominence is in the context of omissions. 
Omissions as a Cause of Death 
An initial objection may be raised that an omission cannot in any real sense be a cause of death.97 
Since the person has simply omitted to act, the death would have occurred in precisely the same way 
if, at the moment of the alleged omission, he or she did not exist.98 On this view, the death can 
readily be attributed to factors other than the non-intervention of the person omitting to act. Thus, in 
the medical context, where certain treabnent or procedures have been withheld or withdrawn from a 
terminally ill patient, it is easy to attribute the cause of death to the underlying condition or disease of 
the patient rather than the failure of the doctor to intervene.99 However, as Williams observes, 
whatever the philosophical view may be, the courts certainly assume and must assume that an 
omission can be a cause of death. Whilst it may be easier to find the causation requirement established 
in a simation where a doctor has taken active steps to kill his or her patient, circumstances can be 
readily envisaged where the death of the patient was clearly caused by the omission of the doctor to 
provide necessary treabnent. Take, for instance, a situation where an otherwise healthy patient, who 
desired treatment, dies from untreated pneumonia. In these circumstances, the doctor's failure to 
provide the necessary treabnent could fairly be taken to have caused the death of the patient. loo 
95 This proposition is supported by the Canadian case of Nancy B. v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec et al 69 C.C.C. 
(3d) (1992) 450; see above, n. 92. 
96 Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 379-380, Fisse, 30. 
97 For example, Fletcher, where he develops the argument that in certain circumstances, an omission 
which involves the interruption of life-sustaining therapy, such as turning off a mechanical respirator, 
is not a cause of death. See also Smith, 88; Hogan, 85-91. 
98 Smith, 88. 
99 See the discussion in the President's Commission Report, 68-70 where it is pointed out that the 
identification of the cause of death inevitably involves a normative question of attributing 
responsibility. In circumstances where a patient dies following non-treatment, the designation of the 
patient's underlying disease as the cause of death indicates not only that a fatal disease process was 
present, but also communicates acceptance of the doctor's conduct in forgoing treatment. 
100 Id. 69-70. 
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Omissions to Provide Treatment Resulting in the Death of the Patient 
As was noted earlier, both at common law and under the Codes, there are two distinct aspects to the 
legal principle of causation; the sine qua non test and the issue of imputability .101 Under the sine qua 
non or 'but for' test, it is necessary to establish that, as a matter of fact, the doctor's conduct caused 
the death of the patient although it need not be the sole or the main cause of death. 102 This will be a 
question of fact in each case, and must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. As 
Williams comments, the application of the usual burden of proof to the issue of causation is of 
considerable practical importance in the case of omissions103 and often results in unsuccessful 
prosecutions.104 Thus, it would have to be shown beyond reasonable doubt that, had the doctor not 
withheld or withdrawn treatment, the patient would not have died at that time and in that way. From a 
practical point of view, it may be difficult to determine the factual cause of the patient's death with 
any accuracy. In some instances, it will be relatively easy to establish that the cause of the patient 
dying, at that time and in that manner, was due to the withholding or withdrawing of treatment; for 
example, a diabetic patient requiring insulin or an accident victim requiring a blood transfusion. 
However, in the context of terminally ill patients who are in any event close to death, difficulties may 
arise in establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the ~ath was due to the omission and not the 
patient's underlying condition.105 
In addition to the sine qua non test it will also be necessary to show that the doctor's conduct was an 
imputable or legal cause of the patient's death. The imputable cause component of the causation test 
is by its nature, incapable of strictly objective assessment. Essentially it involves determination of 
whether the doctor's conduct is sufficiently connected with the death of the patient so as to attribute to 
him or her legal responsibility for that death. In circumstances where a patient has died following 
non-treatment, the court will need to weigh up the factors leading to the death of the patient to 
determine the significance of the doctor's contribution in withdrawing treatment, and whether legal 
responsibility for the death should, as a matter of law, be attributed to the doctor. Whilst the 
involvement in the cause of death need not be substantial to render a defendant guilty of murder, 1<>6 a 
very minimal or trivial contribution to the cause of death may be ignored under the de minimus 
principle.107 The court may find that although the withholding or withdrawal of treatment 
contributed to the patient dying at that time and in that manner, the contribution was so minimal or 
negligible in light of the patient's terminal condition that it should be disregarded. Whether there is 
101 See above, 13. 
102 Smith and Hogan, 278. 
103 Textbook of Criminal Law, 380. 
104 See Hughes, 627-631 for criticism of this rule on the ground that it is inappropriate in the case of 
homicide by omission, because it allows too easy a let-out for the accused. 
105 Williams, 'What Should the Code do About Omissions?' 106 where he notes that doctors will often 
testify that their ministrations would probably have saved the sufferer, but are unlikely to swear that 
they could, beyond reasonable doubt, have saved him. 
For a case law example of difficulties which may be encountered in establishing causation, see R v 
Arthur (unreported) The Times, 6 Nov. 1981. 
106 R v Cato [1976] 1 All E.R. 260, 265-266. 
107 See above, 14. 
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sufficient evidence to support a finding of imputable cause is a question of law for the determination 
of the court. Ultimately, it remains a value judgment whether the result can fairly be said to be 
imputable to the defendant.108 If the court is of the opinion that there is sufficient evidence to 
support such a finding, the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence will be left to the jury.109 
A number of criminal law cases involving the withdrawal of treatment from victims of assault 
suggest that the courts may be reluctant to attribute the death of a patient to the conduct of the 
doctor.110 In these cases the courts have held that the discontinuance of life-support from a brain-
damaged assault victim does not break the chain of causation between the initial injury and the death 
and therefore did not constitute the relevant cause of death. These cases lend support to the view that 
withholding treatment is sometimes a sound medical decision and in some circumstances will not 
constitute a cause of death.111 
Special note should also be made of the position in South Australia pursuant to the Natural Death 
Act 1983 (S.A.). Although the principal object of this legislation is to give effect to the written 
directions of a patient that he or she does not wish to receive certain medical treatment if he or she 
becomes terminally ill, 112 the exculpation provision contained in the Act has a potentially much 
wider application. Section 6(1) provides that: 
For the purposes of the law of this State, the non-application of extraordinary 
measures to, or the withdrawal of extraordinary measures from, a person 
suffering from a terminal illness does not constitute a cause of death. 
The effect of this section would be to allow a doctor to withhold or withdraw extraordinary measures 
from a patient who is terminally ill, irrespective of whether or not the patient has executed an advance 
directive under the legislation. If the patient subsequently dies, the illness, and not the withholding or 
withdrawal of treatment, would constitute the relevant cause of death.113 Significantly, the Northern 
Territory Natural Death Act 1988, which is largely modelled on the South Australian legislation does 
not contain such an expansive provision.114 
108 See above, 13. 
109 Fisse, 33. 
110 See, for example R v Malcherek [1981] l W.L.R. 690; R v Kinash [1982] Qd.R. 648; and the 
discussion in Z. Lipman, 'The Criminal Liability of Medical Practitioners for Withholding Treatment 
from Severely Defective Newborn Infants' (1986) 60 A.L.J. 286, 289. 
111 Lipman, 289. 
112 See chapter VII, 294-297. 
113 For an analysis of this provision, see D. Lanham and B. Fehlberg, 'Living Wills and the Right to Die 
With Dignity' (1991) 18 Melbourne U.L.Rev. 329, 348-349. 
114 See s. 6(1) Natural Death Act 1988 (N.T.) which makes it clear that the scope of the provision is 
limited to circumstances where the non-application or withdrawal of extraordinary measures was as a 
result of and in accordance with the patient's direction, made under the legislation. 
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Mens Rea for the Crime of Murder 
In order to establish criminal liability for murder by omission, the actus reus for that crime, (the 
failure to perform a legal duty which causes the death of the victim,) must be accompanied by the 
requisite mens rea for the crime of murder. It is therefore necessary to consider the mens rea for the 
crime of murder and its application in circumstances in which a doctor omits to provide medical 
treatment and the patient dies as a result.115 As a result of certain differences in the law regarding the 
mens rea for murder as between common law and Code jurisdictions, separate consideration will be 
given to the law in these respective jurisdictions. 
Common Law Position 
The common law position regarding the mental element for murder in Australia has been 
unequivocally stated by the High Court in R v Crabbe.116 The requisite mental element can be 
established by evidence of either an intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm or, in the 
absence of actual intention, knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was the probable or likely 
consequence of that conduct. l 17 The High Court was of the view that this conclusion regarding the 
mental element for murder was not only supported by the preponderance of authority but was also 
sound in principle.118 A person who does an act knowing that death or grievous bodily harm is a 
probable or likely consequence, can be regarded for the purposes of the criminai law as just as 
blameworthy as a person who does an act intending those consequences to occur.119 
In the medical context, it is not difficult to accept the possibility that a doctor may omit certain 
treatment with the intention of causing the death of the patient so as to relieve the patient of 
prolonged suffering. However, it may appear incongruous to suggest that a bona jide doctor could 
intend to cause a patient grievous bodily harm by his or her omission. As unlikely as it may seem, 
this possibility cannot be ruled out. It is conceivable that certain treatment may be withheld or 
withdrawn with the intention of not actually causing the death of the patient, but of diminishing the 
patient's defences, and thereby leaving the patient more susceptible to the process of death. 
On the basis of the principles propounded by the High Court in R v Crabbe, it would appear that the 
prosecution would have little difficulty in establishing the necessary mental element for murder in 
respect of a doctor who has deliberately withheld or withdrawn life-sustaining medical treatment from 
115 It should be noted that even if the necessary intention for the crime of murder cannot be established, a 
doctor may still face charges of criminal negligence. However, as noted earlier, this thesis is 
concerned with conduct deliberately undertaken at the request of a patient. Consideration of the law 
with regard to manslaughter is therefore beyond its scope. 
116 (1985) 58 A.L.R. 417. 
117 Id. 421. As the mental element for murder under the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) mirrors the position at 
common law the following discussion is also relevant for the purposes of New South Wales. See also 
s. 12(1) Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 2) 1990 (A.C.T.) which bas, for the purposes of the law 
in the Australian Capital Territory, modified the operation of the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.). 
118 Id. 420. 
119 Ibid. 
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a patient. The acceleration of the patient's death would generally be the intended result, or if not 
intended, certainly death or grievous bodily ruum would be within the (actual) knowledge of the doctor 
as the probable or likely result of the withholding or withdrawing of medical treatment. Further, note 
should be taken of an obiter statement in Crabbe's case that knowledge of a possible (as distinct from 
probable) result might be enough to establish murder if the act is done with the intention and for the 
sole purpose of creating a risk of death or grievous bodily harm.120 It has been suggested that this 
situation could be applicable to doctors who cease treatment, since the reason for withdrawing or 
withholding treatment may be to create a situation in which the patient may die more quickly and 
with less suffering.121 
Position Under the Codes 
As outlined earlier, in all Australian Code jurisdictions, the mental element for murder includes an 
intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm.122 Accordingly, if there is evidence that the doctor 
actually intended to cause the death of the patient or cause the patient grievous bodily harm by the 
withholding or withdrawing of medical treatment, the mens rea for murder could readily be 
established. In most of the Australian Criminal Codes, there is no provision corresponding to the 
common law category of knowledge or foreseeability that death or grievous bodily harm is a probable 
or likely consequence.123 The relevant provisions refer only to an intention to cause death or 
grievous bodily harm.124 However, where there is evidence that the doctor knew that death or 
grievous bodily harm was a probable or likely consequence of the withholding or withdrawing of 
treatment, it would not be difficult to find that the doctor actually intended that result 125 
Of all the Australian Criminal Codes, the Tasmanian Code provision with regard to the mental 
element for murder most closely approximates the common law. Under s. 157(1)(b) of the Tasmanian 
Criminal Code 1924, in addition to the intentional causing of death, the mens rea for murder can be 
established in circumstances where the defendant intended to cause bodily harm which he or she knew 
to be likely to cause death in the circumstances. The High Court has interpreted the phrase 'knew to 
be likely to cause death' as being synonymous with knowledge of the probability that death would 
result.126 To this extent, this provision of the Tasmanian Code is equivalent to the common law 
position as expounded by the High Court in R v Crabbe. The Tasmanian provision is, however, 
narrower than the common law by virtue of the requirement under s. 157(1)(b) that the offender must 
intend to cause bodily harm to the person killed. Thus, in the medical context, if a doctor, in breach 
of his or her legal duty, omits to provide life-sustaining medical treatment intending to cause bodily 
120 Id. 420-421. 
121 D. Mortimer, 'Criminal Responsibility for Cessation of Medical Treatment' (unpublished Honours 
thesis, Law Library, Monash University, 1986) 26. 
122 See above, 12. Grievous bodily harm is defined in the Codes; for example in s. 1 of the Tasmanian 
Criminal Code, it is defined as 'any bodily injury of such a nature as to endanger or be likely to 
endanger life, or to cause or be likely to cause serious injury to health'. 
123 The only exception is the Tasmanian Criminal Code discussed below. 
124 For example, N.T. s. 162; Qld. s. 302; W.A. s. 279. 
125 R v Wilmot [1985] 2 Qd. R. 413, 418. 
126 Baughey v R (1986) 65 A.L.R. 609. 
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harm which he or she knew to be likely to cause death, the necessary mens rea for murder will be 
established under the criminal law as applying in Tasmania. 
Irrelevance of Motive and the Terminal Condition of the Patient. 
As was observed during the earlier discussion regarding the criminal liability of doctors for acts which 
cause the death of the patient, provided the necessary mens rea for the crime of murder is established, 
the motive of the doctor is irrelevant Thus, if the doctor's omission to provide a patient with medical 
treatment involves the actus reus and mens rea for murder, it will be irrelevant to the question of 
liability that the doctor acted out of compassionate and bona fide motives. Further, the fact that the 
patient in respect of whom treatment was withheld or withdrawn was in a terminal condition, and 
would in any event have soon died, does not alter the criminal liability of the doctor. Any acceleration 
of death will suffice, provided only that it is not so minimal or trivial as to be disregarded under the de 
minimus principle. 
Conclusion 
The object of this chapter has been to examine the present state of the criminal law regarding the 
practice of active and passive euthanasia in Australia with the aim of ascertaining the potential 
liability of doctors for participation in these practices. 
It has been demonstrated that the practice of active euthanasia, even where performed at the request of 
a patient, constitutes murder. If a doctor, at the request of his or her patient, performs an act which 
causes death, the doctor is potentially liable for murder. For the purposes of establishing criminal 
liability for acts causing death, no account is taken of the special nature of the doctor/patient 
relationship, the fact that ihe acts causing death were performed at the request of the patient, or that 
they were performed by a doctor acting bonafida, out of the highest motives. Moreover, the fact that 
the patient was in a terminal condition and death was in any event imminent would also be irrelevant. 
It has also been shown that passive euthanasia may attract criminal liability. As a result of the special 
duty owed by doctors to their patients, a doctor who deliberately withholds or withdraws treatment 
from a patient with the intention of facilitating the patient's death or in the knowledge that this would 
probably result, is potentially liable for murder if the patient's death in fact results from that 
omission. Whether or not a doctor is liable in these circumstances will depend on the scope of the 
doctor's duty to his or her patient. It is to this question which attention must now turn. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PATIENT'S RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT 
lntroductjon 
The analysis in the foregoing chapter of a doctor's potential liability for passive euthanasia has been 
predicated on the premise that a doctor is, in certain circumstances, under a legal duty to provide 
treatment to his or her patient. As was previously emphasised, an omission to act which results in 
death will only give rise to criminal liability in circumstances where there is a legal duty to act. 
Crucial therefore to the question of a doctor's criminal liability for passive euthanasia is the scope of 
the doctor's duty to his or her patient. For the purposes of this thesis, particular attention will be 
focussed on the legal effect of a patient's refusal of treatment upon the doctor's duty to provide 
treatment. 
As was demonstrated in chapter I, both at common law1 and under the Codes, doctors are, in certain 
circumstances, under a legal duty to provide their patients with medical treatment and the failure to do 
so may be a culpable omission for the purposes of the criminal law. 2 If a patient dies as a result of 
the doctor's deliberate omission in providing necessary medical treatment which is reasonably 
available, the doctor may be found criminally liable for murder. 
However, the fact that doctors have a legal duty to provide medical treatment to their patients does not 
mean that every omission to provide life-prolonging treatment is a culpable omission for the purposes 
of the law of homicide. Whether a doctor is criminally liable for an omission which causes death 
depends upon the scope of the doctor's professional duty towards his or her patient. It is generally 
accepted that a doctor's duty to his or her patient is not absolute.3 The law does not require that all 




Also under the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) which relies upon general common law principles regarding 
legally recognised duties to act. 
See chapter I, 22-30. 
G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed., 1983) 279-282; H. Beynon, 'Doctors as Murderers' 
(1982) Crim.L.Rev. 17, 25; A. Dix et al, Law for the Medical Profession (1988) 298-300. There have 
also been a number of cases (albeit in the civil jurisdiction) where the courts have indicated that the 
termination of life-sustaining treatment would in some circumstances, not be unlawful; see, for 
example, the famous In re Quinlan 355 A. 2d 647, 669-670 (1976) (see discussed below, 46, 52-53) 
and the cases involving defective newborns; see In re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) 
[1981) 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1422; In re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1989) 3 W.L.R. 240; 
In re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) (1991) 2 W.L.R. 140. However, these latter English 
cases have involved the court's wardship jurisdiction and are therefore not decisive of the circumstances 
in which the criminal law imposes a duty on doctors. In a wardship case, the court can only act in the 
best interests of the child, and therefore the future prospects for the child will almost inevitably be the 
sole criterion, but in criminal cases, other factors may be relevant. See also Beynon, 26. 
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the continuation of treabnent is futile, and the artificial prolongation of the dying process may in fact 
be seen as being contrary to the patient's best interests. In such circumstances, where the patient is 
unlikely to benefit from further treatment, a doctor would not be under a legal duty to provide that 
treatment. 4 Furthermore, in view of the practical limitations on the availability of medical resources, 
some consideration of the appropriate allocation of scarce resources and of cost-effectiveness inevitably 
must come into the decision-making.5 Especially in light of the general ageing of our population, the 
demand for medical resources could not be met if every possible measure was obligatory in all cases. 
Whilst there is widespread agreement that there are limits on the duty of doctors to treat terminally ill 
patients, the difficulty lies in determining the precise scope of that duty and at what point the doctor's 
duty ceases. This has resulted in a considerable amount of uncertainty about the extent of a d~tor's 
duty to provide medical treabnent to his or her patient and what omissions will amount to a 
dereliction of duty. There is very real concern amongst many health care professionals about their 
potential legal liability for the withholding or withdrawing of treabnent from a patient. 6 This state of 
uncertainty obviously has undesirable consequences for medical practice as doctors may, for fear of 
criminal liability, be reluctant to withhold or withdraw treatment where it would otherwise be 
appropriate to do so. In turn, the continuation of futile medical treatment is unlikely to promote the 
interests of patients. 
In an attempt to clarify the nature and extent of a doctor's duty to his or her patient, a number of 
different formulations have been advanced.7 It is, however, not intended to embark here upon a general 
examination of the precise scope of a doctor's duty to provide treabnent. T~e purpose of this part is to 
pursue a more limited line of inquiry; to confine analysis to circumstances where a doctor is under a 
prima facie duty to treat, and then to focus attention on the position of a patient with decision-making 
capacity, who has given a clear direction that he or she wishes to have no further treabnent, and to 
examine the legal implications of such a direction upon the doctor's legal duty to provide treatment. 
Situations may arise where a doctor has in his or her care a patient with decision-making capacity, for 
whom certain life-prolonging or even life-saving measures would be available, but the patient may 






This would be the case regardless of whether the patient wishes to receive that treatment: whilst a 
patient has a right to refuse treatment he or she cannot insist upon receiving all possible medical 
treatment against the medical judgement of the doctor; I. Kennedy, Treat Me Right (1988) 321. For an 
American case which raised this issue in a civil context see In re Helga Wanglie Fourth Judicial District 
(Dist. Ct. Probate Ct. Div.) PX-91-283, Minnesota, Hennepin County. For discussion of this case see 
M. Angell, 'The Case of Helga Wanglie' (1991) 325 New Eng.J.Med. 511; and S. Miles, 'Informed 
Demand for Non-Beneficial Treatment' (1991) 325 New Eng.J.Med. 512. 
See National Health and Medical Research Council, Discussion Paper on the Ethics of Limiting Life-
Sustaining Treatment (1988) 15. 
For example, Parliament of Victoria Social Development Committee, Second and Final Report Inquiry 
into Options for Dying with Dignity (1987) 43-48 (hereafter referred to as Victorian Social 
Development Committee Report); Law Reform Commission of Western Australian, Project No. 84, 
Report, Medical Treatment for the Dying (1991) 4. 
For example, a duty based upon professional standards and customary practice or a duty dependent on 
the contract pursuant to which the doctor provides medical treatment. For discussion, see Beynon, 23-
28. 
The patient may refuse all further treatment or may selectively refuse treatment; for example, declining 
certain life-prolonging treatment but accepting nutrition and hydration and treatment for pain 
management. 
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omission to treat unless he or she is under a legal duty to provide treatment. the fundamental question 
which arises for determination is the legal effect of the patient's refusal of treatment upon the doctor's 
duty to treat. Resolution of this question involves consideration of the interrelationship between two 
disparate and potentially conflicting areas; the patient's common law right to refuse treatment and the 
criminal law position regarding the legal status of consent of the victim in determining culpability for 
homicide. In turn, these issues reflect wider interests and competing considerations; the individual's 
interest in patient autonomy and self-determination on the one hand, and the State's interest in the 
preservation of human life on the other. 
In the discussion which follows, it will be argued that in circumstances where a patient refuses 
treatment. a doctor is no longer under a legal duty to provide that treatment to the patient and is in fact 
required by law to comply with the patient's wishes. In the absence of a legal duty to provide 
treatment, failure to do so is not a culpable omission for the purposes of the criminal law and will not 
give rise to criminal liability, even though the patient's death may result. Thus, a patient who directs 
that life-sustaining treatment be withheld or discontinued is not consenting to a crime, but simply 
exercising his or her right to refuse treatment 
This chapter is divided into two parts; part I dealing with the patient's common law right to refuse 
treatment. and part II examining the legal effect of this right upon a doctor's duty to provide treatment 
PART I 
The Patient's Common Law Right to Refuse Treatment 
Introduction 
Whilst there is not much direct authority in support of the common law right of a patient to refuse 
treatment in either Australia or the United Kingdom,9 there is little room for doubt that the principles 
of bodily integrity and self-determination which underlie that right apply in these jurisdictions. 
Because of the dearth of direct authority in these jurisdictions regarding the right of a patient to refuse 
treatment. it is necessary to resort to basic common law principles in support of the existence of this 
right. 
The common law has long recognised an individual's right to self-determination over his or her own 
body, free from interference by others.10 This right of self-determination is said to express the 
9 The same holds true for New Zealand. There is, however, a growing body of case law in Canada and of 
all jurisdictions, the patient's right to refuse treatment has been most frequently litigated in the United 
States. (The position in the United States is dealt with separately below, 45-68.) 
10 T. Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics (1986) 264 where he states that it is one of the 
presumptions of English law that individuals should be secure in their bodies against the unauthorised 
touching of others. See also Union Pacific Railway v Botsford 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) where the 
court stated 'no right is more sacred or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of 
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principle, or value choice, of autonomy of the person.11 Central to this right to bodily integrity is 
the common law doctrine of consent. Strictly speaking, every unauthorised touching of a person 
constitutes an assault and battery! 2 and it is only the fact of consent which renders it lawfut.13 
Consequently, in the medical context, the administration of medical treatment which involves any 
touching, without the consent of the patient, will prima facie be unlawfu114 and may give rise to 
both civil liability for damages 15 as well as possible criminal proceedings for assault.16 Since the 
unlawfulness stems from the fact of touching itself, 17 the contact need not be harmful to the patient 
11 
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference 
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.' For a general discussion of the 
principles of self-determination, autonomy and inviolability, see the Law Reform Commission of 
Canada, Study Paper, Consent to Medical Care (1979) chapter 1. 
See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Consent lo Medical Care, 3. 
12 See Collins v Wilcock [1984) 3 All E.R. 374, 378 where it is stated that 'The fundamental principle, 
plain and incontestable, is that every persons body is inviolate. It bas long been established that any 
touching of another person, however slight may amount to a battery' (per Goff L.J.) . See also the 
House of Lords decision in In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1989] 2 W.L.R. 1025, 1066-1067, 
1082-1083 and the Court of Appeal in Re T Court of Appeal Transcript, July 30 1992, per Lord 
Donaldson. These principles have been accepted in Australia; see, for example, the judgments of 
Nicholson C.J. of the Family Court in the cases of In re Jane [1989) F.L.C. 92-007, 77,243; In re 
Marion [1991) F.L.C. 92-193, 72,299-78,300. 
13 It is now well established that there is no requirement that the touching was done with hostility. In R v 
Phillips (1971) 45 A.L.J.R. 467, 472, Barwick C.J. of the High Court bad suggested that there was a 
requirement of hostility in order to establish battery at common law; see also Windeyer J., 479). 
However, in the later case of Baughey v R (1986) 65 A.L.R. 609 the High Court rejected a submission 
made in reliance upon R v Phillips (1971) 45 A.L.J.R. 467 that the intentional application of force to 
the person of an unwilling victim could not constitute battery at common law or assault or unlawful 
assault under the Code unless it were accompanied or motivated by positive hostility on the part of the 
assailant towards the victim. For discussion, see D. Lanham, 'The Right to Choose to Die with Dignity' 
(1990) 14 Crim.LI. 401, 402-404. 
In the United Kingdom, it was suggested in Wilson v Pringle [1987) 1 Q.B. 237, 248 per Croom 
Johnson L.J. that hostility is an element of the tort of battery, but this bas been rejected in subsequent 
cases; see Tv T and another [1988) 1 All E.R. 613, 622-625; In re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) 
[1989) 2 W.L.R. 1025, 1083. Note also Faulkner v Talbot [1981) 1 W.L.R. 1528, 1534 dealing with 
the offence of battery for the purposes of the criminal law. 
14 There are some exceptions, discussed below, 40-45. 
15 Civil liability may arise for the torts of assault and battery. As explained in Collins v Wilcock [1984) 
3 All E.R. 374, 377-378, both assault and battery are forms of trespass to the person. An assault is an 
act which causes another person to apprehend the infliction of immediate, unlawful force on his 
person. A battery is the actual infliction of immediate, unlawful force on another person. 
For an example of a case where a patient successfully sued a doctor for damages in res~ct of 
unauthorisc;i;l,qi.,e• ical treatment see Malette v Shulman (1991) 2 Med.L.R. 162. On appeal, the S 1 c, . -f.{) 
Court of ~ upheld the trial judge's findings that a doctor was liable for administering emergency 
blood transfusions to an unconscious card-carrying Jebovab's Witness. It was held that the transfusion 
was given in contradiction of the patient's expressed wishes and amounted to a battery. The patient was 
awarded damages of Can $20,000. There have also been a number of cases in the United States where 
the courts have recognised that doctors may be sued for imposing life-sustaining treatment against the 
wishes of the patient; see Leach v Shapiro 13 Ohio App. 3d 393 (1984); Bartling v Superior Court 147 
Cal. App. 3d 1006 (1983). 
16 For the position in Australian common law jurisdictions (although dealt with under statutory law) see 
the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (S.A.) s. 39; Crimes (Amendment) Act 1981 (Vic.) amending 
the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic.); Crimes Amendment Ordinance (No. 2) 1990 (A.C.T.) ss . 22-26; Crimes 
Act 1900 (N.S.W.) s. 61 ; and under the Criminal Codes; Criminal Code 1983 (N.T.) s. 187-189; 
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld.) s. 245, 246, 335 ; Criminal Code 1924 (Tas .) ss . 182-184; Criminal Code 
1913 (W.A.) s. 313, 317, 318. (Note also ss. 265-268 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985; s. 192-
193 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961.) On the basis of common usage, the term 'assault' is taken to 
cover both assault in the strict sense of the term and a battery; L. Waller and C.R. Williams, Bretl, 
Waller and Williams Criminal Law (6th ed., 1989) 45 . 
Since criminal liability for assault is virtually never alleged against a doctor, attention will primarily 
be focussed on the doctor's potential civil liability for the purposes of the following discussion . 
17 The term 'battery' bas traditionally bad connotations of harmful and offensive conduct, but as Kennedy 
and Grubb explain (I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, Medical Law (1989) 173), the essence of the 'harmfulness' 
and 'offensiveness lies in the unwanted nature of the touching. 
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in order to give rise to liability.18 It is therefore no defence that the treatment or procedure was 
skilfully performed or that it was medically necessary and actually benefited the patient.19 In order to 
establish a valid cause of action and subject to the exceptions dealt with below,20 all that needs to be 
shown is that the treatment was administered in the absence of consent. Where, however, the patient 
bas consented to the particular intervention (and provided it is a medical procedure to which the patient 
can give a legally valid consent) the patient's consent is a complete defence to any action for damages 
based on the tort of battery and to any criminal proceedings. 21 
The classic exposition of these principles is to be found in the frequently cited judgment of Cardozo J. 
in the American case of SchiJloendorffv Society of New York Hospital: 22 Ito 
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation 
without his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable in 
damages.23 
The High Court of Australia, in an appeal from the Family Court concerning the sterilisation of a 
handicapped minor, has endorsed the fundamental right to personal inviolability reflected in this 
judgment. 24 In the words of McHugh J.: 
It is the central thesis of the common law doctrine of trespass to the person that 
the voluntary choices and decisions of an adult person of sound mind concerning 
what is or is not done to his or her body must be respected and accepted, 
irrespective of what others, including doctors, may think is in the best interests 
of that particular person .. . the common law respects and preserves the autonomy 
of adult persons of sound mind with respect to their bodies. By doing so the 
common law accepts that a person has rights of control and self-determination in 
respect of his or her body which other persons must respect. Those rights can 
only be altered with the consent of the person concerned. Thus the legal 
requirement of consent to bodily interference protects the autonomy and dignity 
of the individual and limits the power of others to interfere with that person's 
body.25 
The patient's right of self-determination has also been acknowledged by the House of Lords in In re F 
(Mental Patient: SterilisationJ26 in the following terms: 
18 Hart v Herron (1984) Aust. Torts Reports 80-201, 67821. 
19 For example, Cull v Royal Surrey County Hospital and Butler [1932] 1 B.M.J. 1195. If the patient has 
not suffered any harm from the treatment, damages are likely to be nominal only; P. Bates and J. 
Dewdney, (eds.) Australian Health and Medical Law Reporter 21 ,004. 
20 See below, 40-45. 
21 There are some applications of force to which legally effective consent cannot be given for the purpose 
of the offence of battery; see A-G's Reference (No. 6 of 1980) [1981] 1 Q.B. 715. For discussion, see 
Kennedy and Grubb, 286-290 and their conclusion that this limitation based upon the 'public interest' 
should not hinder modem medical practice. 
22 211 N .Y. 125 (1914). 
23 Id. 126. 
24 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v J. W.B. and S.M.B. 6 May 1992 F.C. 
92/010, 7, 29 (majority, comprised of Mason C.J., Dawson J. Toohey J. and Gaudron J. ) 44 (Brennan 
J.), 91-92 (McHugh J.). (At the time of writing this decision has not yet been published.) 
25 Id. 91-92. 
26 [1989] 2 W.L.R. 1025. 
At common law a doctor cannot lawfully operate on adult patients of sound mind 
or give them any other treatment involving the application of physical force 
however small, without their consent. If a doctor were to operate on such 
patients or give them other treatment without their consent, he would commit 
the actionable tort of trespass to the person.27 
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One of the clearest statements yet of the common law right to refuse treatment was made in the case 
of Re T, 28one of the tare English cases which has actually involved a refusal of treatment situation. 
The subject of this case, T, who had been brought up by her mother who was a Jehovah's Witness, 
was injured in a car accident when she was 34 weeks pregnant. She was admitted to hospital where the 
possibility of her receiving a blood transfusion was discussed. After a private conversation with her 
mother, T had indicated to the medical staff, both orally and in writing, that she did not wish to have a 
blood transfusion if one should become necessary. Following an emergency caesarian operation T's 
condition deteriorated and she required a blood transfusion. An emergency court hearing was iµitiated 
by T's father and her boyfriend (who were not Jehovah's Witnesses) and they sought a declaration that 
it would be lawful to administer a blood transfusion if, in the clinicaljudgment of the doctor, that was 
in the patient's best interests. At first instance, Justice Ward granted the declaration, holding that in 
the circumstances, it would not be unlawful for doctors to administer a blood transfusion if that was 
required in the best interests of the patient. An appeal was brought against this order. The Court of 
Appeal affirmed the decision of Ward J. on the grounds that the patient was not in a physical or 
mental condition which enabled her to reach a decision binding on the medical authorities and that 
even if, contrary to that view, she would otherwise have been in a position to reach such a decision, 
the influence of her mother was such as to vitiate the decision which she expressed. The case is 
particularly significant for the unequivocal support given to the right of a patient who has decision-
making capacity, to refuse medical treatment. In the words of Lord Donaldson M.R., with whom 
Butler-Sloss and Staughton L.JJ. agreed: 
An adult patient who ... suffers from no mental incapacity, has an absolute 
right to choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to 
choose one rather than another of the treatments being offered ... 
The law requires that an adult patient who is mentally and physically capable 
of exercising a choice must consent if medical treatment of him is to be 
lawful, although the consent need not be in writing and may sometimes be 
inferred from the patient's conduct in the context of the surrounding 
circumstances. Treating him without his consent or despite a refusal of 
consent will constitute a civil wrong of trespass to the person and may 
constitute a crime. 
The common law doctrine of 'informed consent' has evolved from these fundamental principles and 
provides a firm basis for legal recognition of the right of a patient with decision-making capacity to 
refuse treatment.29 Pursuant to this doctrine, a doctor is required to make full disclosure to a patient 
27 Id. 1066-67 per Lord Brandon. 
28 Court of Appeal Transcript, July 30 1992. 
29 See also the Report of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioural Research, Making Health Care Decisions (1982) 16-17 where the doctrine 
of informed consent was described as a principle of law embodied within the patient's autonomy or 
right of self-determination requiring full disclosure to the patient. 
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of all proposed medical procedures, the material risks of those procedures, and alternative courses of 
action. On the basis of the information received from the doctor, the patient is then free to choose 
amongst the available treatment options. This right of a patient with decision-making capacity to give 
consent to treatment after having been fully informed as to the material risks of the proposed 
treatment, logically involves a corresponding right to refuse treatment. If a doctor administers 
treatment without the consent, or indeed, contrary to the express wishes of the patient, the patient's 
rights are violated. This reasoning has gained wide acceptance and it is now established beyond doubt 
that patients who' have decision-making capacity have a common law right to refuse treatment 30 
In addition to the common law right to refuse treatment, a limited right to refuse treatment exists 
under the statute law of a number of Australian jurisdictions. 31 
The Requirement of Consent to Medical Treatment 
Treatment without the patient's consent may arise either where consent is totally lacking (i.e. where 
there has been a failure to obtain the consent of the patient or where the treatment has been 
administered against the expressed wishes of a patient) or where the patient has given consent but the 
consent is legally invalid.32 For a consent to medical treatment to be legally effective, a number of 
conditions must be fulfilled; (1) the procedure/treatment must be one to which it is possible to give a 
legally effective consent, 33 (2) the person must have the legal capacity to give a valid consent, 34 and 
(3) the consent must be a real consent 35 
This latter requirement of a real consent demands further clarification. In certain limited circumstances, 
the apparent consent by a patient may be held not to be a real consent and consequently will not afford 
a defence to a doctor in an action for battery brought by an aggrieved patient. In order for consent to be 
real, it must be freely and voluntarily given .. Consent which is procured by duress, fraud, or 
30 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All E.R. 374, 378; In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1989] 2 W.L.R. 
1025, 1066-1067, 1082-1083. For Australian authority in support, see In re Jane [1989] F.L.C. 92-
007, 77243; In re Marion [1991] F.L.C. 92-193, 72,299-78,300 and the appeal from this decision to 
the High Court; Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v J. W.B. and S.M.B. 6 May 
1992 F.C. 921010. The New South Wales case of R v Johnston (1903) 9 A.L.R. (C.N.) 11 (decided 
under the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) could also be interpreted as upholding the right of a patient to 
determine his or her own medical treatment. For discussion, see Lanham, 406-407 and below, 81. Note 
also the New Zealand case of Smith v Auckland Hospital Board [1965] N.Z.L.R. 191, 219. The position 
in Canada is reflected in the case of Marshall v Curry [1933] 3 D.L.R. 260 and more recently in the case 
of Nancy B. v Hotel-Vieu de Quebec et al 69 C.C.C. (3d) (1992) 450, 456-457. 
31 See Vic. Medical Treatment Act 1988, Medical Treatment (Enduring Power of Attorney) Act 1990 and 
the Medical Treatment (Agents) Act 1992; S.A. Natural Death Act 1983; N.T. Natural Death Act 1988. 
For consideration of these legislative development, see chapter VII, 294-311. Note also the natural 
death and enduring power of attorney legislation which exists in the United States and Article 19.1 of 
the Civil Code of Lower Canada as amended in 1989. 
32 D. Giesen, International Medical Malpractice Law (1988) 253. 
33 P. Skegg, Law, Ethics and Medicine (Revised ed., 1988) 33-40; A-G's Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] 
1 Q.B. 715. 
34 Skegg, 47-57. 
35 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 All E.R. 257. 
38 
misrepresentation is not a real consent and clearly will not be valid in law.36 Further, the patient's 
consent must cover the procedure/treatment to be performed. Thus, if the patient consents to a 
particular operation or form of treatment but the treatment or procedure performed is essentially 
different in nature from that to which the patient consented, the patient's consent is clearly 
ineffective.37 Not only must the patient's consent cover the treatment or procedure to be performed, it 
should also cover the particular person who is to perform the treatment or procedure.38 Furthermore, 
in order for consent to be real, the doctor must provide the patient with sufficient information so that 
the patient understands the general nature of the procedure or treatment be or she is to undergo and is 
able to give a voluntary and informed consent.39 Failure of a doctor to provide such basic information 
may be held to vitiate the patient's co~sent. 40 Normally, however, once the patient is informed in 
broad terms of the nature of the procedure which is intended, and gives a consent thereto, that consent 
is treated in law as a real consent41 and will be a complete defence to any civil liability for battery. In 
this context, reference must also be made to the legal doctrine of 'informed consent'. The doctrine of 
'informed consent' concerns the amount of information that a doctor must provide to a patient 
regarding the proposed treatment, including information with respect to any inherent risks and 
possible treatment alternatives, to enable the patient to make an informed decision whether to accept 
or reject that treatment. The principle of informed consent protects the patient's right to autonomy and 
self-determination.42 This doctrine originated in the United States43 and bas taken bold in that 
jurisdiction and also in Canada. Early cases44 in the evolution of this doctrine indicated that failure by 
a doctor to make adequate disclosure would actually vitiate consent and render the doctor liable in 
damages for trespass to the person. The prevailing view in a number of jurisdictions, including the 
36 H. Teff, 'Consent to Medical Procedures: Paternalism, Self-Determination or Therapeutic Alliance' 
(1985) 101 Law. Q.R. 432, 439; Freeman v Home Office [1983] 3 All E.R. 589, 593, affd. [1984] 1 All 
E.R. 1036. 
37 For example, Cull v Royal Surrey County Hospital and Butler [1932] 1 B.M.J. 1195 (the surgeon had 
obtained consent to curettage but performed a hysterectomy); Devi v West Midland Regional Health 
Authority (1980) 7 Current Law 44 (a woman who had consented to a minor operation on her womb was 
held not to have consented to a sterilisation operation being carried out.) For the Canadian position, 
see Murray v McMurchy [1949] 2 D.L.R. 442 (the patient had consented to a caesarean birth but the 
doctor tied her fallopian tubes). See also the discussion of relevant principles in Brushett v Cowan 
(1991) 2 Med.L.R. 271. In the American case of Comfledt v Tongen 262 N.W. 2d 684, 699 (1977), it 
was stated that an action in battery will lie where 'the treatment consists of a touching that is of a 
substantially different nature and character from that to which the patient consented.' 
Special considerations apply with respect to emergency situations, arising, for example, during the 
course of an operation, where the consent of the patient cannot be obtained and the treatment is 
necessary to preserve the life of the patient. See below, 40-41. 
38 Skegg, 76 where he cites the case of Michael v Molesworth [1950] 2 B.M.J. 171 in which the patient 
had consented to a particular specialist to perform the operation, but it was performed by the house 
surgeon. 
39 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 All E.R. 257, 264-26~; Freeman v Home Office [1984] 1 All E.R. 1036, 
1044. 
40 See Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 All E.R. 257, 264-265 and discussion by K. Mc~orrie, 'Standards diJ. 
of Disclosure; When Does Consent Become Informed?' (1984) 36 Scots L Times 237; Freeman v Home 
Office [1984] 1 All E.R. 1036, 1044. 
41 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 All E.R. 257, 265; Hills v Potter [1983] 3 All E.R. 716; Sidaway v 
Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All E.R. 643. 
42 M. Kirby, 'Informed Consent: What Does it Mean?' (1983) 9 J.Med. Ethics 69, 70. 
43 Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, (1957). For a 
discussion of the evolution and development of the doctrine of informed consent in the United States 
see G. Robertson, 'Informed Consent to Medical Treatment' (1981) 97 Law Q.R. 102, 104-108. 
44 For example, Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees 154 Cal. App. 2d 560 (1957); 
Koehler v Cook (1975) 65 D.L.R. (3d) 766. 
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United Kingdom and Australia, is that where a pit.tient has given consent to treatment, lack of 
information regarding risks does not deny the reality of consent as required for an action in battery, and 
will therefore only give rise to liability in negligence.45 It is not proposed here to examine the extent 
of a doctor's duty of disclosure46 and whether indeed, the doctrine of informed consent, as generally 
understood in the United States, can be said to apply in Australia and the United Kingdom.47 For 
present purposes, it is sufficient to note that an action in battery is available in Australia and the 
United Kingdom in cases where, as a matter of fact, there is no consent at all, or where the consent 
was not in law a real consent. 
Having noted the existence of the common law right to refuse treatment as a fundamental 
manifestation of the individual's right of self-determination, it now becomes necessary to examine the 
extent of that right. There has been little consideration in Australia or the United Kingdom of the 
extent of the patient's right to refuse treatment There have only been a few cases on the subject and 
the issue has largely been neglected in the academic literature. 
In examining the extent of the patient's right to refuse treatment, attention will initially be focussed 
on the circumstances in which medical treatment or procedures can lawfully be performed without the 
consent of the patient. 
45 The position in the United Kingdom is reflected in the cases of Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 All E.R. 
257, 265; Hills v Potter [1983] 3 All E.R. 716; Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 
All E.R. 643. For authorities on the Australian position see Hart v Herron [1984] Aust. Torts Reports 
80-201, 67,823 ('the appropriate place for informed consent is in the context of a count in negligence 
based upon alleged failures to warn or inform' per Fisher J.) and a number of South Australian cases 
involving inadequate disclosure in which proceedings have been brought in negligence; F v R [1984] 
33 S.A.S.R. 189; Battersby v Tottman (1985) 37 S.A.S.R. 542; Gover v S.A. (1985) 39 S.A.S.R 543; 
Petrunic & Anor v Barnes [1988] Aust. Torts Reports 80-147. This approach has recently been 
confirmed by the High Court; Rogers v Whitaker 19 Nov. 1992, 92/045, 11. 
For the position in the United States see, for example, Natanson v Cline 186 Kan. 393 (1960); 
Canterbury v Spence 464 F. 2d 772 (1972); Cobbs v Grant 8 Cal. 3d 229 (1972). For the Canadian 
position see Reihl v Hughes (1980) 114 D.L.R. (3d) 1. Although the courts in the United States and 
Canada have moved away from actions based on trespass in favour of negligence actions, the concept 
of 'informed consent' has been retained to impose upon doctors an obligation to provide the patient 
with information about the treatment which is proposed. 
There are a number of policy reasons behind limiting liability of doctors for battery and holding that 
cases involving inadequate disclosure (as distinct from the complete failure to obtain consent) should 
be brought in negligence; see Robertson, 123-4; A. Grubb, 'The Emergence and Rise of Medical Law 
and Ethics' (1987) 50 Mod.L.Rev. 241, 249-250. Some commentators have, however, been critical of 
this approach and have argued that it would be more realistic to frame the action in trespass rather than 
negligence since there cannot be real consent in the absence of full information; e.g. B. Bromberger, 
'Patient Participation in Medical Decision-Making: Are the Courts the Answer?' (1983) 6 U.N.S. W.L.J. 
1, 17; M. Gochnauer and DJ. Fleming, 'Tort Law - Informed Consent - New Directions for Medical 
Disclosure - Hopp v Lepp and Reihl v Hughes' (1981) 15 U.B. C.L.Rev. 475, 488; M. Somerville, 
'Structuring the Issues in Informed Consent' (1981) 26 McGill L.J. 740, 742-752. See also Teff, 438-
440 for an outline of the advantages of an action based upon trespass as distinct from negligence. 
46 The most authoritative Australian statement regarding the scope of a doctor's duty of disclosure to a 
patient can be found in Rogers v Whitaker 19 Nov. 1992, 92/045. For discussion of the standard of 
doctors' duty of disclosure developed in Australia (based on the earlier South Australian authorities 
which have been upheld by the High Court) as compared with United Kingdom and the United States see 
M. Wood, 'Informed Consent - The Australian Position' (1990) 20 Qld.LS.J. 121. 
4 7 The High Court in Rogers v Whitaker 19 Nov. 1992, 92/045, 10-11 was wary of the use of the phrase 
'informed consent' but strongly endorsed the view that doctors must give patients warning about 
'material risks'. Doubt remains in the wake of the Sidaway Case [1985] 1 All E.R. 643 as to the status 
of the informed consent doctrine in the United Kingdom. Compare for example, the views of Teff, 434 
and P. Gerber, 'Informed Consent - the Last of Mrs Sidaway? (1985) 142 M.J.A. 643 with that of 
Kennedy, Treat Me Right, 193-212. 
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Justification for Medical Treatment Performed Without the Patient's Consent 
The principal situation where the consent of the patient to medical treatment is not required is in cases 
of emergency where the treatment provided was necessary to save the life or semble, to preserve the 
health of the patient. Circumstances may arise where a patient is in immediate need of treatment, but 
because of his or her condition, is unable to give consent to treatment. Although there is little 
authority directly on the point in either England or Australia,48 it would appear that in such cases, the 
law would allow the defence of necessity in respect of any action brought by an aggrieved patient.49 
The basis of the defence of necessity is that acting unlawfully (in this case, providing treatment 
without the patient's consent), is justified if the resulting good effect materially outweighs the 
consequences of adhering strictly to the law.5° In order to succeed with such a defence, it is likely that 
the doctor would have to show that the treatment which was administered was necessary in order to 
save the life or preserve the health of the patient5 1 and that it would have been unreasonable to 
postpone intervention until consent could be obtained.52 Furthermore, the treatinent . which is 
provided should not go beyond what is necessary to cope with the particular emergency. Another 
important limitation is that the defence is only available in circumstances where the patient is not 
known to object to the treatment in question.53 The fact that treatment is necessary to save the life or 
preserve the health of the patient does not justify the imposition of treatment against the patient's 
48 See dicta in Tv T and another [1988] 1 All E.R. 613, 621 ; In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1989] 
2 W.L.R. 1025, 1036, 1057, 1084; cited with approval by Nicholson C.J. in In re Marion [1991] 
F.L.C. 92-193, 78 ,299. Note also the judgment of McHugh J. of the High Court in Secretary, 
Department of Health and Community Services v J. W.B. and S.M.B. 6 May 1992 F.C. 921010, 92-93. 
In the United States and Canada, the defence of necessity has been recognised by the courts ; see Pratt v 
Davies 224 Ill. 300, 309 (1906) and the Canadian case Marshall v Curry [1933] 3 D.L.R. 260. The 
recent English Court of Appeal decision in Re T (Court of Appeal Transcript, July 30 1992) has 
confirmed that in an emergency situation, where the patient has made no choice and is in no position 
to make one, the practitioner can lawfully treat the patient in accordance with his or her clinical 
judgment of what is in the patient's best interests. 
49 A number of commentators have indicated their support for the existence of such a defence: e.g. D. 
Kloss, 'Consent to Medical Treatment' (1965) 5 Med.Sci. I.Aw 89, 90-91 ; G. Williams, 'The Defence of 
Necessity' (1953) 6 C.L.P . 216; Geisen, 323; P. Skegg, 'A Justification for Medical Procedures 
Performed Without Consent' (1974) 90 I.Aw Q.Rev. 512, 512-514. The defence of necessity is 
potentially applicable to both criminal and civil liability that a doctor may incur as a result of 
unauthorised treatment. The alternative suggestion made in Wilson v Pringle [1987] Q.B. 237 that 
operative treatments (and presumably other forms of medical treatment) are justifiable on the grounds 
that they come within the ordinary conduct of everyday life, (per Croom-Johnson L.J .) has been 
rejected in subsequent cases; see Wood J. in Tv T and another [1988] 1 All E.R. 613; Butler-Sloss L.J. 
in In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1989] 2 W.L.R. 1025,1057. 
50 J.K. Mason and R.A. McCall Smith, I.Aw and Medical Ethics (2nd ed., 1987) 143. 
51 This is the approach which has been adopted by the Canadian courts ; e.g. Marshall v Curry [1933] 3 
D.L.R. 260; Mulloy v Hop Sang [1935] 1 W.W.R. 714. However, there is, as yet, no uniformly 
accepted understanding of what constitutes an emergency; i.e. whether it must be threatening to the 
patient's life or whether it is sufficient that there is a risk of grave physical and/or mental injury. See 
also L. Skene, You, Your Doctor and the I.Aw (1990) 38. 
52 See also Skegg, 'A Justification for Medical Procedures Performed Without Consent,' 517-519 where a 
distinction is drawn between treatment merely being convenient on the one hand, which clearly does 
not justify intervention, and circumstances where it would be unreasonable to postpone intervention 
until consent could be sought. Compare Marshall v Curry [1933] 3 D.L.R. 260 and Murray v McMurchy 
[1949] 2 D.L.R. 442. 
53 Seh~ Mh ulhloy,.,v,,JJ,PP. ~anC g [193f5]. l yv.V(.R
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doctrine to override the patient's wishes . It should be noted that different considerations may apply in 
relation to the treatment of attempted suicides. See chapter ill, 108-109. 
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expressed wishes. Allowing the defence of necessity in these limited circumstances gives effect to the 
value of saving life, without detracting from the patient's right of self-determination. 
In some jurisdictions relevant statutory provisions exist which may empower a doctor or other health 
care professional to provide emergency treatment in specified circumstances. S4 
Scope of a Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment at Common Law 
Although there is little authority dealing directly with the scope of a patient's right to refuse treatment 
at common law, the overwhelming view is that a patient who has decision-making capacity has a 
right of self-determination and may refuse even life-saving treatment.SS A significant contribution has 
been made to this subject by the Court of Appeal in the recent English decision of Re ]56 referred to 
earlier. S7 Although upholding the decision of the court below for the administration of treatment 
against the apparent wishes of the patient, the Court of Appeal strongly defended the prima facie right 
S4 For example, N.S.W. Ambulance Services Act 1900 s. 26; Qld. Medical Act 1939 s. S2, Voluntary Aid 
in Emergencies Act 1973 s. 3; S.A. Medical Practitioners Act 1983 s. 37a, Consent to Medical and 
Dental Procedures Act 198S s. 7; Tas. Criminal Code 1924 s. Sl(3). (Note also the Criminal Code 1899 
(Qld.) s. 282; Criminal Code 1913 (W.A.) s. 2S9.) See also s. 62 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (U.K.) 
dealing with urgent treatment which Kennedy and Grubb, 298 describe as a statutory example of the 
doctrine of necessity. 
SS Judicial support for this proposition can be found in the judgments in Sidaway v Beth/em Royal 
Hospital Governors [198S] 1 All E.R. 643 (see, in particular, Lord Scarman, (in dissent) 649) and in 
the judgment of Nicholson C.J. in In re Marion [1991] F.L.C. 92-193, 78,299. Many commentators 
can be cited in support of this view; e.g. G. Williams, 'The Right to Die' (1984) 134 New L.J. 73; 
Skegg, 'A Justification for Medical Procedures Without Consent' S23-S29; Kennedy, Treat Me Right, 
320; Kennedy and Grubb, 346; Geisen, 2S8-260, 4S6-464. Influential support for this view can also be 
found in the writings of P. Devlin, Samples of Law Making (1962) 93. 
More difficult questions arise regarding patients who have lost decision-making capacity but who have 
previously indicated their wishes with regard to treatment in a living will or other form of advance 
directive in jurisdictions where there is no legislation giving legal effect to such documents. (The only 
jurisdictions in Australia to make provision for a living will are South Australia and the Northern 
Territory; see discussion below in chapter VII, 294-297 and 310-311 respectively.) Some Australian 
commentators have emphasised the uncertainty of the present state of the law; see, for example,. the 
opinion of Mr Ron Castan Q.C. sought for the Parliament of Victoria Social Development Committee 
Inquiry and discussed in the Parliamentary debates with regard to the Victorian Medical Treatment Bill 
Vic. Parl. Deb. (L.C.), Vol. 391, 23 March (1988) 1013-1014. See also D. Lanham and B. Fehlberg, 
'Living Wills and the Right to Die with Dignity' (1991) 18 Melbourne U.L.Rev. 329, 331-332. There 
is no case law in Australia directly dealing with this issue. However, in the recent English case of Re T 
(Court of Appeal Transcript, July 30 1992) the Court of Appeal approved the decision of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Malette v Shulman (1991) 2 Med.L.R. 162 where a Jehovah's Witness successfully 
sued the medical authorities for damages for administering a blood transfusion, contrary to the 
expressly stated wishes on a card carried by the patient. The English Court of Appeal went on to give 
some guidance as to the circumstances in which an advance directive would be legally binding on the 
medical authorities. Essentially, the court held that a directive made by a patient who has decision-
making capacity will be valid if the patient has anticipated and intended his decision to apply in 
circumstances that ultimately prevail. For discussion of this aspect of the court's decision, see A. 
Grubb 'Refusal of Medical Treatment: I - The Competent Adult' (1992) Vol. 3 No. 1 Dispatches 1. On 
the basis of this decision in Re T and the earlier Canadian case of Malette v Shulman (1991) 2 Med.L.R. 
162 as well as the United States authorities discussed below, (see in particular, In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 
1209, 1229-1230 (198S); Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health 111 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1990)) 
it can be argued that an advance directive in which the patient's wish to refuse particular treatment is 
clearly stated, should have the same force as the refusal of treatment by a patient who has decision-
making capacity. The only relevant difference would be of an evidentiary nature in terms of 
ascertaining whether the directive reflects the patient's wishes, whether that constituted a continuing 
wish etc. 
S 6 Court of Appeal Transcript, July 30 1992. 
S 7 See above, 36. 
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and capacity of every adult to decide whether or not he or she will accept medical treatment, even if a 
refusal may risk permanent injury to his or her health or lead to premature death. Moreover, as the 
Court of Appeal made clear, the exercise of this right to refuse treatment does not depend on the 
objective reasonableness of the patient's decision or whether the treating doctor(s) approve of the 
course chosen by the patient Provided the patient has decision-making capacity, the right to refuse 
treatment is paramount, no matter how umeasonable or foolish that refusal may seem to the patient's 
medical advisers58 or even if the reasons for that refusal are unknown or non-existent. 59 
The right to refuse medical treatment recognised by the court in Re T is potentially far-reaching. It 
extends not only to patients who are terminally ill, but to patients whose lives are salvageable and yet 
who refuse life-saving treatment. 60 Although extensive, the patient's right to refuse treatment is not 
absolute and as noted by the Court of Appeal in Re T, there are a number of limitations on the 
exercise of this right. 
Requirement of Decision-Making Capacity 
A major qualification on the patient's right to decline medical treatment is the requirement that the 
patient exercising that right must have decision-making capacity. 61 The mental capacity of the patient 
is therefore critical in determining the validity of a patient's refusal of treatment. The law presumes a 
person to be competent and have decision-making capacity unless proven otherwise.62 The notion of 
competency requires that the patient has the capacity or ability to understand, to a reasonable extent, 
the nature and consequence of his or her decision, including the risks and benefits of and the 
alternatives to a specific treatment.63 In practice, the seemingly fundamental right of self-
determination can readily be undermined by a finding that the patient lacks the necessary decision-
making capacity to exercise that right. 64 The major difficulty appears to be that the request by a 
patient that life-sustaining treatment be withheld or withdrawn may readily be interpreted as an 
indication of unsoundness of mind, since it is generally presumed that no-one really wants to die. 65 
Thus, a patient who expresses a wish to die and directs that life-saving treatment be withheld or 
discontinued is at risk of being found to lack the necessary decision-making capacity, and therefore as 
5 8 See also McHugh J. of the High Court in Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v 
J. W.B. and S.M.B. 6 May 1992 F.C. 92/010, 91-92; Smith v Auckland Hospital Board [1965] 
N.Z.L.R. 191, 219 per Grasson J.; Lane v Candura 376 N.E. 2d 1232 (1978). In practice, however, the 
objective reasonableness of the patient's decision may affect the assessment of the patient's decision-
making capacity. See discussion below, 42-43. 
59 Court of Appe~ Transcript, July 30 1992 per Lord Donalsdon M.R. 
60 Grubb, 'Refusal of Medical Treatment: I - The Competent Adult,' 2. 
61 For a discussion of the meaning of 'decision-making capacity', see the Introduction to this thesis, 6-7. 
62 See also Re Treferred to above, 36, 41-42. 
63 On the facts of Re T Lord Donaldson M.R. held that Ts physical and mental condition was such that she 
had lacked the capacity to refuse treatment. · 
64 I. Kennedy, 'The Legal Effect of Requests by the Terminally Ill and Aged Not to Receive Further 
Treatment from Doctors' (1976) Crim.L.Rev. 217, 222; B. Dickens, 'The Right to a Natural Death' 
(1981) 26 McGill L.J. 847, 849-851. 
65 Kennedy, 'The Legal Effects of Requests by the Terminally Ill and Aged Not to Receive Further 
Treatment from Doctors,' 222; Kennedy and Grubb, 346 where the authors suggest that there is a 
tendency in the courts to avoid attacking the principle of inviolability of the person head on and 
instead, to cast doubt on the competence of the person whose decision is in question. 
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being unable to effectively withhold or withdraw his or her consent.66 The difficulties are 
compounded by the fact that it is the doctor's responsibility to make a determination about the 
patient's decision-making capacity.67 A doctor who disapproves of a patient's decision to reject 
treatment can, through a finding of incapacity, justify the medical interventions that the doctor 
favours. Another factor which militates against the patient is that the professional training of doctors 
predisposes them to saving lives and treating the sick and they may consequently be disinclined to 
respond to the request of a patient that treatment be discontinued. 68 
It is a matter of real concern that the question of a patient's decision-making capacity, which is the 
linchpin for the exercise of patient autonomy, should be so susceptible to defeat. The fact that a 
patient's decision to refuse treatment may appear unreasonable should not of itself justify the 
conclusion that the patient is incompetent in the legal sense. 69 Moreover, if the 'right to refuse 
treatment' is to have any substance, appropriate procedures must be in place for the independent 
assessment of patient decision-making capacity in accordance with clear standards and a structured and 
reviewable process.70 
Consent Vitiated by Undue Influence 
Another exception which was in issue in the case of Re T, arises in circumstances where the patient's 
capacity to make a decision has been overborne by the will of others. As noted earlier, 71 the Court of 
Appeal in that case held that apart from the question of Ts condition and the effect that that would 
have on her decision-making capacity, Ts refusal was invalid because it was vitiated by the pressure 
exerted by her mother at the hospital which amounted to undue influence.72 Whilst recognising that a 
patient is entitled to seek advice from others in reaching a decision, particularly from family members, 
the court stated that doctors have to consider whether the decision is really that of the patient The real 
question in each case is: does the patient really mean what he says or is he merely saying it for a quiet 
life, to satisfy someone else or because the advice and persuasion to which he has been subjected is 
66 B. Naylor, 'Death with Dignity Legislation in Victoria' (1987) 12 L.S.B. 273. The much publicised 
John McEwan case in Victoria acutely highlighted the problems which can arise in this area. John 
McEwan, former Australian water-skiing champion, became a quadriplegic as the result of an accident. 
After expressing a wish to die and refusing further treatment, he was certified insane. For coverage of 
this case, see the Victorian Social Development Committee Report, Appendix I and N. Tonti-
Fillippini, 'Some Refusals of Medical Treatment Which Have Changed the Law in Victoria' (1992) 157 
M.J.A. 277, 277-278. 
67 Kennedy, The Legal Effects of Requests by the Terminally Ill and Aged Not to Receive Further 
Treatment from Doctors,' 222. 
68 Ibid. 
69 For example, the case of Lane v Candura 376 N.E. 2d 1232 (1978) in which the court distinguished the 
question of patient competence from that of medical reasonableness and held that the irrationality of 
the patient's decision did not justify the conclusion that she was incompetent in the legal sense. 
70 G.P. Smith, 'All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely 
Enlightened Self-Determination?' (1989) 22 U.Calif., Davis 275, 381; Hastings Center Report 
Guidelines on the Tennination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and Care for the Dying (1987) 23, 131; G. 
Annas and L. Glantz, 'The Right of Elderly Patients to Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment' (1986) 64 
Milbank Q. 95,112-113. See also Kennedy, Treat Me Right, 321 where he suggests that the most 
appropriate mechanism for safeguarding both the patients' and the doctors' interests is for the hospital 
to document the circumstances fully in the notes and have the patient's competence assessed by a 
qualified person not otherwise concerned in the patient's case. 
71 See above, 36. 
72 For analysis of this aspect of the court's decision, see Grubb, 'Refusal of Medical Treatment: I - The 
Competent Adult,' 3. 
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such that he can no longer think and decide for himself? When assessing the extent of external 
influences, doctors should have particular regard to the strength of the will of the patient (e.g. whether 
the patient was tired, in pain or depressed) and the relationship between the patient and the persuader 
(whether, for example, the persuader was in a position of power over the patient.) In Re T the court 
held that in circumstances where the patient's capacity to make a decision has been overborne by 
others it is the duty of the doctors to treat him or her in whatever way they consider, in the exercise of 
their clinical judgment, to be in bis or her best interests. 
Protection of a Viable Fetus 
Another possible exception to the right of an adult patient with decision-making capacity to refuse 
medical treatment which was noted by Lord Donaldson M.R. in Re T is the situation where the 
patient's decision may lead to the death of a viable fetus.73 This was noted by his Lordship to be a 
novel problem of considerable legal and ethical complexity, but on the facts of Re T the issue did not 
directly arise. Despite the tentative nature of this possible suggestion, it has already been relied upon 
in a subsequent case to override a pregnant woman's refusal of treatment.74 In the recent case of Re S, 
Sir Stephen Brown of the High Court, exercising the court's inherent jurisdiction, granted a 
declaration authorising the surgeon and staff to carry out an emergency caesarian operation 
notwithstanding the patient's religious objection, on the grounds that it was in the best interests of 
the defendant and necessary to save the life of the unborn child. This decision is open to criticism on 
that basis that it undermines the autonomy and right of self-determination of female patients who are 
carrying a viable fetus, and is inconsistent with earlier English authority regarding the status of an 
unborn child.75 In the absence of an authoritative ruling on the matter by a higher court, the position 
in the United Kingdom remains uncertain but, in rejecting this decision, commentators have 
vigorously defended the right of a woman to refuse treatment even if that refusal leads to the death of 
the baby. 76 In view of the uncertainty surrounding this case and for reasons of principle, this does not 
appear to be a desirable precedent for the Australian courts to follow. 
Statutory Exceptions to the Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment 
A clear exception to the patient's common law right to refuse treatment is public health legislation 
which contain provisions regarding compulsory treatment in certain circumstances. 77 This legislation 
is concerned with the control of infectious diseases and allows for the involuntary detention and/or 
treatment of individuals who are presenting a threat to the public. The primary focus of the legislation 
is to protect the interests of the public rather than the interests of any particular person who may be 
m.78 Statutory exceptions to the common law right to refuse medical treatment and other 
73 Court of Appeal Transcript, July 30 1992. 
7 4 Re S High Court Transcript, October 13 1992. 
75 See D. Morgan, 'Whatever Happened to Consent?' (1992) 142 New L.J. 1448; Grubb, 'Refusal of 
Medical Treatment: I - The Competent Adult,' 2 (referring to Re F (in utero) [1988] Fam. 122). 
76 Ibid. 
77 For example, N.S.W. Public Health Act 1991 ss. 21-42; S.A. Public and Environmental Health Act 
1987 ss. 31-34; Vic. Health Act 1958 ss. 120-122; and in the United Kingdom, the Public Health 
(Control of Diseases) Act 1984. 
78 Kennedy and Grubb, 365. 
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interventions are also contained in other legislation79 including the mental health legislation,80 
prison legislation81 and traffic or road safety legislation governing the compulsory testing of bodily 
fluids.82 
Suicide Prevention 
Another qualification upon the patient's common law right to refuse treatment arises in cases of 
suicide, where a doctor may be justified in taking action to save the patient's life in the absence of 
consent and possibly against the wishes of the patient. Although in some cases, a person who has 
attempted to commit suicide will be suffering from a mental disorder which deprives the patient of 
decision-making capacity, in many cases, the person will have sufficient understanding to give or 
withhold consent. 83 A doctor may, nevertheless, be justified in intervening, and may even be under a 
duty to do so in circumstances where there is reason to believe that if given help, the person will be 
glad that he or she did not kill or seriously injure him or herself. 84 Whilst there is little direct 
authority on the matter, the legal basis for this exception would most readily come within the 
category of necessity, considered above in the context of emergency cases. 85 The area of suicide and 
the rights and duties of doctors treating suicidal patients is the subject of more detailed consideration 
in the following chapter.86 
The Position in the United States 
The legal position in the United States with regard to the patient's right to refuse treatment deserves 
special consideration. The patient's right to refuse treatment has been most frequently litigated in that 
country and there is now a considerable body of case law dealing with the subject. The courts in the 
United States have addressed many of the issues in this area: the circumstances in which a patient's 
19 For reference to legislation permitting doctors or other health care porfessionals to provide emergency 
treatment, see above, n. 54. 
80 A.C.T. Mental Health Act 1983 s. 21; N.S.W. Mental Health Act 1990 s. 10 Ch. 4 Pt. 2; N.T. Mental 
Health Act 1979 ss. 9-10; Qld. Mental Health Services Act 1974 ss. 25-26; S.A. Mental Health Act 
1977 s. 18; Tas. Mental Health Act 1963 ss. 99-100; Vic. Mental Health Act 1986 ss. 10-11; W.A. 
Mental Health Act 1962 s. 29, 31. See Bates and Dewdney, para 20-170 - 20-250 for analysis. 
See also the Mental Health Act 1983 (U.K.) s. 63 and the discussion in Kennedy and Grubb, 364-365. 
As those authors point out, not all persons who are liable to be detained and afe subject to compulsory 
detention are by that reason alone incompetent in a legal sense. The legislation therefore clearly 
envisages the administration of medical treatment against the refusal of even a competent patient. For 
reference to mental health legislation in other jurisdictions under consideration, see Giesen, 452. 
81 For example, s. 16 of the Prisons Act 1952 (N.S.W.) which provides for compulsory medical treatment 
where the life or health of a prisoner is likely to be endangered or seriously prejudiced by the failure of 
such prisoner to undergo medical treatment 
82 In most Australian jurisdictions, traffic or road safety legislation provides for the taking of blood 
samples in certain circumstances without the person's consent. For an outline of the legislation, see 
Bates and Dewdney, para. 37-000-37-090. In some States, legislation also exists providing for the 
compulsory detention and treatment of certain alcoholic and drug dependent people; see, for example, 
Tas. Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act 1968; Vic. Alcoholics and Drug-Dependent Persons Act 1968. 
83 Skegg, Law Ethics and Medicine, 111. 
84 Id. 112. A doctor may be liable in negligence for breach of a civil duty to protect a suicidal patient from 
foreseeable harm, (e.g. Selfe v King George Hospital, (unreported) The Times 26 Nov. 1970) and may 
even be liable under criminal law principles for manslaughter on the grounds of criminal negligence. 
85 See above, 40-41. 
86 Chapter ill, 107-110. 
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refusal of treatment will be upheld; what kinds of treatment a patient has a legal right to refuse; and 
what qualifications a State may seek to impose on the exercise of a patient's right to refuse treatment. 
The case law in the United States may well be influential in the future in shaping Australian and 
English law in this area, particularly in light of the dearth of case law in these jurisdictions. 
The courts in the United States have generally recognised the right of a patient to refuse life-
prolonging and even life-saving medical treatment.87 There has, however, been considerable 
uncertainty as to the proper basis of this right: whether it has a constitutional basis or whether it is 
based on the right to bodily integrity recognised at common law.88 In the case of In re Quinlan, 89 the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey presumed that the constitutional right of privacy established in 
Griswold v Connecticut90 was broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical 
treatment. On the basis of this assumption, courts in various other American States have followed In 
re Quinlan and have relied upon the constitutional right of privacy in support of the right of a patient 
to decline treatment.91 The constitutional right of privacy is in many respects similar to its common-
law counterpart. Both are founded on principles of autonomy and self-determination92 and in their 
treatment by the courts, the two have become somewhat merged and almost indistinguishable.93 In 
some cases, the courts in the United States have based their recognition of the right to refuse 
81 The court system in the United States is organised along federal lines; there is a court hierarchy in each 
of the State jurisdictions, culminating in the State Supreme Courts and there is a Federal Supreme Court 
which deals predominantly with federal matters. There have been numerous decisions at the State level 
upholding the patient's right to refuse treatment; e.g. Erickson v Dilgard 252 N.Y.S. 2d 705 (1962); In 
re Brooks' Estale 32 III. 2d 361 (1965); In re Quinlan 355 A. 2d 647 (1976); B,ouvia v Superior Court 
225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); In re Farrel 529 A. 2d 404 (1987). The case of Cruzan v Director, Missouri 
Department of Health 111 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1990) (hereafter referred to as the Cruzan case), was the first 
time that the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of this right. 
88 Compare, for example, In re Quinlan 355 A. 2d 647 (1976) and Bartling v Superior Court 163 Cal. 
App. 3d 186 (1984) which rely upon the constitutional right of privacy with In re Storar 52 N.Y. 2d 
363 (1981); In re Eichner 52 N.Y. 2d 363 (1981) and In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985) which rely 
on the common law. The Supreme Court has previously noted that the constitutional privacy right 
includes the freedom to care for one's health and person (Doe v Bolton 410 U.S. 179 (1973)) but, until 
the Cruzan case, the court had not considered whether that freedom includes the right to refuse life-
saving medical treatment. 
89 355 A. 2d 647 (1976) (The facts of the case are set out below, 52.) 
90 381 U.S. 479 (1965) in which the United States Supreme Court found that although the United States 
Constitution does not specifically mention a right to privacy, a right to privacy exists in the 
penumbra of specified guarantees in the Bill of Rights. The right of privacy was subsequently extended 
in Roe v Wade 410 U.S . 113 (1973) and was held to include the decision of a woman to have an 
abortion. 
91 For example, Superintendent of Belchert</fi Stale School v Saikewicz 370 N.E. 2d 417 (1977); Severns 
v Wilmington Medical Center 421 A. 2d 1334 (1980); In re Colyer 99 Wash. 2d 114 (1983) ; Bartling v 
Superior Court 163 Cal. App. 3d 186 (1984). 
A privacy right founded on the United States Constitution and applied to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment only extends to situations involving State action. (United Stales v Stanley 109 
U.S. 3, 11-12 (1883)) The courts have, however, recognised a sufficient nexus between the State and 
the challenged action so as to imply State presence, for example, in the State's capacity to impose 
criminal sanctions (In re Colyer 99 Wash. 2d 114, 121 (1983)) and a State's licensing of physicians 
(Rasmussen v Fleming 154 Ariz. 207, 215, n. 9 (1987)). Some commentators have been critical of the 
attempt to extend the constitutional right of privacy to protect a patient's right to refuse medical 
treatment; e.g. E. Lyon, 'The Right to Die: An Exercise of Informed Consent, Not an Extension of the 
Constitutional Right to Privacy' (1990) 58 U.Cin.L.Rev. 1367. 
92 See In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209, 1222-23 (1985); N. Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying 
(1987) 9 . 
93 A. Clarke 'The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging Technology and 
Medical - Ethical Consensus' (1979-80) 13 Creighton LRev. 195; N. Cantor, 'Conroy, Best Interest, 
and the Handling of Dying Patients' (1985) 37 Rutgers LRev. 543, 547 . 
,"'10 
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treatment on both the constitutional and common raw grouncts.94 However, in the absence of a 
definitive ruling on the issue from the United States Supreme Court and with indications that the 
Supreme Court was narrowing its conception of privacy,95 some State courts deliberately refrained 
from basing the right to refuse treatment upon the constitutional right of privacy. As a result, there 
has been increasing reliance upon the more widely accepted common law prerogative to refuse 
treatment. 96 Since the right to refuse treatment at common law and under the Constitution are 
virtually indistinguishable, it makes little difference to the content of that right which of the two 
sources is relied upon.97 One advantage of basing the right on the Constitution would be to ensure 
that it could not subsequently be altered by the legislature.98 However, some commentators are of the 
view that the right to refuse treatment in the United States does not need constitutional support, 99 and 
that there are in fact distinct advantages in grounding the right in common law principles.100 
The recent case of Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of HealthlOl was the first time in which 
the United States Supreme Court heard a case involving the right of a patient to refuse life-sustaining 
medical treatment and was faced with the issue whether the United States Constitution confers a right 
to refuse life-sustaining treatment.102 However, a majority of the Supreme Court declined to address 
the issue whether the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment is protected by a constitutional 
right to privacy, preferring instead to analyse it in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest 
which was seen as implicit in previous court decisions.103 The Supreme Court held that a competent 
person has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing unwanted medical treatment.104 
The court 'assumed, for the purposes of this case' that the constitutionally protected liberty interest for 
competent persons includes the right to refuse life-saving hydration and nutrition and went on to frame 
94 For example, Superintendent of Belchert<J.."f. Stale School v Saikewicz 370 N.E. 2d 417 (1977); Salz v 
Perlmutter 362 So . 2d 160 (1978); In re Spring 380 Mass. 629 (1980); Bouvia v Superior Court 225 
Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986). Some courts have also recognised a right of privacy under State Constitutions; 
e.g. In re Barry 445 So. 2d 365, 370 (1984). 
95 Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying 9-10. See, for example, Roberts v United States Jaycees 
104 S.Ct. 3244, 3250 (1984) and Bowers v Hardwick 478 U.S. 186, 191-95 (1986) In which the 
Supreme Court resisted expansion of the privacy right 
96 In re Storar 52 N.Y. 2d 363 (1981); In re Eichner 52 N.Y. 2d 363 (1981); Barber v Superior Court 195 
Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985). 
97 Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Dealh and Dying, 10. 
98 Ibid. and D. Horan, 'The Quinlan Case' in D. Horan and D. Mall, (eds.) Dealh, Dying and Euthanasia 
(1980) 526. 
99 Horan, 527. 
100 As Cantor points out, (Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 10) if the right is anchored in the common 
law, the patient need not establish 'State action' or government involvement in order to assert his legal 
right Furthermore, there may be advantages with respect to damages. 
101111 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1990). 
102 The facts of this case are dealt with below, 58. The trial court held that a fundamental right exists under 
the Missouri and United States Constitutions to refuse medical treatment. On appeal, the Missouri 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, and expressed doubts as to whether a constitutional 
privacy right was applicable; Cruzan v Harmon 160 S.W. 2d 408 (1988). 
103 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 241 -242 (1990). For analysis of the courts approach, see W. Leschensky, 
'Constitutional Protection of the "Refusal-of-Treatment;" Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of 
Health,' 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990)' (1991) 14 Harv.J.L &: Pub.Pol'y. 248, 254-255. Justice Scalia, who 
wrote a concurring judgment, was the only member of the court to expressly° reject any constitutionally 
protected right or interest, based largely on his view that forgoing nutrition and hydration is 
indistinguishable from ordinary suicide; 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 251-256 (1990). 
104 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 241-242 (1990). The Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution provides that 'No State shall .. . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law'. 
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the question before the court in very narrow terms.105 The court emphasised that this was the first 
case in which the Supreme Court had been squarely presented with the issue of whether there is a 
constitutionally protected 'right to die' and referred to the court's previously stated principle of judicial 
restraint; that in deciding 'a question of such magnitude and importance ... it is the better part of 
wisdom not to attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase of the subject' .106 
Notwithstanding the tentative nature of the Supreme Court's finding, the case is significant for its 
recognition of a constitutionally protected liberty interest to refuse life-saving medical treatment.107 
However, the refusal by the majority of the court to recognise a fundamental privacy interestl08 is of 
some significance.109 In constitutional terms, a 'fundamental right' is subject to strict scrutiny and 
cannot be abridged in the absence of a compelling State interest.110 A liberty interest, on the other 
hand, is a weaker interest, and subject to State regulation so long as the regulation is rationally related 
to the legitimate State interest.111 
It should be noted that in addition to the common law and constitutional right to refuse treatment, a 
majority of American States have natural death or 'living will' legislation which confers a limited 
statutory right to refuse medical treatment.112 
The Right to Refuse Treatment and Countervailing State Interests 
Whether the right to refuse treatment is grounded in the common law or the Constitution, it is not an 
absolute right.113 The American courts have held that the right of a patient to refuse treatment must 
be balanced against a number of State interests: the State's interest in (1) the protection of innocent 
third parties; (2) the prevention of suicide; (3) the preservation of life; and (4) the safeguarding of the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession.114 Only if the individual's right to self-determination 
105 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 241-242 ( 1990). Th.e main issue for determination was whether the Federal 
Constitution prohibited the State of Missouri from requiring 'clear and convinciug evidence' of an 
incompetent patient's previously expressed wishes to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment. For 
further discussion, see below, 59-60. 
106 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 241 (1990) referring to the court's earlier decision in Twin City Banlc v Newbeker 
167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897). 
107 See also G. Annas, 'The Long Dying of Nancy Cruzan' (1991) 19 Law, Med. & Health Care 52, 55. It 
has been suggested that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in particular, ss. 7 and 12, may 
possibly offer a patient some protection in relation to the patient's wishes regarding his or her body; 
R. Samek, 'Euthanasia and Law Reform' (1985) 17 Ottawa L.Rev. 86, 102. 
108 Of the dissenting judges, Brennan J. with whom Marshall J. and Blackmun J. agreed, upheld the 
'fundamental right' of a person to be free of unwanted medical treatment; 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 256-274 
(1990). 
109 For discussion see L. Gostin, 'Life and Death Choices After Cruzan' (1991) 19 Law, Med. & Health Care 
9; J. Bopp and T. Marzen, 'Cruzan: Facing the Inevitable' (1991) 19 Law, Med. & Health Care 37, 38; 
A. Kambouris, 'A Qualified "Right to Die:" Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health' (1991) 1 
Detroit College L.Rev. 417. Contra. Annas, 54 where he states that both the right to privacy and the 
liberty interest delineated in the Fourteenth Amendment derive from the same source and their content 
in this context is unlikely to be different. 
110 Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
111 J. Bopp and R.E. Coleson, 'Webster and the Future of Substantive Due Process' (1990) 28 Duq.L.Rev. 
271, 280. 
112 See chapter V1I, 326-330. 
113 For example, In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985). Although the common law right to refuse treatment, 
unlike its constitutional equivalent, is not inherently limited by State interests, the courts have 
assumed that the exercise of the common law right must also be weighed against State interests. 
114 The relevant State interests have been formulated by the various State courts in the United States, 
beginning with the seminal In re Quinlan case, 355 A. 2d 647 (1976), and then more comprehensively 
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outweighs all the relevant State interests will the right to refuse medical treatment be upheld. If, 
however, the court concludes that there is a State interest which overrides the patient's individual 
interests, the patient's request that treatment be withheld or withdrawn will be refused.115 
In all the treatment cases coming before the courts in the United States, the courts have balanced the 
asserted right of the patient to reject further treatment on the one hand against the countervailing State 
interests on the other in order to determine whether the right of the patient should be upheld. 
Notwithstanding the judicial rhetoric of balancing the patient's right to refuse treatment against these 
countervailing State interests, up until the recent 'right to live' cases there was a fairly predictable 
endpoint of judicial reasoning. 116 Although the courts have, on occasions, denied the right of a 
patient to refuse treatment and have ordered that treatment be administered against the patient's 
expressed wishes, 117 the clear trend emerging from more recent cases is that the patient's right to 
refuse treatment, even life-saving treatment will be upheld. 118 
It is proposed here to briefly review the various State interests which the American courts have taken 
into account and to examine how the courts have dealt with these considerations. 
Protection of Innocent Third Parties 
One of the State interests which must be balanced against the right of an individual to refuse treatment 
is the State's interest in the protection of innocent third parties who may be harmed by the patient's 
treatment decision.119 The State, acting as parens patriae has an interest in protecting those who 
cannot take care for themselves. The State's interest encompasses the protection of incompetent 
persons and dependent third parties but has most frequently been asserted in cases involving minor 
children.120 Since parents have the primary obligation of care and support for their minor children, 
the State has an interest in maintaining the life of the parents in order that they may continue to 
provide financial and emotional support to their children. Thus the court may find it necessary to 
override the self-determination of the parent in order to protect the children from the emotional and 
,.-fil 
outlined in Superintendent of Belchert9{i State School v Saikewicz 370 N.E. 2d 417 (1977) and In re 
Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985). The existence of State interests which must be balanced against the 
individual's right to refuse treatment bas also been acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court in 
the Cruzan case; 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 242 (1990). 
115 In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209, 1223 (1985). 
116 L. Gostin, 'A Right to Choose Death: The Judicial Trilogy of Brophy, Bouvia and Conroy' (1986) 14 
Law, Med. & Health Care 198. See also S. Cole and M. Shea, 'Voluntary Euthanasia: A Proposed 
Remedy' (1975) 39 Alb.L.Rev. 826, 831 where the authors suggest that the qualification of an 
overriding State interest is more palatable in theory than in practice. 
117 For example, United States v George 239 F. Supp. 752 (1965); In re President and Directors of 
Georgetown College, Inc. 331 F. 2d 1000 (1964). 
118 In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985); In re Farrel 529 A. 2d 404 (1987). 
119 Superintendent of Belchertlf.i State School v Saikewicz 370 N.E. 2d 417, 425 (1977). 11 " · 
120 A.S. Oddi, 'The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The Wrongful Living Cause of Action' (1986) 
75 Geo.L.J. 625, 633 . See, for example, In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc . 331 
F. 2d 1000 (1964); United States v George 239 F. Supp. 752 (1965); In re Osborne 294 A. 2d 372 
(1972). The issue bas also arisen in circumstances where the patient is pregnant and attempts are made 
to override the patient's refusal of treatment in order to preserve the life of the fetus . See Raleigh 
Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v Anderson 42 N.J. 421 (1964). 
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financial damage which may occur as a result of the decision of a parent to refuse life-saving 
treatment 
In a number of cases, the State's interest in ensuring that children will not be left parentless has been 
invoked by the courts to justify the imposition of medical treatment against the clearly expressed 
wishes of the patient.121 These cases have mainly involved the administration of blood transfusions 
necessary to save the life of the patient in circumstances where the patient has refused such medical 
treatment on religious grounds.122 One such example is the case of In re President and Directors of 
Georgetown College, Inc.123 The Full Court of the United States Court of Appeals (District of 
Columbia) upheld a court order requiring the patient, a Jehovah's Witness and mother of a seven 
month old child, to submit to a blood transfusion which was necessary to save her life, 
notwithstanding the patient's objections to such treatment based upon her religious beliefs. The court 
based its decision in part on the ground that the State had an interest in protecting the child from the 
effects of abandonment.124 The patient, in her capacity as parent, had a duty to her child as well as to 
the community to care for the child and could therefore be forced to accept medical treatment which 
would save her life. 
These blood transfusion cases are perhaps distinguishable from the more usual refusal of treatment 
cases in that blood transfusions can be seen to represent only a temporary and minimal invasion of a 
patient's body and in all the cases where treatment was ordered, the prognoses for recovery was 
good.125 These cases do at least demonstrate that the State has the power to enforce the treatment of a 
patient who is a parent of minor children, if such treattnent would afford the parent complete recovery 
and the ability to care for his or her children.126 However, where the patient's condition is terminal 
and medical treatment cannot offer a cure, application of the State interest in protecting children is 
clearly inappropriate. 
121 For example, In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc. 331 F. 2d 1000 (1964); United 
States v George 239 F. Supp. 752 (1965). But see Cole and Shea, 830-831 where they argue that in no 
case has the right to refuse treatment been denied solely on the basis of this State interest. 
122 It should be noted that the refusal of treatment on religious grounds raises the issue of freedom of 
religion guaranteed under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. However, as with the 
more general right of a patient to refuse treatment, the right to exercise one's religious beliefs must be 
balanced against countervailing State interests. Consequently, the approach adopted in these cases 
involving the refusal of treatment on religious grounds is of more general relevance. Support for this 
conclusion can be found in the concurring judgment of Yeagley J. in Re Osborne 294 A. 2d 372, 376 
(1972) where he stated that his decision was not based solely on religious freedom, but also on the 
broader based freedom of choice whether founded on religious beliefs or otherwise. 
123 331 F. 2d 1000 (1964). 
124 Id. 1008. The court's decision to order treatment was also in part based upon the issue of the patient's 
decision-making capacity. 
125 R. Hill, 'Euthanasia; The Right to Be 'Let' Alone' (1980-81) 7 S.U.L.Rev. 101, 103. See also In re 
Quinlan 355 A. 2d 647, 664 (1976). 
126 N. Vaughan, 'The Right To Die' (1973-4) 10 Cal.W.L.Rev. 613, 619. Even in circumstances where the 
patient refusing life-saving treatment does have dependent children, the court may nevertheless uphold 
the patient's refusal of treatment if it satisfied that adequate provision has been made for their future 
care and support; e.g. In re Osborne 294 A. 2d 372 (1972) in which the court upheld the right of the 
father to refuse life-saving treatment since he had made provision for the care and support of the 
children. 
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Even in cases where life-saving treatment is at stake, it could be argued that the State's legitimate 
interest in protecting the emotional and material welfare of minor children cannot justify judicial 
interference with a patient's decision to refuse treatment.127 Individual interests of bodily integrity and 
self-determination are of such fundamental importance that they should prevail over the interests of 
dependent children. Significantly, in more recent cases, the courts have rejected any restriction on a 
patient's right to refuse treatment on the baSis that he or she is a parent.128 
In addition to its concern to protect minor children from the effects of their parent's refusal of 
treatment, the State's interest in protecting innocent third parties extends also to wider public health 
considerations. Where the patient's exercise of his or her free choice could adversely affect the health, 
safety or security of others, the patient's right of self-determination may have to yield to the wider 
public interestl29 and the courts have, on occasions, required competent adults to undergo medical 
procedures against their will in order to protect public health. 130 There appears to be little 
disagreement with the view that in certain circumstances, public interest considerations, in particular, 
matters of public health and safety, must be given priority over individual interests. 131 However, 
only in exceptional circumstances will the refusal of treatment by a patient have implications for the 
health and safety of the public. 
State's Interest in the Prevention of Suicide 
Another of the interests which the courts have held must be weighed against the individual's right to 
refuse treatment is the State's interest in the prevention of suicide.132 However, as a result of the 
approach adopted by the courts, this particular interest appears to be of little practical significance in 
refusal of treatment cases. On numerous occasions, the courts in the United States have held that the 
refusal of treatment by a patient does not amount to suicide.133 This conclusion has been justified on 
the grounds that the patient may lack the requisite intent to die, and even if that intent was present, 
death would be caused, not by the patient's refusal of treatment, but as a result of the underlying 
condition of the patient.134 Since the courts have consistently distinguished the refusal of treatment 
127 Lanham, 'The Right to Choose to Die with Dignity,' 420; Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 
23-24; M. Oberman, 'Withdrawal of Life Support: Individual Autonomy Against Alleged State Interests 
in Preserving Life' ( 1989) 20 Loy. U. Chi.Li. 797, 803-804. 
128 For example, Fosmire v Nicoleau 75 N. Y. 2d 218 (1990). 
129 In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209, 1225 (1985). 
130 For example, Jacobson v Massachusetts 197 U.S. 11 (1905) in which the court upheld the 
enforceability of compulsory small pox legislation and held that the interest of a State in protecting 
its inhabitants from a dangerous and contagious disease outweighed the right of a person to refuse 
treatment. 
131 See also G. Grisez and J.M. Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice (1979) 93 ; R. Byrn, 
'Compulsory Life-Saving Treatment for the Competent Adult' (1975-6) 44 Fordham LRev. 1, 35. ~" 
132 For example, Superintendent of BelchertJ'h State School v Saikewicz 370 N.E. 2d 417, 425 (1977). 
Although this interest is perhaps better se'~n as part of the State's broader interest in the preservation 
of life (In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209, 1224 (1985)) it has generally been considered as a distinct State 
interest. 
133 In re Quinlan 355 A. 2d 647 (1976); Superintendent of BelchertM. State School v Saikewicz 370 N.E. '-10. 
2d 417 (1977). /\ 
134 Superintendent of Belcherto"fi State School v Saikewicz 370 N.E. 2d 417, 426 (1977). Some courts t.(.i, 
have, however, questioned fuis reasoning; see, for example, the dissenting judgment of Lynch I. in 
Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital, Inc. 497 N.E. 2d 626 (1986); the Missouri Supreme Court 
decision, Cruzan v Harmon, 760 S.W. 2d 408,411-412 (1988) per Robertson J.; and the concurring 
judgment of Scalia J. of the Supreme Court in the Cruzan case 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 251-256 (1990). 
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by a patient from suicide, they have been able to find that the State's interest in the prevention of 
suicide does not arise in the refusal of treatment cases.135 
State's Interest in the Preservation of Life 
The State's interest in the preservation of life is commonly considered to be the most significant of 
the four State interests.136 It comprises two separate but related concerns: an interest in preserving 
the life of a particular patient and an interest in preserving the sanctity of all life.137 Over recent 
years, the law in this area has undergone significant development. Although early precedentl38 can be 
cited in which the courts upheld the right of a patient to refuse treatment, even if death were to result, 
it was not until the mid 1970s, against a background of ever increasing medical capacity to sustain 
life, that the courts more clearly articulated the principles regarding the right to refuse treatment and 
its relationship with the State interest in the preservation of life. Through its development in the case 
law, the right of a patient to refuse treatment has been expanded to include a broadening spectrum of 
persons and types of treatment that may be terminated or withheld 139 
The majority of cases coming before the courts in the United States have involved incompetent 
patients, and it is largely within this context that the relevant principles regarding patient rights have 
been propounded. Since the courts have equated the rights of competent and incompetent patients, 140 
the principles laid down in these cases are of general application to all patients. One of the major 
cases in the development of the patient's right to refuse treatment is the landmark decision of the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey in In re Quinlan.141 This case involved an application by Karen Ann 
Quinlan's father for the discontinuation of artificial life-support with respect to his comatosed daughter 
who was in a persistent vegetative state. The court, in its evaluation of the State's interest in the 
preservation of life, emphasised the serious and irreversible condition of the patient.142 Earlier cases 
in which the courts had ordered treatment were distinguished on the ground that in many of those cases 
the medical procedure required, (usually a blood transfusion) constituted a minimal bodily invasion and 
the chances of recovery and return to functioning. life were very good.143 In the opinion of the court: 
135 More detailed consideration will be given to the court's approach to the suicide issue and the 
relationship between refusal of treatment and suicide in the following chapter, 91-95. 
136 In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209, 1223 (1985); President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems 
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research, Deciding to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment 
(1983) 32 (cited hereafter as the President's Commission Report.); G.P. Smith, 381. 
137 In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209, 1223 (1985). 
138 For example, Erickson v Dilgard 252 N.Y. S. 2d 705 (1962); In re Brooks' Estate 32 Ill. 2d 361 (1965). 
139 Oddi, 636. 
140 E.g In re Quinlan 355 A. 2d 647, 664 (1976, ); In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985); In re Fa"el 529 A. 
2d 404 (1987). Although the courts have consistently equated the rights of competent and incompetent 
patients, significant practical difficulties may arise with regard to the exercise of this right by an 
incompetent patient. As a result, in many of these cases, considerable atteption has focussed on the 
procedural requirements and in particular, the appropriate mechanisms and safeguards for the exercise of 
the incompetent patient's right to refuse treatment. 
141 355 A. 2d 647 (1976). 
142 Id. 663-664. 
143 Id. 664. 
The State's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as 
· the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. lntimately there 
comes a point at which the individuals rights overcome the State interest. 
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Since Karen's prognosis was extremely poor and the degree of bodily invasion was very great, 144 the 
court concluded that there was no compelling interest of the State requiring her to endure further 
treatment and the court sanctioned the removal of artificial life-support. 
This approach was extended further by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Superintendent of 
/-tO, Be/chert°-'~ v Saikewicz.1 45 This case concerned a 67 year old man with severe mental retardation who 
had been institutionalised for most of his life. He was diagnosed as suffering from myeloblastic 
monocytic leukemia, an incurable and terminal condition. Medical evidence indicated that aggressive 
treatment of the disease was unlikely to be successful, 146 and was likely to cause pain and distress. 
As in the Quinlan case, the court emphasised the relevance of the patient's condition in assessing the 
weight to be attached to the State's interest in the preservation of life. The Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts found that: 
There is a substantial distinction in the State's insistence that human life be saved 
where the affliction is incurable, as opposed to the State interest where the issue 
is not whether but when, for how long and at what cost to the individual that life 
may be briefly extended. 
Thus, on the facts of the case, the court was able to conclude that the patient's right to privacy must 
prevail over the asserted State interest in the preservation of life.147 However, the court rejected any 
suggestion that it was being involved in quality of life considerations.148 
As illustrated by the Quinlan and Saikewicz decisions, in determining whether treatment should be 
withheld or withdrawn, attention has frequen~y focussed on the condition of the patient and the degree 
of bodily invasion that further treatment would entail. In circumstances where the condition of the 
patient is terminal or beyond cure, and treatment involves significant bodily invasion, there is seen to 
be little conflict between, on the one hand, the interests of the individual in avoiding prolongation of 
the dying process and unnecessary suffering, and on the other hand, the interests of the State in the 
preservation of life. In such cases the courts have generally held that there is no compelling State 
144 The medical evidence indicated that she bad no chance of being restored to cognitive or sapient life and 
she required 24 hour nursing care, antibiotics, the assistance of a respirator, a catheter and feeding tube. 
145 370 N.E. 2d 417 (1977). 
146 Chemotherapy offered the possibility of achieving a remission in 30% to 50% of cases. However, the 
duration of the remission was estimated at between 2 to 13 months; see the report at 420. 
147 The decision has, however, been criticised as an unjustifiable extension of the Quinlan case; see, for 
example, S. Schultz, W. Swartz and J. Appelbaum, 'Deciding Right to Die Cases Involving 
Incompetent Patients: Jones v Saikewicz' (1977) 11 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 936; P. Ramsey, Ethics at the 
Edges of Life (1978) 353. 
148 370 N.E. 2d 417, 432 (1977). However, by applying a 'substituted judgment' test in determining 
whether treatment should proceed and by bavirig regard to the condition and prognosis of the patient, it 
is arguable the court did in effect give consideration to quality of life considerations. See also R. 
Sherlock, 'For Everything there is a Season: The Right to Die in the United States' (1982) 
B.Y. U.L.Rev. 545, 581. 
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interest in the preservation of life and there has been ready acceptance of the right of a patient to be 
free from unauthorised bodily invasion.149 
However, in circumstances where the death of the patient is not imminent or where the patient's life is 
potentially salvageable, the tension between individual and State interests arises more acutely. The 
State's interest in the preservation of life is, potentially at least, more significant in these 
circumstances, since the life of the patient is capable of preservation. On the basis of the courts 
approach in the Quinlan and Saikewicz which emphasises the need to balance the State's interest in 
the preservation of life against the condition and prognosis of the patient, it would appear that the 
resolution of the conflict in such circumstances would result in the interests of the patient being 
subordinated to the interests of the State. 
Notwithstanding the significant influence of these earlier decisions, subsequent cases indicated that 
judicial doctrine in the United States was evolving in favour of respecting the choice of a competent 
patient to decline medical treatment, even in circumstances where death was not imminent and where 
the condition of the patient was salvageable.150 This development occurred through a series of cases 
in which the courts in a number of United States jurisdiction rejected any suggestion that the patient's 
right of self-determination is dependent upon an assessment of the condition of the patient The courts 
in these cases have ruled that ultimately thf? patient should be free to decide whether treatment should 
be discontinued. 
The case of Bartling v Superior Court 151 involved a 70 year old competent patient suffering from a 
number of potentially fatal conditions152 who had requested that he be removed from the life-
sustaining ventilator. This request was denied by the trial judge, 153 but on appeal, the Californian 
Court of Appeal held that the request should have been respected, notwithstanding the fact that he had 
not been diagnosed as 'terminally ill'. The court held that the right to disconnect a life-support 
mechanism was not limited to comatose or terminally ill patients.154 The court was of the view that 
all competent adults have the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment and held that this right 
outweighed societal interests, including the State interest in the preservation of life.155 This 
149 For example, Satz v Perlmutter 362 So. 2d 160 (1978) (court upheld the right of a patient to refuse 
treatment in circumstances of unbearable pain and imminent death, finding that the patient's right to 
refuse treatment far outweighed the State's interest in the preservation of life); In re Eichner 52 N.Y. 2d 
363 (1981). 
150 For example, Bartling v Superior Court 163 Cal. App. 3d 186 (1984); Bouvia v Superior Court 225 Cal. 
Rptr. 297 (1986). See also discussion by Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying 19-20; G.P. 
Smith, 392-408. 
151 163 Cal. App. 3d 186 (1984). Bartling died on the eve of the appeal but the Californian Court of 
Appeal agreed to hear the case in view of the lack of guidelines regulating the conduct of hospitals in 
'right to die cases'. 
152 Bartling was suffering from cancer, emphysema, chronic respiratory failure, arteriosclerosis and an 
abdominal aneursym. 
153 The lower court had refused to uphold the patient's request on the grounds that he was neither terminally 
ill nor permanently comatose. 
154 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 193 (1984). 
l55 Id. 195-196. 
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development was furthered in the case of Bouvia v Superior Court 156 where the California Court of 
Appeal, again overruling the trial court, 157 upheld the request of Elizabeth Bouvia, a competent 28 
year old quadriplegic, that naso-gastric feeding be discontinued. The court found that the legitimate 
interest of the State in preserving life may not be advanced without regard to the costs to the 
individual patients.158 Although Elizabeth Bouvia could have possibly lived for another 15 or 20 
years if appropriate feeding was ordered, the court emphasised the need to respect the patient's 
subjective assessment of her quality of life.159 
It is possible to conclude from the decisions of the appeal courts in Bartling and Bouvia that the right 
to refuse treatment is not dependent on the condition of the patient; whether for example the patient is 
permanently comatose, or terminally ill. Furthermore, the patient's subjective assessment of his or 
her quality of life and what steps are reasonable to preserve it are paramount 160 
An important case in the evolution of the patient's right to refuse treatment in the United States is In 
re Conroy, 161 a decision by the same court that had determined the seminal Quinlan case. Ms Conroy 
was an elderly nursing-home patient who had serious and irreversible mental and physical impairments 
and a limited life expectancy. Nourishment was provided by a naso-gastric feeding tube. Ms Conroy's 
nephew, her only relative, petitioned the court, requesting that the naso-gastric feeding tube be 
removed and that she be allowed to die. This request was granted at first instance, 162 but an appeal by 
Ms Conroy's guardian ad /item resulted in this decision being reversed by the Appellate Division of 
the Superior Court.163 On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the court upheld the 
paramountcy of the patient's right to refuse treatment stating that on balance, the right to self-
determination ordinarily outweighs any countervailing State interests.164 Whilst acknowledging the 
strength of the State's interest in preserving the life of a particular patient as well as the sanctity of all 
life, the court held that these interests will not in themselves usually foreclose a competent person 
from declining life-sustaining medical treatment for him or herself. As was explained by the court, 
this is because the life that the State is seeking to protect in such a situation is the life of the same 
person who has competently decided to forgo the medical intervention: it is not some other actual or 
potential life that cannot adequately protect itself. 
156 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986). 
157 The trial judge had based his decision on the grounds that the patient was not terminally ill and had a 
life expectancy of 15-20 years and that force-feeding was justified on a non-terminal patient; Bouvia v 
County of Riverside, Riverside County (Cal.) Sup. Ct. Case No. 159780 (1983). See V. Gilbreath, 'The 
Right of the Terminally Ill to Die with Assistance if Necessary' (1986) 8 Crim.Just.]. 403, 408. 
158 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304-05 (1986). 
159 Id. 305. 
160 See G. Annas, 'Transferring the Ethical Hot Potato' (1987) 17 Hastings Center R. 20. 
161 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985). 
162 457 A. 2d 1232 (1983). 
163 464 A. 2d 303 (1983). Ms Conroy had in fact died with her naso-gastric feeding tube still in place prior 
to the hearing of the matter but the court agreed to proceed with the case on the grounds that it raised a 
matter of substantial importance, capable of repetition but which appeared to evade review. 
164 486 A. 2d 1209, 1225 (1985). 
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Although the case before the court involved an incompetent patient with a limited life expectancy,165 
the court made it clear that if Ms Conroy were competent. her right to self-determination would not be 
affected by her medical condition or prognosis.166 The court stated that a young, generally healthy 
person bas the same right to decline life-saving medical treatment as a competent elderly person who 
is terminally ill. Further, the court specifically rejected judicial reliance upon a qualitative assessment 
of the patient's life in determining whether to uphold a decision of a competent patient to refuse 
treatment. Whilst acknowledging that a patient's decision to accept or reject medical treatment may be 
influenced by bis or her medical condition, treatment and prognosis, the court held that a competent 
person's right to refuse medical treatment does not depend on the quality or value of bis or her life.167 
The rejection of quality of life considerations by the court in determining refusal of treatment cases is 
significant. It heralds judicial recognition that it is inappropriate for a court to determine whether to 
uphold a patient's decision to refuse treatment on the basis of whether or not the court finds that the 
patient's life is worth preserving. Indeed, this represents the major criticism of the position underlying 
some of the earlier cases which had emphasised the condition and prognosis of the patient and nature 
of treatment in determining whether the individual interests should yield to the State's interest in the 
preservation of life. The difficulty with this earlier approach is that it appears to involve the court in 
an objective assessment of the person's quality of life and whether that life is worth living.168 
Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that only if the person's life is worth preserving will the 
State interest outweigh the right of the individual to refuse treatment. For the courts to be involved in 
this kind of assessment is clearly objectionable on policy grounds, since it creates a vague, invidious 
and perilous criterion on which to decide whether to comply with a patient's refusal of treatment.169 
It was this realisation which led the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy to reject any 
distinction based upon the condition or prognosis of the patient or the patient's quality or value of 
life.170 As was recognised by that court, the only acceptable alternative is to respect the decisions of 
all competent patients regarding the withholding or withdrawal of treatment, based upon the patient's 
own subjective assessment.171 This clearly involves giving priority to individual rights over the 
State's interests in the preservation of life. 
165 Id. 1219 where the question for the courts determination was stated to be 'the circumstances under which 
life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from an elderly nursing-home resident who is 
suffering from serious and permanent mental and physical impairments, who will probably die within 
approximately one year even with treatment and who, though formerly competent, is now incompetent 
to make decisions about her life-sµstaining treatment and is unlikely to regain such competence.' 
166 Id. 1226. 
167 Id. 1226. 
168 Lanham, 'The Right to Choose to Die with Dignity,' 417. 
169 Id. 418; Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying 20; K. Hegland, 'Unauthorised Rendition of 
Lifesaving Medical Treatment' (1965) 53 Calif.LRev. 860, 872. 
170 Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying 20. Where, however, decisions have to be made on behalf 
of incompetent patients on the basis of the 'limited objective' and 'pure objective tests' established in 
Jn re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985) quality of life considerations cannot be entirely avoided; S. 
Levant, 'Natural Death: An Alternative in New Jersey' [1985] 73 Geo.LJ. 331, 1337. 
171 This was the approach adopted .in the case of Bouvia v Superior Court 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) 
considered above, 55. The patient's decision will no doubt be influenced by quality of life 
considerations but this is quite a different matter from the courts making such an assessment; In re 
Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209, 1226 (1985); Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying 53-57. 
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A more recent decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court which confirms and consolidates the 
approach taken in In re Conroy is In re Farrel, one of a trilogy of cases decided by the court on the 
same day. 172 Kathleen Farrel, a competent 37 year old woman suffering from an incurable condition 
(Lou Gehrig's disease), bad requested that the mechanical ventilator that sustained her breathing be 
disconnected. When her doctor refused to comply with this request, her husband applied to the court 
seeking an order that treatment be discontinued. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the right of 
patients to make decisions regarding their own treatment: 
In the case of a competent adult patient, it is primarily that person who should 
make the decision. A competent person's interest in her or his self-determination 
generally outweighs any countervailing interest the State may have.173 
The court continued: 
All patients, competent or incompetent, with some limited cognitive ability or 
in a persistent vegetative state, terminally ill or not terminally ill, are entitled to 
choose whether or not they want life-sustaining medical treatment ... Medical 
choices are private ... They are not to be decided by societal standards of 
reasonableness or normalcy. Rather it is the patient's preferences - formed by his 
or her unique personal experiences - that should control. The privacy that we 
accord medical decisions does not vary with the patient's condition or 
prognosis.17 4 
The court emphasised, however, that in cases of this nature, there must be some procedural safeguards 
to ensure that the patient is competent and informed about the prognosis, alternative treatments 
available and the risks involved in terminating the life-sustaining treatment and that the patient's 
decision is made voluntarily and without coercion.175 
The judgment in this case, (one of the few cases dealing with a competent patient) represents one of 
the clearest statements recognising the patient's right to refuse treatment. It unequivocally affirms the 
right of a patient to refuse treatment regardless of the patient's condition or prognosis and asserts the 
primacy of this right over countervailing State interests, including the State's interest in the 
preservation of life.17 6 
172 529 A. 2d 404 (1987). The other two cases, involving incompetent patients, were In re Peter by 
Johanning 529 A. 2d 419 (1987); In re Jobes 529 A. 2d 434 (1987). 
173 Id. 416. 
174 In re Peter by Johanning 529 A. 2d 419, 423 (1987) (decided by the same court on the same day.) 
175 529 A. 2d 404, 413 (1987). 
176 There have been a number of other cases involving non-terminal competent patients; e.g. In re Rodas, 
District Court, County of Mesa, State of Colorado, No. 86 P.R. 139, 22 Jan. 1987; Georgia v McAfee, 
Georgia Supreme Court, 21 Nov. 1989; McKay v Bergstedt, No. 21207, Nevada Supreme Court, 30 
Nov. 1990, 59 U.S.L.W. (General) 2364, 18 Dec. 1990. Although the principles in these cases have 
been stated to apply to both competent and incompetent patients, (e.g. In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209 
(1985); In re Farrel 529 A. 2d 404 (1987)), in practice, the application of these principles with respect 
to incompetent patients may prove problematic, particularly in cases where' there is no indication of 
the patient's prior wishes. In such circumstances, where a decision must be made on behalf of an 
incompetent patient, it may be impossible to avoid consideration of the patient's condition and 
general quality of life considerations. See also Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, ~6-57; 
Levant, 1337. Examination of decision-making for incompetent patients is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
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Although the majority of cases have followed this trend, upholding the principles of patient autonomy 
and self-determination over countervailing interests in the preservation of human life, there have been 
a few isolated cases which appear to have gone against the mainstream.177 All of these cases have 
involved incompetent patients dependent on artificial nutrition and hydration and the courts have 
strongly asserted the State's interest in the preservation of life, refusing to authorise the withdrawal of 
these measures. 
The decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in the Cruzan case is illustrative of these 'right to live' 
cases.178 As a result of a motor vehicle accident Nancy Cruzan, a 30 year old woman, was in a 
persistent comatose and vegetative state. After five years of nursing home care there was no indication 
of improvement in her condition, and her parents, in their capacity as court appointed guardians, 
sought the discontinuance of nutrition and hydration which was being provided through a gastronomy 
feeding tube. The hospital refused to comply with the parent's direction in the absence of a court order. 
The parents consequently initiated proceedings against the Director of the Missouri Health Department 
and the hospital administrator seeking a declaratory judgment to sanction the treatment withdrawal. 
After hearing evidence about the patient's circumstances, including testimony from family and friends 
about statements she had made to the effect that she would not wish to continue living in such a state, 
the trial court upheld the parent's request for the withdrawal of medical treatment. including the feeding 
tube. 
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court, by a narrow majority, reversed the trial court's decision.179 
Whilst recognising the right of a patient to refuse medical treatment based on the common law 
doctrine of informed consent, 180 the court found that the State of Missouri had a strong policy 
favouring the preservation of life, as embodied in the Missouri living will statute.181 Because the 
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration would.result in death, the court held that the State of Missouri, 
in exercise of its interest in the preservation of life, was entitled to regulate such decisions by 
requiring 'clear and convincing evidence' of the patient's wishes before treatment would be 
withdrawn.182 Since the court was not satisfied that such evidence existed, the request for the 
withdrawal of the feeding tube was refused. 
However, the decision of the court. particularly with regard to the State's interest in the preservation 
of life, went beyond what was necessary to decide the case on its facts. The court ruled that the State's 
interest in the preservation of life, particularly valid in circumstances where the patient is not 
177 See, for example, the Washington Supreme Court decision in In re Grant 109 Wash. 2d 545 (1987); the 
New York Court of Appeals in In re Westchester County Medical Center (O'Connor) 72 N.Y. 2d 517 
(1988); and the Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan v Harmon 160 S.W. 2d 408 (1988). There have also 
been strong dissenting judgments in a number of other cases; see, for example, In re Gardner 534 A. 2d 
947 (1987); Brophy v New England Sinai Hosp. Inc. 497 N.E. 2d 626 (1986). 
178 This terminology comes from J. Bopp and J.D. Avila, 'Trends in the Law from Death to Life' (1990-91) 
27 Idaho L.Rev. 1, 3. 
179 Cruzan v Harmon 160 S.W. 2d 408 (1988) by a majority of 4:3. 
180 Id. 416-417. 
181 Mo. Rev. Stat 459.010 et seq, 1986. 
182 Id. 425-427. 
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terminally ill, is 'unqualified' and under the circumstances, outweighed the patient's right to refuse 
treatment. Consistent with the earlier cases outlined above, 183 the court rejected any quality of life 
considerations but chose instead to devise its own formula based on the assessment of the patient's life 
expectancy balanced against the extent of the treatment burden.184 The court held that: 
Given the fact that Nancy is alive and that the burdens of her treatment are not 
excessive for her, we do not believe her right to refuse treatment ... outweighs the 
immense, clear fact of life in which the State maintains a vital interest.185 
The decision of the Missouri Supreme Court is significant because it is the first case in modem 
American jurisprudence in which treatment was ordered explicitly on the basis of the State's interest in 
the preservation of life, rather on the basis of the patient's wishes or best interests.186 The decision 
has, as a result, drawn sharp criticism from a number of quarters.187 In analysing the significance of 
the decision, there is a temptation to confine its application to the facts of the case; i.e. a case of 
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration1 88 from an incompetent patient whose wishes were not 
established to the satisfaction of the court.189 However, the reasoning adopted by the Missouri 
Supreme Court strongly suggests that the revived State interest in the preservation of life would apply 
also to competent patients who had expressed their wishes about medical treatment.190 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and upheld the decision of the Missouri Supreme 
Court by a majority of five to four.191 As noted earlier, 192 the question before the Supreme Court 
was framed in very narrow terms; whether the procedural requirement imposed by the State of 
Missouri of 'clear and convincing evidence' of an incompetent patient's previously expressed wishes as 
a precondition to the withdrawal or withholding of treatment was unconstitutional.193 Whilst 
183 See above, 55-57. 
184 Id. 420, 422-424. See also P. Peters, 'The State's Interest in the Preservation of Life: From Quinlan to 
Cruzan' (1989) 50 Ohio St.L.J. 891, 905-907. 
185 760 s.w. 2d 408, 424 (1988). 
186 Peters, 905. For an early example of a court subordinating a patient's right to refuse treatment to the 
State's interest in the preservation of life, see John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v Heston 58 N.J. 
516 (1971). 
187 See, for example, R. McCormick, 'The Cruzan Decision' (1990) Vol. 9 No. 2 Bioethics News 16; 
Peters, 905-910. 
188 The issue of withdrawal of nutrition and hydration is dealt with in more detail below, 61-64. 
189 It could be argued that the Cruzan case has justifiably cast doubt on reliance upon principles of 
autonomy and self-determination in respect of incompetent patients, at least in circumstances where 
the patient has never been competent, or in respect of formerly competent patients who have not 
clearly expressed their treatment preferences. For discussion see S. Johnson, 'From Medicalization to 
Legalization to Politicization: O'Connor, Cruzan and the Refusal of Treatment in the 1990s' (1989) 21 
Conn.L.Rev. 685. A full examination of decision-making for incompetent patients is, however, 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
190 See discussion by Peters, 908-909; L. Albert, 'Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health' 
(1991) 12 J. Legal Med. 331, 355-356; Johnson. In this respect the decision arguably goes further 
than the earlier 'right to live' cases referred to above, 58. 
191 Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion, in which Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and 
Kennedy joined. Justices O'Connor and Scalia also delivered separate concurring opinions to further 
express their views. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices· Marshall and 
Blackmun joined. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion. 
192 See above, 47-48. 
193 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 241, 243 (1990). 
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affirming the right of a competent patient to refuse treatment, 194 the Supreme Court held that since 
States have an interest in protecting and preserving life, they are entitled to regulate the exercise of 
that right, particularly with regard to incompetent patients. The court recognised that where a patient 
is incompetent, States have a legitimate interest in protecting the patient's life and ensuring through 
heightened evidentiary standards, that the decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment reflected the 
patient's actual preferences.195 The court went on to hold that the requirement under Missouri law of 
'clear and convincing evidence' of an incompetent patient's wishes was a legitimate form of State 
regulation not contrary to the United States Constitution.196 
The implications of the Supreme Court decision in the Cruzan case must be carefully assessed. 
Although affirming the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court, the question addressed by the United 
States Supreme Court was narrowly framed in terms of the constitutionality of the procedural 
requirement imposed by the State of Missouri in respect of incompetent patients.197 The effect of the 
Supreme Court's ruling is that States are largely free to determine their own procedural safeguards in 
relation to the withholding or withdrawing of medical treatment from incompetent patients. The 
decision is of more limited relevance to the general issue of the right of patients to refuse medical 
treatment. The Supreme Court did acknowledge the right of a competent patient to refuse treatment as 
a constitutionally protected liberty interest. In accordance with earlier decisions, the court held that 
this right is not absolute and must be weighed against relevant State interests including the State's 
interest in the preservation of life. The court did not, however, specifically address the issue of the 
appropriate weight to be given to the State's interest in the preservation of life, particulaily when this 
is balanced against the right of a competent patient to refuse treatment.198 
In light of the Missouri Supreme Court decision in the Cruzan case, and a number of other similar 
cases, it can no longer be stated with certainty that a patient's right to refuse treatment will necessarily 
prevail over the State's interest in the preservation of life. The full implications of this line of cases 
has yet to be determined. Whilst some commentators have sought to dismiss this line of authority as 
an aberration199 against the mainstream view, others see this case as a significant and growing 
challenge to an individual's right to refuse treatment.200 However, care must be taken not to overstate 
the significance of this development. Mainstream judicial doctrine in the United States, which has, 
implicitly at least, been affirmed by the Supreme Court decision in the Cruzan case, is still firmly in 
194 Id. 241-242. 
195 Id. 243-244. 
196 Id. 244-246. 
197 Consideration of other aspects of the Supreme Court's decision concerning decision-making in respect 
of incompetent patients, (including the ruling that the Due Process Clause does not require a State to 
accept the 'substituted judgment' of close family members in the absence of substantial proof that their 
views reflect the views of the patient 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 246-247 (1990)), are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
198 The only comment in the case to suggest that a State may assert a strong interest in the preservation of 
life, even where The patient is competent, was at 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 243 (1990) where the view was 
expressed by the Chief Justice to the effect that a State need not remain neutral in the face of an 
informed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to death. 
199 See discussion by Bopp and Avila, 4. 
200 For example, Johnson, 686. 
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favour of respecting patient autonomy and giving priority to the patient's right to refuse treatment 
over any interest that the State may have in preserving the life of that patient.201 It could, however, 
be argued, particularly in the wake of the more recent 'right to live' cases, that there is a need for 
clearer analysis of the underlying values served by the State's interest in the preservation of life in 
order for the courts to be able to determine the weight to be assigned to this State interest in relation 
to the patient's right to refuse treatment.202 
Nutrition and Hydration as Medical Treatment 
Although the question of nutrition and hydration has, indirectly at least, already been dealt with in the 
foregoing discussion, 2o3 it is proposed to give this matter separate consideration, in view of the 
controversy surrounding this issue. 
If a patient is no longer able to orally take nutrition and hydration, these requirements will have to be 
administered artificially. This can be done in a variety of ways including intravenous infusions, 
through a naso-gastric tube, a gastronomy tube or a jejunostomy tube. 204 The question which arises 
is whether the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration can be characterised as medical treatment. 
and if so, whether a patient has the right to reject such procedures. 
The issue of withholding or withdrawing of artificial nutrition and hydration from a patient has given 
rise to considerable debate and controversy. Some commentators take the view that the provision of 
such basic bodily needs goes beyond the realm of medical treatment which can be withheld or 
withdrawn from a patient. 205 On the other hand, the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration is 
regarded by some as a basic, non-negotiable form of ordinary routine care which should be provided so 
long as the patient is alive.206 To a large extent, this belief appears to be based upon the emotional 
and symbolic significance commonly associated with the provision of nutrition and hydration. 207 The 
feeding of a patient is seen to be an expression of care and compassion which sets it apart from other 
forms of treatment208 and consequently there has been a reluctance in some quarters in condoning the 
201 For commentators in support of this development, see Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 19-
20; G.P. Smith, 408; Annas, 'Transferring the Ethical Hot Potatoe,' 21. Note also the President's 
Commission Report, 32. 
202 See Peters, also for analysis of the possible values or purposes that may give the State an interest in 
the preservation of a patient's life. 
203 In particular, in the context of the cases such as In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985); Bouvia v Superior 
Court 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); and Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health 111 L. Ed. 2d 
224 (1990) involving the withdrawal of artificial feeding. 
204 D. King et al, 'Where Death Begins While Life Continues' (1990) 31 S.Tex.LRev. 145, 168. 
205 For example,. G. Meilaender, 'On Removing Food and Water: Against the Stream' (1980) 14 Hastings 
Center R. 11. 
206 See Meilaender; S. Helsper and J. McCarthy, 'Forgoing Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: Some Recent 
Legal and Moral Implications for Catholic Health Care Facilities' (1987) 54 Linacre Q. 39. 
207 J. Lynn and J. Childress, 'Must Patients Always be Given Food and Water?' (1983) 13 Hastings Center 
R. 17; R. Dresser and E. Boisaubin, 'Ethics, Law and Nutritional Support' (1985) 145 Arch. Internal 
Med. 122; B. Lo and L. Dornbrand, 'The Case of Claire Conroy: Will Administrative Review Safeguard 
Incompetent Patients?' (1986) 104 Annals Internal Med. 869; A. Capron, 'Care of the Dying: 
Withholding Nutrition' (1984) 14 Hastings Center R. 32; D. Callahan, 'On Feeding the Dying' (1983) 
13 Hastings Center R. 22. 
208 See, for example, Cantor, 'Conroy, Best Interests and the Handling of Dying Patients,' 542 where he 
considers this particular argument. 
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withholding or withdrawing of such care. 209 Furthermore, concern has been expressed that if a patient 
dies following the withdrawal of nutrition or hydration, the cause of death is starvation or dehydration 
rather than death from natural causes.210 This has given rise not only to questions of criminal 
liability for the withholding or withdrawing of artificial nutrition and hydration21 l but has also raised 
fundamental questions about its moral permissibility. 
Notwithstanding the special significance which is often associated with the provision of nutrition and 
hydration, there is a growing consensus in both medical and legal circles in support of the view that 
there is no valid distinction between the provision of nourishment and other forms of life-support and 
that in appropriate circumstances, such procedures can be withheld or withdrawn. 212 
In recent years, this issue has arisen for judicial consideration on a number of occasions, primarily in 
the context of care of incompetent patients. An important case in this area was that of Barber v 
Superior Court213 in which the Californian Court of Appeal unequivocally ruled that artificial 
nutrition was to be treated like other forms of artificial life-support and could be withdrawn where it 
was demonstrated to be of no benefit to the patient In this case two doctors were charged with murder. 
The doctors had, at the request of the family, removed first the respirator and then intravenous tubes 
from Clarence Herbert who was in a permanently comatose state. Whilst recognising the emotional 
symbolism of providing food and water,214 the court refused to distinguish between artificial 
nutrition and hydration and other forms of artificial life-support. The court was of the view that: 
Medical procedures to provide nutrition and hydration are more similar to other 
medical procedures than to typical human ways of providing nutrition and 
hydration. Their benefits and burdens ought to be evaluated in the same manner as 
any other medical procedure.215 
Thus, it was held, in circumstances where the patient was in a comatosed state, from which any 
meaningful recovery of cognitive brain function was exceedingly unlikely, the treating doctors were, 
209 For example, Meilaender. There have also been objections founded on religious grounds; e.g. D. 
McCarthy, 'Murder by Deprivation of Medical Treatment' (1983) 8 Ethics and Medics 3; Helsper and 
McCarthy. 
210 See Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 39-40 where he raises and dismisses this objection. 
See also Lynn and Childress, 20. 
211 For example, Barber v Superior Court 195 Cal Rptr. 484 (1983). 
212 See Statement of the Council of Judicial and Ethical Affairs of the American Medical Association, 
Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment March (1986) (which recognised that 
a physician may ethically withdraw all means of life-prolonging medical treatment, including nutrition 
and hydration, from patients who are terminally ill or who are in irreversible comas); Hastings Center 
Report Guidelines on the Termination of life-Sustaining Treatment and Care for the Dying (1987) 60-
62; S. Wanzer et al, 'The Physician's Responsibility to the Hopelessly Ill Patient' (1984) 310 New 
Eng.J.Med. 955, 958; and the President's Commission Report, 90 (where the commission 
acknowledged that no particular treatments are universally warranted and thus obligatory for a patient 
to accept) 
It should be noted that under many of the 'living will' acts in the United States, nutrition is either 
explicitly excluded from the types of life-prolonging treatment which may be rejected through an 
advance directive, or the circumstances in which nutrition may be withdrawn are circumscribed. See N. 
Cantor, 'The Permanently Unconscious Patient, Non-Feeding and Euthanasia' (1989) 15 Am.J.L & 
Med. 381, 386-387. For further discussion, see chapter VII, 328. 
213 195 Cal Rptr. 484 (1983). 
214 Id. 490. 
215 Ibid. 
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for the purposes of the criminal law, under no legal duty to continue medical nourishment and 
hydration, notwithstanding that the patient's death w~uld result 
Another case which bas been influential in this area is In Re Conroy216 (considered above217) which 
was the first case in which a State Supreme Court recognised that the right to refuse treatment 
encompasses the right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration. As in the earlier Barber case, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged the emotional symbolism of food but held that artificial 
feeding such as naso-gastric tubes and intravenous infusions are medical procedures with risks and side 
effects. Accordingly, the court ruled that the withdrawal of artificial feeding, like any other medical 
treatment, would be permissible in app;opriate circumstances.218 In the opinion of the court 
Analytically, artificial feeding by means of a naso-gastric tube or intravenous 
infusion can be seen as equivalent to artificial breathing by means of a respirator. 
Both prolong life through mechanical means when the body is no longer able to 
perform a vital bodily function on its own.219 
The court went on to make it clear that a competent patient bas the right to decline any medical 
treatment, including artificial feeding, and should retain that right when and if be or she becomes 
incompetent. 220 
The tragic case of Elizabeth Bouvia, also noted above, 221 is further confirmation of the judicial trend 
towards upholding the right of a patient to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration in the same way 
that be or she can refuse all other medical treatments and procedures. In an application brought by Ms 
Bouvia for the discontinuance of naso-gastric feeding, the Californian Court of Appeal, reversing the 
decision of the trial judge, upheld the right of a competent adult to refuse any treatment or medical 
service, even though such treatment could be classified as nourishment and hydration and 
notwithstanding that the exercise of that right could create a life-threatening condition. 
Although in the majority of cases, the courts have characterised artificial feeding as a form of medical 
treatment equivalent to other forms of artificial life-support, 222 in a number of cases, the courts have 
rejected this approach. 223 One of the more publicised instances where a court refused to authorise the 
withdrawal of artificial feeding was the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in the Cruzan case. 
216 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985). 
217 See above, 55-56. 
218 Id. 1235-1236. 
219 Id. 1236. 
220 Ibid. 
221 See above, 55. 
222 See also Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital, Inc. 497 N.E. 2d 626 (1986); In re Peter by Johanning 
529 A. 2d 419 (1987); In re Jobes 529 A. 2d 434 (1987). 
223 See, for example, /n re Grant 109 Wash. 2d 545 (1987); In re Westchester County Medical Center 
(O'Connor) 72 N.Y. 2d 517 (1988); Cruzan v Harmon 760 S.W. 2d 408 (1988); and the strong dissents 
in a number of other cases; e.g. Lynch J. in Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital, Inc. 497 N.E. 2d 
626 (1986). For commentators who have been critical of the courts approach in treating nutrition and 
hydration as a form of medical treatment, see, for example, J. Bopp, 'Nutrition and Hydration for 
Patients: The Constitutional Aspects' (1988) 4 Issues Law & Med. 3; Y. Kamisar, 'The Right to Die' 
(1988) 33 Mich.L. Quadrangle NBl?s 1, 7-8. 
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The court sought to distinguish artificial nutrition and hydration from medical treatment, on the basis 
that 'common sense tells us that food and water do not treat illness, they maintain a life'.224 
However, according to the court, the issue was not whether the continued feeding was medical 
treatment but rather, whether the procedure was a burden to the patient.225 Since the provision of 
artificial nutrition and hydration was not, in the court's opinion, invasive or oppressively burdensome, 
and in view of the patient's long life expectancy, the court held that the State's interest in the 
preservation of life outweighed the patient's right to refuse treatment. 
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Cruzan case was, however, more in 
accordance with mainstream authority. Some members of the court specifically held that artificial 
feeding is a form of medical treatment, and that therefore, an individual's decision to reject artificially 
delivered food and water was encompassed within the constitutionally protected liberty interest.226 
This proposition was implicitly accepted by the majority of the court. 227 In the light of this 
decision, it is arguable that living will legislation which purports to treat artificial nutrition and 
hydration differently from other life-sustaining interventions may be unconstitutional. 228 The 
Supreme Court did, however, recognise that from a practical point of view, the decision to withhold 
nutrition and hydration was one of obvious finality and therefore the States were entitled to take an 
active role in the regulation of such decisions. 
In sum, the position is that despite a few notable exceptions, in the majority of cases, the courts have 
classified artificial nutrition and hydration as a form of medical treatment which a patient is entitled to 
forgo. If the principles of patient autonomy and self-determination are to be consistently applied, it 
would logically follow that the patient's right to refuse nutrition and hydration is not confined to 
circumstances where nourishment is provided by artificial means, but includes cases where a patient 
refuses oral feeding. 229 Whilst there is, todate, no case law in the United States directly on point, this 
appears to be the diection in which the courts are advancing. 
Ordinary and Extraordinary Treatment 
Attempts have also been made to curtail the right of a patient to r_efuse treatment by reference to the 
theological distinction between 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' means.230 According to traditional 
224 760 S.W. 2d 408, 423 (1988). For criticism of this aspect of the court's decision, see McCormick, 21-
22. 
225 Ibid. 
226 See O'Connor J., concurring judgment, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 247-251 (1990) and the dissenting judgment 
of Brennan J. with whom Marshall J. and Blackmon J. joined; 256-274. 
227 It was assumed by the majority, for the purposes of the decision, that the constitutionally protected 
liberty interest for competent persons includes the right to refuse life-saving hydration and nutrition; 
see Rehnquist C.J. 242. 
228 See also G. Annas, 'Nancy Cruzan and the Right to Die' (1990) 323 New Eng.J.Med. 670, 671; F. 
Rouse, 'Advance Directives: Where are We Heading After Cruzan?' (1990) 18 Law, Med. & Health Care 
353. 
229 See also Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 43-44. 
230 For discussion of the historical background of this distinction, see the President's Commission Report, 
82-89; J. McCartney, 'The Development of the Doctrine of Ordinary and Extraordinary Means of 
Preserving Life in Catholic Moral Theology Before the Karen Quinlan Case' (1981) 45 Conn.Med. 
725. 
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Catholic teaching, an individual is morally obliged to use ordinary means231 to preserve bis or her 
life but there is no obligation to use extraordinary means.232 Attempts have been made to convert 
this theological distinction into one of legal significance with some commentators arguing that the 
patient's legal right to refuse treatment only applies to the refusal of 'extraordinary' treatment and does 
not extend to the refusal of 'ordinary' treatment.233 Although the courts in the United States have, on 
occasion, made reference to this distinction, 234 it bas never been fully accepted for legal pwposes and 
in more recent times it bas been almost universally rejectect.235 It is now widely recognised that there 
are enormous difficulties inherent in the ordinary and extraordinary means dichotomy, particularly with 
respect to its application in practice. 236 
Accordingly, any argument that the patient's right to refuse treatment only applies to"Rtdin~y 
treatment and does not extend to eMfftordinary treatment simply lacks foundation. Apart from its 
theological source, there is no authority to support such an argument, and particularly in view of the 
difficulties inherent in the distinction, it must be concluded that it is neither a sound nor an 
appropriate basis for determining the extent of a patient's right to refuse treatment. 
Notwithstanding the challenge from the Missouri Supreme Court in the Cruzan decision, on the basis 
of mainstream case law in the United States, a competent patient bas the right to refuse any treatment, 
even life-saving treatment. Although the courts in the United States have recognised that the State bas 
a legitimate interest in the preservation of life, in most cases, this State interest is not regarded as 
sufficiently compelling to override the patient's right to refuse treatment. Indeed, since most courts 
have held that a competent patient bas the right to refuse any treatment, even life-saving treatment, 
231 'Ordinary means' of preserving life have been defined as all medicines, treatments, and operations, 
which offer a reasonable hope of benefit and which can be obtained and used without excessive 
expense, pain, or other inconvenience; G. Kelly, 'The Duty to Preserve Life' (1951) 12 Theological 
Studies 550. 
232 'Extraordinary means' are all medicines, treatments, and operations, which cannot be obtained or used 
without excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience, or which if used, would not offer a 
reasonable hope of benefit; Kelly. 
233 See, for example, B. Dickens, 'The Right to a Natural Death' (1981) 26 McGill LJ. 847, 856-862, 868, 
876 . 
234 For exam le, in the cases of In re Quinlan 355 A. 2d 647, 667-678 (1976); Superintendent of ,-t. -
Belchert<W State School v Saikewicz 370 N.E. 2d 417, 423 (1977); Brophy v New England Sinai Hosp. .(I 
Inc. 497' N.E. 2d 626, 637 (1986). As Cantor points out, (Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying 35), 
whilst many of the judicial opinions in the area of death and dying have mouthed this formula, they 
have generally not analysed its meaning nor applied its limitation. 
235 The ordinary/extraordinary distinction has been unequivocally rejected in a number of cases (e.g. In re 
Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209, 1234-1235 (1985); Barber v Superior Court 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491-492 
(1983)); as well as by a significant body of recognised commentators (e .g. Ramsey, 153 ; Cantor, 
Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 35; G.P. Smith, 345-350) and law reform organisations (e.g. the 
President's Commission, see the President's Commission Report, 88-89.) 
Significantly, there appears to have been some reconsideration of the terms of this distinction, even 
within the Catholic Church itself. In the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration 
on Euthanasia, Vatican City (1980) 10-11 the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means 
was replaced by the concepts of 'proportionate and disproportionate means.' 
236 For example, in In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209, 1235 (1985) the court was of the view that the term 
'extraordinary' 'has too many conflicting meanings to remain useful' and suggested that 'to draw a line 
on this basis for determining whether treatment should be given leads to a semantic milieu that does 
not advance the analysis' . 
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regardless of the condition and prognosis of the patient,237 they have effectively elevated the 
individual interests of patients above the State's interest in the preservation of life. 
State's Interest in Maintainin~ the Ethical lnte~rity of the Medical Profession 
The final interest of the State which must be balanced against the individual's right to refuse treatment 
is the State's interest in preserving the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Traditionally, the 
role of the medical profession has been to save and prolong life and doctors are, in certain 
circumstances, under a legal and ethical obligation to provide treatment to their patients. Thus the 
refusal by a patient of life-saving treatment may pose legal and ethical difficulties for the medical 
profession. Particularly in more recent times, there has been a very real concern expressed in medical 
circles that if treatment is withheld, and a patient dies as a result, civil or even criminal liability may 
result Moreover, compliance with the patient's request to terminate treatment may be contrary to the 
ethical standards of the medical profession and may even attract sanctions for unprofessional 
conduct.238 Consequently, it has been held that, in weighing up the right of an individual to refuse 
treatment, the courts must take into account the need to preserve the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession. There appears, however, to be widespread agreement that this State interest is not 
sufficiently compelling to justify overriding the patient's right to refuse treatment. Whilst the 
concerns of the medical profession regarding potential civil or even criminal liability arising from the 
withholding or withdrawal of treatment are indeed understandable, they do not constitute a valid basis 
for a court to deny the right of a patient to refuse treatment.239 With regard to the need to safeguard 
the ethical integrity of the medical profession, the view has generally been taken that ethical standards 
are not in fact compromised by adhering to the request of a patient to refuse treatment 
One of the first cases to raise this issue was In re Quinlan 240 considered earlier,241 in which one of 
the claimed interests of the State was the defence of the right of the doctor to administer medical 
treatment according to his best judgment 242 There was evidence from the doctors in that case to the 
effect that removing Karen from the respirator would conflict with their professional judgment and 
prevailing medical standards. 243 Although the court acknowledged this particular interest, the view 
was taken that in an action for declaratory relief, the court had a non-delegable judicial responsibility 
to review the doctor's decision in order to preserve underlying human values and rights.244 The court 
was of the view that the state of the pertinent medical standards which had guided the attending doctor 
in declining to withdraw the respirator from the patient, was not such as to justify the court in 
237 For example, In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985); In re Farrel 529 A. 2d 404 (1987). 
238 Oddi, 634. 
239 In any event, the courts have held on a number of occasions, that a doctor who withholds or withdraws 
treatment at the request of a competent patient or in respect of an incompetent patient in the patient's 
'best interests' will not incur civil or criminal liability; e.g. In re Quinlan 355 A. 2d 647 (1976) (see 
discussion below, 73-74). 
240 In re Quinlan 355 A. 2d 647 (1976). 
241 See above, 52-53. 
242 See also In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc. 331 F. 2d 1000 (1964); John F. 
Kennedy Memorial Hospital v Heston 58 N.J. 576 (1971). 
243 355 A. 2d 647, 663, 667 (1976). 
244 Id. 665. 
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deeming itself bound or controlled thereby.245 The court held that in the circumstances, the State 
interest in defending the right of the doctor was not sufficiently compelling to override the patient's 
right to privacy. 
In subsequent cases, the courts have more clearly articulated the relevant State interest in preserving 
the ethical integrity of the medical profession and the manner in which it can be reconciled with the 
Ho . 
right of an individual to refuse treatment.246 In Superintendent of Belcherto~ v Saikewcz241 referred 
to above, 248 there was recognition from the court that 
Prevailing medical ethical practice does not, without exception, demand that all 
efforts toward life prolongation be made in all circumstances. Rather ... the 
prevailing ethical practice seems to be to recognize that the dying are more often 
in need of comfort than treatment. Recognition of the right to refuse necessary 
treatment in appropriate circumstances is consistent with existing medical mores: 
such a doctrine does not threaten either the integrity of the medical profession, the 
proper role of hospitals in caring for such patients or the State's interest in 
protecting the same. 249 · 
A similar approach was espoused by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the case of In re Conroy, 
considered earlier, 250 in the context of the issue of withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. 251 
In dismissing the State's interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession in this 
case, the court reiterated that medical ethics do not require medical intervention at all cost, and 
reference was made to surveys indicating that a majority of doctors now practice passive euthanasia 
As the court observed, even if doctors were exhorted to attempt to cure or sustain their patients under 
all circumstances, that moral and professional imperative, at least in cases of patients who are clearly 
competent, would not go beyond advising the patient of the risks of forgoing treatment and urging the 
patient to accept the medical intervention. The court concluded: 
Indeed, if the patient's right to informed consent is to have any meaning at all, it 
must be accorded respect even when it conflicts with the advice of the doctor or 
the values of the medical profession as a whole. 
Thus the approach of the courts, as exemplified in these cases, is to give the patient's right of self-
determination priority over the State interest in the integrity of the medical profession. In most cases, 
the withholding or withdrawing of treatment will be consistent with prevailing medical ethics and 
practices, and even in rare circumstances where the treating doctors are ethically opposed to the 
245 Id. 666, 669. But see Horan, 528-9 where the author is critical of the court's dismissal of accepted 
medical standards. 
246 For example, Superintendent of Belchert<f(i Stale School v Saikewicz 370 N.E. 2d 417 (1977); In re HO. 
Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985); Bouvia v Superior Court 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Bartling v 
Superior Court 163 Cal. App. 3d 186 (1984); Salz v Perlmutter 362 So. 2d 160 (1978). 
247 370 N.E. 2d 417 (1977). 
248 See above, 53. 
249 Id. 426-427. 
250 See above, 55-56, 63 . 
251 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985). Although the American Medical Association has endorsed the removal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration in appropriate cases, (see above, n. 212) this area has been the 
subject of intense debate and many doctors are opposed to the withdrawal of these forms of medical 
care. 
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withdraw.al of treatment, the court is nevertheless likely to give effect to the patient's request.252 
Furthermore, even though a patient has refused life-saving treatment, the health care professionals are 
under an obligation to continue to provide palliative care to the patient, notwithstanding that they 
may disapprove of the patient's decision.253 
The courts in the United States have adopted the correct approach in subordinating the State interest in 
safeguarding the ethical integrity of the medical profession to the patient's right of self-detemtiuation. 
Neither prevailing ethical standards in the medical profession, nor the professional judgment of an 
individual doctor should be allowed to override the decision of a patient to reject treatment. The 
alternative would be to eliminate consent altogether and to absolutise the standard of good medical 
practice. 254 If a doctor has a genuine conscientious objection to the patient's refusal of treatment the 
most appropriate solution is to allow the doctor to withdraw from the management of that patient, 
rather than to compel the patient to accept unwanted medical treatment.255 
The Australian Position: Applicability of the American Experience? 
The foregoing discussion has focussed on the legal position in the United States, since the question of 
the patient's right to refuse treatment has been most fully litigated and analysed in that country. In 
comparison with developments in the United States, the law in Australia and England with respect to 
the right of a patient to refuse treatment is still in its formative stages. 256 As was seen in the earlier 
analysis, apart from reliance upon ancient common law concepts regarding non-consensual touching, 
there is little direct authority in support of the patient's right to refuse treatment.257 In view of the 
dearth of relevant case law in these jurisdictions and the wealth of American authority, it is quite 
possible that the American cases which have strongly defended the right of a competent patient to 
refuse treatment may be influential in the future in shaping Australian and English law in this area It 
is difficult to predict whether the courts in Australia are likely to follow the details of the American 
approach, balancing the individual's right to refuse treatment against competing State interests.258 To 
252 It is interesting in this context to note the case of Brophy v New England Sinai Hosp. Inc. 497 N.E. 2d 
626 (1986) in which the treating doctors were opposed to the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and 
hydration from a patient in a persistent vegetative state. Notwithstanding that this view was 
inconsistent with a substantial body of medical opinion, the court sought to avoid making an order 
which would compel the treating doctors to withdraw treatment against their own judgment and 
accordingly made an order that the hospital assist in the transfer of the patient to another institution 
where the wishes of the patient could be given effect to. This decision has, however, been subject to 
criticism; see Annas, 'Transferring the Ethical Hot Potato' 21. On this subject of the doctor's and 
hospital's role, note also Gray v Romeo 691 F. Supp. 580 (1988), decision of the Federal District 
Court of Rhode Island, discussed by I. Loftus, 'I Have a Conscience, Too: The Plight of Medical 
Personnel Confronting the Right to Die' (1989) 65 Notre Dame LRev. 699. 
253 For ex~ple, Bouvia v Superior Court 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (1986). 
254 Grisez and Boyle, 96. 
255 Ibid. 
256 Whilst the same applies for New Zealand, the position in Canada is significantly more advanced, see, 
for example, Malette v Shulman (1991) 2 Med.L.R. 162; Nancy B. v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec et al 69 
c.c.c. (3d) (1992) 450. 
257 See above, 33. 
258 It must be emphasised that the courts in the United States have held that patient's right to refuse 
treatment must be balanced against State interests regardless of whether that right is based on the 
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some extent, the rudimentary elements of this approach already exist; for example, with regard to the 
State's interest in the preservation of life, the common law has always upheld life as sacred and has 
consequently sought to prevent persons from permitting their own destruction. It has also been 
frequently assumed that the right to refuse treatment may be curtailed in circumstances where the 
exercise of that right may cause danger to the life or health of others. 259 Even if this balancing 
approach is adopted, in the final analysis, the courts would be inclined to uphold and protect the 
patient's right to refuse treatment The general principles of self-determination and bodily integrity are 
already well recognised at common law and can readily be applied in the medical context so as to 
empower patient's to make their own treatment decisions, even in circumstances where the patient's 
life is at stake.260 
Significantly, one of the few English cases to directly consider the patient's right to refuse treatment 
has adopted this approach and is a good indication of the way in which the Australian courts are likely 
to proceed. In the recent Court of Appeal decision in Re r261 Lord Donaldson M.R. recognised that a 
refusal of treatment situation, particularly where life-saving treatment is at issue, gives rise to a 
conflict between the interests of the patient and that of the society in which the patient lives: 
The patient's interest consists of his right to self-determination - his right to 
live his own life how he wishes, even if it will damage his health or lead to 
his premature death. Society's interest is in upholding the concept that all 
human life is sacred and that it should be preserved if at all possible. It is well 
established that in the ultimate the right of the individual is paranwunt. 262 
As a matter of principle, the only justification for interference with the patient's right to refuse 
treatment is if the exercise of that right in some way endangers other persons.263 Where the patient's 
refusal of treatment does not pose a risk of harm to others, and provided that the patient has decision-
making capacity, the patient's decision ought to be respected, regardless of whether in the opinion of 
the patient's medical advisers the decision may appear foolish or unreasonable.264 
common law or the Constitution. (see above, 48 and n. 113.) Analysis of State interests in the United 
States is therefore not simply a constitutional requirement. 
259 See, for example, the Victorian Social Development Committee Report, 98 where it is suggested that 
an exception to the right to refuse medical treatment may occur when the public interest is adversely 
affected; for example, if a criminal offence will be committed, or an innocent third party, or the public 
generally will suffer if the right is upheld. This is the approach adopted by the courts in Canada. In 
Nancy B. v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec et al 69 C.C.C. (3d) (1992) 450, 456 it was held by the Quebec 
Superior Court that the right of an individual to refuse treatment is almost absolute, being subject only 
to a corresponding right of others to maintain their life and health. 
260 This would include the decision to refuse all forms of treatment, even nutrition and hydration. Whilst 
there have been no Australian or English authorities involving the refusal of nutrition and hydration 
by a competent patient, there has been a recent High Court ruling in the United Kingdom in which the 
court authorised the withdrawal of a naso-gastric tube from a 22 year old patient, Tony Bland, who was 
in a persistent vegetative state. At the time of writing, an appeal to the English Court of Appeal was 
pending. 
261 Court of Appeal Transcript, July 30 1992. 
262 Author's emphasis. His Lordship did, however, say that the strong public interest in the preservation of 
life calls for a careful examination of the circumstances in which an individual is exercising that right 
and 'in cases of doubt, that doubt falls to be resolved in favour of the preservation of life for if the 
individual is to override the public interest, he must do so in clear terms.' 
263 For example, in circumstances where a patient purports to refuse medical treatment in respect of a 
serious contagious disease. See also C. Heifetz with M. Mangel, The Right to Die (1975) 27-29. The 
situation regarding possible harm to unborn children requires special consideration; see above, 44. 
264 Smith v Auckland Hospital Board [1965] N.Z.L.R. 191, 219 and see above, 42. 
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Once it is accepted that a patient has a legal rlght to refuse treatment, it follows that that right is 
legally enforceable. Thus, in the event of breach, the patient can bring an action by way of civil 
damages265 or even criminal prosecution for assault. Alternatively, in anticipation of a breach or 
continuing contravention, legal proceedings can be instituted for injunctive r~lief, restraining the 
medical practitioner from performing any procedure or administering treatment without the consent of 
the patient. 266 Accordingly, doctors are under a legal duty to respect the directions of a patient who 
has decision-making capacity.267 In addition to the patient's remedies in tort and criminal law, a 
patient may discharge him or herself from the care of the medical practitioner and seek out a medical 
practitioner who will respect his or her wishes.268 
PART II 
Legal Effect of Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment Upon Doctors' Duty to Treat 
Introduction 
Having established that a patient has a legally enforceable right at common law to refuse treatment it 
now becomes necessary to consider the legal effect of a patient's refusal of treatment upon a doctor's 
duty towards his patient under the criminal law. In the preceding chapter, it was seen that a doctor may 
be criminally liable for an omission to treat in circumstances where he or she was under a legal duty 
to provide treatment. 269 It is therefore necessary to examine whether, in circumstances where a doctor 
is under a prima facie duty to treat, a direction by a patient who has decision-making capacity, that 
treatment be withheld or discontinued effectively extinguishes the doctor's duty to treat so as to 
absolve the doctor from criminal liability in the event that the patient's death is caused or hastened by 
the omission of treatment. Consideration will first be given to those jurisdictions where the criminal 
law is dealt with under common law principles. 
The Position at Common Law 
One is immediately confronted with a fundamental and apparently irreconcilable inconsistency between 
the criminal law principles in relation to the validitY. of consent on the one hand, and common law 
265 J. Hasl, 'Patient Autonomy and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Available Remedies' (1989) 33 St. Louis 
U.L.J. 711. 
266 Ibid. See also the Victorian Social Development Committee Report, 274. 
267 See Oddi, 636 where he discusses 'rights' and correlative 'duties'. 
268 Baugham, Bruha and Gould, 1208; P. Foreman, 'The Physician's Criminal Liability for the Practice of 
Euthanasia' (1975) 27 Baylor L.Rev. 54, 60. See also the Victorian Social Development Committee 
Report, 98-99 where the committee referred to advice which was received by the committee to this 
effect. However, the committee was strongly of the view that this analysis is divorced from the 
realities of a person in extremis and rejected this argument as 'cynical and unrealistic'. 
269 See chapter I, 19-30. 
71 
principles regarding patient self-determinatiort on the other. It is well established that the consent of 
the victim is no defence to the crime of murder. Even where it can be shown that the consent of the 
victim went beyond mere acquiescence and involved a firm request that the defendant bring about the 
victim's death, it would nevertheless be irrelevant for the purposes of the criminal law. Thus, at first 
glance, it might appear that a doctor who complies with a patient's refusal of treatment, where that is 
likely to result in the death of the patient, could be liable for homicide and the consent of the patient 
would not be a valid defence. This would seem to be a rather perplexing result which could potentially 
undermine the right of a patient to refuse treatment. Apart from a number of American decisions and a 
recent Canadian case,270 there is no common law authority directly dealing with this issue and whilst 
there is a mass of academic literature on the subject of a patient's right to refuse treatment, this 
particular question has been largely neglected. Most commentators have simply assumed that a doctor 
can lawfully comply with a patient's refusal of treatment whilst others have cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of consent in these circumstances. 271 The failure to adequately address this issue has, in 
turn, resulted in uncertainty for the medical profession, with doubts frequently expressed by many 
doctors about their potential liability if they withhold or withdraw treatment at the patient's request, 
and the patient's death results.212 Given the importance of this issue, it is essential that the legal 
position be clarified and that doctors and patients are made aware of their legal rights and 
responsibilities. 
Notwithstanding the criminal law rules regarding the irrelevance of consent to a charge of homicide, 
the wishes and directions of a patient, who has decision-making capacity, are in fact critical and will, 
in certain circumstances, exculpate a doctor from criminal liability. From the outset it is vital to 
identify exactly what the criminal law prohibits. A person cannot give a valid consent to the taking of 
life where that constitutes a criminal offence. Clearly, therefore, a patient cannot give a valid consent 
to a doctor to take active steps to take his or her life since that would amount to the criminal offence 
of murder. But, as we have seen, the basis of a doctor's liability for omissions to treat is predicated 
upon the existence of a legal duty in respect of that patient. If, as a result of the patient's refusal of 
treatment, there is no duty to treat, failure to provide that treatment cannot amount to a culpable 
omission for the purposes of the criminal law. On this reasoning, the patient's refusal of treatment 
would not amount to consent to a criminal offence. Consequently, the criminal law rules which hold 
consent irrelevant as a defence to criminal conduct, would have no application. 
270 Discussed below, 78-79. 
271 See, for example, the opinion of the New South Wales Crown Solicitor, in a letter of advice regarding 
the legal ramifications for hospitals and others who withhold potentially life-saving treatment from 
seriously ill patients. (A copy of this letter is included in the Appendix of the New South Wales Health 
Department, Discussion Paper, Proposed Legislation to Give Legal Effect to Directions Against 
Artificial Prolongation of the Dying Process (1990)). For discussion of the criminal law principles 
with regard to consent, see chapter I, 16-18.) 
272 See above, 32. 
72 
An initial objection may be raised that sinre the docter's duty to treat is imposed by law, for the 
benefit not only of the individual, but also for the benefit of the State, 273 the absolution by the 
patieJlt is ineffective in relieving the doctor of his duty.274 In response it can be asserted that 
although the doctor's duty to treat is imposed by law, the individual's right of self-determination must 
ultimately prevail and override any interest the State may have in the preservation of the individual's 
life. 
In order to substantiate the foregoing argument, it is necessary to examine in more detail the nature of 
the doctor/patient relationship and the circumstances in which a patient can effectively limit or 
terminate a doctor's duty to provide treatment 
Whilst under normal circumstances, a doctor is under a duty to provide treatment to his or her patient, 
the doctor's duty may be limited or terminated by a patient, who has decision-making capacity, 
refusing treatment. Alternatively, the doctor's legal duty may be terminated by the patient formally 
discharging his or her doctor. 
In the foregoing part it was argued that under common law principles and subject only to a few 
limited exceptions, 275 all patients who have decision-making capacity have the right to refuse 
treatment, even life-saving treatment and any treatment administered contrary to a patient's expressed 
wish is unlawful and may attract both civil and criminal liability. Since a patient has a legally 
enforceable right to refuse treatment it should logically follow that a doctor who complies with the 
instructions of a patient, who has decision-making capacity, that treatment be withheld or withdrawn 
would not be acting in violation of the criminal law.276 The law gives the doctor no authority to act 
against the patient's wishes so the failure to do so cannot amount to breach of any duty by the 
doctor.277 It is also possible that the patient terminates the doctor/patient relationship which gives 
rise to the doctor's duty to treat. If a patient does tenninate the relationship in this way, the doctor's 
legal duty to the patient would come to an end and the doctor would incur no liability for the 
consequences of any omission to provide further treatment 278 
273 This reasoning is consistent with other aspects of the criminal law which have upheld the sanctity of 
life; see, for example, chapter I, 17-18 for a discussion explaining the rationale behind the prohibition 
on a person being able to give a legally effective consent to death. 
274 See Kennedy, 'The Legal Effect of Requests by the Terminally ill and Aged Not to Receive Further 
Treatment from Doctors,' 229-230 where this question is raised. 
275 See above, 40-45. 
276 I. Kennedy, 'Switching Off Life Support Machines: the Legal Implications' (1977) Crim.L.Rev. 443, 
450; Kennedy, 'The Legal Effect of Requests by the Terminally ill and Aged Not to Receive Further 
Treatment from Doctors,' 229-230; Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 279. There are, however, 
practical problems involved in determining whether the patient has the capacity to make such a 
decision, with the resulting risk of liability if it subsequently found that the patient lacked the 
necessary capacity to refuse treatment; E. Gurney, 'Is there a Right to Die? - A Study of the Law of 
Euthanasia' (1972) 3 Cumberland-Samford LRev. 235, 244. 
277 Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 279 n. 1 to the effect that the D.P.P. will not in such 
circumstances institute a prosecution; see the A.G.'s statement in Note, (1982) 284 B.M.J. 1562. 
278 Kennedy, 'The Legal Effect of Requests by the Terminally Ill and Aged Not to Receive Further Treatment 
from Doctors,' 229; D. Meyers, Medico Legal Implications of Death and Dying (1981) 140; Baugham, 
Bruha and Gould, 1208; Foreman, 60. 
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Thus, by refusing treatment and/or terminating the doctor/patient relationship, the patient in effect 
absolves the doctor of his or her legal duty to act. Any interest the State may have in the imposition 
of that duty is outweighed by the patient's right of self-determination. In the absence of a duty to act 
no criminal liability can result from the doctor's omission to provide treatment. 279 Indeed, if it were 
otherwise, a doctor would be compelled by the law to act unlawfully, by providing unauthorised 
medical treatment in order to avoid liability for the more serious offence of murder. In response it 
could be argued that a doctor in these circumstance could possibly plead the defence of necessity as a 
defence to an action for criminal assault. 280 Acceptance of this argument would, however, entail 
inappropriately subordinating the individual's right of self-determination to the principle of 
preservation of life. 281 
The Case Law 
There have been no decided cases in Australia or the United Kingdom directly dealing with the scope 
of a doctor's duty for the purposes of the criminal law, in circumstances where a patient, with 
decision-making capacity, has refused life-saving medical treatment 282 In fact, the only jurisdiction 
under consideration where these issues have been addressed is the United States, so attention will be 
focussed on the case law in that country. 
Although the refusal of treatment cases which have been decided in the United States have largely 
occurred independently of the criminal law, they nevertheless have significant implications for 
criminal law principles. In upholding patient autonomy and self-determination as the determinative 
factors in the medical context, the courts in the United States have held, either expressly or by 
implication, that it would not be unlawful for a doctor to act upon a patient's request that treatment be 
discontinued. 
One of the earliest cases to consider the criminal liability of a doctor for the withdrawal of treatment 
from a patient was In re Quinlan, 283 although the case did not actually involve criminal 
proceedings.284 In that case, the facts of which have been outlined above,285 the New Jersey 
279 V. Thurman, 'Euthanasia: The Physician's Liability' (1976-7) 10 John Marshall Jr. 148, 152. 
280 For Australian authority in support of the existence of a general defence of necessity in the criminal law 
see R v Loughnan [1981] V.R. 443. Note also the Canadian case Perka v R (1985) 14 C.C.C. 3d 385, 
417-420 which specifically recognises the existence of the defence of necessity in circumstances 
where the defendant is faced with conflicting legal duties. With the exception of Tasmania, the Code 
jurisdictions contain a statutory version of the defence of necessity; see N.T. s. 33; Qld. s. 25; W.A. s. 
25. 
281 Lanham, 'The Right to Choose to Die with Dignity,' 406-407. 
282 This is also the position in Canada and New Zealand. 
283 355 A. 2d 647 (1976). 
284 For a criminal case arising outside the medical context, see People v Robbins 443 N.Y.S. 2d 1016 
(1981). In this case a patient suffering from epilepsy and diabetics decided to stop taking all her 
medication on the basis of religious conviction. The court accepted that a husband had a legal duty to 
summon care or to administer insulin to his wife when she became incapacitated, but that there would 
be no breach of that duty if the wife, while capable of doing so, had made a rational decision to forgo 
medical assistance. It was accepted by the New York Court of Appeal, that since treatment could not be 
administered against her wishes, the State could not impose criminal sanctions on her husband for 
respecting the wishes of his wife. 
_ 285 See above, 52. 
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Supreme Court held that, on the assumption that the removal of the respirator from the patient could 
be classified as homicide, the death would not come within the scope of unlawful killings proscribed 
by statute. The court concluded that the termination of treatment pursuant to the constitutional right 
of privacy is ipso facto lawful and that the constitutional protection extends to third parties whose 
action is necessary to effectuate the exercise of that right 286 Accordingly, doctors participating in the 
removal of the respirator would be protected from criminal liability. Although the reasoning of this 
case is obviously founded on the constitutional right of privacy (which has, implicitly at least, been 
rejected by the United States Supreme Court as encompassing the right of a patient to refuse 
treatment287) the case can be interpreted as authority for the wider proposition that where_ a patient 
has a right to refuse treatment, whether based upon constitutional principles or the common law, 
doctors may lawfully comply with the patient's directions, without fear of criminal prosecution. 
Implicit in this conclusion is the proposition that in circumstances where a competent patient has 
refused treatment, a doctor is no longer under a legal duty to provide that treatment. 
The criminal law issues were more clearly spelt out in the Barber case288 (noted above289) where the 
treating doctors actually faced criminal prosecution for murder. The Californian Court of Appeal held 
that the doctor's omission to continue life-support treatment for a terminally ill and comatosed 
patient, though intentional and in the knowledge that the patient would die, was not an unlawful 
failure to perform a legal duty.290 Although this case actually involved an incompetent patient, the 
court made it clear that in determining whether a doctor is under a duty to provide medical treatment of 
debateable value, the patient, whenever possible, should be the ultimate decision-maker.291 
On the basis of these cases, and others decided along similar lines, 292 the position in the United 
States would appear to be that a doctor can withhold or withdraw treatment at the request of a 
competent patient without incurring criminal liability, even though the patient's death may result. 
These cases, particularly the Barber case specifically dealing with the question of criminal liability, 
support the proposition that the refusal of treatment by a competent patient effectively terminates the 
doctor's duty to provide treatment, in such a manner that the subsequent omission of treatment is not 
a culpable omission for the purposes of the criminal law. 
Since consent is part of the general theory of law, it is both logical and desirable that its effects 
should be the same in all branches of law. 293 Under private law principles, the courts have recognised 
the right of an individual to either give or refuse consent to treatment, and there are strong arguments 
in favour of the common law rights being given parallel effect under the criminal law. The principal 
286 355 A. 2d 647, 670 (1976). 
287 See above, 47-48, 59-60. 
288 Barber v Superior Court 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). 
289 See above, 62-63. 
290 Id. 493. 
291 Id. 492. 
292 For example, In re Fa"el 529 A. 2d 404, 415-416 (1987). 
293 Castel, 318. 
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advantage to be derived from the development of a unified doctrine is the guarantee of consistency and 
uniformity in the application of legal principle. Indeed, if it were otherwise, doctors would be faced 
with a most unsatisfactory dilemma; they would, on the one hand, be required to comply with the 
patient's legally enforceable right to decline treatment, yet, if no regard was given to the fact of patient 
consent and the patient's right to refuse treatment, the doctor could be criminally liable if the patient 
died as a result of his failure to provide treatment As doctors are legally bound to respect the wishes 
of a patient who has decision-making capacity, they should not thereby be at risk of criminal 
liability.294 If the right to refuse treatment is to have any real meaning, it must be given parallel 
effect in the criminal law so that the refusal of treatment by a patient who has decision-making 
capacity, terminates the doctor's obligation to treat, and thereby absolves the doctor of any 
liability.295 
The Position Under the Australian Criminal Codes 
Each of the Australian Criminal Codes contains a specific provision to the effect that the victim's 
consent to death does not affect the question of criminal liability.296 Questions therefore arise also in 
Code jurisdictions regarding the legal effect of a patient's refusal of treatment upon the doctor's 
criminal liability. 
A preliminary matter meriting investigation is the wording of the provisions invalidating consent 
contained in the Codes of Tasmania and the Northern Territory. The relevant sections respectively 
provide that a person cannot consent to 'the infliction of death upon himself or 'permit another to kill 
him.'297 As a matter of interpretation, it could be argued that the phrases 'infliction of death' and 'kill' 
imply some active intervention rather than l,Ul omission to act and therefore have no application in 
relation to the withholding or withdrawing of treatment which results in death. If these provision are 
held not to apply in this context, there would appear to be nothing in the Tasmanian or Northern 
Territory Codes to prevent a doctor from relying upon the consent of the deceased as a defence to any 
charges arising from the death of the patient. The relevant provision in the other Code jurisdictions 
294 Grisez and Boyle, 101. 
295 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper No. 26, Medical Treatment and the Criminal Law 
(1980) 73. 
296 Section 53 of Tasmanian Criminal Code 1924 provides that 'No person bas a right to consent to the 
infliction of death upon himself and any consent given in contravention hereof shall have no effect as 
regards criminal responsibility.' The relevant provision in the Queensland and Western Australia 
Criminal Codes states 'consent by a person to the causing of his own death does not affect the criminal 
liability of any person by whom such death is caused.' (s. 284 and s. 261 respectively.) Section 26(3) 
of the Northern Territory Criminal Code 1983 provides that 'A person cannot authorise or permit 
another to kill him or, except in the case of medical treatment, to cause him grievous harm.' Note also 
s. 14 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985; s. 63 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
Whilst it could be argued that a clear direction from a patient that his or her death be brought about is 
not equivalent to mere 'consent', it is likely that the 'term 'consent' under the Codes would, as at 
common law, be interpreted to include active requests for death. 
297 N.T. s. 26(3); Tas. s. 53. (Author's emphasis.) 
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provides that a person cannot consent to the causing of Iris own death and is therefore, not open to the 
same interpretation. 298 
Leaving aside this statutory interpretation argument, it is still open to assert that notwithstanding the 
terms of the various Code provisions regarding the irrelevance of consent to death, a doctor can 
lawfully comply with a patient's request that no further treabllent be administered, even though the 
patient's de~th will result The reasoning which lies behind this conclusion parallels that set out above 
with respect to those jurisdictions where the criminal law is dealt with at common law;299 the refusal 
of treatment by a patient effectively terminates the doctor's duty to provide treatment.300 In the 
absence of a duty to provide treabllent, the doctor's omission tQ provide that treabllent is not a 
culpable omission for the purposes of criminal liability under the Codes and no liability can arise. On 
this reasoning, the provisions invalidating consent are irrelevant, since they only apply where 
criminal liability is established.30l In order to substantiate this argument, consideration must be 
given to the rights a patient has to refuse treatment in Code jurisdictions, and the effect these rights 
have on the duty of a doctor to provide treabllent. 
The common law principles regarding civil liability for non-consensual touching which underlie the 
individual's right of self-determination, apply with equal force in the Code jurisdictions.302 In 
addition to the rights a patient has at common law, there are a number of provisions in the Codes 
which seek to protect individuals against any invasion of their bodily integrity. Apart from those 
circumstances where consent is specified to be irrelevant, 303 the Code provisions regarding crimes 
against the person generally uphold the right of an individual to authorise or alternatively refuse 
bodily contact.3°4 Thus, it could be argued that the Criminal Codes in Australia have preserved the 
basic common law approach which upholds the right of an individual to refuse intrusion on his or her 
body, except where there is a specific statutory exception providing otherwise.305 If the common law 
right to refuse unwanted bodily contact is indeed consistent with the approach of the Codes, it 
298 Qld. s. 284; W.A. s. 261. (Author's emphasis.) 
299 See above, 74-75. 
300 Contra P. Gerber and A. Vasta, 'Criminal Law' (1984) 58 A.L J. 291; P. Gerber, 'Brain Death, Murder 
and the Law' (1984) 140 M.J.A. 536 where it is argued that by virtue of the Code provision regarding 
consent, a direction by a patient to discontinue treatment would not absolve a doctor from criminal 
responsibility in the event that the omission causes the death of the patient. 
301 With the exception of the Northern Territory (s. 26(3)) the relevant Code provisions are in terms that 
consent to death has no effect with regard to criminal responsibility. (Qld. s. 284; Tas s. 53; W.A. s. 
261. Note also s. 14 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985; s. 63 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961.) 
In the definition section of all the Australian Codes, 'criminal responsibility' is defined as meaning 
liability to punishment as for an offence; e.g. Qld. s. 1. 
302 In the Northern Territory certain statutory rights also exist under the Natural Death Act 1988 (For 
further discussion, see Chap VII, 310-311.). Note also Article 19.1 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada 
inserted in 1989. 
303 See above, n. 296. 
304 For example, provisions in relation to rape (e.g. Tas. s. 185) and the offence of assault (e.g. Tas. s. 
182(4)). 
305 See also Law Reform Commission of Canada, Medical Treatment and Criminal Law, 71 where this point 
is made with reference to the provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985. 
77 
logically follows that it may be relevant in detl!rminiilg 1he scope of the doctor's duty to treat for the 
purposes of the criminal law in Code jurisdictions. 306 
As indicated in the preceding chapter,307 in Code jurisdictions, the duty of a doctor to provide 
treatment arises as- a result of the combined effect of the duty provisions in the Codes relating to the 
preservation of human life and the provisions relating to unlawful killing. In circumstances where a 
doctor is under a duty to provide treatment to a patient, he or she will be held criminally responsible 
for any consequences which result from his or her omission to act 308 In determining the effect of a 
patient's refusal of treatment upon the scope of the doctor's duties under the Codes, it is necessary to 
have regard to the two duty provisions which are of particular relevance to the question of the liability 
of doctors for withholding or withdrawing of treatment; the duty to provide necessaries,309 and the 
duty to do acts undertaken, the omission of which would be dangerous to human life or health. 310 
Duty to Provide Necessaries of Life 
Before a duty to provide the necessaries of life can arise, a person must have 'charge of another, who 
is unable by reason of age, sickness, unsoundness of mind, detention or any other cause to withdraw 
himself from such charge ... .'31 l It is clear from the terms of the Code provisions that the charge can 
arise in a number of ways, including under contract, by imposition of law or by voluntary 
undertaking.312 Whether a person has charge of another is a question of fact in each case.313 Under 
normal circumstances, a doctor clearly has charge of a sick patient, and the doctor would therefore be 
under a duty to provide the patient with the 'necessaries of life.'314 The crucial question for the 
purposes of the present inquiry is the effect that a patient's refusal of treatment has upon this concept 
of charge and, in particular, whether the patient thereby 'withdraws himself from the charge' within the 
meaning of the section. On the basis of the wording of the provision, it is certainly open to argue that 
in the medical context, a patient who has decision-making capacity, is free to withdraw him or herself 
from the charge by requesting that treatment be withdrawn or withheld, and this would effectively 
terminate any duty of the doctor to provide further treatment. 315 If the patient subsequently died as a 
306 See, however, the contrary view of Gerber and Vasta, 295 regarding the Queensland provision, where 
they suggest that a directive of a patient to cease treatment would not absolve a doctor from liability if 
any omission caused the patient's death. In their view, the only way in which a doctor could be 
absolved from liability is by reading down the requirement with regard to the 'necessaries of life'. 
307 Chapter I, 22-25. 
308 N.T. s. 153; Qld. ss. 285-290; Tas. s. 152; W.A. ss. 262-267. 
309 N.T. s. 149; Qld. s. 285; Tas. s. 144; W.A. s. 262. Note also s. 215 of the Canadian Criminal Code 
1985; s. 151 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
310 N.T. s. 152; Qld. s. 290; Tas. ss. 151-152; W.A. s. 267. Note also s. 217 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code 1985; s. 157 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
311 N.T. s. 149; Qld. s. 285; Tas. s. 144; W.A s. 262. Note also s. 215(1)(c) of the Canadian Criminal 
Code 1985; s. 151 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
312 N.T. s. 149; Qld. s. 285; Tas. s. 144(2); W.A. s. 262. Note also s. 151 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 
1961. 
313 R v McDonald [1904] Qld. S.R. 151; R v McCallum [1969] Tas. S.R. 73, 78. 
314 Under the Tasmanian Criminal Code 1924, 'necessaries of life' are stated to include 'medical and surgical 
aid- and medicine'; see s. 146. There is no definition of this term in the other Code jurisdictions, but it 
is clear from judicial interpretation of this phrase, both under the Codes and at common law, that it 
includes medical treatment. (See chapter I, 23-24.) 
315 There are a number of early English cases which examine in a non-medical context, whether the 
deceased was able to withdraw him or herself from the control or charge of the defendant; R v Smith 
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result of the omission to treat, the doctor would not bC criminally responsible, since he or she was no 
longer under a duty to provide treatment. This interpretation of the provision is in accordance with 
common law principles outlined above,316 and would therefore have the advantage of a uniform 
approach as between Code and common law jurisdictions. 
Duty to Do Acts Undertaken 
In addition to the duty to provide necessaries, a doctor may also be under a duty to do 'an act 
undertaken, the omission of which may be dangerous to human life or health' .317 A doctor may have 
undertaken to provide treatment to a patient by entering into a doctor/patient relationship. Once 
treatment has been undertaken, any cessation of that treatment which may be dangerous to the life or 
health of the patient comes directly under this provision. It remains to be considered what effect the 
patient's refusal of treatment has upon the doctor's duty to do acts undertaken. It is clear that the 
undertaking may, in certain circumstances, be terminated; by mutual consent, revocation by the 
patient, or lack of need for medical services. It logically follows that the refusal of treatment by a 
patient terminates the doctor/patient relationship, thereby bringing to an end any duties the doctor may 
have in respect of the patient, including the duty to do acts undertaken. 318 Consequently, any 
omission to perform that duty which results in the death of the patient is not a culpable omission for 
the purposes of the criminal la~. 
The only case to specifically consider the criminal liability of a doctor for the withholding or 
withdrawing of medical treatment in a Code jurisdiction is the Canadian case of Nancy B. v Hotel-
Dieu de Quebec et al.319 This case involved a competent 25 year old patient who was suffering from 
an incurable neurological disorder that left her incapable of movement. She had refused further 
treatment including the respirator upon which she was dependent. She sought an injunction against 
her doctor and the hospital to require them to comply with her decision. Although a case arising in the 
civil jurisdiction, the Quebec Superior Court also examined the criminal law implications of a 
doctor's compliance with a patient's request that artificial respiratory support be removed. The 
principal section of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985 considered by the court was s. 217 dealing ·with 
the duty of persons undertaking acts, the omission of which may be dangerous to life. The court 
recognised that if strictly interpreted, this provision would have the effect that a doctor who has 
undertaken treatment is not permitted to terminate that treatment if that involves a risk of life to the 
patient. 320 The court was, however, anxious to avoid this result and held that the section must be 
(1865) 169 E.R. 1533; R v Chattaway (1922) 17 Cr. App. R. 7. These cases lend some support to the 
view that a patient could withdraw from a doctor's charge by requesting that treatment be withdrawn or 
withheld. 
316-see above, 71-75. 
317 N.T. s. 152; Qld. s. 290; Tas. ss. 151-152; W.A. s. 267. Note also s. 217 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code 1985; s. 157 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
318 N~te, however, academic opinion to the contrary; see Law Reform Commission of Canada, Medical 
Treatment and the Criminal Law, 27 where a number of commentators are cited who are of the view that 
the refusal of treatment by a patient does not necessarily constitute revocation of the doctor/patient 
contract and does not justify abandonment by the doctor. 
319 69 c.c.c. (3d) (1992) 450. 
320 Id. 458. 
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read in context with other provisions in the Code which exclude from criminal liability conduct which 
can be characterised as 'reasonable'.321 The court concluded that the conduct of a doctor who stops 
respiratory support treatment of his or her patient at the freely given and informed request of the 
patient, so that nature may take its course, could not be characterised as unreasonable. Adopting a 
broad and liberal interpretation of the Code, the court accordingly held that persons involved in 
terminating the patient's respiratory support treatment in order to allow nature to take its course would 
not commit any crime under the Code. The court emphasised that unlike cases of homicide and suicide 
which are not natural deaths, if the patient's death takes place after the respiratory support treatment is 
stopped at the patient's request it would be the result of nature taking its course.322 
In reaching this conclusion, the court did not specifically consider the effect of s. 14 of the Canadian 
Criminal Code 1985 which invalidates a victim's consent to his or her own death. Implicit, however, 
in the court's reasoning is the view that in circums~ces where a patient has freely and informedly 
refused treatment the doctor is no longer under a legal duty to provide that treatment. This decision, 
based upon a Code in similar terms to the Australian Criminal Codes, provides support for the 
proposition that a doctor who withholds or withdraws treatment at the direction of the patient will not 
incur criminal liability. 
Lawful Excuse 
In the foregoing paragraphs it has been argued that the refusal of treatment by a patient in effect 
extinguishes the doctor's duty to treat, thereby absolving the doctor from any criminal liability arising 
from his or her omission to provide treatment. In Code jurisdictions, an alternative argument can be 
based upon the notion of lawful excuse. 
For the purposes of the Tasmanian Code, even if the courts were to hold that the refusal of treatment 
by a patient does not affect the doctor's duties under the Codes, it would still be possible to argue that 
a doctor who, at the request of the patient, omits to provide treatment, has lawful excuse. Section 152 
is a general provision dealing with criminal responsibility for omissions. Under that section, the 
absence of lawful excuse is a prerequisite for criminal liability.323 It could therefore be argued that the 
patient's request that treatment be terminated in exercise of the patient's common law right to refuse 
treatment, provides lawful excuse for the doctor to act on that request and withhold or withdraw 
treatment. 324 Since the doctor is bound by law to respect the wishes of the patient, it must be 
possible for the doctor to comply with the patient's request without incurring criminal liability. 
321 Id. 458-459, referring to ss. 216, 45 and 219(1) Canadian Criminal Code 1985. 
322 Id. 460. 
323 Section 152; 'A person who without lawful excuse omits to perform any of the duties mentioned in this 
chapter shall be criminally responsible for such omission.' 
324 See also the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Medical Treatment and the Criminal Law, 23 where it 
is noted that the wilful choice of the person to whom the duty to provide necessaries is owed, not to 
receive them, constitutes lawful excuse. Some support for this view can also be derived from the case of 
R v Johnston (1903) 9 Argus L. R. (C.N.) 11 decided under the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) and 
considered below, 81. 
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Although Tasmania is the only jurisdiction where the absence of lawful excuse is an element of the 
offence, in the other Code jurisdictions, there is some room for arguing that the defence of lawful 
excuse is implicit in the statutory scheme. Some support for this view can be derived from the 
provision in all of the Codes, creating a separate offence of failing to provide necessaries.325 Under 
the Code provisions, this offence is established if a person charged with the duty of providing 
necessaries, fails to do so without lawful excuse. Since lawful excuse is a feature of these provisions 
dealing with the failure to provide necessaries it could therefore be argued that it should apply 
uniformly in the interpretation of the duty provisions. And, as argued above,326 on this view, the 
refusal of treatment by a competent patient would constitute lawful excuse for omitting to perform 
duties involving the provision of mediCal treatment. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that in the Australian Code jurisdictions, doctors can lawfully comply 
with the patient's refusal of treatment, even in circumstances where refusal of treatment amounts to 
consent to death. This is because the refusal of treatment by a competent patient terminates the 
doctor's duties under the Codes.327 Alternatively, it could be argued that since the patient had 
exercised his or her right to refuse treatment, the doctor had lawful excuse in omitting to perform his 
or her duty to patient. As was suggested earlier in the context of the common law position,328 there 
are strong arguments in favour of a uniform approach with regard to consent so that the common law 
right to refuse treatment is given recognition also for the purposes of the criminal law. It is also 
clearly desirable for there to be uniformity in the interpretation of the criminal law as between 
common law and Code jurisdictions. 
Position Under the Crimes Act 1900 (N .S. W .) 
Consideration must also be given to the legal position under Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) regarding the 
effect of the patient's refusal of treatment upon the doctor's liability to provide that treatment. 
Although the definition of murder under s. 18 clearly covers omissions, as noted earlier,329 the Act 
relies upon the common law as the source of the relevant duties for the purposes of criminal liability. 
It follows, therefore, that the arguments advanced earlier with respect to the common law position330 
apply with equal force under the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) namely that the refusal of treatment by a 
competent patient has the effect of extinguishing any pre-existing duty of a doctor to provide 
treatment 
325 N.T. s. 183; Qld. s. 325; Tas. s. 177; W.A. s. 302. Note also ss. 215(2) and (3) of the Canadian 
Criminal Code 1985; s. 151(2) of the New '.Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
326 See above, 79. 
327 See also the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Medical Treatment for the Dying, 4 for 
support for this view. 
328 See above, 74-75. 
329 See chapter I, 21-22. 
330 See above, 74-75. 
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An alternative argument open under the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) is based upon the defence of 
lawful excuse discussed earlier in the context of the Criminal Codes.331 In the proviso to the 
definition of murder ins. 18 of the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) it is stated that 'no act or omission .. 
for which the accused had lawful cause or excuse, shall be within this section'. Thus, it could be 
argued that if a doctor, acting upon the patient's directions, omits to provide treatment and the 
patient's death results, the doctor has lawful cause or excuse for that omission, thereby effectively 
removing that conduct from within the scope of the prohibition on murder ins. 18. 
An early New South Wales case which appears to support this proposition is R v Johnston.332 That 
case involved criminal charges under the New South Wales Crimes Act 1900 against a husband for the 
murder of his wife on the ground that he had omitted, without lawful excuse, to send for a doctor 
when his wife's life was in danger. The facts were that the husband had offered to send for help but the 
wife had vigorously refused medical aid. Both the husband and wife were members of the Christian 
Catholic Church of Zion and held the belief that medical aid is unnecessary in cases of illness and also 
wrong in the sight of God. 
Even though the husband had pleaded guilty to the charges of murder, Simpson J. directed the jury to 
acquit the defendant. His Honour was of the view that, having regard to the refusal of the wife to see a 
doctor, and the parties' belief that doctors were not necessary, lawful excuse for the omission within 
the meaning of the section was established on the facts. Although the facts of R v Johnston are 
somewhat removed from the more usual refusal of treatment situation, the case can be interpreted as 
authority for the view that the refusal of treatment by a competent patient constitutes lawful excuse 
for the omission to provide that treatment 
Conclusjop 
The object of this chapter has been to examine the legal effect of a patient's right to refuse treatment 
upon a doctor's legal duty to provide treatment. This has involved consideration of the patient's 
common law right to refuse treatment and the criminal law position regarding the legal status of 
consent of the victim in determining culpability for homicide. 
Although the criminal law, both in common law jurisdictions and under the Codes, prevents the 
consent of the victim from being a valid defence to criminal charges, this does not affect the right of a 
patient to refuse treatment and the capacity of a doctor to lawfully comply with the patient's request, 
even though the patient's death may result. This is because the refusal of treatment by a competent 
patient eliminates a doctor's duty to provide treatment, both at common law and under the Codes, such 
that the failure to provide that treatment does not amount to a culpable omission and will not give 
331 See above, 79-80. 
332 (1903) 9 Argus Law Reports (C.N.) 11. See also the analysis of this case by Lanham, 'The Right to 
Choose to Die with Dignity,' 406-407. 
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rise to criminal liability. Thus, the scope of the doctor's duty ultimately lies within the control of a 
competent patient, by virtue of the patient's right to either consent to333 or refuse treatment or to 
terminate the doctor/patient relationship. This conclusion is sound in principle. The duty imposed by 
the criminal law exists primarily for the benefit of the patient, and it should therefore logically follow 
that a competent patient who has decided to forgo further treatment should have the capacity to 
terminate the doctor's duty to provide that treatment. 
It follows from the foregoing analysis that a doctor may lawfully perform passive euthanasia at the 
request of a competent patient: i.e. be or she may deliberately withhold or withdraw treatment from a 
patient with the intention of facilitating the patient's death. This conclusion, in tum, highlights the 
law's starkly differential treatment of active and passive euthanasia. It was demonstrated in chapter I 
that a doctor who performs active euthanasia will potentially face criminal liability for murder even in 
circumstances where the acts causing death were performed at the patient's request. Yet, a doctor who 
withholds or withdraws treatment at the request of a competent patient, intending that the patient's 
death will result, will not be criminally liable for the patient's death. Thus, even though the object 
and end result of active and passive euthanasia are the same, the legal consequences differ widely. 
333 Subject to the qualification that a patient cannot insist upon treatment which is not medically 
indicated. See discussion above, n. 4. 
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CHAPTER III 
SUICIDE AND ASSISTED SUICIDE 
Introductjon 
Apart from the potential criminal liability of a doctor for homicide it is also possible for a doctor who 
is involved in bringing about a patient's death to incur criminal liability for assisting suicide. The 
object of this chapter is to look at the law in relation to assisted suicide! and examine the 
circumstances in which a doctor may be subject to criminal liability for this offence. In the course of 
this analysis attention will be drawn to relevant analogies between the legal response to active and 
passive euthanasia on the one hand, as outlined in the preceding chapters, and assisted suicide on the 
other. 
At common law, a person who committed suicide was regarded as a self-murderer or felo de se (felon 
against himself). 2 Consequently, anyone who instigated or aided another to commit suicide was guilty 
of murder as an accomplice. 3 In all Australian jurisdictions suicide is no longer an offence. In the 
Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria, the offence of suicide 
has been abolished4 but a new statutory offence has been created which makes it an offence for a 
person to incite, counsel, aid or abet another to commit suicide or attempt to commit suicide.5 In the 
Code jurisdictions (the Northern Territory, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia) the Criminal 
Codes contain no specific offence of suicide and the definition of unlawful homicide in the Codes 
refers to the killing of 'another,'6 thereby clearly excl~ding suicide from within its scope.7 Although 








For the purposes of this discussion, the word 'assisted' suicide will be used as a shorthand way to 
describe the various terms, aid, abet procure etc. 
For a discussion of the history of suicide and its prohibition, see H. Trowell, The Unfinished Debate 
On Euthanasia (1973) 1-11 and G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed., 1983) 578. 
L. Waller and C.R. Williams, Brett, Waller and Williams Criminal Law (6th ed., 1989) 120. 
A.C.T. s. 16 Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 2) 1990 which modifies the operation of the Crimes 
Act 1900 (N.S.W) for the purposes of the law in the Australian Capital Territory; N.S.W. s. 31A of the 
Crimes Act 1900 as amended by the Crimes (Mental Disorder) Amendment Act 1983; S.A. s. 13(a)(l) 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 as amended by the Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment 
Act 1983; Vic. s. 6A of the Crimes Act 1958. 
A.C.T. s. 17(1) and (2) Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 2) 1990; N.S.W. s. 31C(l) and (2) of the 
Crimes Act 1900 as amended by the Crimes (Mental Disorder) Amendment Act 1983; S.A. s. 13(a)(5) 
of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 as amended by the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 
Amendment Act 1983; and Vic. s. 6B(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). In the absence of such 
legislation, assisted suicide would no longer have been unlawful following the abolition of the offence 
of suicide. 
N.T. s. 161 Criminal Code 1983; Qld. s. 293 Criminal Code 1899; Tas. s. 153 Criminal Code 1924; 
W.A. s. 270 Criminal Code 1913. Note also s. 222 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985; s. 158 of the · 
New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
Howard's Criminal Law (5th ed., 1990 by B. Fisse) 132. 
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herself. 8 The Northern Territory is the only Anstralian jurisdiction in which attempted suicide is also 
an offence.9 
The legal position in Australia in relation to suicide parallels developments in other common law 
jurisdictions. In England, the Suicide Act of 1961 abrogated the crime of committing suicidelO and 
created a new offence of 'aiding, abetting counselling or procuring the suicide of another' .11 Similarly, 
in the United States, suicide is no longer a crime, but in quite a number of States, assisting suicide is 
a criminal offence.12 
Some patients who are terminally ill or in intolerable pain will actively seek death and may endeavour 
to enlist the support of their doctor in achieving this result. Whilst there are, obviously, a number of 
possible scenarios, two particular situations need to be distinguished: 1) circumstances where a doctor, 
at the request of a patient, provides some form of a~tive assistance in bringing about the patient's 
death (for example, providing a patient with the necessary medication to commit suicide and assisting 
in its administration); and 2) circumstances where a patient refuses treatment, knowing and intending 
that death should result_ and the doctor complies with the patient's refusal by withholding or 
withdrawing that treatment. In the former case, assisting suicide is almost indistinguishable from the 
killing of patients on request (or active voluntary euthanasia) which clearly constitutes murder.13 The 
latter category involving patient's refusal of treatment may not, at first sight, appear to be suicide at 
all but it will be argued that in certain circumstances, refusal of treatment is tantamount to suicide. 
Consideration therefore must be given to the legal position of a doctor who knowingly assists a 
patient with this purpose. 
In the following section it is proposed to examine the legal requirements for liability for assisting 
suicide and to ascertain the legal liability of a doctor if he or she responds to a patient expressing the 
wish to die by either actively assisting the patient in taking his or her own life or by complying with 
the pa!ient's wish that no further treattnent be administered. 
8 
9 
N.T. s. 168; Qld. s. 31; W.A. s. 288; which make it an offence to 'procure' or 'counsel' another to kill 
himself or 'aid' another in killing himself, and s. 163 of the Tasmanian Code which makes it an offence 
to 'instigate or aid another to kill himself. Note also s. 241 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985; s. 
179 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
N.T. s. 169. 
10 Section 1 Suicide Act 1961 (Eng.). 
11 Section 2(1). This legislation only applies in England and Wales. Suicide has never been an offence 
under Scottish law. No specific offence of assisting suicide exists but such conduct may be treated as 
culpable homicide. 
12 Some American States consider suicide assistance to be murder or manslaughter. However, the majority 
of States that have statutes imposing criminal liability for assisting a suicide have done so by creating 
a separate offence of suicide assistance. See C. Shaffer, 'Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide' 
(1986) 8'6 Colum.L.Rev. 348, 350-353. For consideration of the position in Canada, see A. Browne, 
'Assisted Suicide and Active Voluntary Euthanasia' (1989) 2 Can.J.L.Juris. 35, 35-36. As in England 
and Australia, suicide and attempted suicide has been legalised but assisting suicide remains a crime; 
see s. 241 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985. The relevant legislation in New Zealand is the Crimes 
Act 1961, s.179; for discussion, see P. Key, 'Euthanasia: Law and Morality' (1989) 6 Auckland 
U.L.Rev. 225, 229. 
13 See, however, R. Weir, 'The Morality of Physician-Assisted Suicide' (1992) 20 Law, Med. & Health 
Care 116, 117-118 where he suggests that there are a number of significant differences between active 
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. 
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Assjstjng Suicide; The Legal Requirements 
As was outlined earlier, 14 following the abolition of the offence of suicide in all Australian 
jurisdictions, a new statutory offence of assisting suicide was created.15 In the Australian Capital 
Territory, New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria, it is an offence to 'incite, counsel, aid or 
abet another to commit suicide or attempt to commit suicide'.16 The Criminal Codes in the Northern 
Territory, Queensland and Western Australia make it an offence to 'procure or counsel another to kill 
himself or aid another in killing himself17 and under the Tasmanian Code, it is an offence to 
'instigate or aid another to kill himself.18 The provision made in the various Australian jurisdictions 
closely parallels that contained in the Suicide Act 1961 (Eng.) which makes it a statutory crime to 
'aid, abet, counsel or procure' a person to commit suicide.19 Although there are some variations in the 
wording of these various provisions, they are all essentially directed at prohibiting any conduct which 
involves assisting suicide.20 In those jurisdictions where abetting suicide is also prohibited the scope 
of the provision is wider. The terminology used in these provisions (aid, abet, incite, counsel, procure 
etc.) is the same as that commonly used to define secondary participation in crime. As a result, some 
guidance can be obtained in the interpretation of the assisting suicide provisions from existing 
Australian authority dealing generally with parties to crime. Prosecutions for assisting suicide rarely 
arise and there is as a result, very little direct judicial authority in Australia regarding the interpretation 
of these assisting suicide provisions.21 Decisions from other jurisdictions, based upon equivalent 
statutory provisions, are therefore likely to be particularly relevant. 
In the English case of Attorney-General v Able 22 the court was called upon to considers. 2(1) in the 
Suicide Act 1961 (Eng.) which contains the statutory offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or 
procuring a person to commit suicide. This case involved the distribution of a booklet entitled 'A 
Guide to Self-Deliverance' by the Voluntary Euthanasia Society to members of the society. The 
booklet contained information about various methods of suicide and was prepared with the expressed 
14 See above, 83-84. 
15 The statutory prohibition is in the nature of a principal offence and will therefore give rise to liability 
for attempt to aid, abet suicide etc. even though the person concerned did not actually attempt suicide. 
See J.C. Smith and B. Hogan, Criminal Law (5th ed., 1983) 336; Attorney-General v Able [1984] 1 All 
E.R. 277, 285, citing R v McShane (1977) 66 Cr. App. R. 97. 
16 See above, n. 5. 
17 N.T. s. 168; Qld. s. 311; W.A. s. 288. 
18 Section 163. The term 'instigate' is defined in the interpretation part of the Act to mean 'counsel 
procure or command'. 
19 Suicide Act 1961 (Eng.) s. 2(1). See also s. 241 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985; s. 179 of the 
New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
20 See J.K. Bentil, 'Voluntary Euthanasia and the Criminal Law' (1984) 128 Solie.I. 826, 826 for 
analysis of the words 'aid, abet, counsel and procure' in the Suicide Act 1961 (Eng.). 
21 There are only a handful of unreported cases in Australia and these have generally involved pleas of 
guilty. As a result, little or no attention has been directed to the interpretation of the relevant 
legislation. See, for example, R v Larkin (unreported) 14 April 1983, S.C. Vic.; R v Den Heyer 
(unreported) 28 Sept. 1990, Parammatta D.C. N.S.W.; R v Savage (unreported) 28 March 1992, 
Newcastle D.C., N.S.W. 
22 [1984] 1 All E.R. 277. 
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aim of overcoming people's fear of dying anct to reduce the incidence of unsuccessful suicides. The 
booklet also sought to discourage hasty and ill-considered suicide attempts. 
In a civil action brought by the Attorney-General against members of the society's executive 
committee, a declaration was sought that the future supply of the booklet to persons who were known 
to be, or likely to be, considering or intending to commit suicide, constituted the offence of aiding, 
abetting, counselling or procuring the suicide of another, contrary to s. 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 
(Eng.). Although no final determination was made as to whether the distribution of the booklet was 
in contravention of the legislation,23 Justice Woolf did offer some guidance with respect to the 
interpretation of the provision. His Honour was of the view that in the ordinary case, in deciding 
whether an offence has been committed, it is preferable to consider the phrase 'aids, abets, counsels or 
procures' as a whole, but recognised that circumstances could arise which would justify interpreting 
part of the phrase in isolation. With respect to the meaning of the terminology used in the section, 
his Honour indicated that whilst 'aiding' requires some form of assistance, it does not require 
consensus between the accessory and principal or a causal connection between the conduct of the 
accused and the commission of suicide.24 'Abetting' and 'counselling' on the other hand, imply 
consensus but not causation25 and 'procuring' implies causation but not necessarily consensus.26 His 
Honour went on to make it clear that in order for liability to be established under s. 2(1) of the 
Suicide Act 1961 (Eng.) it must be proved that: 
(1) the accused intended to assist a person to commit suicide; 
(2) while the accused had that intention, he or she provided some assistance to the 
person contemplating suicide; 
(3) that the person committing suicide was thereby in fact assisted or encouraged in 
taking, or attempting to take his or her own life - (otherwise the alleged 
offender cannot be guilty of more than an attempt).27 
With respect to the necessary intention, it was held that an intention to assist another to commit 
suicide need not involve a desire that suicide should be committed or attempted.28 Moreover, if these 
facts can be proved, then it does not make any difference that the person would have tried to commit 
suicide anyway.29 
Although Justice Woolfs interpretation of s. 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 (Eng.) was made in the 
context of civil proceedings, his views would be likely to be considered the clearest guide to the 
23 Since the declaration sought could result in treating as criminal conduct which was not in 
contravention of the criminal law, the declaration was refused. 
24 [1984] 1 All E.R. 277, 287. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Id. 287-8, also citing Lord Widgery C.J. in A.G's Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1975] Q.B. 773. 
27 Id. 288. 
28 For further discussion of the mens rea requirement for the offence of suicide under s. 2 of the Suicide Act 
1961 (Eng.) see K. Smith, 'Assisting Suicide - The Attorney General and the Voluntary Euthanasia 
Society' (1983) Crim.L.Rev. 579. 
29 [1984] 1 All E.R. 277, 288. 
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criminal law position in England. In view of the similarity between this provision and the 
prohibitions on assisting suicide in the various Australian jurisdictions, the reasoning of Woolf J. is 
likely to be persuasive in Australia alongside existing Australian authority dealing generally with 
parties. 
A Doctor's Liability for Actjye lnyolyement ju a Patient's Suicide 
In view of the statutory prohibition on assisting suicide and the judicial interpretation it has received, 
it is readily apparent that a doctor who actively assists a patient to commit suicide will incur criminal 
liability. Common to all of the statutory provisions is the prohibition on 'aiding suicide' which 
clearly involves some form of assistance in a person's suicide.30 To establish a person's guilt as an 
aider and abettor, it is necessary to show that the person was intentionally assisting or encouraging 
the commission of the act in question or that he or she was at least ready to assist if required. 31 The 
prohibition on 'aiding and abetting' suicide is also of direct relevance in the medical context since a 
doctor who, at a patient's request, provides the means of committing suicide is, without doubt, aiding 
the patient's suicide. Furthermore, there would be no difficulty in establishing that the doctor thereby 
intended to assist the patient to commit suicide, (irrespective of whether he or she desired that result) 
and that the patient was in fact assisted or encouraged in taking, or attempting to take his or her own 
life. In circumstances where the doctor has provided the patient with information and advice, for 
example, regarding the toxicity of drugs and what would amount to a lethal dose, the doctor's conduct 
may also attract liability on the basis of 'counselling'32 or even 'procuring' the patient's suicide.33 
Once the basis for liability is made out under the statutory prohibition, the special features which 
arguably set a doctor's conduct apart from other forms of criminal conduct are irrelevant.34 Thus, the 
fact that the doctor was acting bona jide and that assistance was provided at request of the patient 
would not exculpate a doctor from criminal liability. Furthermore, it would be irrelevant that the 
patient was in a terminal condition and that the patient's death was in any event imminent 
When one comes to consider the factual situations which would come within the statutory prohibition 
of assisting suicide, it becomes evident that there is, in practice, a fine line between assisting suicide 
and active voluntary euthanasia which, as we have seen, constitutes murder. Essentially, it all depends 
30 Attorney-General v Able [1984] 1 All E.R. 277. 
31 For reference to relevant cases see below. 
32 A.C.T. s. 17(2) Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 2) 1990; N.S.W. s. 31C(2) of the Crimes Act 
1900 as amended by the Crimes (Mental Disorder) Amendment Act 1983; S.A. s. 13(a)(5) of the 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 as amended by the Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment 
Act 1983; N.T. s. 168 (b); Qld. s. 311(2); W.A. s. 288(2). Note also s. 179(a) of the New Zealand 
Crimes Act 1961. The legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and Victoria 
also contains a prohibition on inciting another person to commit suicide; see s. l 7(2)(a); s. 
31C(2)(a); and s. 6B(2)(a) respectively. 
33 N.T. s. 168(b); Qld. s. 311(1); W.A. s. 288(1). Note also s. 179(a) of the New Zealand Crimes Act 
1961. 
34 See, however, the suggestion that existing 'right to die' jurisprudence in the United States could be 
extended to cover physician-assisted suicide; for example, the prescription of drugs at the patient's 
request that would end the life of a terminally ill, mentally competent patient; Note, 'Physician-
Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance' (1992) 105 Harv.L.Rev. 2021, 2023. 
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on the degree of the doctor's involvement. Active assistance in suicide amounts to murder if death 
occurs as a result of an overt act of the 'assistant•.35 Where, however, there has simply been 
participation in the events leading up to the commission of the final overt act, such as providing the 
means for bringing about death for the patient's own use, the doctor's conduct comes within the 
prohibition on assisting suicide.36 Notwithstanding the apparent simplicity of this classification, 
difficulties may yet arise in determining the appropriate charge in any given case and instances of 
consent killing are occasionally reduced to assisting suicide.37 
Refusal of Treatment as Suicide and the Legal Posjtjon of Doctors 
In the foregoing part, it was noted that if a doctor provides active assistance to a patient wishing to 
commit suicide, by providing the means by which the suicide is to be effected, the doctor will incur 
criminal liability under the statutory provisions prohibiting assisted suicide. The fundamental question 
which now arises for determination is whether a doctor's compliance with a patient's refusal of 
treatment can ever amount to assisting suicide. In order to answer this question, attention must be 
directed to the following matters: 
(1) Can the refusal of treatment by a patient ever amount to suicide?38 
(2) If, in some circumstances, the refusal of treatment can amount to be suicide, is a 
doctor who accedes to a request by a patient to cease treatment criminally liable for 
assisting suicide? 
For the purposes of Australian law, the difficulty is that there is virtually no authority, either on the 
subject of assisted suicide or the right of a patient to refuse treatment and as a result, there is little 
guidance as to how the courts are likely to decide these questions. It therefore becomes necessary to 
extrapolate the relevant legal principles from the authority which is available and examine their 
potential relevance in Australia and other common law jurisdictions. 
Elsewhere, consideration has been given to the fundamental right of a competent patient at common 
law to refuse treatment including life-saving treatment.39 The question which now arises for 
35 For American case law on th'.is issue see State v Bouse 264 P. 2d 800, 812 (1953); State v Cobb 625 P. 
2d 1133 (1981); In re Joseph G 34 Cal. 3d 429 (1983). See also V. Gilbreath, 'The Right of the 
Terminally Ill to Die with Assistance if Necessary' (1986) 8 Crim.Just.]. 403, 419. 
36 In re Joseph G 34 Cal. 3d 429 (1983). It has, however, been argued that notwithstanding statutory 
prohibitions on aiding or instigating suicide, the conduct of the defendant may also constitute murder 
on the basis of common law principles of causation; see D. Lanham, 'Murder by Instigating Suicide' 
(1980) Crim.L.Rev. 215, 220-221. This suggestion has been rejected by Williams, 578 n.3. 
37 Williams, 580. This is also a reflection of the lenient approach of the law in practice in genuine cases 
of mercy killing or assisted suicide. For further discussion see chapter IV, 123-146. 
3 8 It should be understood that although suicide is no longer an offence, the question of whether particular 
conduct constitutes suicide in law is still relevant for the purposes of determining liability for the 
offence of assisting suicide. 
39 Chapter II, 33-37, 41-42. 
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determination is whether the exercise of this right can ever amount to suicide.40 It is therefore 
necessary to examine more closely the notion of suicide and its legal requirements. 
From the outset, it should be acknowledged that there are some practical obstacles in settling upon an 
adequate definition of suicide. Suicide has traditionally been anathema in Judaeo-Christian culture, 
evoking both popular condemnation and legal intervention.41 Although the law no longer treats 
suicide or attempted suicide as a crime,42 in contemporary society, suicide is still socially disapproved 
of and there are a variety of common legal provisions which reflect continued societal concern over the 
phenomenon of suicide.43 Consequently, attempts to define suicide are likely to reflect this social 
disapproval,44 and conduct which is regarded as socially acceptable may well fall outside the scope of 
the accepted definition of suicide.45 
According to the traditional legal definition at common law, suicide is the intentional, voluntary 
taking of one's own life by a person of sound mind and of the age of discretion.46 It remains now to 
be considered how refusal of treatment has been characterised and whether it can ever amount to 
suicide. 
Suicide by Omission 
A preliminary question of some importance is whether there can be suicide by omission. By 
definition, suicide involves the taking of one's own life so the question for determination is whether 
this must be by some positive conduct or whether an omission to act could amount to suicide. 
Williams has suggested that inaction cannot be suicide in law.47 It is certainly true that suicide is 
4o This discussion is confined to the position of patients who have decision-making capacity, since 
patients lacking that capacity would be unable to form the necessary intention to commit suicide. It 
should also be pointed out that what is being considered here is the refusal of treatment by a patient 
who has decision-making capacity as distinguished from the situation where a person has inflicted 
injury upon themselves in an attempted suicide and then refuses necessary life-saving treatment 
41 N. Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying (1987) 46. 
42 Attempted suicide remains a crime in the Northern Territory; sees. 169 Criminal Code 1983. 
43 Cantor, 46 where he refers to the prohibitions with regard to aiding and abetting suicide, the fact that 
persons are often hospitalised for psychiatric scrutiny after a suicide attempt, and the fact that 
bystanders are authorised to use reasonable force to thwart a suicide attempt. 
44 T. Beauchamp and S. Perlin, (eds.) Ethical Issues in Death and Dying (1978) 88, 97-7; R. Wennberg, 
Terminal Choices (1989) 17-18. 
45 See also J. Rachels, The End of Life (1986) 82. Note should also be taken of the religious position in 
respect of refusal of treatment and suicide. In the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 
Declaration on Euthanasia Vatican City (1980) it was stated that a patient's refusal of risky or 
burdensome treatment 'is not the equivalent of suicide; on the contrary, it should be considered as an 
acceptance of the human condition, or a wish to avoid the application of a medical procedure 
disproportionate to the results that can be expected, or a desire not to impose excessive expense on the 
family or the community.' The corollary is that according to Catholic teaching, refusal of ordinary 
treatment does amount to suicide. -
46 Clift v Schwabe (1846) 3 C.B. 437, approved in Re Davis [1968] 1 Q.B. 72. See also N. St. John 
Stevas, Life, Death and the Law (1961) 242 where he notes that the definition of suicide generally 
adopted in the United States is the same as in England, and refers to the case of Southern Life and 
Health Insurance Co. v Wynn 29 Ala. App. 207 (1940). 
41 Williams, 613. See also I. Kennedy, 'The Legal Effect of Requests by the Terminally Ill and Aged Not 
to Receive Further Treatment from Doctors' (1976) Crim.LRev. 217, 226 where he questions whether 
the omission/commission dichotomy applies to suicide. 
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typically associated with affirmative conduct sllch as taking an overdose of tablets or jumping to one's 
death.48 !~deed, the 'cide' in the word suicide entails "'killing' which is commonly contrasted with 
'allowing to die. •49 However, as Lanham suggests50 there seems to be no reason in principle why 
suicide cannot be committed by an omission. Provided there is suicidal intent, omissions resulting in 
death are not relevantly different from acts. For example, if a person deliberately chooses not to move 
from the path of an avalanche, or refuses to leave a burning building, it is arguable that the person is 
committing suicide.51 Furthermore, recognition of the possibility of suicide by omission would be 
consistent with the widespread rejection of technical distinctions between acts and omissions. 52 
There is some, albeit modest, judicial support for the view that there can be suicide by omission. The 
English case of Leigh v Gladstone53 has been cited in support of this proposition.54 This case 
involved the forcible feeding of a suffragette prisoner who was on a hunger strike. Although the issue 
of preventing suicide was not specifically raised, the court held that the prison officials had a duty to 
preserve the lives of prisoners and were consequently justified in force-feeding the prisoner.55 This 
decision can be rationalised on the basis that the conduct of the prisoner in refusing food was 
tantamount to suicide (then a felony) and the prison officials were therefore entitled (quaere obliged) to 
use force to prevent the prisoner from committing suicide by starving herself to death. 56 
There is also some Australian authority in support of the proposition that there may be suicide by 
omission. In Schneidas v Corrective Services Commission57 the court was called upon to determine 
the legal position of prison authorities with respect to a prisoner who had gone on a hunger strike. 
Justice Lee of the New South Wales Supreme Court was of the view that the prisoner, by denying his 
body necessary food, was in the course of attempting to commit suicide. His Honour accordingly 
48 Cantor, 47. See also Hale, Pleas of the Crown (1736) (where suicide or felo de se is defined to be 'where 
a man of the age of discretion, and compos mentis, voluntarily kills himself, by stabbing, poison or 
any other way') and the interpretation of suicide in Clift v Schwabe (1846) 3 C.B. 437. 
49 Beauchamp and Perlin, 99. For discussion of the distinction between 'killing' and 'allowing to die' see 
chapter IV, 158-159. 
50 D. Lanham, 'The Right to Choose to Die with Dignity' (1990) 14 Crim.L.J. 401, 408. See also M. 
Matthews, 'Suicidal Competence and the Patient's Right to Refuse Life-Saving Treatment' (1987) 74 
Calif.L.Rev. 707, 740; J. Fletcher, Humanhood (1979) 157; G. Grisez 'Suicide and Euthanasia' in D. 
Horan and D. Mall, (eds.) Death, Dying and Euthanasia (1980) 742, 745. 
51 Cantor, 47. This analysis is consistent with the definition of suicide proposed by the eminent 
sociologist Emil Durkheim; 'The term suicide is applied to all cases _of death resulting directly or 
indirectly from a positive or negative act of the victim himself which he knows will produce this 
result' E. Durkheim, Suicide (J. Spaulding and G. Simpson translation 1951) 44. 
52 For example, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioural Research, Deciding to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment (1983) 60-77. 
(Hereafter referred to as the President's Commission Report) 
53 (1909) 26 T.L.R. 139. 
54 For example, Lanham, 'The Right to Choose to Die with Dignity', 408. 
55 (1909) 26 T.L.R. 139, 142. For criticism of this decision see Williams, 617. 
56 For an analysis of this decision see G. Zellick, 'The Forcible Feeding of Prisoners: An Examination of 
the Legality of Enforced Therapy' (1976) Pub. Law 153, 163. 
57 (Unreported) 8 April 1983, S.C. N.S.W. At the time of this decision, suicide was still an offence in the 
State of New South Wales. Whilst this may explain the reluctance of the court to be involved in the 
suicide attempt, it does not affect the court's characterisation of the prisoner's refusal of food as an 
attempt to commit suicide. 
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refused to grant an injunction preventing force~feeding, because to do so would, in effect, involve the 
court in aiding and abetting the commission of a crime.SB 
A similar approach has been taken by the American and Canadian courts in a number of prisoner 
cases. In In re Caulk, 59 a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment had decided to starve himself to 
death and the court was called upon to consider whether the prison authorities could lawfully force-feed 
the prisoner. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the prisoner's decision to starve himself 
to death amounted to attempted suicide and since aiding and abetting suicide was a crime, the prison 
authorities could lawfully force-feed the prisoner.60 There is also Canadian authority to the effect that 
refusal of food by a prisoner may amount to suicide.61 Apart from the prisoner cases, there have been 
other instances of judicial recognition that there can be suicide by omission. 62 
It is submitted that as a matter of law, suicide can be committed by an omission. This conclusion is 
not inconsistent with the traditional common law definition of suicide (i.e. the voluntary and 
intentional taking of one's own life) and derives some support from the modern case law. More 
importantly, however, this view is supportable as a matter of principle and logic.63 There appears to 
be no valid basis for categorically holding that suicide can only be committed by affirmative conduct 
and that inaction cannot amount to suicide at law. 
Refusal of Treatment as Suicide? 
On the assumption that in principle, suicide can be committed by omission, it is necessary to 
specifically consider whether the refusal of treatment by a patient can ever amount to suicide. It must 
be emphasised that since suicide or attempted suicide are no longer criminal offences, 64 the 
significance of this question lies in determining the legal liability of persons who assist another to 
commit suicide. 
58 For comment on this decision, see M. Findlay, 'Hunger Strikes and the State's Right to Force Feed -
Recent Australian Experience' (1984) 19 fr. Jurist 304 and I. Potas, 'Schneidas v Corrective Services 
Commission and Ors' (1983) 7 Crim.L.J. 353. 
59 480 A. 2d 93 (1984). 
60 See also State ex rel White v Narick 292 S.E. 2d 54 (1982); Re Sanchez 577 F.S. 7 (1983); Van Holden 
v Chapman 450 N.Y.S. 2d 623 (1982). CJ. Zant v Prevatee 286 S.E. 2d 715 (1982). Lanham has, 
however, criticised these cases on the grounds that the typical hunger striker is not a would-be suicide 
since they do not actively seek death but rather life on their terms; 'The Right to Choose to Die with 
Dignity,' 409. 
61 See A.G. of British Columbia v Astaforoff and A.G. of Canada [1984] 4 W.W.R. 385 in which it was 
held that whilst the patient is competent and able to make a free choice, it would be unreasonable for 
prison authorities to force-feed her in order to prevent her suicide and they were under no duty to do so. 
62 See, for example, the dissenting judgment of Lynch J. in Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital, Inc. 
497 N.E. 2d 626, 642-643 (1986). 
63 N. Cantor, 'A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the 
Preservation of Life' (1973) 26 Rutgers LRev. 228, 255 n. 133 where he suggests that efforts to 
distinguish suicide from refusal of treatment on the basis of misfeasance versus non-feasance or the 
immorality of affirmative actions as opposed to passive refusal are unconvincing. See also Matthews, 
740; R. Sherlock, 'For Everything there is a Season: The Right to Die in the United States' (1982) 
B. Y. U.L.Rev. 545, 557-558. 
64 Attempted suicide remains an offence in the Northern Territory; see above, 84. 
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It appears to be commonly assumed that refusal of treatment by a patient is not tantamount to 
suicide. 65 This assumption has undoubtedly been encouraged by the widespread recognition and 
approval of the patient's common law right to refuse medical treatment, since, as noted earlier, our 
conception of suicide is influenced by contemporary attitudes. 66 It must, however, be questioned 
whether the notion of suicide and the right of a patient to refuse treatment are necessarily mutually 
exclusive. It will be argued that, as a matter of legal principle, it is quite possible that a patient who 
exercises his or her right to refuse life-saving medical treatment is in fact committing suicide. 67 
As was noted in the preceding chapter, 68 case law regarding the patient's refusal of treatment and the 
legal effects of such a refusal has emerged almost entirely from the United States and there is a dearth 
of Australian authority in this area. The Australian courts have not, todate, been called upon to 
directly adjudicate upon whether the refusal of treatment by a patient can amount to suicide. The 
meagre case law which does exist in Australia has involved related issues which have not directly 
raised the refusal of treatment and suicide analogy.69 Whilst it could be argued that ·the unreported 
New South Wales decision in Schneidas v Corrective Services Commission considered earlier,70 lends 
some modest support to the view that refusal of treatment may constitute suicide, Australian courts 
when directly faced with these issues are likely to be influenced by the same policy considerations 
which appear to have shaped the judicial response in the United States. Thus, in view of the social 
stigma still attached to suicide, and the tendency to avoid using the label 'suicide' in respect of conduct 
which we approve, the courts in Australia may well decide to follow the approach taken in the United 
States and distinguish refusal of treatment from suicide. It is therefore appropriate to examine the 
American cases dealing with these matters and to assess their significance in Australia and other 
common law jurisdictions. 
65 For example, the Parliament of Victoria Social Development Committee was of the view that a patient 
who refuses treatment which cannot cure is not committing suicide and stated that there is a 'clear 
distinction between suicide and an individual's enforceable right at common law to refuse medical 
treatment'; Parliament of Victoria Social Development Committee, Second and Final Report, Inquiry 
into Options for Dying with Dignity (1987) 107. 
Some commentators have been critical of this kind of approach and have argued that the refusal of 
necessary life-sustaining treatment is a form of suicide; see Sherlock, 558-9; C. Rice, The Vanishing 
Right to Life (.1969) 83; K. Hegland, 'Unauthorised Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment' (1965) 
53 Calif.L.Rev. 860, 869-871. 
66 See above, 89. 
67 See also D. Mendelson, 'The Medical Treatment (Enduring Power of Attorney) Act and Assisted Suicide: 
The Legal Position in Victoria' (1992) Vol. 12 No. 1 Bioethics News 34 where specific consideration 
is given to the scope of a refusal of treatment under the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic.) and related 
legislation. 
Some commentators take the view that refusal of life-saving medical treatment does not amount to 
suicide; see, for example, Lanham, 'The Right to Choose to Die with Dignity', 407-410; D. Lanham 
and B. Fehlberg, 'Living Wills and the Right to Die with Dignity' (1991) 18 Melbourne U.L.Rev. 329, 
335-336. 
68 See chapter II, 33, 45-46. 
69 See the New South Wales case of Schneidas v Corrective Services Commission (unreported) 8 April 
1983, S.C. N.S.W. involving a prisoner on a hunger strike (discussed above, 90-91) and the Victorian 
decision of Re Kinney (unreported) 23 Dec. 1988, S.C. Vic. (discussed below, 104) in which the 
medical condition requiring life-saving treatment had been brought about by an attempt to commit 
suicide. 
70 See above, 90-91. 
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The Position in the United States 
In a number of the earlier refusal of treatment cases arising in the United States the courts drew an 
analogy between a patient's refusal of treatment and suicide, thereby justifying the courts decision to 
override the patient's refusal of treatment.71 So, for example, in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital 
v Heston 72 the court ordered that a blood transfusion be administered to a Jebovah's Witness who bad 
been seriously injured in a car accident. It was held by the court that 
If the State may interrupt one mode of self-destruction, it may with equal 
authority interfere with the other ... the State's interest in sustaining life in such 
circumstances is hardly distinguishable from its interest in the case of suicide. 73 
Accordingly, the State's interest in the prevention of suicide and the preservation of life was held to 
outweigh the patient's right to decline medical treatment. 
In more recent cases, however, the courts have consistently distinguished between suicide and the 
refusal of treatment by a patient74 and consequently, the State's interest in the prevention of suicide 
bas not arisen.75 The basis for differentiating between refusal of treatment and suicide rests on two 
main grounds. According to the traditional conception of suicide, as interpreted in a number of 
American cases, there must be: 1) a specific intention to bring about death; and 2) a self-initiated 
action which causes death. In the more recent refusal of treatment cases, the courts have tended to find 
both these elements of suicide to be absent.76 Refusal of treatment by patients bas been interpreted by 
the courts as being aimed at avoiding unwanted treatment, pain or the violation of religious 
principles, rather than causing one's own death, and therefore the specific intent element bas been held 
71 For example, Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College Inc. 331 F. 2d 1000 
(1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v Heston 58 N.J. 576 (1971) . q. Erickson Dilgard 252 
N.Y. S. 2d 705 (1962). For a discussion of the early case law, see L. Sandak, 'Suicide and the 
Compulsion of Lifesaving Medical Procedures: An Analysis of the Refusal of Treatment Cases' (1977-
78) 44 Brooklyn L.Rev. 285, 299-302. These cases can, perhaps, be explained on the basis that at the 
time they were decided, the principles in respect of refusal of treatment were still in their format~ve 
stages. Moreover, they can also be factually distinguished from many of the later 'right to die' cases on 
the basis that the treatment which was refused was capable of restoring the patient to health. 
72 58 N.J. 576 (1971). 
?3 Id. 581-2. w t-W 
74 For example, Superintendent of Belchert<)ll State School v Saikewicz 370 N.E. 2d 417, 426 (1977; ' 
Satz v Perlmutter 362 So. 2d 160, 162-163 (1978); Bartling v Superior Court 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 
196 (1984); In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209, 1224 (1985); Bouvia v Superior Court 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 
306 (1986); Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital, Inc. 497 N.E. 2d 626, 638 (1986); In re Farrel 529 
A. 2d 404, 411 (1987) . There have, however, been a few isolated exceptions; see the dissenting 
judgments of Nolan, Lynch and O'Connor J.J. in Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital, Inc. 497 N.E. 
2d 626 (1986); the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan v Harmon 160 S.W. 2d 408 
(1988), per Robertson J. 419-422; and the concurring judgment of Justice Scalia of the United States 
Supreme Court in Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 251-156 
(1990). 
Note should also be made of the living will legislation existing in many American States which 
specifically provides that the withholding or withdrawing of treatment in accordance with a patient's 
directive does not constitute suicide. For further discussion, see chapter VII, 329. In some cases, the 
courts have relied on this legislation in support of the view that the refusal of treatment does not 
constitute suicide; e.g. In re Colyer 99 Wash. 2d 114 (1983). 
15 See chapter Il, 51-52. W JV(} . 
16 For example, Superintendent of Belchert<J...n State School v Saikewicz 370 N.E. 2d 417, 426 (1977); 
Satz v Perlmutter 362 So. 2d 160, 162-163 (1978); Bartling v Superior Court 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 
196 (1984); Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital, Inc. 497 N.E. 2d 626, 638 (1986). 
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to be absent.77 Furthermore, since the courts have considered the underlying disease or injury - and 
not the withholding or cessation of treatment - to be the cause of death, they have not considered 
suicidal refusals to be affirmative acts causing death.78 The approach of the courts in the United 
States is well illustrated by In re Conroy19 in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey specifically 
rejected the analogy between refusal of treatment and suicide and held that a refusal of medical 
treatment may not properly be viewed as an attempt to commit suicide: 
Refusing medical intervention merely allows the disease to take its natural 
course; if death were eventually to occur, it would be the result, primarily, of the 
underlying disease, and not the result of self-inflicted injury8o ... .In addition, 
people who refuse life-sustaining medical treatment may not harbour a specific 
intent to die, .. rather they may fervently wish to live, but to do so free of 
unwanted medical technology, surgery, or drugs and without protracted 
suffering.81 
The relevant issues in this area were starkly raised in the case of Bouvia v Superior Court. 82 As noted 
in the preceding chapter, 83 this case involved a competent 28 year old quadriplegic who required 
permanent hospitalisation but whose condition was not terminal.84 In 1983 Elizabeth Bouvia had 
expressed the wish to commit suicide and had unsuccessfully sought permission from the court to 
starve herself to death. In 1986 she again applied to the court, seeking an injunction against her 
doctors, ordering that the naso-gastric tube with which she was being force-fed be removed. The trial 
court refused to grant the relief sought. Bouvia then appealed to the California Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal held that a competent adult has an absolute right to refuse life-saving treatment, 
including nourishment and hydration, even if the exercise of this right creates a life-threatening 
condition. 85 The court rejected arguments that the naso-gastric feeding be maintained in furtherance of 
the State's interests in the prevention of suicide and the preservation of life. Although Bouvia had 
claimed she did not wish to commit suicide, the trial court had found that she was motivated by a 
desire to end her life. This view was rejected by the Court of Appeal on the grounds that it was not 
supported by the evidence. The court effectively evaded the suicide issue by holding that her refusal of 
medical treatment indicated a decision to 'allow nature take its course' rather than a decision to commit 
suicide. 86 In the view of the court, Bouvia was not actively seeking to end her life but had merely 
resigned herself to an earlier death without force-feeding. 87 Although the court had concluded that her 
rejection of naso-gastric feeding was not motivated by a desire to commit suicide, the Court of Appeal 
77 Matthews, 735-736. 
78 Id. 736. 
79 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985). 
80 This approach has also been endorsed in Canada by the Quebec Superior Court in the case of Nancy B. v 
Hotel-Dieu de Quebec et al 69 C.C.C. (3d) (1992) 450, 458, 460. 
81 Id. 1224. 
82 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986). 
83 See chapter II, 55. 
84 She had been diagnosed as likely to live for a further 15 or 20 years; see the Report at 304-305. 
85 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300-301 (1986). 
86 Id. 306. 
87 Ibid. 
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was prepared to concede that in any event, it was irrelevant whether or not she desired to commit 
suicide be'cause 'if the right to refuse treatment exists, °it matters not what 'motivates' its exercise•.88 
This latter proposition appears to acknowledge, implicitly at least, that a refusal of treatment by a 
patient may amount to suicide but suggests that the right to refuse treatment is virtually absolute and 
will be upheld regardless of whether the exercise of that right is tantamount to suicide. 89 However, 
apart from this concession, which was in any event obiter, the approach taken by the Bouvia court 
was essentially in keeping with that articulated by other courts in the United States.90 
Thus, the suicide issue has been circumvented by the American courts. Regardless of the particular 
circumstances of the cases before the courts, 91 the refusal of treatment by a patient has genefally been 
distinguished from suicide. Consequently, the State's interest in the prevention of suicide has been 
held not to arise and further, the courts have been able to avoid the question of whether a doctor is 
unlawfully assisting suicide by complying with a patient's request that treatment be discontinued. 
Analysis of the Ap.proacb Taken by the Courts in the United States 
The approach of the American courts is to a large extent92 explicable on the basis of the patient's 
right of self-determination and the paramountcy which has been attached to that principle. According 
to Cantor,93 both popular perception and judicial doctrine have come to regard a dying patient's 
refusal of treatment as a legitimate form of self-determination, thereby taking it outside the realm of 
suicide.94 This widespread respect for individual bodily integrity and self-determination can be seen 
here to interact with another powerful consideration, namely the common societal aversion to 
suicide95 and the tendency to tailor our conception of suicide so as to exclude behaviour which is 
regarded as acceptable. 
88 Ibid. 
89 L. Fisher, 'The Suicide Trap: Bouvia v Superior Court and the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment' 
(1987) 21 Loy.L.A.LRev. 219, 237. 
90 Note, however, the concurring judgment of Compton J., 307-308 in which the Judge acknowledged 
that Elizabeth Bouvia wanted to die and held that the right to die, 'an integral part of our right to 
control our own destinies', should include the ability to enlist assistance from others, including the 
medical profession, in making death as painless and quick as possible.' This judgment obviously has 
far-reaching implications, being a rare instance of unequivocal judicial endorsement of active 
voluntary euthanasia and assisting suicide. 
91 For example, the Bouvia case, w~ere the patient was previously known to want to commit suicide, and 
where she had a relatively long life expectancy if she were to accept artificial feeding. 
92 A number of other policy considerations underlying the courts' approach have been advanced; see, for 
example, Matthews, 737 where she suggests that the distinction between affirmative acts causing 
death and passive refusals of life-saving treatment reflects a general jurisprudential principle that the 
law should primarily prohibit misfeasance as opposed to non-feasance. Further, she points out that the 
passive fatalistic stance of a patient who allows an injury or disease to overtake him or her seems less 
disrespectful for the sanctity of life than the act of a person who violently kills him or herself. 
93 Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 47-49 
94 The position is less clear with regard to a patient whose condition is salvageable; Cantor, Legal 
Frontiers of Death and Dying, 49-50. Note also Matthews, 737 where she argues that the courts' 
approach may reflect a judicial unwillingness to distinguish good from bad reasons for patients' 
treatment decisions, and recognition of the need to protect individual decision-making, even with 
respect to unorthodox decisions. 
95 Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 47; Rachels, 82-83. 
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Whilst there may be sound policy consideratibns underlying the courts' approach, it will be argued 
that the characterisation of a patient's refusal of treatment as falling outside the realm of suicide on the 
grounds that the patient lacks a specific intent to die and further, that refusal of treatment does not 
involve a self-initiated condition, lacks substance and results in an undesirable distortion of legal 
principles. 96 
Absence of a 'Specific Intent' to Die 
Under normal criminal law principles, an individual is generally taken to intend consequences which 
he or she knows will occur or which are reasonably foreseeable. However, for the purposes of the law 
of suicide, the courts have held that there must be evidence of a specific intent to die.97 The 
requirement of a specific intent in the context of suicide has been justified on the basis that it avoids 
the inappropriate labelling of some conduct as suicide; for example, the conduct of a person who 
jumps in front of a car to save another, or who undertakes an heroic but mortally dangerous military 
mission. 98 This approach, in itself, demonstrates an adaption of legal principles in order to avoid the 
result that acceptable behaviour may be classified as suicide. But for present purposes, the major 
interest lies in the way in which the specific intent requirement is actually applied in the refusal of 
treatment cases. First of all, let us be clear on what is required by this 'specific intent' requirement. 
Mere knowledge or foresight of death will not be sufficient A person has the necessary suicidal intent 
in circumstances where conduct causing death is deliberately undertaken in order to end his or her life 
and not for some other purpose.99 There will inevitably be circumstances where treatment may be 
refused but the specific intent requirement may be lacking - for example, a Jehovah's Witness who 
refuses a blood transfusion on the grounds of religious principle but will accept other available 
treatment, or a patient who declines distasteful or burdensome treatment but does not thereby 
deliberately seek death.100 However, it cannot be denied that in some instances, a patient's motives in 
refusing treatment are indistinguishable from suicidal intent.101 Take, for example, the situation of a 
terminally ill patient who declines further medical treatment in order to facilitate an earlier death. In 
such a case, the patient's rejection of treatment clearly entails a specific intent to die and suggestions 
to the contrary are simply semantic sleights of hand so as to avoid what is commonly regarded as an 
undesirable result; i.e. that the patient wishes to commit suicide. Even more obvious are cases where 
the patient's condition is salvageable or non-terminal and the patient refuses life-saving treatment with 
the clear intention of orchestrating his or her death; for example, a physically disabled patient who has 
lost the will to live and rejects further treatment, even nutrition and hydration.102 Here there is little 
96 For commentators criticising this approach see J. Fletcher, 'The Courts and Euthanasia' (1987-88) 15 
Law, Med. &: Health Care 223, 224-6; Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 47; Matthews, 738; 
Sherlock, 554; G. Alexander, 'Death by Directive' (1988) 28 Santa Clara L.Rev. 82. 
97 Re Davis [1968] 1 Q.B. 72 and above, n. 74. 
98 Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 47. 
99 See also K. Lebacqz and H.T. Engelhardt, 'Suicide' in Horan and Mall, 669, 670; Grisez, 745. 
100 Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 47 
101 Matthews, 738; C. Jarret, 'Moral Reasoning and Legal Change: Observations on the Termination of 
Medical Treatment and the Development of Law' (1988) 19 Rutgers L.J. 999, 1014-1016; P. Peters, 
'The State's Interest in the Preservation of Life: From Quinlan to Cruzan' (1989) 50 Ohio St.L.J. 891, 
964. 
102 This was the situation in the Bouvia case, see above, 94-95. 
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room fo~ doubt that the patient's decision to refuse treatment entails an intention to bring about his or 
her death. 
Although in many instances, patients who refuse treatment are clearly seeking death, the courts in the 
United States have repeatedly held that they lack the necessary intent for that conduct to constitute 
suicide.103 There has been a tendency to rationalise this conclusion on the basis that a patient who 
refuses life-saving treatment would really prefer to live, free of his or her afflictions.104 This is a 
patent absurdity which, if followed through to its logical conclusion, would mean that a person 
deliberately taking his or her life would not be committing suicide if he or she wished it were not 
necessary .105 
No Self-Initiated Action Which Causes Death 
In their attempts to distinguish refusal of treatment from suicide, the American courts have 
consistently held that the death of a patient following the withdrawal of treatment, is from 'natural 
causes', (i.e. the patient's underlying disease or condition) which were not initiated by the patient.106 
A distinction is then drawn between this situation and suicide which is said to require voluntary, self-
initiated action causing death. This analysis is also open to criticism.107 It was demonstrated earlier 
that the distinction between acts and omissions is not a valid basis for determining whether certain 
conduct can amount to suicide.108 Thus, the refusal of necessary treatment is potentially as much a 
cause of death over which the person has control, as is the proverbial bottle of barbiturates.109 The 
reality is that where death results following the patient's refusal of treatment, the death of the patient 
at that particular time is due to the patient's decision to die rather than the underlying condition of the 
patient.11° It is only because of the patient's decision to die and the subsequent refusal of treatment, 
that the natural processes are 'fatally set in motion.'111 
The inaccuracy of the current legal analysis is most clearly apparent in cases of refusal of treatment by 
non-terminal patients. Although the patient's death may be medically avoidable, and indeed the patient 
may have a potentially long life span if appropriate medical treatment were administered, the patient 
may decide to refuse further medical treatment. The patient's refusal may extend to nutrition and 
hydration or other minimally invasive life-saving treatment In such cases, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that the patient has set in motion the cause of death, and if deliberately done for the 
103 See cases discussed above, 93-95. 
104 For example, Satz v Perlmutter 362 So. 2d 160, 162-3 (1978). For criticism of this approach, see 
Fletcher, 'The Courts and Euthanasia,' 225-6. 
105 Fletcher, 'The Courts and Euthanasia', 226. On the basis of this conclusion a child abuser who takes his 
life after facing criminal charges would not be committing suicide. 
106 See cases discussed above, 93-94. 
107 See also Jarret, 1016-1018; Peters, 965-966. 
108 See above, 89-91. 
109 Sherlock, 557. 
llO Fletcher, 'The Courts and Euthanasia,' 224-5. Under the ordinary principles of causation applying in 
the criminal law, the critical question is whether the death occurred at the time that it did as a result of 
the conduct of the defendant and it is irrelevant that the deceased's death was in any event imminent. 
See chapter I, 13-16. 
111 Fletcher, 'The Courts and Euthanasia,' 225. 
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purpose of bringing about his or her own deat.J:i, the patient's conduct constitutes suicide.112 Yet, 
even in these circumstances, the courts have maintained their position that refusal of treatment does 
not amount to suicide, relying on the argument that the patient's death is not self-initiated but results 
from 'natural causes•.113 This conclusion is clearly contrary to fact114 and highlights the distortions 
which have occurred in this area It is difficult to deny that where a patient dies following the refusal 
of nutrition or hydration or other life-saving treatment of a minimally invasive nature, the patient's 
death is self-induced.115 Somewhat ironically, the logic of this conclusion has been accepted in the 
context of self-initiated starvation by prisoners, where arguably, it is least appropriate.116 In a 
number of cases involving hunger sbikes by prisoners, the courts have held that the prisoners' conduct 
amounted to attempted suicide and therefore justified force-feeding.117 Yet, in analogous cases of 
patient's refusing treatment, including nutrition and hydration, the courts have avoided this 
conclusion. Clearly what the courts are doing is presenting as a factual premise, what is in reality a 
normative conclusion about how such conduct should be characterised.118 
Whilst it may be more obvious in cases involving non-terminal patients, that a refusal of treatment 
may result in a self-induced death, the same reasoning applies with respect to terminal patients; any 
refusal of treatment which hastens death and which is deliberately made for this purpose amounts to 
suicide and should be recognised as such. 
There are, undoubtedly, significant policy considerations which can be used to justify the view that 
refusals of treatment are to be distinguished from suicide. Although suicide is no longer illegal, there 
is still a stigma attached and the courts are understandably reluctant to classify as suicide, conduct 
which is socially acceptable. Furthermore, if some cases of refusal of treatment are held to be suicide, 
concerns are likely to arise about the legality of that conduct, both from the perspective of the patient 
and whether he or she is legally entitled to adopt that course without interference, and from the 
perspective of the doctor, whether compliance with a patient's request that treatment be discontinued 
amounts to assisting suicide. Nevertheless, the prevailing approach of creating fictions in order to 
avoid what in some cases are obvious conclusions is most undesirable and, in the long run, is likely 
to erode the credibility of the courts. Whilst the force of some of the underlying policy considerations 
must be acknowledged, there are more satisfactory means of dealing with these issues. It would be far 
112 Peters, 953-954; J. Bopp, 'Nutrition and Hydration for Patients: The Constitutional Aspects' (1988) 4 
Issues Law & Med 3, 47-48. 
113 For example, Bouvia v Superior Court 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Brophy v New England Sinai 
Hospital, Inc. 491 N.E. 2d 626 (1986); Jn re Rodas District Court, County of Mesa, State of Colorado, 
No. 86 P.R. 139, 22 Jan. 1987. 
114 Fletcher, 'The Courts and Euthanasia,' 225. 
115 Matthews, 740; Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 29, 51; Fisher, 247; Sherlock, 557. See 
also the dissenting judgments of Lynch and O'Connor J.J. in Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital, 
Inc. 497 N.E. 2d 626 (1986) and the concurring judgment of Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme 
Court in Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health 111 L. Ed. 2d 224, 251-156 (1990). 
116 Lanham, 'The Right to Choose to Die with Dignity', 409. 
117 For example, Jn re Caulk 480 A. 2d 93 (1984); State ex. rel. White v Narick 292 S.E. 2d 54 (1982); Re 
Sanchez 511 F.S. 7 (1983). 
118 Jarret, 1017. See also the President's Commission Report, 68-9 for discussion regarding the normative 
content of causation determinations, based on assumptions about what is right or wrong under the 
circumstances. 
99 
preferable if the courts were to recognise that some cases of refusal of treatment do amount to suicide 
and then having recognised this as a starting point, to find more valid grounds to overcome the 
potential legal difficulties regarding the patient's right to pursue that course and the legal position of 
the doctor in assisting the patient. 
The crux of the matter is that although in certain circumstances, refusal of treatment does amount to 
suicide, these cases are significantly different from other forms of suicide which the State may have a 
valid interest in preventing. It will therefore be argued that the competent patient's right to refuse 
treatment must be respected and upheld notwithstanding that it may be tantamount to suicide, and that 
doctors who assist patients in carrying out their suicidal intention by withholding or withdrawing 
treatment at the patient's direction, should be free of criminal liability. 
Legal Implications of Recognising Refusal of Treatment as Suicide 
It has been suggested in the foregoing pages that in many instances, the refusal of treatment by a 
patient is in fact tantamount to suicide and should be recognised as such. What then are the 
implications of this conclusion? Some commentators have accepted the analogy between refusal of 
treatment and suicide, but have argued that this logically demands that the same State interests which 
justify the prevention of suicide should apply to prevent the patient's refusal of treatment.119 This is 
by no means an inevitable conclusion; the question of whether refusal of treatment is legally 
tantamount to suicide is not determinative of whether the State can validly compel a patient to 
undergo treatment.120 
Although refusal of treatment may legally be equivalent to suicide, there are valid reasons for 
differentiating between the two.121 There is obviously no single explanation for the phenomenon of 
suicide, but there does appear to be widespread agreement that many suicide attempts are the products 
of mental disorder122 and not infrequently, represent a cry for help rather than a determined effort to 
die.123 If the persons attempting to commit suicide are restrained and given assistance, the majority 
119 For example, Hegland, 869-871; Cantor, 'A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Treatment: 
Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life', 255, n. 135; Note, 'Compulsory Medical Treatment 
and Constitutional Guarantee; A Conflict?' (1972) 33 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 628, 634. Note also John F. 
Kennedy Memorial Hospital v Heston 58 N.J. 576, 581-582 (1971) cited above, 93. 
120 Cantor, 'A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the 
Preservation of Life,' 255. 
121 M. Heifetz with C. Mangel, The Right to Die (1975) 79-81; T. Engelhardt, The Foundations of 
Bioethics (1986) 315; Peters, 966-970; Cantor, 'A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical 
Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life,' 256-257. In addition to the argument 
based upon rational as opposed to irrational death Cantor suggests that the sheer magnitude of the 
suicide problem justifies government intervention and differentiates common· suicide from the refusal 
of treatment cases. 
122 Cantor, 'A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the 
Preservation of Life,' 256; Williams, 616-617; Engelhardt, 315. 
123 Cantor, 'A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the 
Preservation of Life,' 256. 
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do not make a further attempt.124 It is therefore perfectly valid for the State to intervene to prevent 
the occurrence of suicide as a general rule, since the State has a valid interest in the prevention of 
irrational self-destruction.125 The State's concern in relation to suicide is reflected in the continued 
legal regulation of some aspects of suicide; although suicide is no longer punishable, aiding or 
assisting suicide remains a crime and in some jurisdictions the law permits a person to use reasonable 
force to prevent suicide.126 
As a general proposition, State intervention to prevent suicide is justifiable, however, special 
considerations apply in relation to those suicides which take the form of a refusal of medical 
treatment. For terminal patients, the choice of death may be a rational one, offering a release from a 
painful and undignified death.127 Even where a patient's condition is non-terminal, the patient may be 
suffering acutely from a debilitated and dependent existence and life on such terms may become 
unacceptable to the patient. Here again, the choice of death may be entirely rational. In the medical 
context, the refusal of treatment by a patient is usually a considered and rational decision, based on 
their medical condition and the circumstances of their continued existence.128 The State's legitimate 
interest in the prevention of irrational self-destruction clearly does not arise in these circumstances.129 
Thus, there is an important distinction to be made between the usual type of suicide and refusal of 
treatment by a patient aimed at facilitating an earlier death. However, the courts in the United States 
have adopted an inappropriate means of giving effect to this distinction. As we have seen, the courts 
have consistently denied the connection between suicide and refusal of treatment and have thereby been 
able to avoid consideration of the State's interest in the prevention of suicide in such cases. In this 
way, the courts have upheld the right of a patient to refuse treatment even though that refusal closely 
approximates suicide. It was argued earlier that this line of reasoning is deficient, resulting in 
unnecessary distortions of fact and law .130 In. its place, an alternative model is suggested; we need to 
recognise that refusal of treatment may amount to suicide, but must tailor our response to this 
124 P. Skegg, 'A Justification for Medical Procedures Performed Without Consent' (1974) 90 ww Q.Rev. 
512, 524 where he cites E. Stengel and N.G. Cook, Attempted Suicide (1958) 19-24, 126-127, 129 and 
E. Stengel, Suicide and Attempted Suicide (1964) 79-84. 
11
.) 
125 Superintendent of Belchert~ State School v Saikewicz 370 N.E. 2d 417, 425 (1977); Bartling v 
Superior Court 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 (1984). 
126 For example, A.C.T. s. 18 Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 2) 1990; Vic. s. 463B Crimes Act 
1958; N.S.W. s. 574B Crimes Act 1900; S.A. s. 13(a)(2) Criminal ww Consolidation Act 1935 as 
amended by the Criminal JJzw Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1983. Note also s. 155 of the 
Northern Territory Criminal Code 1983 dealing with liability for failure to rescue which may arguably 
impose a duty to prevent suicide. 
127 For support for the view that patient suicide may be rational, see S. Wanzer et al, 'The Physician's 
Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second Look' (1989) 320 New Eng.J.Med. 844, 847-
848; R. Brandt, 'The Rationality of Suicide' in M. Battin and D. Mayo, (eds.) Suicide (1980) 117. 
128 It is, of course, possible that a patient may have suicidal intentions, quite unrelated to the medical 
condition which requires life-saving medical treatment; see Lanham, 'The Right to Choose to Die with 
Dignity,' 410. IA/ l4. 0. 
129 The comments of the court in Superintendent of Belchertwz State School v Saikewicz 370 N.E. 2d 417, ' 
426 n. 11 (1977) are particularly apt in this context. It was stated that 'the underlying State interest in 
this area lies in the pre tion of self-destruction. What we are considering here is a competent t( .0 -
rational decision to refuse treatment when death is inevitable and the treatment offers no hope of cure 
or preservation of life. There is no connection between the conduct here in issue and any State concern 
to prevent suicide'. 
130 See above, 95-99. 
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particular form of suicide so as to take into acrount the special considerations applying in the medical 
context. Thus, having regard to the circumstances of the patient and the overriding principle of self-
determination, 131 it will be readily apparent that any interest the State may have in the prevention of 
irrational suicide simply does not apply in such cases.132 Conversely, because of the special features 
of the refusal of treatment cases, upholding a patient's right to refuse treatment (even though that 
refusal may be tantamount to suicide), does not necessarily imply a general right to commit suicide 
free of State intervention.133 
In the foregoing analysis, it has been argued that the refusal of treatment by a patient may be 
tantamount to suicide. On the assumption that this proposition is indeed correct, 134 it becomes 
necessary to consider the legal implications of this conclusion for the medical profession. In 
particular, it is necessary to examine whether a doctor's compliance with the patient's request amounts 
to the criminal offence of assisting suicide and whether a doctor has a legal right, or indeed, an 
obligation, to prevent the patient from committing suicide in this way. 
Does a Doctor's Compliance with a Patient's Refusal of Treatment Amount to 
Assisting Suicide? 13 5 
This is a question of some considerable importance; if a doctor could incur criminal liability for 
assisting suicide as a result of his or her acquiescence in the patient's refusal of treatment, it would 
have the effect of seriously undermining the common law right to refuse treatment. This has already 
proved to be a matter of practical relevance; in a number of the refusal of treatment cases litigated in 
the United States, the hospital and medical staff refused to comply with the patient's request on the 
ground that to do so would involve them in liability for assisting suicide.136 
In order to ascertain whether a doctor's compliance with the patient's refusal of treatment can amount 
to assisting suicide, it is necessary to examine the legal requirements in respect of assisting suicide 
and the case law in this area. It will be argued that if the statutory prohibitions regarding assisted 
suicide are given a fairly wide interpretation, the conduct of a doctor in acquiescing in the patient's 
refusal of treatment could theoretically attract criminal liability. Whilst this is obviously an 
131 Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 50-51. 
132 This conclusion will almost inevitably flow in circumstances where the patient's condition is terminal 
or where the patient is suffering from a debilitating and irreversible condition. Where, however, the 
patient is potentially salvageable to a healthy existence, the position is less clear; arguably, the State 
interest in the prevention of suicide is stronger in these circumstances but faithful adherence to the 
principle of self-determination would protect the right of a patient to refuse treatment in such cases. 
133 Engelhardt, 315. But see Cantor, 'A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: 
Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life,' 258 where he argues that if we uphold refusals of 
treatment which are suicidal, we must permit all cases of 'serious suicide'; i.e., persons whose decision 
to die is clearly competent, deliberate and firm should be permitted to die. 
134 Even if this was not accepted as a general proposition, it is nevertheless possible to envisage 
circumstances in which the refusal of treatment by a patient would be regarded by most people as 
tantamount to suicide; e.g. a quadriplegic, non-terminal patient who decides to starve himself to death. 
135 Although this analysis is confined to consideration of the potential liability of doctors, it should be 
noted that the relatives of a patient could also potentially be liable for assisting the suicide of a patient 
by their compliance with a patient's refusal of treatment. 
136 Bouvia v Superior Court 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital, Inc. 497 
N.E. 2d 626 (1986). 
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undesirable possibility, the laws in relation to' the prevention of suicide have a sound social purpose 
and it would therefore be inappropriate to distort the meaning of these teoos in order to protect doctors 
from liability. The better solution to this difficulty is found through the patient's common law right 
to refuse treatment and reliance upon an argument analogous to that raised earlier in the context of 
homicide.137 The essence of this argument, applied here to the issue of suicide, is that since a doctor 
is legally required to respect the directions of a patient who has decision-making capacity, a doctor's 
compliance with a patient's refusal of treatment cannot constitute the criminal offence of assisting 
suicide, even though the patient's refusal of treatment may be tantamount to suicide and the doctor 
does in fact provide assistance to the patient. 
Can the Offence of Assistina Suicide be Established on the Basis of Passive Conduct? 
As was outlined earlier, although suicide is no longer an offence in any of the Australian jurisdictions, 
a new statutory offence of assisting suicide has been created, pursuant to which, a person is variously 
prohibited from aiding, abetting, instigating, counselling or procuring the suicide of another.138 
Since the conduct under consideration is essentially of a passive nature (i.e. the withdrawal or 
withholding of treatment by a doctor at the request of a patient)139 a preliminary matter for 
deteooination is whether it is possible to aid or abet by omission or whether something in the nature 
of affirmative conduct is required. 
In the jurisdictions under consideration, the only case to specifically consider this matter in the 
context of determining the legal liability of a doctor for assisting the suicide of his or her patient as a 
result of withholding or withdrawing treatment, has arisen in the United States.140 In the case of 
Bouvia v Superior Court141 the hospital and treating doctors had argued that Elizabeth Bouvia should 
not be allowed to refuse medical treatment whilst in their care because that would be tantamount to 
suicide and they could accordingly be liable for aiding and abetting suicide.142 The court was therefore 
called upon to consider the possible liability of the hospital and medical staff for assisting Bouvia's 
suicide.143 At first instance, it was held that Bouvia was committing suicide by her refusal of 
137 See chapter II, 70-82. 
138 See above, 83-84. 
139 It will be argued in the following chapter that some cases of withdrawal of treatment involve 
affirmative conduct, such as turning off artificial life-support or the withdrawal of artificial nutrition 
and hydration. (For discussion, see chapter N, 150-163.) These forms of withdrawal of treatment have 
nevertheless usually been classified as omissions rather than acts. 
140 In the case of Nancy B. v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec et al 69 C.C.C. (3d) (1992) 450 (see chapter II, 78-79) 
the Quebec Superior Court held that persons involved in the termination of artificial life-support to the 
patient in order to permit nature to take its course, would not be aiding the suicide of the patient in 
contravention of s. 241 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985. This conclusion appears to have been 
based on the court's view that if the death of the patient occurred after the respiratory support treatment 
had been stopped at the patient's request, it would be because nature had taken its course and would 
consequently be distinguishable from suicide which is not a natural death. (460) Consequently, the 
court did not specifically consider whether it was possible to aid suicide by omission. 
141 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986). 
142 Id. 306. Furthermore, it was argued that since the patient was in a public facility, the State would be a 
party to her conduct and the State could not be forced to commit the crime of aiding and abetting 
suicide. 
143 The law in relation to assisting suicide in the State of California is contained in s. 401 of the 
Californian Penal Code which states that 'every person who deliberately aids, or advises, or encourages 
another to commit suicide is guilty of a felony.' 
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treattnent and the medical staff would be assisting her suicide if they adhered to her request that she not 
be force-fed.144 On appeal, however, this ruling was overturned and it was held that by refusing 
treatment, Bouvia was not committing suicide, but simply letting nature take its course.145 This 
conclusion would have been enough to dispose of the suggestion that the hospital and medical staff 
might have been liable for assisting suicide. Nevertheless, the court went on to consider the possible 
criminal liability of the hospital and medical staff. The Court of Appeal was of the view that to 
establish liability for aiding or abetting suicide, there must be some affirmative act such as providing 
a gun, poison, knife or other instrumentality by which a person could inflict upon themselves an 
immediate and fatal injury.146 Such situations were said to be 'far different than the mere presence of 
a doctor during the exercise of [a] patient's constitutional rights.'147 Thus, the appellate court was 
able to conclude that neither the doctors nor the hospital would be criminally liable for assisting 
suicide if they were to respect the decision of a competent and informed patient to refuse medical 
treattnent. 
On the basis of the Bouvia case it would appear that in order to establish liability for assisting 
suicide, there must be some affirmative conduct on the part of the accused, such as supplying the 
means for taking one's life, and conduct in the nature of an omission to act would not suffice.148 On 
this reasoning, a doctor's compliance with the refusal of treattnent by a patient, with decision-making 
capacity, would not attract criminal liability for assisting suicide. However, it may be wondered to 
what extent this reasoning has been influenced by policy considerations and in particular, the natural 
reluctance of the courts to impose criminal liability on doctors. 
There seems to be no reason in principle why the offence of assisting suicide cannot be committed by 
omission, provided it is accompanied by the necessary intent. This conclusion is supported by an 
analysis of the wording used in the various statutory prohibitions on assisting suicide. The word 
'aid'149 has been defined as meaning 'to help or assist•l50 and it is certainly possible to envisage 
circumstances in which a person may, in a general sense, aid another in committing suicide, although 
not actually taking an active role in the person's suicide; for example, acting as lookout to clear the 
way for the person to commit suicide, or the deliberate failure to seek medical assistance for a person 
who has attempted to commit suicide with the intention of facilitating that suicide.151 This 
144 Id. 305-306. 
145 Id. 306. 
146 Ibid. See also In re Joseph G. 34 Cal. 3d 429, 436 (1983). 
147 225 Cal Rptr. 297, 306 (1986). 
148 This view is also supported by some commentators; see, for example, Williams, 613. 
149 This term is used in the legislation of most jurisdictions; see A.C.T. s. 17(1) Crimes (Amendment) 
Ordinance (No. 2) 1990; N.S.W. s. 31C(l) Crimes Act 1900 as amended by the Crimes (Mental 
Disorder) Amendment Act 1983; S.A. s. 13(a)(5),Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 as amended by 
the Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1983; Vic. s. 6B(2)(b) of the Crimes Act 1958; 
and in the Code jurisdictions, N.T. s. 168(c); Qld. s. 311(3); Tas. s. 163; W.A. s. 288(3). Note also s. 
241 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985; s. 179 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
150 R v Arnol [1981] Tas.R. 157 per Everett J. at 230 (in the context of parties to offences); Attorney-
General v Able [1984] 1 All E.R. 277. 
151 In an English case, R v Johnson (unreported) the parents of a girl who had committed suicide after a 
long period of disablement from multiple sclerosis were convicted of aiding and abetting the suicide of 
their daughter because of their failure to intervene to prevent her suicide; Note, 'Wrong to do Right' 
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interpretation of aiding suicide has the advantage of consistency with the general criminal law 
principles regarding complicity in crime. For the purposes of those jurisdictions which prohibit 
abetting suicide, 152 it is evident from judicial interpretation of the word 'abet' in the context of parties 
to offences that there is no requirement of active conduct or assistance; abetment can be established 
merely on the basis of a person's presence and acquiescence in certain conduct, where, by their . 
presence, the person intended to and did in fact give encouragement.153 In any event, in a typical 
refusal of treatment case, the withholding or withdrawing of life-saving medical treatment would be 
accompanied by continued medical and physical comfort care from doctors and nursing staff which 
could readily be interpreted as active assistance or encouragement of the patient in their effort to 
commit suicide. Even in the absence of such active assistance, it is possible that the existence of the 
doctor/patient relationship, which imposes on doctors certain duties with regard to their patients, may 
be a factor influencing a court to find that the passive conduct of a doctor did amount to assistance. 
There have, todate, been no reported cases in Australia directly raising the question of a doctor's 
potential liability for assisting suicide as a result of his or her withholding or withdrawing treatment 
at the request of the patient. However, an interesting case which may shed some light on this issue is 
the decision of Justice Fullagar of the Victorian Supreme Court in Re Kinney.154 This case involved 
an unsuccessful suicide attempt by Mr Kinney who was suffering from leukemia and awaiting trial on 
a murder charge. As a result of an attempted suicide by drug overdose, the patient was in urgent need 
of medical treatment. The patient's wife, sought an injunction to stop St. Vincent's Hospital from 
treating her husband and gave evidence that her husband had indicated to her that he wanted to die. 
Justice Fullagar refused to grant the injunction sought, stating that: 
The preventing of medical or surgical treatment amounts to carrying into 
execution the attempted suicide of the person concerned. To grant the injunction 
would be to assist the person to complete his suicide.155 
This decision could be interpreted as supporting the proposition that suicide assistance can take the 
form of an omission; the injunction was sought to prevent treatment, and the court held that granting 
the injunction would be to assist the person in his suicide, the clear implication being that 
withholding or withdrawing treatment can amount to assisting suicide. 
(1990) 38 V.E.S. Newsletter 1. The case appears to support the proposition that the offence of 
assisting suicide can be committed by passive conduct which in some way facilitates the person's 
suicide. 
152 A.C.T. s. 17(1) Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 2) 1990; N.S.W. s. 3 lC(l) of the Crimes Act 
1900 as amended by the Crimes (Mental Disorder) Amendment Act 1983; S.A. s. 13(a)(5)Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935 as amended by the Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1983; 
Vic. s. 6B(2)(b) of the Crimes Act 1958. Note also s. 24l(b) of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985; s. 
l 79(b) of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. 
153 R v Russel [1933] V.R. 59, 66-67; R v Clarkson (1971) 55 Crim.App.R. 445, 448. 
154 (Unreported) 23 Dec. 1988, S.C. Vic. See also discussion of this case by L. Skene, 'The Fullagar 
Judgment' (1989) 14 LS.B. 42; Mendelson, 37-38; and N. Tonti-Filippini, 'Some Refusals of Medical 
Treatment Which Have Changed the Law in Victoria' (1992) 157 M.J.A. 277, 278-279. 
155 Id. 4. (Author's emphasis.) 
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Another first instance decision along similar lines was made in the case of Schneidas v Corrective 
Services Commission 156 considered earlier, 157 which. involved the force-feeding of a prisoner on a 
hunger strike. In an application brought on behalf of the prisoner to prevent the prison authorities 
from force-feeding him, Lee J. refused to grant the injunction since it would in effect aid and abet the 
prisoner in committing suicide.158 By analogy, it could therefore be argued that a doctor who 
withholds or withdraws treatment at the request of a patient pursuant to a patient's suicidal refusal of 
treatment, in effect assists (aids, abets etc.) the patient in committing suicide. 
Since neither of these cases specifically dealt with the question of liability for assisting suicide as a 
result of passive conduct, such as a doctor's compliance with the patient's suicidal refusal of treatment, 
one must be careful not to overstate the significance of these decisions. Nevertheless, the cases can be 
interpreted in support of the view that the offence of assisting suicide could be established on the basis 
of some relevant omission as distinct from affirmative conduct 
Reference was made earlier to the English case of Attorney-General v Able159 in which Justice Woolf 
was called upon to interpret the English provision dealing with suicide assistance. Whilst this case did 
not specifically consider whether the offence of assisting suicide can be committed by omission, the 
principles laid down in that case160 may nevertheless provide some guidance in interpreting the 
prohibition on assisting suicide and assessing whether a doctor may be acting unlawfully by 
complying with a patient's refusal of treatment. If it is accepted that the refusal of treatment by a 
patient may be equivalent to suicide and that the offence of assisting suicide can be established on the 
basis of passive conduct, it could be argued on the basis of the reasoning in Attorney-General v Able, 
that in some circumstances at least, doctors who withhold or withdraw treatment intend to assist the 
patient to commit suicide, by their inaction, provide assistance, and the patien~ is thereby in fact 
assisted in committing suicide. Thus, the various requirements for the commission of the offence of 
assisting suicide could arguably be satisfied.161 According to Woolf J. in Attorney-General v Able, if 
these elements can be proved, it does not make any difference that the person would have committed 
suicide anyway.162 
It would appear from the foregoing analysis that as a matter of interpretation, the conduct of a doctor 
in complying with the patient's suicidal refusal of treatment could potentially come within the 
156 (Unreported) 8 April 1983, S.C. N.S.W. 
157 See above, 90-91. 
158 As noted earlier, (above, n. 57) at the time of this decision, suicide was still a crime in New South 
Wales. 
159 [1984] 1 All E.R. 277. See above, 85-87. 
160 See above, 86. 
161 Probably the most difficult element to establish would be that the doctor intended to assist the patient's 
suicide; it could for example be argued that a doctor who withholds or withdraws treatment on a 
patient's instructions simply seeks to honour the patient's refusal and does not intend to assist the 
patient's suicide. It should be noted, however, that Woolf J. in Attorney-General v Able [1984] 1 All 
E.R. 277 held that an intention to assist a person commit suicide need not involve a desire that suicide 
should be committed or attempted; see above, 86. 
162 [1984] 1 All E.R. 277, 288. 
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prohibition on assisting suicide. It therefore lfecomes very relevant to examine the legal effect of a 
patient's right to refuse treatment on the doctor's potential criminal liability. 
Legal Effect of a Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment upon a Doctor's Potential 
Liability for Assisting Suicide 
As outlined in the preceding chapter, the common law principles of informed consent and self-
determination prohibit any unauthorised medical intervention except in emergency cases where the 
patient's consent cannot be obtained.163 Thus, if a patient, who has decision-making capacity, refuses 
further medical treatment, the doctor is legally obliged to respect the patient's decision and the failure 
to do so may attract both criminal and civil liability.164 Since the doctor cannot continue to treat the 
patient except with the patient's consent, the doctor cannot be held criminally liable for assisting 
suicide where he or she simply respects the patient's wishes and withholds or withdraws treatment.165 
As a matter of both law and logic, it cannot be unlawful to do that which by law one is legally 
required to do.166 The most satisfactory way in which the legal principles regarding liability for 
assisted suicide and the refusal of treatment can be reconciled is for the courts to take a broad view of 
the patient's right to refuse treatment so that the withholding or withdrawal of treatment performed in 
recognition of that right is exempt from criminal liability even though the requirements for a doctor's 
liability for assisting suicide may be present.16 7 Whilst this line of reasoning has yet to be 
unequivocally confirmed by the courts, some support for this view can be gleaned from a number of 
cases decided in the United States dealing with the constitutional right of privacy.168 Although rights 
which are constitutionally guaranteed obviously have a special status, in view of the similarities 
between the common law right to refuse treatment and the equivalent constitutional guarantee, there is 
some ~oundation for the adoption of analogous arguments with respect to protection from criminal 
liability for those who assist a patient in the exercise of his or her common law right to refuse 
treatment. This is of particular relevance in jurisdictions such as Australia and the United Kingdom, 
163 See chapter II, 40-41. 
164 See chapter II, 34. 
165 D. Meyers, Medico Legal Implications of Death and Dying (1981) 134-5; Williams, 613. 
166 The defence of necessity may be relevant in this context on the basis that since there is a legal duty to 
comply with the patient's wishes there can be no criminal liability for doing so. (See chapter II, n. 
280.) Of particular relevance is the Canadian case of Per/ea v R (1985) 14 C.C.C. 3d 385, 417-420 
which specifically recognises the existence of the defence of necessity in circumstances where the 
defendant is faced with conflicting legal duties. 
167 I.e., that the patient by his or her refusal of treatment is committing suicide, that the doctor intends to 
assist the patient and does in fact assist the patient in committing suicide. 
168 In re Quinlan 355 A. 2d 647 (1976) (in which the court held that the exercise of the patient's 
constitutional right of privacy is protected from criminal prosecutions and that this protection extends 
to third parties whose action was necessary to effectuate the exercise of that right); Bouvia v Superior 
Court 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) (in which the court distinguished between circumstances involving 
affirmative acts, such as providing the means for the person to commit suicide and 'the mere presence 
of a doctor during the exercise of [a] patient's constitutional rights.' Some commentators in the United 
States have even gone so far as to suggest that the constitutional right of privacy recognised in many 
cases encompasses a right to commit suicide. For discussion, see L. Carl, 'The Right to Voluntary 
Euthanasia' (1988) 10 Whittier L.Rev. 489, 494-497. However, in light of the United States Supreme 
Court decision in the Cruzan case (111 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1990)) where it was held that refusal of treatment 
by a patient should be analysed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest rather than the 
more generalised constitutional right of privacy (see chapter II, 47) such claims appear to be without 
foundation. 
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where there is fairly widespread acceptance' of the right of a patient to refuse treatment, but no 
equivalent constitutional right 
In the foregoing pages, attention has been focussed on the potential legal liability for assisting suicide 
of a doctor who, in compliance with the suicidal request of a patient, with decision-making capacity, 
withholds or withdraws treatment. A distinct, but nevertheless related matter is whether a doctor ever 
has the right to intervene so as to prevent the patient from committing suicide or i-; even under a duty 
to do so. 
Does a Doctor Have a Right or Indeed a Duty to Prevent Suicide? 
At one time, suicide and attempted suicide were crimes and it was therefore possible to justify 
intervention in a person's attempted suicide in order to prevent the commission of a crime.169 Since 
suicide has ceased to be criminal under Australian law this particular argument no longer applies. 
Although suicide is no longer a criminal offence, as noted earlier, in a number of Australian 
jurisdictions legislation exists which permits the use of reasonable force to prevent a person from 
committing suicide. l 70 Even in jurisdictions where there is no such provision, it could be argued on 
policy grounds that well-intentioned intervention in an attempted suicide should not give rise to civil 
or criminal liability .171 
It has, for example, been argued that where a patient refuses treatment in the knowledge that death will 
result, the doctor is under an obligation to ignore the patient's request and, under the protection of the 
plea of necessity, prevent the patient, from adopting a course of conduct which would lead to self-
destruction.172 Reliance may be placed on the Leigh v Gladstonel13 case in support of this view.174 
Whilst the principle in that case is potentially wide and may well be capable of extension to the 
medical context, commentators have overwhelmingly rejected such an approach.175 Kennedyl76 for 
example, suggests that the case was simply a response to 'a particular situation against a particular 
political background, and is poor material on which to build any general proposition'. The consensus 
appears to be that reliance µpon this authority so as to provide justification to a doctor to override a 
169 Williams, 616-617. It should be noted that attempted suicide remains a crime in the Northern Territory; 
s. 169 Criminal Code 1983 (N.T.). 
170 See above, 100. 
171 See D. Kloss, 'Consent to Medical Treatment' (1965) 5 Med. Science & Law 89, 91-92 and the case of 
Meyer v Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias 10 N.E. 111 (1904) in which it was held by a majority of 
the New York Court of Appeal that a doctor who gave medical treatment to an attempted suicide, 
contrary to that person's express wishes, would not be liable in trespass. But as Zellick points out at 
166, since the facts of this case involved irrational, impulsive suicide, the case is not authority for the 
broad proposition that all intervention in suicide is protected from liability. In circumstances where a 
well meaning person intervenes to prevent a suicide, even if such conduct is technically unlawful, it 
would be most unlikely to give rise to prosecutions and if prosecuted, the persons would almost 
certainly be given an absolute discharge; Williams, 617. 
172 Kennedy, 226-7 where he cites J.C. Smith and B. Hogan, Criminal Law (3rd ed., 1973) 158. This point 
does not, however, appear to have been made in subsequent editions of this text. 
173 (1909) 26 T.L.R. 139. 
174 The court upheld the forced feeding of a suffragette prisoner by the prison authorities and suggested that 
the prison officers may in fact have been under a duty to preserve the prisoner's life; see above, 90. 
175 Kennedy, 227; Zellick, 171; Skegg, 525-6. 
l 76 'The Legal Effect of Requests by the Terminally Ill and the Aged Not to Receive Further Treatment from 
Doctors,' 227. 
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patient's refusal of treatment would be a most inappropriate infringement of the patient's right of self-
determination.177 Thus, Leigh v Gladstone cannot validly be used to impose upon doctors a duty or 
for that matter even a right to prevent a patient from committing suicide by refusing treatment. As 
was argued in the preceding chapter, 178 the defence of necessity should only apply in emergency 
situations where the patient is in need of life-saving treatment but the patient's consent to that 
treatment cannot be obtained. It does not justify overriding the refusal of treatment by a patient, who 
has decision-making capacity, even where that refusal is clearly suicidal. 
A related line of argument that may be advanced is that a doctor is not obliged to respect a suicidal 
request by a patient that treatment be terminated, indeed that he or she is obliged to disregard it, since 
otherwise the doctor would be criminally liable for the offence of assisting suicide.179 It has been 
argued that the conduct of a doctor in complying with a patient's suicidal refusal of treatment does, 
strictly speaking, come within the statutory prohibition on assisting suicide. However, as outlined 
earlier, patients who have decision-making capacity have the right to refuse treatment and a doctor 
may in fact incur both civil and criminal liability for disregarding the patients' directions.180 It 
follows therefore that a doctor should be protected from any criminal liability which may arise as a 
result of the doctor respecting the patient's refusal of treatment. Thus, it would not be legally 
justifiable for a doctor to force treatment upon a patient on the grounds that it is necessary to do so in 
order to avoid liability for assisting suicide. 
Rational Suicide by a Patient Distin2uished from Irrational Suicide - A Reconciliation with 
State Suicide Policy 
Although as a general proposition, doctors are sometimes free and indeed, even obliged to intervene to 
avert the consequences of suicide attempts, 181 a doctor is under no legal duty to prevent the rational 
suicide of a patient with decision-making capacity, who has declined life-saving treatment. 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether a doctor has a legal right to intervene in these circumstances. 
177 Ibid.; Zellick, 171; Skegg, 526. 
178 Chapter II, 40-41. 
179 Kennedy, 226-228. 
180 See above, 34. 
181 For discussion, see Giesen, 358; Skegg, Law, Ethics and Medicine, 110-113. When suicide was an 
offence a doctor's intervention could be justified on the basis of preventing the commission of a crime. 
However, since the abolition of the crime of suicide it has continued to be accepted that doctors are 
sometimes free, and may even be under a duty, to prevent a person from committing suicide. Once the 
relationship of doctor/patient is established, a doctor is under an affirmative duty of care to the patient. 
The failure by a doctor to administer necessary medical treatment to a person who has attempted to 
commit suicide may result in criminal prosecution for manslaughter on the grounds of criminal 
negligence and/or civil proceedings for negligence; e.g. Selfe v King George Hospital (unreported) 
The Times 26 Nov. 1970. Particularly where the doctor or hospital knows, or ought to know of the risk 
of suicide, the health care providers would be under a special duty to supervise the patient, especially in 
psychiatric heath care institutions. For other cases suggesting that doctors are sometimes under a duty 
to prevent patients from committing suicide, see Pallister v Waikato Hospital [1975] N.Z.L.R. 725, 
736, 741-748; Haines v Bellissimo (1977) 82 D.L.R. 3d 215. Cf. Robson v Ashworth (1985) 33 
C.C.L.T. 229, 246-24 in which the Ontario High Court dismissed a negligence action on public policy 
grounds since the concept of a sane suicide's responsibility for his or her own actions militated 
conclusively against liability of others. 
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The State bas a legitimate interest in the prevention of suicide. A£ was previously observed, suicide is 
frequently associated with mental disorder and irrational behaviour and in many instances, attempted 
suicides represent a plea for help rather than a determined effort to die.182 Accordingly, laws which are 
directed to the prevention of suicide183 are perfectly sound and serve an important social service in 
protecting individuals from irrational self-destruction. 
It is imperative, however, to distinguish between two fundamentally different types of suicide; the 
typical form of suicide or attempted suicide which is the product of irrational and disturbed behaviour 
on the one band and on the other, the situation where a person, who bas decision-making capacity, 
reaches a reasoned and firm decision that be or she wishes to die. For the purposes of the present 
discussion, the prime example of rational suicide is where a patient reaches a decision to end bis or her 
life and in furtherance of that decision, seeks to commit suicide, either by refusing necessary medical 
treatment or by some other means.184 
Since society bas a legitimate interest in the prevention of irrational self-destruction, nothing should 
impede well meaning by-standers or medical staff from intervening in clear cases of irrational suicide 
and imposing medical treatment in an attempt to save the life of that person. Further, where a person 
is found attempting to commit suicide, and nothing is known about bis or her state of mind, it would 
be reasonable to assume that the attempt is evidence of mental disorderl 85 and it would be quite 
justifiable for concerned persons or members of the medical profession to take whatever steps were 
necessary to prevent the death of that person. As Skegg points out, doctors are constantly intervening 
in these circumstances and there can be little doubt that a court would bold their action to be 
justified.186 
Where, however, there is clear evidence that a patient, who bas decision-making capacity, bas made a 
well informed, firm and rational decision that they wish to die, and elects to commit suicide, the 
decision of the patient should be upbeld.1 87 In these circumstances, it would be completely 
inappropriate and misplaced for medical staff to impose medical treatment against the wishes of the 
patient, on the grounds that they are preventing the patient's suicide. This conclusion bas been 
endorsed by a group of prominent American doctors in the United States. In an influential paper, it 
was accepted that if a terminal patient, not suffering from treatable depression, acts on bis or her wish 
182 See above, 99 and Cantor, 'A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily 
Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life,' 256. 
183 For example, the general prohibition on assisting suicide and the provisions which exist permitting 
physical intervention in order to prevent a person from committing suicide. See above, 100. 
184 For support for the view that patient suicide may be rational, see above, n. 127. 
185 The available empirical evidence supports the presumption of unsoundness of mind. See also Williams, 
616. 
186 Skegg, 'A Justification for Medical Procedures Performed Without Consent,' 525. See also G. Williams, 
The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (1956) 292. 
187 Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 50-51; Cantor, 'A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-
saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life,' 258; Williams, Textbook 
of Criminal Law, 617; Skegg, 'A Justification for Medical Procedures Performed Without Consent,' 
524. 
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for death and commits suicide, it is ethical for a doctor wllo knows the patient well to refrain from an 
attempt at i:esuscitation.188 
Legal validation for the foregoing view can be found in the fundamental common law right of a 
patient, who has decision-making capacity, to refuse medical treatment. Provided there is clear 
evidence of a firm and informed decision by the patient, the doctor has no right to intervene in the 
patient's suicide.189 Further, the validity of the patient's decision to commit suicide should not be 
dependent on whether the patient's condition is terminal. Whilst it may, from an objective point of 
view, be easier to understand the decision of a terminal patient to put and end to prolonged suffering 
and opt for an earlier death, the decision of a salvageable patient to commit suicide may also be 
perfectly rational. It is a fundamental aspect of an individual's right to bodily integrity and self-
determination, that he or she should be free to make his or her own assessment of quality of life and 
determine when continued existence becomes an intolerable burden.190 Provided the patient has 
decision-making capacity and the patient's decision is fully informed it should be respected by the 
medical staff.19l 
Once one accepts that a patient's decision to commit suicide (whether by refusal of treatment or other 
means) should be upheld if it is the product of a reasoned and rational decision, it must be recognised 
that these arguments carry implications far beyond the medical context. As Cantor has correctly 
pointed out, if these arguments are taken to their logical conclusion, it would require that all serious 
suicides, (i.e. of persons who have decision-making capacity and whose decision is deliberate and firm) 
should be permitted to die and medical intervention to prevent such suicides would be unwarranted.192 
Although a full examination of these wider issues is beyond the scope of this thesis, it should be 
noted that many commentators have acknowledged the possibility of rational suicide.193 In 
circumstances where the suicide is rational, it.could be argued that the State interest in the prevention 
of suicide in the form of irrational self-destruction does not arise.194 
188 Wanzer et al, 'The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second Look', 848. 
Ten of the twelve doctors expressed their belief that it is not immoral for a doctor to assist in the 
rational suicide of a terminally ill person by, for example, prescribing drugs. 
189 This should be the case even in those jurisdictions which have specific statutory provision allowing 
the use of force to prevent suicide. Since the object of these provisions is to prevent irrational self-
destruction it would be indefensible to invoke these powers in circumstances where it is known that the 
patient has made a clear and rational decision to commit suicide. 
190 Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 51. 
191 See chapter II, 42-43 for discussion regarding assessment of the patient's competence and capacity for 
rational decision-making. 
192 Cantor, 'A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the 
· Preservation of Life', 258; Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 51-52; Zellick, 170-1; Skegg, 
'A Justification for Medical Procedures Performed Without Consent', 524. 
193 See above, n. 127. 




The object of this chapter has been to examine the law in relation to assisted suicide and to consider 
the potential criminal liability of a doctor who assists a patient to die. If a doctor actively assists a 
patient in committing suicide, for example, by supplying the necessary means ~o bring about the 
patient's death, the doctor may be criminally liahle for _assisting suicide. However, by non-action, a 
doctor may lawfully facilitate the suicide of a patient who wished to hasten his or her death by 
refusing treatment. Although refusal of treatment may in certain circumstances constitute suicide, it 
has been argued that since a patient has a common law right to refuse treatment, a doctor is legally 
required to comply with the patient's refusal and would therefore not be criminally liable for respecting 
the patient's decision. Further, it has been suggested that the legitimate State aim of suicide 
prevention does not justify intervention in the rational suicide by a patient who has decision-making 
capacity. A doctor is under no duty to intervene so as to avert this form of suicide and arguably has no 
right to prevent the patient's exercise of self-determination. 
On the basis of the analysis in the foregoing chapters, it can be concluded that patients have a right to 
refuse medical treatment, including life-saving medical treatment, and a doctor who assists a patient to 
die by either withholding or withdrawing treatment would not incur criminal liability for either 
homicide or assisted suicide. There is, therefore, some scope for the lawful practice of passive 
euthanasia. If, howev~r, a doctor takes active steps in assisting a patient to die, by either providing 
some assistance to a patient in committing suicide, or in the form of active voluntary euthanasia, he 
or she may incur criminal liability for assisting suicide or murder, depending on the degree of their 
involvement in the patient's death. 
So far, attention has focussed on the law regarding active and passive euthanasia performed at the 
request of the patient, in terms of theoretical liability. In the chapter which follows, attention will 
turn to an examination of the position in practice in terms of what doctors actually do and how the 
law is in fact applied. 
'.· 
CHAPTER IV 




It is evident from the preceding chapters, that there is, in law, a significant distinction between 
passive and active euthanasia The position is that passive euthanasia can in certain circumstances be 
lawfully performed.1 It is, in fact, widely practised by the medical profession and accepted as 
legitimate medical practice. 2 In sharp contrast, the law treats active voluntary euthanasia as murder, 
regardless of the special circumstances,3 and it is officially condemned by the medical profession. 
Similarly, a doctor's active involvement in a patient's suicide is unlawful4 and the practice is rejected 
by medical organisations. The Hippocratic Oath is often cited as evidence of the medical profession's 
long tradition of opposition to active voluntary euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide.5 Although 
doctors are no longer required to swear the Hippocratic Oath, it has in part been incorporated in the 






See chapter II, 82. 
The Australian Medical Association (A.M.A.) has no official position on passive euthanasia but does 
support World Medical Association (W.M.A.) statements which, implicitly at least, accept the 
practice; see, for example, the W.M.A. Declaration of Venice on Terminal Illness (1983) and the 
W.M.A. Declaration on Euthanasia (1987). One common and well accepted form of passive euthanasia 
is the practice of making 'not for resuscitation' orders; T. Torda and P. Gerber,' To Resuscitate or Not 
That is the Question' (1989) 151 M.J.A. 244; D. Stanley and D. Reid, 'Withholding Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation: One Hospital's Policy' (1989) 151 M.J.A. 251. For recognition of the permissibility of 
the withholding or withdrawing of treatment from terminally ill patients in some circumstances, see 
also the draft guidelines prepared by the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital Ethics of Medical Practice Sub-
Committee, The Ethics of Medical Practice and the Management of Terminally Ill Patients (1992) 3-4. 
These guidelines were submitted to the Australian Health Ethics Committee (A.H.E.C.) for comment, 
and have since been widely circulated by the A.H.E.C. 
For discussion of the position in other jurisdictions, see for the United Kingdom; British Medical 
Association (B.M.A.) Working Party Report, Euthanasia (1988) 46; in the United States; Statement of 
the Council of Judicial and Ethical Affairs of the American Medical Association, Withholding or 
Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment March (1986); President's Commission for the Study 
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research, Deciding to Forgo Life-
Sustaining Treatment (1983) (hereafter referred to as the President's Commission Report); Hastings 
Center Report Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and Care for the Dying 
(1987), (hereafter referred to as the Hastings Center Report); American Medical Association, House of 
Delegates, Proceedings, 140th Annual Meeting (1991); S. Wanzer et al, 'The Physician's 
Responsibility to the Hopelessly Ill Patient' (1984) 310 New Eng.J.Med. 955; S. Wanzer et al, 'The 
Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second Look' (1989) 320 New 
Eng.J.Med. 844; and for Canada; the Canadian Medical Association (C.M.A.) Statement on Terminal 
Illness (1982) and Joint Statement on Terminal Illness (1984). 
For the purposes of this thesis attention is focussed on the liability of doctors. It is, however, 
acknowledged that medical decisions to withhold treatment with the intention of hastening death will 
usually be made by a doctor, but in practice, are often carried out by the attending nurse; see M. 
Johnstone, Bioethics (1989) 249. 
See chapter I, 11. 
See chapter ill, 87-88. 
The relevant part of which provides: 'I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any 
such counsel.' For critical analysis of the status of the Hippocratic Oath, see chapter V, 219. 
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under consideration. 6 Apart from the Hippodatic Oatli ~d the codes of ethical practice which are 
based upon it, the question of active voluntary euthanasia has been specifically addressed by a number 
of medical associations. In 1987, the World Medical Association (W.M.A.) issued a Declaration on 
Euthanasia which states: 
Euthanasia, that is the act of deliberately ending the life of a patient, even at the 
patient's own request or at the request of close relatives, is unethical. This does 
not prevent the physician from respecting the desire of a patient to allow the 
natural process of death to follow its course in the terminal phase of sickness.7 
This declaration applies to all member associations of the W.M.A., including the Australian Medical 
Association (AM.A.).8 The medical associations in the United Kingdom and the United States have 
formulated their own policies on the subject of active voluntary euthanasia, also condemning the 
practice.9 
This chapter will be focussing on the position in practice with respect to active voluntary euthanasia 
and to a lesser extent, doctor-assisted suicide. Essentially, the object of this chapter is to highlight the 
discrepancies between the strict legal position and the position in practice in terms of what doctors 
actually do and how the law is applied, in order to demonstrate the inadequacies of the present law and 
the need for re-evaluation of the law's approach. A clear understanding of the position in practice and 
the extent to which it is at variance with strict legal principles is fundamental to any informed debate 
on this subject. The analysis in this chapter is, therefore, intended to lay a foundation for subsequent 
chapters containing ethical evaluation of active voluntary euthanasialO and consideration of reform in 
this area. 11 
On the basis of existing criminal law principles, any conduct which involves active steps to bring 
about the death of a patient amounts to murder, regardless of what may appear to be extenuating 





The modem version of the Hippocratic Oath is now contained in the Declaration of Geneva a<lopled by 
the W.M.A. at its meeting in Geneva in 1948 and amended at its meeting in Sydney in 1968. At 3.1.9 it 
states that: 'I will maintain the utmost respect for human life, from the time of conception; even under 
threat, I will not use my medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity'. 
Adopted by the 39th World Medical Assembly, Madrid, Spain, October 1987. 
The official view of the A.M.A. has also been expressed through the submission of the A.M.A. (Vic. 
Branch) to the Parliament of Victoria, Social Development Committee Inquiry into Options for Dying 
With Dignity June (1986). For a summary of the submission, see Note, 'A.M.A. Opposes Euthanasia' 
(1986) A.M.A. Vic. Branch News 175. 
British Medical Association, Report, The Problem of Euthanasia (1971), (Extracted in Trowell, The 
Unfinished Debate on Euthanasia (1973) Appendix A, 151-158); B.M.A. Working Party Report, 
Euthanasia, 67; House of Delegates of the American Medical Association, 1969-1978 Digest of Official 
Action, A.M.A. Dec. (1973); Statement of the Council of Judicial and Ethical Affairs of the American 
Medical Association, Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment March (1986). 
Note also the American Medical Association, House of Delegates, Proceedings, 140th Annual Meeting 
1991 where euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are rejected, but in more qualified terms; see 
chapter VI, 287-288. 
Whilst the official position of the medical profession is to unequivocally condemn active euthanasia, 
there appears to be increasing dissension within medical associations with regard to this issue. (For 
discussion, see chapter VI, 261-290. 
10 See chapter V. 
11 See chapters VI and VII. 
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that those steps be taken, and that the doctor boo acted bona fule and out of compassionate motives. 
Similarly, liability will potentially arise for assisting suicide if a doctor provides a patient with the 
means to take his or her own life, and the law takes no account of the circumstances of the patient, or 
the doctor's motive in providing that assistance. 
However, if one has regard to the position in practice with respect to active voluntary euthanasia and 
assisted suicide, it is evident that the law is out of touch with reality. Indications are that patients do 
request active euthanasia or suicide assistance and some doctors are responding to such requests. 
However, instances of prosecutions against doctors for euthanasing or assisting the suicide of their 
patients are exceedingly rare. Judging from the few cases which have arisen, and from the experience 
with cases of mercy killing or assisted suicide occurring outside of the medical context, such cases 
will generally be dealt with very leniently by the criminal justice system. It will also be shown that 
other aspects of medical practice, such as turning off life-support or the administration of drugs 
knowing that they will cause death, which would on strict legal principles attract criminal liability for 
murder, are characterised in such a way as to avoid the possibility of such liability. It will be argued 
that the prevailing discrepancies between legal theory and practice, and the deliberate distortion of legal 
principles, cause serious problems and if allowed to continue, threaten to undermine the law and bring 
it into disrepute. 
This chapter will be divided into four parts: part I which sets out the current state of affairs with 
respect to the practice of active voluntary euthanasia; part II which examines the law in practice with 
respect to prosecutions of cases of active voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide as well as cases of 
mercy killing; part III which outlines the discrepancies between theory and practice; and part IV which 
analyses the problems with the current legal characterisation of the withdrawal of life-support and the 
administration of pain-relieving drugs which hasten death. 
PART I 
The Current State of Affairs: Patients' Requests and Doctors' Practices 
Active Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Patients' Requests 
The object of this section is to examine the extent to which patients actually request active euthanasia 
or suicide assistance. Whilst there is obviously no reliable means of accurately measuring the full 
extent of patient demand, on the basis of available evidence there can be little doubt that some patients 
do specifically request their doctor to assist them to die.12 
12 For a discussion of the causes behind a patient's request for euthanasia, see P. Admiraal, 'Justifiable 
Euthanasia' (1988) 3 Issues Law & Med. 361. 
115 
An initial difficulty is that, to a large extent, we are reliant on the doctors dealing with such patients 
to provide'information regarding the frequency of patients' requests for active euthanasia or assisted 
suicide. For a number of reasons, this is information which doctors may be reluctant to provide. A 
patient's request to die might be interpreted as a statement of the failure of the medical profession, 
particularly in light of the profession's traditional role of preservation of life.13 Furthermore, if some 
doctors respond to patient requests for active euthanasia or assisted suicide, it is unlikely to be a 
subject to which they want to draw attention in view of the present criminality of these practices. 
Thus, doctors may have reasons for not disclosing the full extent of patient requests for active 
euthanasia and assisted suicide and it is 1n fact not uncommon for some doctors (or their professional 
associations) to claim that such requests are rarely made.14 Furthermore, even if it is accepted that a 
patient has made such a request, there may be some dispute regarding the proper interpretation of the 
patient's request; whether it constitutes a genuine request to die, or whether it is simply indicative of 
the patient's loneliness, fear, despair and pain, suggesting the need for support and/or more appropriate 
pain relief rather than the termination of life.15 Indeed, in some instances, the very expression of the 
patient's request for death has resulted in the patient's decision-making capacity being questioned.16 
Whilst some medical opponents of active voluntary euthanasia have, on the basis of their own 
experience, disputed the existence of such requests, doctors who are known to have objections to these 
practices are unlikely to be asked for assistance by their patients.17 
Although there clearly are difficulties in obtaining accurate and comprehensive information, the 
available evidence indicates that patients' requests for active euthanasia and assisted suicide are not 
uncommon. One of the most reliable sources of information available are the surveys which have 
been conducted of doctors' experiences in this area. The most significant Australian survey, dealing 
also with doctors' attitudes and practices with ~espect to active voluntary euthanasia, is that conducted 
by Professor Singer and Dr Kuhse of the Centre for Human Bioethics at Monash University.1 8 This 
survey was conducted by means of a questionnaire sent to 2000 doctors in Victoria, chosen at random 
from the Victorian Medical Register for 1986. Of the 2000 doctors questioned, 869 (46%) doctors 
returned completed questionnaires. When asked whether, in the course of their medical practice, they 
13 For example, P. Turnball, 'The Relationship of the Surgeon to the Patient with Advanced Malignant 
Disease' (1980) 92 N.Z.Med. J. 354, 355. 
14 For example, R. Woodruff, 'Euthanasia for Cancer Patients: A Non-Debate' (letter) (1984) M.J.A. 548; 
B. Pollard, Euthanasia (1989) 63-66. 
15 See, for example, R. Woodruff, 548; W. Weddington, 'Euthanasia; Clinical Issues Behind the Request' 
(1981) 246 J.A.M.A. 1949; J. Buchanan and W. Cosolo, 'A Patient's Right to a Good Death' (letter) 
(1991) 154 M.J.A. 710. 
16 For example, the widely publicised case of John McEwan noted in chapter II, n. 66. 
17 H. Kuhse and R. Young, 'A Rejoinder to Some Common Objections to Voluntary Euthanasia,' paper 
delivered to the ANZAAS Symposium; Modern Medical Technology and the Right to Die, No. 222, 
(1985) 1-2. Some evidence to support this view can be found in a recent survey of South Australian 
doctors; 50% of the respondent doctors who have treated incurably ill patients and who also believe 
that assisted dying is sometimes right have been asked by a patient for such help, but only 30% of 
respondent doctors who have treated incurably ill patients and who do not believe that assisted dying is 
sometimes right have been asked by a patient for such help; Medical Practitioners Concerned with 
Assisted Dying, Media Release, 'South Australian Doctors Help Incurable Patients to Die' 28 July 1992. 
18 H. Kuhse and P. Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia' (1988) 148 
M.J.A. 623. 
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had ever been requested by a patient to hasten his or her death, 40% of the respondents answered 
affirmatively .19 These results have been confirmed by a survey which has recently been conducted in 
South Australia to ascertain the attitudes and behaviour of South Australian doctor towards medical aid 
in dying.20 Although on a smaller scale,21 this survey was conducted along similar lines to the 
Monash survey. According to the results obtained, 42% of the responding doctors who have treated 
terminally or incurably ill patients have been asked by a patient to actively assist him or her to die.22 
Since the doctors surveyed in the Monash and South Australian surveys were randomly selected these 
surveys can be taken as a representative response for doctors in Australia. 23 The results of these 
surveys are similar to those conducted in other jurisdictions. 24 They have also been confirmed 
through personal interviews conducted by the writer with doctors involved in the care of terminal and 
incurable patients. 
In addition to information obtained from interviews and surveys of doctors, the occurrence of patient 
requests for active euthanasia and suicide assistance has been documented in a number of other ways. 
Occasionally, patient requests for active euthanasia or assisted suicide attract widespread media 
attention.25 Not infrequently, the medical journals contain case-analyses regarding patient requests for 
active euthanasia or assisted suicide and how these should be dealt with from a practical and ethical 
point of view. 26 
Notwithstanding the somewhat fragmentary nature of the available evidence, it is indisputable that 
some patients do specifically seek active euthanasia or suicide assistance. However, the true extent of 
patient demand has not yet been established. Because of the present illegality of active voluntary 
euthanasia and assisted suicide, patients may be reluctant to make such a request 27 
19 This figure does not disclose what proportion of those 40% of the respondents had been requested to take 
active steps to hasten the death of the patient as distinct from the withholding or withdrawing of treatment. 
20 This survey was conducted by a group of doctors in South Australia supportive of changes to the law -
'Medical Practitioners Concerned with Assisted Dying' 
21 Questionnaires were sent to 1,000 doctors, randomly selected from the South Australian Medical 
Register. 
22 Medical Practitioners Concerned with Assisted Dying, Media Release, 'South Australian Doctors Help 
Incurable Patients to Die' 28 July 1992. 
23 In addition to the available evidence with regard to doctors' experiences with patient requests for 
euthanasia, there is also evidence of the nursing profession quite frequently encountering requests for 
active euthanasia. In a survey conducted by Kuhse and Singer of 1,942 nurses in Victoria, 66% of 
respondents had been asked by a patient to hasten his or her death; H. Kuhse and P. Singer, 'Euthanasia: A 
Survey of Nurses' Attitudes and Practices' (1992) 21 Aust. Nurses J. 21, 22. 
24 For example, N. Brown et al, 'The Preservation of Life' (1970) 211 J.A.M.A. 16, 11 where in a survey 
of 418 physicians, 12% had heard patient requests for positive (active) euthanasia; G. Williams, 
'Euthanasia and the Physician' in M. Kohl, Beneficent Euthanasia (1915) 145, 146 referring to a 
National Opinion Poll conducted in England in 1964 and 1965 in which 48.6% of the doctors who 
responded were reported to have answered 'yes' to the question 'have you ever been asked by a dying 
patient to give him or her final release from suffering which was felt to be intolerable?' 
25 For example, the case of John McEwan noted in chapter II, n. 66. Note also Kylie Tennant's 'Last Letter 
to a Friend' Sydney Morning Herald 6 Feb. 1988. 
26 For example, B. Lo et al, 'Ethical Decisions in the Care of a Patient Terminally Ill with Metastatic 
Cancer' (1980) 92 Annals Internal Med. 107; R. Higgs, 'Cutting the Thread and Pulling the Wool - a 
Request for Euthanasia in General Practice' (1983) 9 J.Med. Ethics 45. 
27 G. Williams, 'Euthanasia' (1973) 41 Medico-Legal J. 14-15. 
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Active Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Doctors' Practices 
In the ongoing debate on the subject of euthanasia, it is frequently asserted or assumed that some 
doctors are involved in the practice of active voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide.28 In this part, 
an attempt will be made to make some assessment of doctors' involvement in these practices. 
Because active voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide29 are presently unlawful, significant practical 
difficulties are encountered in ascertaining the exact extent of these practice. Doctors are naturally 
reluctant to openly admit any involvement in the practice of active voluntary euthanasia or assisted 
suicide for fear of criminal prosecution and/or disciplinary action taken against them by their 
professional organisations. 3° Furthermore, such activities are unlikely to come to the attention of 
others, since they will usually be performed in a clandestine fashion. Not only is the doctor likely to 
act secretly without onlookers, he or she may also readily conceal the true cause of death by indicating 
on the death certificate that the deceased died from natural causes. 31 Apart from the fear of criminal 
prosecution and/or professional disciplinary action, there may be other reasons why doctors may be 
reluctant to divulge their involvement in these practices. For example, doctors may well be reluctant 
to breach patient confidentiality and indeed may have been specifically requested by the patient not to 
disclose to anyone the real cause of death. Doctors may also be reluctant to discuss such matters 
amongst their colleagues for fear of disapproval from their medical peers. There are, consequently, 
inherent limitations in obtaining reliable and comprehensive information regarding the practice of 
active voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide by the medical profession, and the available 
information is, at times, fragmentary and anecdotal in nature. 
Whilst these practical limitations must obviously be acknowledged, there is, nevertheless, almost 
incontrovertible evidence that a significant proportion of the medical profession has to some extent 
been involved in the practice of active voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. 
Evidence regarding the practices of doctors with respect to active voluntary euthanasia and assisted 
suicide can be derived from a number of sources, including prosecutions of doctors, surveys of the 
medical profession and doctors openly admitting their involvement in these practices. 
28 For example, T. Marshall, The Physician and Canadian Law (1979) 26; C. Harris, 'Can Doctors Decide 
if Euthanasia is "The Good Death"?' (1983) 26 Mod.Med.Aust. 9; A. Downing, 'Euthanasia: The Human 
Context' in A. Downing and B. Smoker, Voluntary Euthanasia (1986) 24. There are, however, those 
who challenge these assumptions; e.g. H. Trowell, 136. 
29 For the purposes of this discussion assisted suicide will be used to refer to active forms of assistance, 
for example, where the doctor provides the patient with the necessary drugs to take his or her own life. 
See chapter ill, 87. 
30 Some support for this view can be gleaned from survey results which indicate that the present illegality 
of the practice of active voluntary euthanasia has been a significant factor for those doctors who have 
not responded to patient requests. (See Kuhse and Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding 
Voluntary Euthanasia,' 624.) It is possible to extrapolate from this that fear of legal or other damaging 
professional consequences is likely to be a significant factor in deterring doctors from being open in 
the practice of active voluntary euthanasia. 
31 Since autopsies are a relatively rare procedure following the death of a terminal patient, the real cause of 
death (e.g. the administration of a lethal dose) is unlikely to be discovered. 
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Prosecutions of Doctors for Active Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide 
In the United States and the United Kingdom there have been a number of cases involving the 
prosecution of doctors for their involvement in acts of euthanasia or assisting the suicide of their 
patients.32 Although such prosecutions are very rare and cannot be taken to reflect the true extent of 
the practice of active euthanasia or assisted suicide, 33 they certainly do bear out the contention that 
such practices do occur from time to time. 
Survey Evidence of Doctors' Practices 
Provided that they are professionally conducted, and assure the respondents' anonymity, surveys of 
doctors would appear to offer the most reliable information regarding the practice of active voluntary 
euthanasia and assisted suicide by the medical profession. 
In the 1987 survey of doctors by the Monash Centre of Human Bioethics,34 2000 Victorian doctors 
were asked by means of a questionnaire whether they had ever taken active steps to bring about the 
death of a patient who had asked them to do so. Of the 869 doctors that returned completed 
questionnaires, 369 of the doctors answered this question. Of those, 107 (29%) indicated that they had 
taken active steps to bring about the death of a patient at the patient's request.35 When questioned as 
to the frequency that active steps had been take to bring about the death of a patient at the patient's 
own request, the responses were that 22 doctors had taken such steps once; 70 doctors two or three 
times and a further 22 more frequently.36 This survey clearly reveals that a significant number of 
doctors in Victoria have practiced active euthanasia at the request of a patient 37 · 
32 See discussion below, 123-127. 
33 A number of reasons can be advanced for this dearth of prosecutions; as suggested earlier, doctors may, 
for a variety of reasons, be reluctant to be open in their practice of active voluntary euthanasia or 
assisted suicide and even in circumstances where active voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide are 
known to be performed, there may be a reluctance on the part of prosecuting authorities to take action 
against a doctor. See discussion below, 128. 
34 Kuhse and Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia', 623. 
35 Note also the findings of an earlier Australian survey dealing with decision-making in critical illness; 
E. Bates, 'Decision Making in Critical Illness' (1979) 15 A. & N.ZJ. of Sociology 45, 47 where it is 
reported that a number of the doctors interviewed indicated that they had taken active steps to hasten 
the death of a patient. 
36 When questioned as to the reasons behind their actions, some doctors explained their conduct in terms 
of the relief of pain rather than bringing about death. However, quite a large number of doctors made it 
clear that they had acted with the intention of ending life. Kuhse and Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and 
Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia,' 624. For further discussion with regard to the relationship 
between the admi_nistration of pain-relieving drugs which may hasten death and active euthanasia, see 
below, 163-175. 
37 In a related survey of the practices of Victorian nurses conducted by the same researchers, 25% of the 
1,942 respondents said that they had, on at least one occasion, been asked by a doctor to engage in an 
action that would directly and actively end the life of a patient who had requested that his or her death be 
hastened. Of those, 85% had engaged in such action when asked to do so by a doctor and 80% had done 
so more than once. Kuhse and Singer, 'Euthanasia: A Survey of Nurses' Attitudes and Practices,' 22. A 
much smaller percentage of nurses (5%) indicated that they had complied with a patient's request to 
directly end his or her life without having been asked by a doctor to do so. These results are of 
relevance, reflecting not only the practices of the respondent nurses, but also of the doctors who are 
reported to have requested that the nurses take active steps to end the life of a patient at the patient's 
request. 
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The recent survey of South Australian doctors has produced remarkably similar results. In that survey, 
doctors were questioned whether they had ever been asked by an incurably or terminally ill patient to 
actively assist him or her to die. Twenty-nine per cent of responding doctors who had ever been asked 
by an incurably or terminally ill patient to actively assist him or her to die acknowledged having done 
this for at least one patient. 
On the basis of the Monash and South Australian surveys, there is evidence to suggest that more than 
one quarter of the respondent doctors involved in the care of terminally or incurably ill patients have 
responded to a patient's request to take active steps to bring about the patient's death and some have 
done so on more than one occasion. These results are clearly significant and there appears to be no 
reason to suggest that these responses from Victorian and South Australian doctors, randomly 
selected, would not be broadly representative of Australian doctors generally. 
The results from the Australian surveys are consistent with surveys of doctors' practices conducted in 
the United States. In 1987 the Hemlock Society (a national group advocating active voluntary 
euthanasia38) conducted a survey among Californian doctors using the same questionnaire as used in 
the Monash survey. The questionnaire was sent to 5000 doctors of whom some 588 responded. 
Seventy-nine of the doctors surveyed (nearly 23%) indicated that they had deliberately taken the lives 
of terminal patients who had asked to die, and some had done so on more than one occasion.39 Other 
less extensive surveys conducted in the United States have also revealed that active euthanasia is being 
performed by doctors.40 
There have been relatively few surveys which have attempted to examine the extent of doctors' 
involvement in assisted suicide. One survey which did address this issue was a 1988 study of all 
licensed Colorado doctors conducted by the Center for Health Ethics and Policy at the University of 
Colorado at Denver. According to the results of this survey, a small, but nevertheless significant, 
proportion of doctors admitted to helping patients 'stockpile' lethal doses of medication, knowing that 
the drugs might be used to commit suicide.41 
3 8 See chapter VI, 250-253. 
39 Note, 'Most California Doctors Favour New Euthanasia Law' (1988) 31 Hemlock Q. 1-2. 
40 A. Levisohn, 'Voluntary Mercy Deaths' (1961) 8 J. Forensic Med. 51 referring to a survey of 250 
Chicago internists and surgeons, of which 156 replied. In answer to the question: 'In your opinion do 
physicians actually practice euthanasia in instances of incurable adult sufferers?' 61 % agreed that 
physicians do practice euthanasia, both in the active and passive form. See also H. Bosmann, J. Kay 
and E. Conter, 'Geriatric Euthanasia: Attitudes and Experiences of Health Care Professionals' (1987) 22 
Social Psychiatry 1 for reference to a survey conducted in Cinncinnati, Ohio of 190 health care 
professionals principally involved with long terin care facilities. With respect to active euthanasia, 
44% had heard of such cases and 20% had taken such action. 
41 Center for Health Ethics and Policy Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of Colorado at 
Denver, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment (1988) 17. (Hereafter referred to as 
the Center for Health Ethics and Policy Report.) Over 4% (4.3% of all doctors and 4.7% of primary care 
doctors) acknowledged providing such aid to their patients. Note also Bates, 47 where, on the basis of a 
series of interviews with doctors in Sydney, it was reported that one doctor had indicated that he 
provided patients with the means for committing suicide. 
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Admissions by Individual Doctors 
Notwithstanding the present illegality of active voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, doctors 
have, on occasion, openly admitted that they have participated in these practices. Indeed, in recent 
years there ·appears to be an increasing number of doctors who have admitted that they have actively 
ended the life of a patient or assisted with the patient's suicide. A recent public admission was made 
by an Australian doctor, Dr Rodney Symes (a Melbourne urologist) who acknowledged having helped 
three people to commit suicide in the past 15 years.42 Similar admissions have been made in the 
other jurisdictions under consideration. For example, in the United States, Dr. Timothy Quill 
described in an article submitted to the New England Journal of Medicine how he had prescribed 
sleeping pills to a patient suffering from leukemia in order that she could kill herself. 43 Another 
doctor who has openly admitted his involvement in the practice of physician-assisted suicide is Dr 
Jack Kevorkian, a retired Michigan pathologist. Dr Kevorkian has developed a 'suicide machine' which 
can be activated by a patient wanting to take his or her life.44 Since 1990, when he first used his 
suicide machine, he is reported to have assisted a total of six patients to commit suicide.45 There have 
also been instances of admissions by doctors in the United Kingdom. Such accounts include that of Dr 
George Mair who in 1974 published a book entitled Confessions of a Surgeon in which he openly 
admitted that he had perfolilled active euthanasia during his time in medical practice.46 
Other admissions to the practice of active voluntary euthanasia have been less public, or have been 
made anonymously. For example, there have been reports of medical meetings at which doctors have 
admitted to having administered active euthanasia.47 Anonymous admissions have generally taken the 
form of publications48 and include a much publicised incident in the United States, in which a 
resident doctor admitted that he had injected a fatal dose of morphine into a 20 year old patient dying 
of ovarian cancer.49 
42 The Australian 9 March 1992. See also the admission by Dr John Woolnough who openly admitted in 
taking part in a case of active voluntary euthanasia (the Australian 22 June 1973) and the reported 
admission of a retired psychologist suffering from Aids who has said he has helped 8 people with the 
disease to kill themselves by providing them with a fatal dose of prescription drugs; see Note, 
'Psychologist Helped Eight People to Die' (1990) 40 V.E.S. Newsletter 5. 
43 T. Quill, 'Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualised Decision Making' (1991) '.124 New Eng.J.Med. 
691. For discussion, see N. Newman, 'Euthanasia: Orchestrating "The Last Syllable of .... Time'" (1991) 
53 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 153, 158-160. 
44 The first few incidents involved a device which enabled a patient to release a fatal dose of potassium 
choloride after the patient had been connected to the machine. The more recent incidents have involved 
a device whereby the patient can activate the release of carbon monoxide through a mask. 
45 For further discussion, see chapter VI, 286-287. 
46 G. Mair, Confessions of a Surgeon (1974) 86. Note also the examples referred to in the Linacre Centre, 
Working Party Report, Euthanasia and Clinical Practice (1982) 11; and the admission by a London 
doctor referred to in Note, 'The Dying Patient: Current Practice' (1989) 36 V.E.S. Newsletter 1. See also 
the reference to admissions by doctors in D. Humphry and A. Wickett, The Right to Die (1986) 325-
326; R. Russell, Freedom to Die (Revised ed., 1977) 80, 137, 389-390; J. Fletcher, Moral and 
Medicine (1954) 205-206. 
47 For example, Linacre Centre, Euthanasia and Clinical Practice, 11; Fletcher 205-206. 
48 For example, Note, 'Euthanasia' (1984) 2 lnt'l.Rev.Contemp. Law 63. 
49 Note, 'It's Over, Debbie' (1988) 259 J.A.M.A. 272. This admission provoked a storm of protest, 
particularly because of the manner in which the killing had occurred; the resident had been woken up in 
the middle of the night, had had no previous contact with the patient, and had only hastily informed 
himself of her condition without consulting her doctor before administering the lethal dose. Criticism 
has also been levelled at the editor of the journal, G. Lundberg M.D., for his decision to publish the 
article, at least without any indication of disapproval of the practice. Legal action was in fact 
commenced against the editor in order to obtain further details of the incident but the Cook County 
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Evidence from Interview Work 
In the course of confidential interview work conducted by the writer, quite a number of doctors have 
been prepared to admit that they have, on occasion, deliberately hastened the death of a patient at the 
patient's request. In some instances this was done under the guise of pain relief with the drugs 
manifestly being prescribed for the relief of the patient's pain, but the doctor intending thereby to 
hasten the patient's death. A significant number of doctors have also admitted that they have assisted 
patients in committing suicide by providing the necessary drugs and information. 
Other Forms of Active Assistance in the Termination of Life 
Apart from the deliberate administration of a lethal dose, there are other forms of medical practice 
which may, in effect, involve active assistance in the termination of life, namely the withdrawal of 
life-support (for example, turning off a ventilator), 50 and the administration of pain-relieving drugs 
which hasten death. 
Withdrawal of Life-Support 
Life-support assistance can take a variety of forms; for instance, a ventilator which supports the 
respiratory function of the patient, or artificial feeding, (e.g. intravenous or naso-gastric) which 
provides a patient with nutrition and hydration. The withdrawal of such life-support measures may 
arise in a variety of circumstances. It may, for example, be done at the request of a patient who has 
decision-making capacity and is dependent on life-support.51 Alternatively, artificial ventilation may 
be terminated in respect of a brain-damaged or comatosed patient in order to determine whether the 
patient is able to breathe spontaneously,52 or because the treating doctors have decided that 
continuation of life-support is medically futile. It is a fairly common Occurrence in medical practice 
for doctors to withdraw life-support from a patient and this is widely accepted, even in the most 
conservative medical circles, 53 to be proper medical practice in appropriate circumstances. 54 
Court upheld the right of the journal to withhold the name of the author; N.Y. Times 19 March 1988. 
(For further discussion, see D. Gardy, 'The Doctor Decided on Death' (1988) 15 Feb. Time 31; W. Gaylin 
et al, 'Doctors Must Not Kill' (1988) 259 J.A.M.A. 2139; Note, "It's Over Debbie" and the Euthanasia 
Debate' (1988) 259 J.A.M.A. 2142; M. Bloom, 'Article Embroils J.A.M.A. in Ethical Controversy' 
(1988) 239 Science 1235; Newman, 155-158. 
50 The writing of 'not for resuscitation' orders could also be included in this category since it involves a 
bodily movement even though it is part of a broader plan of non-intervention. 
51 For example, the publicised case which occurred in St. Vincent's Hospital, Melbourne, where the 
hospital acted upon the request of a woman suffering from motor-neuron disease to remove the 
ventilator which was supporting her breathing. The woman died shortly after the ventilator was 
removed. See the Herald 22 March 1988, the Age 23 March 1988 and discussion by N. Tonti-Filippini, 
'Some Refusal of Treatments which Changed the Law of Victoria' (1992) 157 M.J.A. 277, 278. 
52 P. Skegg, Law Ethics and Medicine (Revised ed., 1988) 164; I. Kennedy, 'Switching Off Life Support 
Machines: The Legal Implications' (1977) Crim.L.Rev. 443, 445-448. 
53 This is highlighted by the case at St. Vincent's Hospital (a Catholic institution); see above, n. 51. 
54 For evidence of the occurrence and acceptability of this practice, see the President's Commission 
Report, (summary of the commission's conclusions) 2-9; Hastings Center Report, 35-42, 59-62; L. 
Schneiderman and R. Spragg, 'Ethical Decisions in Discontinuing Mechanical Ventilation' (1988) 318 
New Eng.J Med. 984; J. Behnke and S. Bok, Dilemmas of Euthanasia (1975) 114-115. 
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Administration of Pain-Relieving Drugs which Hasten Death 
Another aspect of medical practice which involves active assistance in the termination of life is the 
administration of pain-relieving drugs which hasten death. Many patients, particularly those suffering 
from a terminal condition such as cancer, may experience considerable pain and other distressing 
symptoms.55 There are a range of analgesic or pain-killing drugs available which may be administered 
to relieve pain, but which may have the effect of shortening the patient's life. A typical example is 
the drug morphine. Regular increases in dosage may be necessary because the effects of the disease 
become more severe or because the patient has developed tolerance to the drug.56 However, excessive 
doses of morphine may lead to the death of the patient through respiratory depression or bronchial 
pneumonia.57 Thus, doctors may face the dilemma of leaving the patient's pain unrelieved, or 
administering the minimum dose to relieve pain, even though this may hasten the death of the 
patient. 58 Whilst indications are that as a result of increased availability of pain control drugs and 
knowledge of their use, this problem is not as great as it once was, difficulties nevertheless remain.59 
It is widely accepted amongst the medical profession that where a patient is beyond recovery, it is 
legitimate medical practice to administer pain-relieving drugs even though they may incidentally 
hasten the death of a patient, 60 and there is considerable evidence that this practice is widespread. 61 
55 R. Twycross, 'Incidence and Assessment of Pain in Terminal Cancer' in R. Twycross and V. Ventafridda 
(eds.) The Continuing Care of Terminal Cancer Patients (1980) 65-74. 
56 B.M.A. Working Party Report, Euthanasia, 12. 
57 It is also possible that the use of morphine may have the effect of extending the life of the patient, 
because the patient is more rested and painfree. See, for example, R. Twycross, 'Debate: Euthanasia - A 
Physician's Viewpoint' (1982) 8 J.Med. Ethics 86, 88; President's Commission Report, 73-77; 
Hastings Center Report, 73. Indeed, some doctors contend that if morphine is used correctly it should 
never have the effect of shortening life; see, for example, R. Barry and J. Maher, 'Indirectly Intended 
Life-Shortening Analegesia: Clarifying the Principles' (1990) 6 Issues Law & Med. 117, 123-136. 
58 See also G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (1956) 287. 
59 Law Reform Commission of Western Australian, Project No. 84, Report, Medical Treatment for the 
Dying (1991) 25 (hereafter referred to as the Law Reform Commission of Western Australian Report). 
60 According to the Hippocratic Oath, one of the aims of medicine is the prevention of suffering and this 
is also reflected in the official position of the medical profession. See, for example, the W.M.A. 
Statement of Policy on the Care of Patients with Severe Chronic Pain in Terminal Illness (1990); 
B.M.A. Working Party Report, Euthanasia, 40; Statement of the Council of Judicial and Ethical Affairs 
of the American Medical Association, Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment 
March (1986); American Medical Association, House of Delegates, Proceedings, 140th Annual 
Meeting (1991); A. Burton, Medical Ethics and Law (2nd ed., 1974); Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, 
Ethics of Medical Practice Sub-Committee, Draft Guidelines, The Ethics of Medical Practice and the 
Management of Terminally Ill Patients (1992) 3; Hastings Center Report, 73, 128; S. Wanzer et al, 
'The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second Look,' 846-847. Note also I. 
Kennedy and A. Grubb, Medical Law (1989) 1076 where the authors refer to a national survey conducted 
in the United States addressing inter alia, the issue of pain relief; 82% of physicians questioned thought 
that it was ethically permissible to administer drugs to relieve a patient's pain even at the risk of 
shortening life. Interviews conducted by the writer with doctors involved in the care of the terminally 
ill also confirms that most doctors are willing to administer pain-relieving drugs knowing that the 
patient's death may be hastened as a result. There also appears to be widespread agreement as to the 
moral acceptability of this practice. See, for example, the findings of the Parliament of Victoria Social 
Development Committee in its Second and Final Report, Inquiry into Options for Dying with Dignity 
(1987) 89, 93-95. 
61 See, for example Bates, 47, the Center for Health Ethics and Policy Report, 16-17; Behnke and Bok, 
111 (referring to a survey conducted by D. Crane); and J. Gould and Lord Craigmyle, {eds.) Your Death 
Warrant? (1971) 118. 
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The Law ju Practice 
All instances of doctors being charged and prosecuted for having performed active euthanasia upon a 
patient or assisted the suicide of a patient are of obvious relevance in analysing the approach of the 
law in practice to these activities. It seems, however, that very few such prosecutions arise and it will 
be argued that this is in itself significant 
By contrast, there have been quite a number of prosecutions outside the medical context involving 
mercy killings by non-medical persons, be it a spouse, relative or friend of the deceased. There are 
clearly important differences between cases of medically administered active voluntary euthanasia and 
family mercy killing, particularly in relation to the personal emotional element which is frequently 
present in family mercy killing cases but is unlikely to be a factor in the context of medically 
administered euthanasia. 62 Notwithstanding these differences, an examination of these non-medical 
mercy killings and their treatment in the criminal justice system may shed some light on how cases 
involving prosecutions of doctors are likely to be dealt with in practice if they were to come before 
the courts more frequently. 
Prosecutions of Doctors for Active Euthanasia or Assisted Suicide6 3 
Interestingly enough, there appears to have been no recorded case in Australia involving the 
prosecution of a doctor for having performed active voluntary euthanasia. 64 However, this dearth of 
prosecutions cannot be taken as evidence that such cases have not in fact occurred. It is far more likely 
62 Note, however, there have been a number of cases in the United States where doctors have been 
prosecuted as a result of their involvement in the death of a family member. See below, 125. 
63 It should be noted that there have also been cases involving the prosecution of nurses for murder or 
assisting suicide of their patients and these cases have frequently been dealt with leniently in the 
criminal justice system; e.g. R v Barnes (unreported) 16 Nov. 1981, S.C. N.S.W. in which the 
defendant, a male nurses' assistant, was charged with attempted murder after allegedly administering an 
unauthorised dose of pethidine to an elderly patient. In the police record of interview, the defendant bad 
admitted administering a large dose of pethidine to the patient in order to kill her but claimed that the 
patient had been in severe pain and that he acted out of merciful motives. The defendant pleaded not 
guilty to the charge of attempted murder and he was acquitted. For reference to an American case, in 
which a nurse was acquitted after administering a fatal dose of morphine to a patient, see D. Humphry, 
(ed.) Compassionate Crimes, Broken Taboos (1986) 16. 
64 The only Australian case in which a doctor bas been charged with the murder of a patient is the case R v 
Lim (unreported) 25 Jan. 1989, P.S. W.A. Whilst there was some suggestion that this may have been a 
case of active euthanasia, it cannot readily be characterised as such. This case, which came before the 
Perth Court of Petty Sessions by way of committal proceedings, concerned the death of an elderly 
female patient from an alleged morphine overdose which was administered by Dr Lim after the patient 
had suffered a heart attack. In the committal proceedings which followed, the prosecution alleged that 
Dr Lim had murdered the patient in order to benefit under her will. There was evidence before the court 
that he had received various gifts of money and property from the patient before she died and that he bad 
been made executor and residual beneficiary under her will. There was, however, conflicting evidence 
about the cause of death and whether the morphine administered was a potentially fatal dose. At the end 
of committal proceedings the magistrate ruled that there was no evidence upon which a jury could 
convict and the case against Lim was dismissed. 
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to be evidence of the invisible nature of such acts65 and/or the unwillingness of prosecuting 
authorities to institute proceedings against members of the medical profession. 
In both the United States and the United Kingdom, there have been a number of prosecutions of 
doctors for either murder or attempted murder, brought on the grounds of the doctors' involvement in 
active euthanasia. The first of such cases to arise in the United States was the much publicised 
prosecution of Dr Hermann Sander in New Hampshire in 1950 for the murder of a patient.66 Dr 
Sander had evidently injected air into a vein of his cancer-ridden patient, with the intention of bringing 
about her death. This was clearly established from the patient's hospital records, in which Dr Sander 
had made the following entry: 'Patient was given 10 c.c. of air intravenously repeated four times. 
Expired within ten minutes after this was started'. At his trial, Dr Sander did not seek to deny that this 
had occurred. Nor did he attempt to allege that his action was in any way justified.67 His defence was 
simply argued on the basis that there was no evidence that he had in fact caused the patient's death. 68 
The jury acquitted the doctor of the murder charges, apparently accepting his defence that his acts were 
not the necessary proximate cause of the patient's death. 
Another American case involving the prosecution of a doctor for having administered active euthanasia 
to a patient is People v Montemarano.69 In that case, Dr Vincent Montemarano was charged with the 
murder of his 59 year old patient who was suffering from terminal cancer of the throat. There was 
evidence before the court that the doctor had administered to the patient a fatal dose of potassium 
chloride and that the patient had died shortly after. As in the earlier Sander case, the issue of euthanasia 
was not specifically raised by the defence.70 It was argued on behalf of the doctor that the patient had 
died before the potassium chloride was administered or alternatively, that the patient had died from 
other causes. The case was tried before ajury and the doctor was acquitted of all charges.71 
It should be noted that in neither case was the jury directly confronted with deciding a case of 
acknowledged medical euthanasia, carried out deliberately by the doctor with the object of terminating 
the patient's suffering. In both cases, the doctors' defence proceeded on the basis that the doctor had not 
65 D. Crane, 'Dying and Its Dilemma as a Field of Research' in 0. Brim et al, (eds.)The Dying Patient 
(1970) 303, 306. 
66 People v Sander (unreported) N.Y. Times 10 March, 1950. For analysis of this case, see T. Sachs, 
'Criminal Law: Humanitarian Motive as a Defense to Homicide' (1950) 48 Mich.L.Rev. 1199. 
67 D. Meyers, Medico Legal Implications of Death and Dying (1981) 121. There appears to be some 
disagreement amongst commentators as to whether the patient had requested such assistance. Compare 
for example, Behnke and Bok, 53; and Y. Kamisar, 'Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed 
Mercy-Killing Legislation' (1958) 42 Minn.LRev. 969, 1019. 
68 Evidence was given at the trial that the patient might already have been dead when Dr Sander gave her 
the injection and that in any event, 40 c.c. of air would be insufficient to cause.death; see W. Baugham, 
J. Bruha and F. Gould, 'Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations' 
(1973) 48 Notre Dame Law. 1202, 1214. 
69 (Unreported) (1974) Nassau County Court, (N. Y.). 
70 L. Goldsmith, 'Physician Acquitted of Charges of Murdering Patient' (1974) 2 J.L.Med. 47, 48. 
71 N.Y. Times 13 Jan. 1974. 
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caused the patient's death and the jury in each case.apparently accepted these arguments despite 
considerable evidence to the contrary.72 
There have also been a number of other cases which have come before the courts in the United States 
involving prosecution against doctors for murder in circumstances suggesting active euthanasia where 
the doctor was a relative of the deceased.73 In a 1986 case, Dr Joseph Rassman was charged with the 
murder of his mother-in-law who had been suffering from Alzheimer's disease. He pleaded guilty to 
killing her by injecting the pain-killer Demerol into her feeding tube. He was sentenced to two years 
probation, fined $10,000 and ordered to perform 400 hours of community service by a New Jersey 
Superior Court judge.74 In imposing ilie sentence, the judge commented that no purpose would be 
served by committing the defendant to gaol and suggested that having regard to all the circumstances, 
gaoling the offender would constitute 'a serious injustice•.75 In 1988 Dr Peter Rosier was charged 
with the murder of his wife who had been suffering from terminal cancer. Dr Rosier had admitted to 
the media, some months after the death of his wife, that he had given his wife drugs at her request so 
that she could end her life. He pleased not guilty to the charge of murder and notwithstanding factual 
evidence which clearly indicated Dr Rosier's criminal liability for taking steps to assist his wife to die, 
he was acquitted by the jury.76 
Another noteworthy case is that of Dr Timothy Quill, (referred to earlier) 77 who had publicly admitted 
assisting a cancer patient to commit suicide. He had been attending the patient for quite a number of 
years and when the patient requested assistance to die, he provided her with a prescription for 
barbiturates and information on how to use them in order to commit suicide. As a result of this 
action, Dr Quill was brought before a grand jury. However, the grand jury refused to indict him on 
charges of assisting suicide. 78 
12 Behnke and Bok, 53-4; R. Veatch, Death Dying and the Biological Revolution (1976) 80. Another case 
involving a prosecution of a doctor for murder arose in 1985 when Dr John Kraai was charged with the 
murder of his patient who had been suffering from Alzeheimer's disease. Dr Kraai committed suicide 
before the matter came on for trial; see Humphry and Wickett, 145-147. 
73 Note also the Canadian case involving the prosecution of Dr Ernest Pedley in 1973 for the attempted 
murder of his cancer-stricken wife. Dr Pedley entered a plea of guilty to attempted murder and was 
convicted to imprisonment for six months; see G. Parker, 'You Are a Child of the Universe: You Have a 
Right to be Here' (1977) 7 Manitoba L.Rev. 151, 165. 
74 People v Hassman (unreported) N. Y. Times 20 Dec. 1986. 
15 Ibid. 
16 People v Rosier (unreported) Washington Post 2 Dec. 1988; Note, 'Dr Rosier's Acquittal Both a Victory 
and a Warning' (1989) 34 Hemlock Q. 1. 
77 See above, 120. 
78 N.Y. Times 21 July 1991. Note should also be made of the charges against Dr Kevorkian for having 
assisted in the suicide of a number of patients. However, because these suicides took place in the State 
of Michigan where assisting suicide is not a specific offence, charges were instead brought for murder 
but were dismissed because the prosecution could not show that Dr Kevorkian had activated the suicide 
device so as to constitute homicide. For further discussion, see above, 120 and chapter VI, 286-287. 
Although there have been other instances of doctors admitting their participation in the suicide of 
patients they have generally not resulted in prosecution. This can, in part, be explained by the 
tendency of the doctors not to disclose the identity of the deceased patient, thereby making it difficult 
for the prosecution to prove liability. There does, however, appear to be a distinct disinclination on 
the part of police and prosecuting authorities to investigate or take action in respect of such cases. See 
further discussion below, 128. 
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In recent years, there have also been a number of prosecutions of doctors in the United Kingdom for 
the attempted murder of their patients.79 In 1986 criminal proceedings were brought against Dr Carr 
for having injected a massive dose of phenobarbitone into a patient who had terminal cancer. The 
patient had died two days later and since natural causes could not be ruled out as the cause of death, the 
charge was one of attempted murder. 80 The prosecution claimed that the dosage could not possibly be 
justified on any genuine medical basis and that it had been deliberately administered in order to hasten 
the death of the patient.81 As part of the prosecution case it was alleged that the doctor had said that 
'he wished the patient should be allowed to die with dignity.'82 Dr Carr, who had pleaded not guilty to 
the charge of attempted murder, alleged that the dose had been given in error. 83 This contradicted an 
earlier statement he had made to the police in which he claimed that he had only administered a 
fraction of the dose. 84 Notwithstanding the weight of evidence against him and a summing up by the 
judge hostile to the defence, the jury acquitted the doctor of the charge. 85 This result wrui hailed by the 
press as the product of the jury's detemlination not to brand a doctor a criminal who they believed had 
acted honourably and mercifully. 86 
A recent case which has attracted much publicity in the United Kingdom is the prosecution and 
conviction of Dr Cox for the attempted murder of one of his patients. 87 Cox, a rheumatologist, was 
charged with attempted murder following the death of a 70 year old terminally ill patient who had 
asked him to put her out of her misery.88 The deceased, who had been a patient of Dr Cox for 13 
years, had rheumatoid arthritis, complicated by gastric ulcers, gangrene and body sores.89 She was 
crippled from her condition and in great pain. There was evidence before the court that five days before 
her death the patient had rejected further medical treatment other than pain-killers in a final decision to 
give up her fight for life. 90 She had apparently begged Cox -to 'finish her off but he had refused, 
promising instead to relieve her pain to allow her to live her final days in dignity.91 When other pain-
killing measures failed to bring relief, Cox administered a large dose of potassium chloride, twice the 
amount which would normally prove fatal and the patient died within minutes. 
79 The prosecutions against doctors in the United Kingdom include R v Arthur (unreported) The Times 6 
Nov. 1981 concerning the prosecution of Dr Leonard Arthur for attempted murder with regard to the 
death a Down's syndrome baby but it is submitted that this case falls outside the ambit of the present 
analysis, since it did not clearly involve active euthanasia. 
80 R v Ca" (unreported) Yorkshire Post 12 Nov. 1986. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Yorkshire Evening Post 19 Nov. 1986. 
84 Yorkshire Evening Post 18 Nov. 1986. Dr Carr had initially claimed that he had only injected 150 
m.g.'s of phenobarbitone but later accepted that he had given the patient 1,000 m.g.'s. 
85 The Sunday Times 30 Nov. 1986. 
86 Ibid. 
87 The Times 22 Sept. 1992. 
8 8 He was evidently charged with attempted murder rather than murder because the deceased had been 
cremated before the police investigation could establish that the drugs were the cause of death; Note, 
'Attempted Murder Conviction of Euthanasia Doctor in England' (1992) 62 V.E.S.N.S. W. Newsletter 2. 
89 The Times 22 Sept. 1992. 
90 The Australian 21 Sept. 1992. 
91 Ibid. 
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Cox admitted that he had administered the drug but maintained that his primary intention was not to 
kill his patient but merely to relieve her suffering. After eight hours of deliberation, the jury, several 
overcome with emotion and weeping, reached a majority verdict of 11-1 against Cox on what the 
judge had described as 'the most clear and compelling evidence'.92 Cox was given a 12 month prison 
sentence, but in recognition of the fact that the public interest would not be served by immediately 
jailing the consultant, the sentence was suspended. Justice Ognall of the Winchester Crown Court 
described the situation as one in which the consultant had allowed his distress over the suffering 
endured by his patient to overcome his professional duty. His Honour said 'such conduct can never be 
legally excused. However, sometimes it can be explained.'93 In sentencing Cox, Justice Ognall told 
him that his conduct in administering a lethal injection to his patient had not only been criminal, but 
also a betrayal of his unequivocal duty as a physician.94 Counsel for the defendant had urged the judge 
to give his client an absolute discharge in view of the exceptional circumstances of the case but the 
judge said that deliberate conduct by a doctor aimed at bringing about the death of a patient required, as 
a matter of principle, to be marked by a term of imprisonment.95 
The conviction against Cox is of consequence, being one of the rare instances where a doctor has been 
found criminally liable for having taken active steps to hasten the death of a suffering patient. 
Moreover, it is significant that a sentence of imprisonment was imposed, albeit one which was 
ultimately suspended. The comments made by Justice Ognall and the course that he took against Cox 
indicates that some members of the judiciary would be inclined to bring the criminal law to bear 
against doctors for any action taken to deliberately hasten the death of a patient. Although the sentence 
imposed may, in some respects, appear lenient, the judge had the discretion to impose a lighter 
penalty, including the possibility of a conditional discharge, which arguably would have been more 
appropriate in all the circumstances.96 
There have also been a number of prosecutions for murder in the United Kingdom in circumstances 
where the doctor alleged that the death inducing drugs administered to the patient were for the relief of 
pain and, therefore, his action did not constitute murder.97 However, in both of these cases the doctor 
was acquitted of the charge.98 




96 See also D. Brahams, 'Euthanasia: Doctor Convicted of Attempted Murder' (1992) 340 Lancet 783 where 
she suggests that in comparison with the sentences imposed against doctors in a number of recent 
convictions for criminal recklessness, (6 months, suspended) the sentence against Cox was unduly 
harsh. 
97 R v Adams (unreported). See H. Palmer, 'Dr Adams' Trial for Murder' (1957) Crim.L.Rev. 365; R v 
Lodwig (unreported) The Times 16 March 1990. These cases are dealt with in detail below, 165-170 in 
the context of the discussion with respect to pain-relieving drugs which hasten death. 
98 In R v Adams the defendant was found not guilty after a very favourable direction from the Judge, and in 
R v Lodwig the prosecution did not offer any evidence against the defendant at his trial. See further 
discussion below, 165-170. 
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Perhaps the most significant point to emerge- from the foregoing analysis is the sparsity of cases 
involving the prosecution of doctors for either administering active euthanasia or assisting the suicide 
of their patients.99 This contrasts markedly with the available information regarding doctors' practices 
which strongly suggests that a not insignificant proportion of doctors have performed active voluntary 
euthanasia or assisted the suicide of a patient A number of informed suggestions can be put forward 
by way of possible explanation for this dearth of cases involving prosecutions of doctors. First of all, 
as noted earlier, lOO in view of the present criminality of active euthanasia and assisted suicide, 
doctors' involvement in these practices is understandably covert and, therefore, unlikely to come to the 
attention of others. Furthermore, although such cases are widely known to occur, there appears to be a 
distinct reluctance by the police and prosecuting authorities to become involved in this area.101 
However, once a matter comes to the attention of the police and prosecuting authorities through the 
reporting of others or even by the doctor's own admission, the authorities have no real choice but to 
proceed with a prosecution, provided there is sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury, 
properly instructed, could convict.102 From an evidentiary point of view, one of the main practical 
difficulties in securing a murder conviction against a doctor for having killed a patient by 
administering a lethal dose or by other means is proving that the death of the deceased was caused by 
the act of the doctor.103 Particular difficulties are likely to arise in circumstances where the patient 
was in a terminal condition and had already been receiving large doses 9f drugs over an extended period 
of time. In these circumstances it may be very difficult for the prosecution to establish that the doctor 
had caused the patient's death.104 Lack of evidence may, therefore, be a ground for not instituting, or 
not proceeding with a prosecution against a doctor. Where a prosecution does proceed, judging from 
the few cases which have come before the courts, the prospect of securing a murder conviction against 
a doctor for administering active voluntary euthanasia in a bona fide medical context seems fairly 
remote. Almost invariably, doctors have escaped criminal liability even though, in many instances, 
the evidence has clearly indicated criminal activity. As the few reported cases have shown, juries are 
often reluctant to convict doctors who have acted bona fide and out of compassionate motives, and are 
therefore likely to seize upon any defect in the evidence as a reason for acquitting the defendant Indeed, 
9 9 Of interest in this regard is a Canadian case in which a Quebec doctor helped a patient suffering from 
AIDS to die. The doctor has been reprimanded by the Disciplinary Committee of the Quebec 
Corporation of Physicians, but was not recommended for prosecution; Note, 'Quebec Doctor Not 
Prosecuted for Euthanasia' (1992) Vol. 6 No. 3 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 2. 
100 See above, 115, 117. 
101 This conclusion has been reached following numerous interviews with heads of police and prosecuting 
authorities throughout Australia. See also Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 291-2; 
Levisohn, 66. Note, however, the statement by the New South Wales Attorney-General made in the 
wate of the release of the results of the survey of Victorian doctors' attitudes and practices regarding 
euthanasia (see above, 115-116) to the effect that doctors who carry out mercy killings would definitely 
be prosecuted; Daily Telegraph 23 June 1988. Note also in the United Kingdom, following the R v 
Arthur case, (unreported) The Times 6 Nov. 1981 (see above, n. 79) it was announced by the Crown 
prosecutor that doctors who deliberately hasten the death could face the prospect of life imprisonment; 
see J. Harvard, 'The Legal Threat to Medicine' (1982) 284 B.M.J. 612, 613. 
102 This has been confirmed by conversations with public prosecutors in Australia. For more detailed 
discussion regarding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, see below, 129-133. 
103 P. Key, 'Euthanasia: Law and Morality' (1989) 6 Auckland U.L.Rev. 225, 230; Williams, The Sanctity 
of Life and the Criminal Law, 291. 
104 For example, People v Sander (unreported) N. Y. Times 10 March, 1950; People v Montemarano 
(unreported) (1974) Nassau County Court, (N. Y.) referred to above, 124-125. Moreover, in practice 
difficulties may be encountered in finding a doctor who is willing to give evidence against another 
doctor, particularly in criminal proceedings. 
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juries have tended to acquit in circumstances where the evidence and the judge's direction leave them 
with no legal reason for doing so.105 It is in fact quite a remarkable that the recent conviction for 
attempted murder of Dr Cox in the United Kingdom is virtually the first case in which a doctor has 
been convicted for having taken steps to end the life of a suffering patient 106 
Mercy Killing Cases in the Criminal Justice System 
Although there have been notably few cases of doctors being prosecuted for performing active 
euthanasia or assisted suicide, there have been quite a number of prosecutions outside the medical 
context In Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, many cases have arisen involving 
'mercy killings' or suicide assistance by non-medical persons, be it a spouse, relative or friend of the 
deceased.107 In the overwhelming majority of cases, such offenders are dealt with extremely leniently 
by the criminal justice system, even though the criminal law has clearly been violated. 
Whilst there is considerable similarity in the overall approach taken to mercy killing cases in these 
countries, there are also significant differences stemming from discrepancies with respect to possible 
jury verdicts and sentencing options.108 For effective coverage of the law in practice with respect to 
mercy killing in Australia, the United S~tes and the United Kingdom, it is therefore necessary to 
examine each of the jurisdictions separately. 
Australia 
A review of mercy killing cases in Australia cases reveals that a number of mechanisms within the 
criminal justice system have been invoked to temper the rigours of the criminal law with respect to 
homicide and assisted suicide. 
Prosecutorial Discretion 
Criminal law in Australia comes within the jurisdiction of the States and Territories and each 
jurisdiction also has its own prosecutorial division. An important feature of the exercise of 
prosecutorial powers is the existence of prosecutorial discretion.109 None of the prosecutorial 
105 Perhaps the most remarkable case is that of Dr Sander in which the jury acquitted the defendant even 
though he had entered on the medical record of the deceased notes to the effect that he had deliberately 
injected air into the vein of the patient and that the patient had died a short time later; People v Sander 
(unreported) N. Y. Times 10 March, 1950. See above, 124. 
106 The only exception has been in cases where the doctor had a familial connection with the deceased and 
had pleaded guilty to the charge; e.g. the case of People v Rassman (unreported) N. Y. Times 20 Dec. 
1986 discussed above, 125. 
107 Reference will also be made where relevant to mercy killing cases arising in Canada and New Zealand. 
Some of the cases considered below were not cas~ of voluntary euthanasia performed at the request of 
the patient, but involved non-voluntary euthanasia. Although these cases are considered together, it is 
by no means intended to suggest that cases of non-voluntary euthanasia can simply be equated with 
voluntary euthanasia. 
108 For example, the defence of temporary insanity which is available in the United States and which has 
proved to be of considerable relevance in the context of family mercy killings, is not available in 
Australia or the United Kingdom. 
109 For discussion of the nature, source and exercise of prosecutorial discretion, see T. Hetherington, 
Prosecution and the Public Interest (1989). 
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departments in Australia have an official policy with regard to the treabllent of mercy killing or active 
euthanasia,
0
nor do they have prosecution guidelines speCifically dealing with these issues.11° There 
are, however, general guidelines and criteria governing the decision to prosecute, 111 and any decision 
as to whether a prosecution should be instituted or continued in a mercy killing case are made having 
regard to these criteria. 
The initial consideration in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is whether the evidence is sufficient 
to justify the institution or continuation of a prosecution.112 A prosecution should not be 
commenced if there is no reasonable prospect of a conviction being secured. In cases of mercy killing 
there is potential for a jury fo be motivated towards an acquittal out of sympathy for the defendant 
notwithstanding the strength of the prosecution case. However, the guidelines make it clear that any 
such potential should be disregarded by the prosecutor in assessing the prospects of securing a 
conviction on the available evidence. The criteria state that in indictable matters, this assessment is to 
be made on the assumption that the jury will act in an impartial manner and in accordance with its 
instructions. 113 Provided the available evidence satisfies the test of evidential sufficiency, it is then 
appropriate for the prosecutor to consider whether the public interest requires a prosecution to be 
pursued.114 The criteria set out a number of factors which may be relevant in determining this 
question, and it is at this stage that the prosecution may validly take into account the special 
circumstances of a mercy killing case. Factors which are relevant in determining the public interest 
requirement, and which may be of particular significance in such cases, include the existence of any 
mitigating circumstances, the age and physical health of the alleged offender or victim, whether the 
consequences of any resulting conviction would be unduly harsh and oppressive, and the likely 
outcome in the event of a finding of guilt having regard to the sentencing options available to the 
court.115 The guidelines go on to make it clear that although there may be mitigating factors present 
in a particular case, often the proper decision will be to prosecute and for those factors to be put to the 
court for the purposes of sentencing by way of mitigation.116 
In practice, the mercy killing cases which have arisen in Australia have almost invariably been 
prosecuted. In discussions with the writer, prosecutors have confirmed that the circumstances would 
have to be quite exceptional for a decision to be made not to prosecute an offender, particularly having 
regard to the gravity of the offence. However, apart from the decision not to prosecute, there are a 
number of other ways in which prosecutorial discretion may be manifest including the discontinuance 
110 This and the information which follows, stems from 'interviews conducted by the writer with persons 
from the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions in each Australian jurisdiction (with the 
exception of the Northern Territory in respect of which inquiries were conducted by correspondence.) 
111 In the interests of consistency in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion uniform guidelines have been 
formulated by Directors of Public Prosecution and senior Crown Prosecutors for application throughout 
Australia. See the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Victoria, Annual Report 1989/90, 55-
66. 
112 Id. 56. 
113 Id. 51. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Id. 59-60. 
116 Id. 61. 
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of a prosecution, prosecuting for a lesser charge; and the acceptance of a plea of guilty for a lesser 
offence.117 
Prosecution Discontinued 
There have been cases where, in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, a decision has been taken not 
to proceed with a prosecution.11 8 One such case arose in the Australian Capital Territory in 1983 
when the then Commonwealth Attorney-General, Senator Gareth Evans, 119 decided not to proceed 
with a charge of murder against a woman who had allegedly killed her sister who had been suffering 
from a terminal illness and bad expressed a wish to die.120 The murder charge arose following a 
coronial inquiry into the death in which a prima facie case of murder was found to have been 
established against the defendant. In explaining the reasons for the decision not to proceed with the 
prosecution, Senator Evans stated that the evidence against the defendant was largely circumstantial 
and it was considered that a jury would be unlikely to convict.121 However, he emphasised that the 
decision was based wholly on the exceptional circumstances of the case, and should not be taken as 
signalling any particular approach to cases of this kind.122 In furtherance of this decision not to 
proceed with the prosecution, the Crown filed a bill of nolle prosequi in the Australian Capital 
Territory Supreme Court.123 
Another example of a discontinued prosecution can be found in the Tasmanian case of R v Baker.124 
The defendant, Reginald Baker, was charged with murder as a result of shooting his sick wife in the 
forehead with a .22 calibre rifle. The deceased's health bad been failing for some time as a result of a 
number of strokes, and in the months preceding the incident, it had significantly deteriorated rendering 
the deceased incapable of caring for herself. In a statement made to the police by the defendant, the 
117 In addition to the circumstances discussed below, prosecutorial discretion may also arise with regard to 
the issue of bail. Significantly, in quite a number of mercy killing cases, the defendants were released 
on bail notwithstanding the seriousness of the charges against them; e.g. R v Baker (unreported) the 
Mercury 5 Dec. 1972, 6 Dec. 1972; R v Johnstone (unreported) 21 Jan. 1987, S.C. S.A. Whilst the 
determination of bail lies at the discretion of the court, the prosecution would usually be called upon to 
present submissions to the court with regard to the matter. It is, therefore, quite possible for the Crown 
not to oppose bail in genuine cases of mercy killing, and interviews with prosecutors have confirmed 
that this would, in some instances, be the appropriate course. 
118 It should be noted that in most Australian jurisdictions, proceedings are initially commenced by the 
police and the prosecution only becomes involved after the defendant has been committed for trial. 
It is possible that proceedings are dismissed at the committal stage; e.g. Police v Caves (unreported) 21 
Sept. 1987, Newcastle L.C., N.S.W. in which Stewart Caves was prosecuted for the manslaughter of his 
wife. The deceased had, for a number of years, suffered unrelievable pain following an unsuccessful 
dental procedure. In a deliberate plan to take her own life, she had, to the knowledge of her husband, 
taken a lethal dose of drugs and her husband had taken no action to prevent her from doing so. At the 
committal hearing the Magistrate found that the police had established a prima facie case against the 
defendant on the manslaughter charge but held that there was no real chance or prospect that a jury 
would convict him and accordingly ordered that the defendant be discharged. 
119 Since the case arose in the A.C.T. prior to the establishment of the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions in March 1984, the discretion whether to prosecute lay with the Commonwealth 
Attorney-General. 
120 Due to a suppression order made by the court, the name of the defendant in this case may not be 
published. 
121 Law Reform Commissioner, Victoria, Working Paper No. 8, Murder: Mental Element and Punishment, 
(1984) 25 (hereafter referred to as Victorian Law Reform Commissioner Working Paper.) 
122 Press release by the Attorney-General, Senator Gareth Evans, 11 July 1983. 
123 (Unreported) the Canberra Times 12 July 1983. 
124 (Unreported) the Mercury 5 Dec. 1972, 6 Dec. 1972. 
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defendant indicated that the deceased had a dreaci of being placed in a nursing home and that in the light 
of her worsening condition, he had summoned the courage to spare her from any more unhappiness 
and pain by taking her life. The defendant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Following committal 
proceedings, the defendant was committed for trial, 125 but in view of the medical evidence presented 
at committal proceedings which had raised some doubt as to the cause of death, 126 the Crown decided 
not to file an indictment, and the defendant was discharged.127 As noted above, 128 the sufficiency of 
evidence is an important consideration in the exercise ofprosecutorial discretion, and having regard to 
the equivocal medical evidence it is possible that a reasonable jury, properly instructed, would have 
had a reasonable doubt as to the cause of death. However, having regard to the tragic circumstances of 
the case, the conclusion appears inescapable that considerations of sympathy for the defendant also 
played some role in the interpretation of the medical evidence.129 
Prosecution for Lesser Charge 
Another way in which prosecutorial discretion may be manifest in a genuine mercy killing case is for 
the prosecution to proceed with a lesser charge.130 This occurred in the case of R v Austen 131 in 
which the defendant, an elderly man of outstanding character, was indicted for manslaughter rather than 
murder for the killing of his wife who had been suffering from Alzheimer's disease. From discussions 
with Crown Prosecutors, it would appear, however, that this would normally only be done in 
circumstances where there is sound justification for reducing the charge.132 
Acceptance of Plea of Guilty by the Crown for Lesser Offence 
In cases where prosecution for the more serious offence is set to proceed the Crown may be prepared 
to accept a plea of guilty from the defendant to a lesser offence in full satisfaction of the charge. 
Whilst the decision to accept a plea for a lesser offence lies within the discretion of the 
prosecution, 133 there are general principles and in some jurisdictions, specific guidelinesl34 which 
guide the exercise of this discretion. According to accepted prosecutorial practice, there must be good 
justification before a decision is taken to accept a lesser plea.135 A plea should not be accepted unless 
it reasonably reflects the nature of the criminal conduct of the defendant and provides an adequate basis 
125 Notice of Committal dated 16 Feb. 1973. 
126 On the evidence, it was impossible to rule out the possibility that the deceased was already dead at the 
time the shot was fired. 
127 Criminal Court, 7 May 1973 before Neasy J. 
128 See above, 130. 
129 An informal conversation with a former member of the Tasmanian Director of Public Prosecutions 
office has confirmed that this was in fact the case. 
130 A reduced charge may possibly be the result of plea-bargaining between the prosecution and the 
offender. 
131 (Unreported) 5 March 1990, S.C. N.S.W. 
132 For example, in the case of R v Austen (unreported) 5 March 1990, S.C. N.S.W., some doubt had been 
raised as to the psychiatric condition of the defendant 
133 See R v Brown (1989) 17 N.S.W.L.R. 472 where it was held that the prosecution has a wide discretion 
to present and accept a plea to a lesser charge, notwithstanding that uncontested evidence establishes 
the commission of a more serious offence. The court does, however, have a discretion whether to accept 
a plea, although this is rarely exercised in practice; see Hetherington, 168. 
134 For example, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Victoria, Annual Report 1989/90, 63-66. 
135 For example, having regard to the likelihood of conviction or doubts with regard to the evidence or the 
mental state of the defendant. 
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upon which a court can impose an appropriate sentence.136 Where there is a plea of guilty to a lesser 
offence the Crown may, for the purposes of sentencing, agree to proceed on an accepted factual basis 
favourable to the defendant 
The Victorian case of R v Larkin131 illustrates the Crown's role in accepting a plea to a lesser offence 
in full satisfaction of the charge. In that case, the defendant, a nurse, was initially charged with the 
murder of her lover - a manic depressive, who had, on a number of occasions, threatened to commit 
suicide. The deceased had taken an overdose of tablets whilst the defendant was at work. When the 
defendant returned from work the deceased once again expressed his wish to die and attempted to inject 
himself with a fatal dose of insulin. The defendant then responded to her lover's plea and administered 
the fatal injection. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to a charge of aiding and abetting suicide 
under the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic.) and the Crown accepted this plea. Another case in point is that of R 
v Thompson.13& The charges against Thompson arose as a result of a confession that he had made to 
the police concerning the murder of his father in 1969, some 12 years earlier. The defendant's father 
had been suffering from Parkinson's disease for several years. He had been in poor physical and mental 
condition, but had declined to go into a nursing home. The defendant had employed a nurse to look 
after him, but he often did the nursing of his father himself. On Christmas day 1969, the defendant 
had killed his father by placing a plastic bag over his head. Thompson pleaded not guilty to the charge 
of murdering his father, but guilty to the lesser charge of manslaughter and this plea was accepted by 
the Crown.139 
The Crown's role in accepting a plea of guilty from the defendant to a lesser offence in full 
satisfaction of the charge is, in practice, likely to be particularly relevant in those jurisdictions where 
there is still a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for murder.140 For the purpose of these 
jurisdictions, if the Crown accepts a plea of guilty to a charge of manslaughter or assisted suicide 
rather than murder, the possibility is thereby opened up for discretion in the sentencing of the 
defendant 141 
136 Id. 63. 
137 (Unreported) 14 April 1983, S.C. Vic. 
138 (Unreported) 25 Nov. 1981, S.C. N.S.W. For further examples of Australian cases in which the Crown 
has accepted a plea for a lesser offence in a mercy killing case, see R v Robert-Jones (unreported) 6 
Aug. 1987 S.C. N.S.W and R v Thiel (unreported) 27 Sept. 1990, S.C. N.S.W. 
A recent New Zealand prosecution, R v Ruscoe, illustrates the same proposition. In 1991 Warren 
Roscoe was charged with the murder of his long-time friend Gregory Nesbit who had become a 
tetraplegic following an accident. Roscoe had confessed to police that he had given the deceased an 
overdose of tablets and had then smothered him with a pillow. The charge of murder was subsequently 
withdrawn and the prosecution accepted a plea of guilty to the lesser charge of aiding and abetting 
suicide; Evening Post 21 March 1992. 
139 This was done largely on the basis of a psychiatric report which suggested diminished responsibility 
on the part of the defendant. 
140 Life imprisonment is still the mandatory sentence for murder in the Northern Territory, Queensland, 
South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia. As a result of legislative reform, the sentence for 
murder is now discretionary m the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and Victoria. The 
position in the Australian Capital Territory is governed by s. 442(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) 
as amended bys. 23 of Ordinance No. 11 in 1963. For the position in New South Wales and Victoria, 
sees. 19 Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) (as amended in 1982) and s. 3 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic.) (as amended 
in 1986) respectively. 




Juries have considerable discretion in the verdicts they bring in, since they are general verdicts only, 
and juries do not have to give reasons for their decisions.142 Of those cases which have proceeded to 
trial, a significant proportion have resulted in the acquittal of the defendant by the jury often against 
the weight of the evidence. Here too, in practice, jury acquittals may be particularly relevant with 
regard to proceedings for murder in jurisdictions where there is still a sentence of mandatory life-
imprisonment.143 
One example of ajury acquittal is the case of R v Meares and Wanless144 in which charges arose out 
of the fatal shooting of a 54 year old cancer victim. The deceased, Mervyn Meares, had been in severe 
pain from terminal cancer and had apparently wanted to end his life. Mr Wanless, a 45 year old invalid 
pensioner, and a close friend of the deceased, was charged with the murder. The deceased's wife, Mrs 
Meares, a 58 year old pensioner, was charged with having solicited Wanless to murder her husband. 
Both had pleaded not guilty to the charges. Notwithstanding the admission into evidence of an 
incriminating police record of interview given by the defendant Meares, her defence counsel succeeded 
with a 'no case to answer' application on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence of 
communication by his client with the co-defendant with the object of soliciting the murder. Justice 
Maxwell accordingly directed the jury to find the defendant Meares not guilty of the charge of having 
solicited the co-defendant Wanless to murder her husband. The case did, however, proceed against the 
co-defendant, Wanless. The Crown case relied on both motive and opportunity in that Wanless felt 
compassion for his sick friend and had visited him the day the shooting had occurred. Further, the 
Crown alleged that the deceased had continually begged for assistance to put an end to his suffering. 
There was also evidence connecting Mr Wanless with the weapon which had been used in the killing. 
Wanless gave evidence that he had visited the deceased that day but that he had not killed his friend. 
Despite the strength of the prosecution case, the jury found Wanless not guilty of the charge and he 
was acquitted. 
Another case where the jury acquitted the defendant against the evidence, was R v Austen.145 As 
noted above, 146 the manslaughter charges in this case arose out of the killing of the deceased, a 
sufferer of Alzheimer's disease, by her husband. The defendant had been caring for his wife for a 
number of years but her condition had deteriorated and he was finding it increasingly difficult to cope 
with the situation. Evidence for the Crown was that he had suffocated his wife by putting his hand 
over her nose and a handkerchief in her mouth. The defendant had pleaded not guilty to the charge but 
did not dispute the evidence that he had suffocated his wife. In his evidence he simply said that he 
could not really believe that he had done it or explain why or how. Following a plea by counsel for 
142 I. Temby, 'Euthanasia - Is It Murder?' (1988) 21 A.J.F.S. 2, 16. 
143 See above, n. 140. 
144 (Unreported) July 1989, Newcastle S.C., N.S.W. 
145 (Unreported) 5 March 1990, S.C. N.S.W. 
146 See above, 132. 
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the defendant for a merciful verdict, (without really putting any legal basis for such a verdict), the jury 
returned a verdict of not guilty. 
There have also been mercy killing cases in Australia where the jury has found the defendant guilty 
but has made strong recommendations for leniency in the treatment of the defendant.147 
Leniency in Sentencini: 
In cases involving conviction of the offender, (mostly arising from pleas of guilty)148 the courts, 
have generally shown great leniency with respect to the sentencing, at least in those jurisdictions 
where the court has had a discretion to do so.149 
For example, in the case of R v Thompson150 noted above,151 in which the Crown had accepted the 
defendant's plea of guilty to the lesser offence of manslaughter in respect of a deliberate killing, 
Justice Hunt deferred passing sentence and placed Thompson on a $5,000 bond to be of good 
behaviour for 5 years. 152 His Honour then went to great lengths to justify this decision. Whilst 
recognising that some people in the community would object to his decision, and regard it as 'weakly 
merciful', he felt that in the circumstances of the evidence disclosed, a term of imprisonment would 
serve no benefit to the prisoner or to the community. Justice Hunt accepted that the defendant's 
dominant motive in acting as he did was to put his father out of his misery. He also accepted that the 
matter was only brought to light by the defendant's own confession, which was a strong indication of 
his contrition. His Honour said that he had taken into consideration that the defendant had no relevant 
prior record as well as his position and acceptance in the community. Furthermore, the judge said that 
he could not imagine that Thompson would offend again. 
Another striking example of judicial leniency in sentencing can be found in the case of R v 
Johnstone153 in which the defendant had pleaded guilty to the murder of his mentally ill wife who had 
begged him to assist her to die. Justice Bollen of the South Australian Supreme Court, said that he 
accepted that the defendant's act of killing was not done out of desire for personal benefit but out of a 
deep compassion and love for his wife. His Honour explained that whilst he was required by statute to 
pass the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for the crime of murder, the defendant was entitled 
to leniency in the fixing of the non-parole period. Justice Bollen was of the view that in all the 
circumstances, it was not appropriate to sentence the defendant to any real term of imprisonment and 
proceeded to fix a non-parole period of only 10 days, to be calculated from the date when the defendant 
147 For example, R v Tait (unreported) 13 June 1972, S.C. Vic. 
148 See, for example R v Larkin (unreported) 14 April 1983, S.C. Vic.; R v Thompson (unreported) 25 Nov. 
1981, S.C. N.S.W.; R v Kelly (unreported) 12 May 1989, S.C. Qld; R v Johnstone (unreported) 21 Jan. 
1987, S.C. S.A. There have also been cases where conviction resulted following a plea of not guilty; 
e.g. R v Tait (unreported) 13 June 1972, S.C. Vic. 
149 See above, n. 140. 
150 (Unreported) 25 Nov. 1981, S.C. N.S.W. 
151 See above, 133. 
152 Section 24 of the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) provides for a maximum sentence of 25 years 
imprisonment for the offence of manslaughter. 
153 (Unreported) 21 Jan. 1987, S.C. S.A. 
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first came before the court. The Crown appealed against sentence on the grounds that the non-parole 
period was manifestly inadequate. Although the Court of Criminal Appeal found that the judge's 
sentencing discretion bad miscarried, the court was, in all the circumstances, not prepared to interfere 
with the sentence wbicb bad been imposed.154 
A further instance of judicial leniency towards mercy killers with respect to sentence can be found in 
the cases of R v Kellyl55 and R v Hollinrake 156 wbicb involved very similar circumstances. In the 
case of R v Kelly the defendant, an 81 year old man pleaded guilty to the attempted murder of bis wife 
who bad suffered several strokes. There was evidence before the Queensland Supreme Court that the 
deceased had been an invalid for some years and the defendant had dutifully taken care of her. However, 
after she suffered her fourth stroke resulting in a marked deterioration of her condition, the defendant 
shot her to put her out of her misery. She survived the shooting but died some months later from 
coronary artery disease. Justice Ryan sentenced the defendant to three years of probation. In passing 
sentence, he referred to the advanced age of the prisoner, bis good background, bis close relationship 
with bis wife, his perception of her condition as one of misery, and his depressed state at the time and 
concluded that in those circumstances, a custodial sentence was not demanded and would not serve any 
useful purpose. 
In the Victorian case of R v Hollinrake the defendant, 80 years of age, was charged with the attempted 
murder of bis 79 year old wife who had been his partner for 51 years. Mrs Hollinrake bad bad a stroke 
which affected her vision and speech and left the right side of her body paralysed. The defendant bad 
slit the wrist of bis wife's paralysed right arm while she was in bospital.157 He then went home and 
tried to kill himself by cutting bis wrists and forearm in the shower. A note written by the defendant, 
informing staff of a euthanasia and suicide pact between the couple, was found beside Mrs Hollinrake. 
His wife was revived by medical staff and bis own suicide attempt was foiled when a visitor 
unexpectedly arrived at bis home. The defendant pleaded guilty in the Victorian Supreme Court to the 
charge of attempted murder. He was placed on a three year good behaviour bond. In sentencing the 
defendant, Justice Coldrey said that the circumstances of the case were truly tragic. His Honour 
accepted that the defendant's motivation in attempting to kill his wife stemmed from his love and 
compassion for her. There was also evidence before the court that the couple bad previously discussed 
the issue of mercy killing. Both had considered the prospect of being dependent in a nursing home 
totally llllacceptable and each bad pledged to act to end the life of the other in such circumstances. The 
judge said that mercy killing could not be accepted or condoned by the courts, and that it was the 
court's duty to uphold the sanctity of life. However, be did not believe that the community would 
want retribution against the defendant in this exceptional case. Nor did be think that specific deterrence 
154 R v Johnstone (1987) 45 S.A.S.R. 482. In support of this conclusion, Chief Justice King referred to the 
well established principle that in a Crown appeal, an error in the sentencing process does not lead 
inevitably to intervention by the court; 485. 
155 (Unreported) 12 May 1989, S.C. Qld. 
156 (Unreported) 29 June 1992, S.C. Vic. 
157 In the evidence before the court it was pointed out that the defendant had chosen to cut the wrist of her 
paralysed right arm in the belief that this would cause her no pain. 
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needed to be given weight in the circumstances of this case. Although acknowledging the court's duty 
in sentencing offenders to attempt to deter others from embarking on similar behaviour, his Honour 
was of the view that given the rarity of this type of offence, the principles of general deterreµce did not 
need to be accorded prominence. Justice Coldrey said that the courts must dispense justice, but in the 
circumstances of this case, that justice may be tempered with mercy. In all the circumstances, his 
Honour came to the conclusion that a sentence of imprisonment was not warranted. 
Similarly, in cases of assisted suicide, the courts have shown considerable leniency. The courts' 
approach is illustrated by the Victorian case of R v Larkinl58 (discussed above159). Following a plea 
of guilty to a charge of aiding and abetting suicide under the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic.) (carrying a 
maximum penalty of 14 years), the defendant was placed on a three year good behaviour bond with the 
condition that the she attend psychiatric counselling.160 Justice Nicholson of the Victorian Supreme 
Court observed that in the circumstances of the case, there was no requirement that the sentence be 
retributive, nor were considerations of general or special deterrence of relevance, the offence being so 
unusual and the defendant having acted from the highest of motives, 'if misguided'.161 · 
The New South Wales case of R v Den Heyer162 also serves to illustrate the leniency shown by the 
courts in cases of this kind. The deceased was suffering from terminal cancer and was experiencing 
severe pain. He had, on an number of previous occasions, attempted to commit suicide. The defendant, 
28 years of age, was charged with aiding and abetting the suicide of his father by supplying the gun 
with which the father had shot himself. The defendant had pleaded guilty to the charge. Justice Court 
was firmly of the view that none of the principal objectives of sentencing called for the imposition of 
a custodial sentence in this case and proceeded to sentence the defendant to the rising of the court.163 
Role of Prosecution in Sentencing 
Although sentencing the offender is the responsibility of the court, it should be noted that the 
prosecution may have some role to play in making submissions with regard to sentence. It is not the 
practice of the prosecution in Australia to routinely address the court with regard to sentence. Rather, 
158 (Unreported) 14 April 1983, S.C. Vic. 
159 See above, 133. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
162 (Unreported) 28 Sept 1990, Parammatta D.C., N.S.W. Note also R v Savage (unreported) 27 March 
1992 in which the defendant had pleaded guilty to aiding his terminally ill wife to commit suicide 
pursuant to a suicide pact. The defendant was ordered by the court to perform 200 hours community 
service; the Australian 28 March 1992. 
Examples of leniency in sentencing in mercy killing cases can also be cited from New Zealand. For 
example, R v Ruscoe, noted above, n. 138, in which the defendant had pleaded guilty to a charge of 
aiding and abetting the suicide of his paralysed friend. Under s. 179 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 
1961 the offence carries a maximum of 14 years imprisonment. The defendant was sentenced to 
imprisonment for nine months. In an appeal against sentence, the Court of Appeal quashed the original 
sentence and substituted a sentence of one years' supervision. The court held that in exceptional cases 
of aiding suicide, a non-custodial sentence is appropriate. 20 March 1992, C.A. N.Z. 
Note also the case of R v Novis (unreported) in which the defendant was charged with the murder of his 
terminally ill father. The jury reduced the conviction to manslaughter and the defendant was sentenced 
to 12 months supervision; Waikato Times 6 Feb. 1988. 
163 Ibid. Section 31C of the Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.) provides for a maximum sentence of 10 years 
imprisonment for the offence of aiding and abetting suicide. 
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the function of the Crown prosecutor is seen as-preventing the judge from falling into appealable error 
and to provide assistance to the court where that is specifically sought.164 The special mitigating 
circumstances of mercy killing cases may, however, justify the Crown in making submissions with 
regard to sentence indicating the Crown's acquiescence in the lenient treatment of the offender, and this 
is in fact one of the many ways in which prosecutorial discretion may be exercised in favour of the 
defendant.165 A useful illustration is the case of R v Kellyl 66 noted above, 167 involving a 
conviction for attempted murder. Counsel for the defendant sought a non-custodial sentence and the 
prosecution accepted that this was appropriate in view of the very special circumstances of the case. 
Parole Boards and the Exercise of Executive Clemency 
As noted earlier, in some Australian jurisdictions, judges have little discretion with regard to the 
sentence they can impose, particularly with regard to the crime of murder.168 As a result, there have 
been a number of mercy killing cases where the courts have had no option but to pass the mandatory 
sentence notwithstanding the special mitigating circumstances in such cases. In some of the earlier 
cases decided while the death penalty still applied, this effectively required passing the mandatory death 
sentence for murder.169 However, in all of these cases where a mandatory sentence was imposed, the 
severity of the sentence was mitigated by the exercise of executive clemency 170 and/or favourable 
determinations of the parole bodies.171 One widely publicised example is the 1964 Western 
Australian case of Dr Maurice Benn who had been sentenced to the mandatory death penalty for the 
mercy killing of his mongoloid son.172 His sentence was subsequently commuted to imprisonment 
with hard labour for ten years and in December 1968 he was released on parole.173 
There have also been a number of mercy killing cases in South Australia and Victoria in which the 
mandatory death sentence was passed but was then commuted to life imprisonment.174 In each of 
164 See, for example, N.S.W. Director of Public Prosecutions, Prosecution Policy and Guidelines (1987) 5-
6. . 
165 Where the defendant is convicted of murder, submissions with regard to sentence would only be 
appropriate in those jurisdictions which do not have a mandatory sentence; see above, n. 140. There is 
a trend in Australia towards statutory provision allowing submissions on sentence from the 
prosecution; e.g. s. 386 of the Criminal Code 1924 (Tas.) as amended by the Criminal Code 
Amendment (Addresses on Sentences) Act 1987 (Tas.). 
166 (Unreported) 12 May 1989, S.C. Qld. See also R v Hollinrake (unreported) 29 June 1992, S.C. Vic. 
(discussed above, 136-137) as a further illustration of this approach. 
167 See above, 136. 
168 See above, 140. 
169 For example, R v Benn (unreported) 2 April 1964, S.C. W.A.; R v Wright (unreported) 3 July 1972, 
S.C. S.A.; R v Cullen (unreported) 25 March 1976, S.C. S.A.; R v Tait (unreported) 13 June 1972, S.C. 
Vic. 
170 The prerogative of mercy is one of the reserve powers of the Crown but may be abolished, restricted or 
regulated by statute; K. Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania (1991) 5. 
171 All Australian jurisdictions have a system of parole. Parole also exists in the United Kingdom, Canada 
and some United States jurisdictions. 
172 (Unreported) 2 April 1964, S.C. W.A. 
173 The West Australian 3 Dec. 1968. There had been widespread community support for Dr Benn's release, 
including signed petitions seeking his early release; see, for example, the West Australian 23 Dec. 
1964. 
174 R v Wright (unreported) 3 July 1972, S.C. S.A; R v Cullen (unreported) 25 March 1976, S.C. S.A.; R v 
Tait (unreported) 13 June 1972, S.C. Vic. 
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these cases the defendant served a relatively short prison term before being released on parole.175 
However, care must be taken not to overstate the significance of the foregoing cases. Whilst these 
cases do provide some evidence of leniency, at least in so far that the death sentence was commuted to 
life imprisonment, of which the defendants only served a few years, there are grounds to suggest that 
the treatment of these cases was by no means exceptional. The death sentence was in fact commuted 
in the majority of cases and it was not unusual for a convicted murderer to be released on parole after 
serving a few years of the life sentence.176 
In contrast to these earlier cases, a more significant illustration of leniency is to be found in the South 
Australian case, R v Johnstone177 referred to above.178 In this case, a token non-parole period of 10 
days was imposed after the mandatory life sentence for murder bad been banded down and Johnstone 
was in fact released on parole a few days after the expiration of this perioo.179 
United States 
In the United States, there have, over the years, been many cases of mercy killing which have come to 
the attention of the criminal justice system 180 and a review of these cases reveals a similar pattern of 
leniency.181 These cases illustrate that under the law in the United States, there are a number of ways 
in which the full rigours of the criminal law can be avoided in circumstances where the mercy killing 
attracts widespread sympathy and approval and in a large proportion of cases, mercy killers have in 
fact completely escaped criminal liability. 
Refusal by Grand Jury to Indict 
Quite a number of American States have provision under legislation for a 'grand jury'. The role of the 
grand jury is to hold a preliminary hearing into the matter to determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence for the matter to go to trial.182 This procedure bas clearly proved favourable to some 
175 In each case the defendant served 5-6 years in' prison. (Verbal communication with an officer of the 
Adult Parole Board, South Australia, September 1990.) 
176 Verbal communication with an officer of the Adult Parole Board, South Australia, September 1990. 
177 (Unreported) 21 Jan. 1987, S.C. S.A. 
178 See above, 135-136. 
179 The discrepancy in dates was due to a delay in the processing of the necessary paperwork. The minimum 
period of parole for a prisoner serving a life sentence was imposed (3 years.) (Verbal communication 
with an officer of the Adult Parole Board, South Australia, September 1990.) 
180 A number of commentators have documented these cases; e.g. Baugham, Bruha and Gould, 1213-1215; 
J. Sander, 'Euthanasia: None Dare Call it Murder' (1969) 60 J.Crim.L., Criminology & Police Science 
351, 355-357; L. Glantz, 'Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment: The Role of the Criminal Law' 
(1987-8) 15 Law Med. & Health Care 231, 232-235; V. Gilbreath, 'The Right of the Terminally Ill to 
Die with Assistance if Necessary' (1986) 8 Crim.Just.I. 403, 416; Russell, 256-260, 391-392; 
Humphry and Wickett, especially at 17-20, 91-92, 137-150; Humphry, Compassionate Crimes, 
Broken Taboos. 
181 Similar developments have also occurred in Canada although the range of possible outcomes is 
somewhat circumscribed in comparison with the United States since Canadian law does not allow for 
the defence of temporary insanity. There have, nevertheless, been cases where juries have acquitted the 
mercy killer, albeit completely against the evidence. See, for example, the case referred to by L. 
Schiffer, 'Euthanasia and the Criminal Law' (1985) 42 U. Toronto Fac.L.Rev. 93, 95 where a couple 
killed their pain-stricken son with car exhaust fumes after they could no longer bear his anguished 
cries. Although the couple had made a confession to the police, they were found not guilty of murder. 
182 Some analogy could be drawn between the grand jury in the United States and committal proceedings in 
Australia. 
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defendants in cases of mercy killing. In a number of instances, the grand jury has refused to indict, 
thereby terminating proceedings against the mercy killer. For example, in 1939, Harry Johnson was 
arrested for asphyxiating his cancer-stricken wife. The grand jury refused to indict on the basis that he 
was 'temporarily insane' at the time of the act.183 Similarly, in 1983, a grand jury in Florida refused 
to indict a 79 year old man, Hans Florian who had killed his wife by shooting her in the head. The 
deceased had been suffering from Alzheimer's disease. Although Mr Florian readily admitted killing 
his wife, the grand jury refused to return an indictment.184 
Conyjction for Lesser Offence 
In other cases, notwithstanding that the mercy killer was, on the facts, clearly guilty of murder, a 
conviction for a lesser offence has resulted. This may follow from a reduction in the offence charged 
by the prosecution 185 or by virtue of a sympathetic jury seeking to avoid liability for murder as was 
the case in People v Repouille. The defendant in that case had chloroformed his 13 year old imbecile 
son.186 He was indicted for first-degree murder but the jury found him guilty of second-degree 
manslaughter, and he was subsequently freed on a suspended sentence of 5-10 years. This verdict was 
completely inconsistent with the facts since manslaughter in the second-degree presupposes that the 
killing had not been deliberate.187 
Acguittals 
In circumstances where the mercy killer pleads not guilty to the offence, there are many instances of 
outright acquittals188 or acquittals on the grounds of temporary insanity. A well-known case of a 
court (as distinct from the jury) acquitting a defendant occurred in People v Wemer.189 The defendant 
had suffocated his crippled and bedridden wife after he had been informed that they were both to be 
moved to a nursing home. Although a plea of guilty to the crime of manslaughter had already been 
accepted by the court, l90 after hearing evidence in relation to se.ntence, of the defendant's love and 
devotion to his wife, the judge suggested that the defendant withdraw his plea of guilty. The defendant 
was subsequently acquitted on the basis that a jury would not be inclined to convict in these 
circumstances.19l 
183 People v Johnson (unreported) N.Y. Times 12 Oct. 1938, N.Y. Times 19 Oct. 1938. 
184 People v Florian (unreported) San Francisco Chronicle 4 April 1983. Note also the case of People v 
Reinecke, a 1967 Illinois case in which the jury refused to indict the defendant who had strangled his 74 
year old wife who had been suffering from cancer; Russell, 259. 
185 For example, People v Hoffman (unreported) (1978) where, through plea-bargaining, the charge for 
first-degree murder was reduced to manslaughter (Humphry and Wickett, 143) People v Kacherian 
(unreported) (1981) charge of murder reduced to manslaughter (Sacramento Bee 12 June 1981) and 
People v Wilson (unreported) (1985) in which, through plea-bargaining, it was agreed that Wilson 
plead guilty to attempted murder (Humphry and Wickett, 140). 
186 (Unreported) N.Y. Times 14 Oct. 1939. 
187 Kamisar, 1022 citing Judge Hand's comments in a later case involving Repouille's petition for 
naturalisation; Repouille v United States 165 F. 2d 152, 153 (1947). 
188 For example, People v Greenfield (unreported) in which the defendant had chloroformed his imbecile 
teenage son to death; N.Y Times 12 May 1939. 
189 See G. Williams, 'Euthanasia and Abortion' (1966) 38 U.Colo.L.Rev. 178, 184-187 for a transcript of 
this case. 
190 The Attorney-General had waived the charge of murder and the defendant had been allowed to enter a plea 
of guilty to the crime of manslaughter. 
191 Williams, 'Euthanasia and Abortion,' 186. For other instances where the court has dismissed charges 
and acquitted the defendant, see also People v Semel (unreported) N. Y. Times 15 Aug. 1985 (judge 
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More usually, acquittals in mercy killing cases result from a jury determination.192 A recent case 
which illustrates the operation of this form of leniency in mercy killing cases in the United States is 
People v Harper involving the assisted suicide of an elderly cancer patient by her husband.193 The 
defendant and his ailing wife had travelled from California to the State of Michigan in the belief that 
assisted suicide was not unlawful in that State. The defendant assisted his wife to commit suicide by 
securing a bag over her head. After his wife's death he immediately contacted the police to advise them 
of what he had done and was subsequently charged with murder. Although the defendant had performed 
the act which brought about the death of the deceased, he was acquitted by the jury.194 
Jury Acquittals on the Grounds of Temporary Insanity 
In quite a number of cases, the mercy killer has been acquitted on the grounds of temporary insanity 
and this has, in practice, become quite a common method of dealing with mercy killers in the United 
States. One such case attracting widespread publicity was the 1967 case of People v Waskin.195 The 
defendant:., a 20 year old college student, was charged with the murder of his mother after shooting her 
in the head three times. His mother who had been suffering from terminal leukemia, was experiencing 
great pain and had apparently begged her son to kill her. She had previously made an unsuccessful 
attempt to commit suicide. After only forty minutes deliberation, the jury found the defendant not 
guilty by reason of insanity. However, the jury found that he was no longer insane and he was 
accordingly released. Another much publicised case was that of People v Zygmanik in 1973.196 The 
deceased had become a quadriplegic as a result of a motorcycle accident. He had made the defendant:., his 
brother, promise that he would kill him, and the defendant complied with this request by shooting his 
brother in the head with a sawn-off shot gun. The defendant was charged with first-degree murder but 
was subsequently acquitted by the jury on the grounds of temporary insanity.197 As these cases 
illustrate, temporary insanity has frequently been relied upon as the basis for an acquittal in mercy 
killing cases even though there was clearly no real basis for the insanity defence.198 The clear 
attraction of this technique for juries in cases of.this kind is that an established legal category can be 
invoked which allows for allowing total exculpation of the defendant 
dropped murder and manslaughter charges); People v Shick (unreported) Associated Press 8 Feb. 1982 
Gudge acquitted defendant of murder charges arising from the shooting of his bedridden wife.) 
192 See I. Horowitz, 'The Effect of Jury Nullification Instruction on Verdicts and Jury Functioning in 
Criminal Trials' (1985) 9 Law & Hum.Behav. 25, 29-30 for some discussion of jury acquittals in these 
circumstances. 
193 (Unreported) N. Y. Times 26 Aug. 1990. 
194 Note, 'Hemlock Member is Acquitted of Murder' (1991) 18 World Right to Die Newsletter 2. 
195 (Unreported) Chicago Tribune 10 Aug. 1967. . 
196 (Unreported) 15 Oct. 1973, Super. Ct., Monmouth County, N.J. 
197 For a discussion of this case, see P. Mitchell, Act of Love (1976). For further examples of jury 
acquittals in mercy killing cases based on the ground of temporary insanity see Kamisar, 1019-1022. 
198 Glantz, 234; A. Morris, 'Voluntary Euthanasia' (1970) 45 Wash.L.Rev. 239, 242. 
142 
Leoieocy in Seotencin~ 
Of those cases which have resulted in a convictio.1, (ustially as a result of the defendant entering a plea 
of guilty), the courts have usually been extremely lenient in the imposition of sentence.199 A good 
example, is the case of People v Collums in which the defendant was charged with first-degree murder 
for the shooting of his hospitalised brother who had been suffering from Alzheimer's disease. 200 As a 
result of a lengthy process of plea-bargaining, the district attorney sought a five year prison sentence 
which the defence had accepted. However, the judge postponed passing the sentence for another ten 
years, in effect making it ten years probation. He had also ordered the defendant to do ten hours of 
work a week as a volunteer in a senior citizen centre.201 Another such case is that of People v 
Reinecke in which the 84 year old defendant had been charged with murder after strangling his 74 year 
old wife who was suffering from terminal cancer. The defendant in this case was found guilty but was 
pl~ on probation after the State attorney said that society needed no protection from this man.202 
Executiye Clemency and Parole 
Examination of the mercy killing cases in the United States reveals that there have also been instances 
of exercise of clemency, at some stage after the sentence has been imposed. One example is the early 
case of People v Noxon in which the defendant had been convicted of first-degree murder for 
electrocuting his mongoloid son. The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment and later 
reduced to six years to life in order to make him eligible for parole. After serving four and a half years 
imprisonment, the defendant was released. 203 A more recent example can be found in the case of 
People v Gilbert. 204 In 1985, the defendant was convicted of the murder of his 73 year old wife who 
had been suffering from an incurable illness. 205 He was sentenced to the mandatory minimum prison 
term of 25 years but was granted clemency on humanitarian grounds and was released after spending 
five years in prison. 206 
199 In addition to the cases referred to in the body of the text, other examples where mercy killers have 
received non-custodial sentences include; People v Healy (unreported) in which a 71 year old lady from 
California had pleaded guilty to a charge of voluntary manslaughter for killing her bedridden husband 
so as to end his misery. She was placed on 5 years probation, fined $10,000 and ordered to perform 
1000 hours of community service work; Associated Press Report 19 June 1984; People v Sallander 
(unreported) in which the defendant after pleading guilty to a murder charge was sentenced to five years 
probation; Houston Chronicle 23 Jan. 1986; People v Cooper (unreported) in which the defendant had 
ended his terminally ill uncle's life with an overdose of drugs and had pleaded guilty to a charge of 
voluntary manslaughter. He was placed on probation for five years and was fined $150; 
Pasadena/Altadena Weekly 16-22 Jan. 1986. Note also People v Hoffman (unreported)Tampa Tribune 
22 June 1979; People v Stephenson (unreported) N.Y. Times 12 May 1984; People v Wilson 
(unreported) San Bernardino Sun 16 July 1985. 
There have also been a number of 'mercy assisted suicides' in which lenient sentences were imposed; 
see, for example, People v Taylor and King (unreported) Hatford Courant 19 May 1981 (suspended 
prison sentence of two to four years for charges of manslaughter). 
200 (Unreported) Dallas Morning News 5 March 1982. 
201 [bid. 
202 (Unreported) (1967); see Glantz, 233; Humphry and Wickett, 92, 235. 
203 (Unreported) (1943); see Humphry and Wickett, 44. 
204 (Unreported) N.Y. Times 10 May 1985. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Washington Post 3 Aug. 1990. 
143 
United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, mercy killing cases have, in the main, also been treated with remarkable 
leniency. As in the other jurisdictions under consideration, there are a number of possible outcomes 
for mercy killing cases in the United Kingdom criminal justice system; prosecutorial discretion exists 
as to whether charges should be brought207 or whether charges should be laid for a lesser offence;208 
where cases proceed to trial, juries may resist conviction209 or find the mercy killer guilty of some 
lesser charge; judges, in the exercise of sentencing discretion, may choose to deal leniently with the 
offender;210 and where a strict sentence is imposed,211 there is always the possibility of executive 
clemency.212 It was noted earlier that in the United States, juries have frequently acquitted mercy 
killers on the grounds of 'temporary insanity,'213 but this particular option is not open to juries in 
the United Kingdom.214 However, a distinctive feature which has emerged from the mercy killing 
cases in the United Kingdom has been the use of the defence of diminished responsibility introduced 
under the Homicide Act 1957 (U.K.).215 
207 One notable example where the prosecution decided not to proceed with charges of assisted suicide 
involved the writer and euthanasia advocate, Derek Humphry. Humphry had publicly admitted that he 
had assisted his wife Jean to commit suicide at her request during the final stages of her terminal cancer 
by supplying her with a lethal dose of drugs. In fact this was the subject of a biography about his wife's 
death, entitled Jean's Way (1978). Following this publication and the public stir which it provoked, 
the police interviewed Humphry. He immediately confessed his culpability to the police for assisting 
his wife's suicide in contravention of the Suicide Act 1961 (Eng.) and offered to plead guilty at any 
trial. However, some months later he was advised by the public prosecutor that he would not be 
charged; see B. Wooten, 'The Right to Die' (1976) 46 New Society 202. 
208 For example, R v Houghton (unreported) Daily Mail 15 May 1985 in which the defendants, the parents 
of the deceased, were initially indicted for murder for asphyxiating their 22 year old quadriplegic son 
who had begged them to assist him to die. They subsequently negotiated a plea of guilty to the reduced 
charge of manslaughter. They were placed on probation for two years. 
209 For example, Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 293 referring to a 1927 case where a 
man was prosecuted for murder after having drowned his incurably ill child who was suffering from 
tuberculosis and gangrene of the face. He was found not guilty by the jury. 
210 For example, R v Houghton (unreported) Daily Mail 15 May 1985, noted above, n. 208; R v King 
(unreported) The Times 16 Oct. 1953 in which a woman who had pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted 
murder of her dying husband was granted a conditional discharge; R v Thompson (unreported) in which 
a brother and sister pleaded guilty to the attempted murder of their dying mother after giving her a drug 
overdose. The deceased, who had been suffering from cancer, had been experiencing great pain and 
repeatedly expressed a wish to die. She survived the overdose but died some weeks later from her cancer. 
The judge described the case as exceptional and granted the defendants a 12 month conditional 
discharge; The Times 14 Nov. 1990. 
There have also been cases of 'mercy assisted suicide' where charges have been laid for aiding and 
abetting suicide resulting in conviction of the offender, but giving rise to fairly lenient sentences with 
the majority of those convicted being discharged or given suspended sentences of imprisonment; 
Wooten, 202. One such example is R v Beecham (unreported) Daily Telegraph, 18 Feb. 1988, in which 
the defendant had assisted his daughter to commit suicide by connecting a hose from the exhaust of her 
car to its interior. His daughter had been seriously afflicted with multiple sclerosis and had, on a number 
of previous occasions, unsuccessfully tried to commit suicide. The defendant pleaded guilty to a charge 
of aiding and abetting suicide and was given a twelve month suspended prison sentence. For discussion 
see J. Horder, 'Mercy Killings - Some Reflections on the Beecham Case' (1988) 52 I.Crim. Law 309; 
J.A. Laing, 'Assisting Suicide' (1990) 54 I.Crim. Law 106. 
211 In practice, this is usually as a result of the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for murder. 
212 See also R. Leng, 'Mercy Killing and the C.L.R.C.' (1982) 132 New L.J. 76. 
213 See above, 141. 
214 Note also Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 293 where he suggests that the English 
jury is less prone to take the law into its own hands than its counterpart in the United States. 
215 It should be noted that although the defence of diminished responsibility is available in a number of 
Australian jurisdictions (A.C.T. s. 14 Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 2), 1990; N.S.W. s. 23A 
Crimes Act 1900; N.T. s. 37 Criminal Code 1983; Qld. s. 304A Criminal Code 1899) in practice, it has 
rarely been used in mercy killing cases. One possible explanation for the difference in use of the 
defence in the United Kingdom and Australia is that the sentence for murder in the United Kingdom is 
mandatory life imprisonment, whereas in two of the Australian jurisdictions in which the defence of 
diminished responsibility is available (the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales) the court 
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Defence of Diminisbed ReslJOllsibility 
Section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 (U.K.) provides that where a person kills while suffering from 
such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of 
mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impairs his or her mental 
responsibility for his or her acts or omissions in doing or being a party to the killing, he or she shall 
not be guilty of murder but of manslaughter. When this defence was initially introduced under s. 2 of 
the Homicide Act 1957 (U.K.), it was intended to deal with identifiable forms of mental disorder 
which fell outside the narrow terms of the insanity defence and to allow sentencing discretion in cases 
where a killing could be linked to such a disorder.216 Notwithstanding the specific nature of the forms 
of mental disorder which come within the defence, it has been broadly interpreted to cover cases of 
mercy killing. The reality is that in genuine cases of mercy killing, the defence of diminished 
responsibility is not interpreted in accordance with strict psychiatric concepts but in accordance with 
the morality of the case. 217 Thus, the depressed state of mind of the offender at the time of the killing 
is often taken to amount to 'abnormality of mind' resulting in the substantial impairment of mental 
responsibility, within the meaning of the section.218 The success of this defence depends upon the 
willingness of a doctor to testify as to the defendant's mental state and to some extent the connivance 
of the prosecution and judge in not challenging the medical evidence.219 In practice, once the 
psychiatric experts' 'sympathies are engaged' it is not difficult to get them to testify, their evidence is 
let in without challenge and the jury invariably accepts the defence, even on the flimsiest grounds.220 
This has been particularly significant in the United Kingdom in view of the mandatory life sentence 
for murder. By invoking the defence of diminished responsibility, a verdict of manslaughter can be 
returned and the court then has considerable discretion with regard to sentencing. 
Numerous cases can be cited to illustrate the operation of the defence of diminished responsibility in 
the context of mercy killings cases.221 For example, in the case of R v Johnson, in which the father 
of a mongoloid child had killed the child by putting a gas poker in the child's cot, the jury accepted 
the defence counsel's plea of diminished responsibility and found the defendant not guilty of murder 
but of manslaughter. 222 Similarly, in R v Jones a 29 year old man suffocated his mother who was in 
an advanced stage of terminal cancer. He had recently watched his father suffer a painful and lingering 
death by the same disease and was in a condition of severe anxiety, despondency and despair. A plea of 
has a discretion in sentencing for murder. In these circumstances there would be less incentive to rely 
on the defence. 
216 The key elements of s. 2 are set out above. 
217 Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (1983) 693. 
218 This is the case notwithstanding the requirement in the section that it stemmed from 'arrested 
development', 'inherent causes' or 'disease or injury'. 
219 Lawton, 461. 
220 Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 686. 
221 According to Home Office research, between 1975 and 1968 there were 23 such cases; E. Gibson and S. 
Klein, Murder 1957-1968, A Home Office Statistical Division Report on Murder in England and Wales, 
Table 42. For documentation of some of the mercy killing cases in the United Kingdom, see N. Reed, 
'Mercy Killing: Exit's Evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure' (1982) 7 Polytechnic 
LRev. 17, 17-18 and Leng. 
222 (Unreported) The Times 2 July 1960. 
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guilty to manslaughter on the basis of diminished responsibility was accepted by the court 223 In the 
more recent case of R v Fairhead the defendant faced criminal charges for the killing of her husband 
who was suffering from multiple sclerosis. She had pleaded not guilty to murder but guilty to a 
charge of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility and this plea was accepted by the 
prosecution. 224 These cases are simply illustrative of the now well established practice in the United 
Kingdom of the prosecution and the courts accepting pleas of diminished responsibility on charges of 
murder in genuine cases of mercy killing and this has, in fact, come to be the most common way in 
which mercy killing cases in the United Kingdom are dealt with.225 
Lenjepcy in the Exercise of Sentepcin~ Discretion 
In circumstances where charges against a mercy killer result in a conviction, (most usually for 
manslaughter, following acceptance of a plea of diminished responsibility), the judges, in the exercise 
of their sentencing discretion, have generally dealt leniently with such offenders, frequently imposing 
non-custodial sentences. Thus, for example, in the case of R v Jones226 (noted above227) in which 
the defendant was convicted of manslaughter, Watkins J. held that the appropriate sentence in the 
circumstances was a conditional discharge. In many of the cases the defendants have been placed on 
probation.228 For example, in R v Fairhead, (referred to above229), the defendant was placed on two 
years probation, after having killed her suffering husband. 230 In some cases, probation is granted 
subject to the condition that they attend for regular psychiatric treatment.231 In cases where a 
custodial sentence is imposed, it has often been of relatively short duration. 232 
Executiye Clemency and Parole 
As in the other jurisdictions under consideration, where a more substantial sentence of imprisonment 
is imposed in respect of a mercy killing, the severity of that sentence may be mitigated by the 
exercise of executive clemency. This is usefully illustrated in the early case of R v Brown hill in 
which the defendant was convicted for the murder of her 31 year old imbecile son. The defendant was 
soon to undergo a serious operation and had been concerned about the fate of her son if she did not 
survive. She was sentenced to death with a strong recommendation for mercy but was reprieved within 
223 (Unreported) the Guardian 4 Dec. 1979. 
224 (Unreported) the Mercury 21 June 1990. For further examples of English cases involving a successful 
plea of diminished responsibility in mercy killing cases, see R v Taylor (1980) C.L.Y. 510; R v Gray 
(1965) J.P.N. 819; R v Price (unreported) The Times 22 Dec. 1971. 
225 Leng, 76. 
226 (Unreported) the Guardian 4 Dec. 1979. 
227see above, 144-145. 
228 For example, R v Price (unreported) The Times 22 Dec. 1971; R v Fairhead (unreported) the Mercury 21 
June 1990. Note also Humphry and Wickett, 238 where the authors estimate that more than 90% of the 
defendants in mercy killing cases who have pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the basis of diminished 
responsibility have been placed on probation. 
229 See above, text accompanying n. 224. 
230 (Unreported) the Mercury 21June1990. 
231 For example, R v Price (unreported) The Times 22 Dec. 1971. 
232 For example, R v Brown (unreported) Dec. 1961 Edinburgh High Court; R v Masters (unreported) 1 July 
1985, Exeter Crown Court. 
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two days and pardoned, and set free three months later. 233 The possibility of a reprieve for persons 
convicted of murder was of particular relevance prior to the introduction of the Homicide Act 1957 
(U.K.) because before that time, murder carried a mandatory death sentence. The exercise of executive 
clemency continues to be of relevance in the United Kingdom in cases where a mercy killer is actually 
convicted of murder in view of the mandatory life sentence for murder. This is illustrated by the case 
of R v Cocker. The defendant bad been convicted of murder and was given a mandatory life sentence 
for helping bis incurably ill and grievously suffering wife to die. After serving four years of his life 
sentence be was released. 234 
PART III 
Discrepancjes Between the Crjmjnal Law Principles and the Law in Practjce 
It is evident from the foregoing analysis of prosecutions of doctors and mercy killing cases generally 
that a glaring gap exists between the law in theory and the law in practice. As noted above, although 
questions of motive are strictly speaking irrelevant for the purposes of establishing criminal liability, 
in practice, they will often be decisive in determining the outcome of cases of active euthanasia and 
mercy killing.235 Without disputing that such cases ought to be dealt with leniently, it is submitted 
that there are certain fundamental problems with the present legal position which tolerates serious 
inconsistencies between legal principles and the law in practice. First, there is the concern that 
because the administration of the law depends to such a large extent on intangible considerations of 
sympathy, there is no guaranteed consistency of application, thus raising serious questions regarding 
justice and equality before the law. The second problem is that the enormous discrepancies between 
the law in theory and the law in practice threaten to undermine public confidence in the law and bring 
it into disrepute. There are a number of further problems which relate specifically to the issue of 
medically administered active voluntary euthanasia. One such problem is that the present ad hoe 
approach fails to establish any legal precedent by which medical decisions in the context of tetminal 
patients can be made and evaluated. A related concern is that there is a very real risk that the illegality 
and secrecy associated with the practice of active voluntary euthanasia tends to undermine the rights of 
patients. Separate attention will now be given to each of these concerns. 
233 (Unreported) The Times 4 Dec. 1934, The Times 4 March 1935. Note also the case of R v Long 
(unreported) in which the defendant had gassed his deformed and imbecile 7 year old daughter to death. 
He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death, but within a week the sentence was commuted to life 
imprisonment; The Times 29 Nov. 1946. 
234 Note, 'Tony Cocker' (1992) 45 V.E.S. Newsletter 4. 
235 See above, 113-114. 
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No Guaranteed Consistency in the Application of the Law 
As we have seen, in the majority of cases, the defendants have been treated with considerable restraint 
and leniency. However, the administration of the law in practice is such that there is no guaranteed 
uniformity of treatment, and restraint in the application of the criminal law cannot be reckoned as a 
certainty.236 Whilst in the majority of cases, the defendant has completely escaped criminal liability, 
or is convicted of some lesser offence and given a light sentence, there have also been cases in which 
the criminal law has been much more rigorously enforced.237 Attempts have been made to explain 
the different approach taken in some of these cases on the basis of their particular facts and 
circumstances.238 However, the point nevertheless remains that there are no objective criteria or 
standards to determine the outcome of mercy killing cases.239 It is a basic principle of justice that 
like cases should be treated alike; that in the interests of justice and equality, the law must be applied 
with certainty and evenhandedly against all who violate it. 24o However, as a result of the lack of 
uniform and objective standards applying in such cases, there is significant potential for unequal 
application of the law and consequently, a very real likelihood of inconsistency of results and 
unfairness being done to some offenders. 
Whilst these comments are made in relation to mercy killing cases generally, they also have an 
important bearing on the prosecution of doctors for administering active voluntary euthanasia or 
assisting the suicide of a patient Although in many cases, doctors have escaped liability, the fact that 
the administration of the law has been lenient in some cases is no guarantee that a doctor would not 
be prosecuted and convicted of murder or assisted suicide. The uncertainty of the present position has 
been acutely highlighted by the recent conviction of Dr Cox in the United Kingdom for the attempted 
murder of one of his patients. This case, and the public outcry that it has provoked, has seriously 
brought the present law into question. 
236 Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 293, but see Kamisar, 971 who retorts that 
defendants are not always entitled to 'sentimental acquittals' and that the few American cases to result in 
conviction demonstrate the elasticity and flexibility of the law rather than any inherent inequality. 
237 In support of this proposition see, for example, Humphry and Wickett, 223-224, 232 citing a study by 
H. Silving, 'Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law' (1954) 103 U.PA.L.Rev. 350; D. 
Maguire, Death by Choice (1984) 22 where it is noted that the results range from outright acquittals to 
conviction for murder in the first-degree. For examples of murder convictions in Australia see R v Benn 
(unreported) 2 April 1964 S.C. W.A.; R v Cullen (unreported) 25 March 1976, S.C. S.A.; R v Tait 
(unreported) 13 June 1972, S.C. Vic.; in the United States, see People v Roberts 211 Mich. 187 
(1920); and in the United Kingdom, R v Simpson (1965) 11 Cr.App.R. 218; R v Cocker (unreported) 
(1989) 37 V.E.S. Newsletter 2. (In some of these cases, executive clemency and/or parole 
determinations mitigated the severity of the sentence. See above, 138-139.) 
238 See Glantz, 234; Kamisar, 972. 
239 L. Kutner, 'Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal' (1969) 44 Ind.L.J. 539, 542. 
240 R. Sherlock, 'Liberalism, Public Policy and the Life Not Worth Living: Abraham Lincoln on Beneficent 
Euthanasia' (1981) 26 AmJ.Juris. 47, 50; Maguire, 20. 
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The Law is Brought into Disrepute 
Another problem which stems from the present position is that the wide discrepancy between law and 
practice threatens to bring the law into disrepute. There are two distinct aspects to this argument 
First, with particular regard to the medical context, notwithstanding the criminal law prohibitions 
with regard to active voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, there can be no doubt that some doctors 
are involved in these practices. In contrast to family mercy killing cases, where it is unlikely that a 
killing could pass undetected, the practice of medically administered active euthanasia or doctor-
assisted suicide is much less likely to come under legal scrutiny and end up before the courts.241 To 
have a situation where it is commonly known that the law is being breached by the medical 
profession yet breaches are usually ignored or pass unpunished, threatens to undermine public 
confidence in the law and to bring the law into disrepute. 
Turning to the second aspect of the problem, there are also serious discrepancies between law and 
practice in the actual punishment of offenders. Because the present criminal law principles which treat 
motive as irrelevant, are widely perceived as being inappropriate, devious means are frequently used to 
circumvent the full rigour of the criminal law. The motive of the offender is in fact being incorporated 
into decision-making, but only surreptitiously through the use of certain fictions or tactics. This can 
result in serious distortion of legal principles and widespread connivance to defeat the application of 
the criminal law. The foregoing analysis bas drawn attention to the use of the defences of temporary 
insanity and diminished responsibility in the United States and the United Kingdom respectively, in 
cases of mercy killing. Not surprisingly, these defences, which rest upon the emotional distress of the 
offender, have not been raised in the few cases in which doctors have been prosecuted. Rather, doctors 
have tended to plead not guilty and rely on arguments based on lack of causation or lack of the 
necessary intention to kill and these arguments have usually been accepted by the jury, often contrary 
to the weight of the evidence. 242 
The criticism is that the use of such fictions represents a blatant abuse of the law, 243 and when 
occurring on a regular basis, suggests that the current criminal prohibitions do not reflect common 
views of reprehensibility. This, in turn, indicates the need to close the gap and bring the overt culture 
as expressed by the law in accord with the covert culture, as expressed in what people do.244 
241 See also above, 117, regarding the likelihood of the practice being performed in secret and the cause of 
death being readily concealed. 
242 See above, 124-126. 
243 Humphry and Wickett, 237. 
244 E. Gurney, 'Is there a Right to Die? A Study of the Law of Euthanasia' (1972) 3 Cumberland-Samford 
L.Rev. 235, 251. Some commentators have stressed the advantages of this gap between law and 
practice arguing that it preserves the legal prohibition against killing, maintains the deterrent affect of 
the law, but at the same time provides mechanisms in the criminal justice system to allow for 
flexibility in the treatment of offenders; see, for example, Kamisar; D. Meyers, The Human Body and 
the Law (1970) 151; J. Childress, 'Civil Disobedience, Conscientious Objection, and Evasive 
Noncompliance: A Framework for the Analysis of Illegal Actions in Health Care' (1985) 10 J.Med. & 
Phil. 63, 76. 
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The two arguments which follow relate specifically to the medical context with regard to the practice 
of active vobmtary euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide. 
Lack of Legal Precedent and Medical Guidance 
As a result of the serious discrepancies which exist between the legal principles and the law in 
practice, there is no established legal precedent with reference to which medical decisions in respect of 
terminal patients can be made and evaluated.245 In theory, the medical profession and the legal system 
both reject active voluntary euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide as an acceptable medical practice, yet 
we know that not infrequently, these practices occur. Furthermore, because active voluntary euthanasia 
and assisting patient suicide are criminal, doctors will inevitably feel inhibited in discussing these 
practices with their colleagues in an open and honest way, and consequently will not be able to benefit 
from criticism or support from their professional peers with regard to their involvement in these 
practices. This, in turn, jeopardises the quality of medical decision-making in this area: 
Patients' Rights are Undermined 
One matter of particular concern is that the present situation threatens to undermine the rights and 
interests of patients. There are a number of possible facets to this argument. One argument is that the 
situation is discriminatory in that the present criminality of active voluntary euthanasia and assisted 
suicide inevitably deters some doctors from engaging in these practices. 246 As a result, there is 
inconsistency of treatment; some patients will have the benefit of practices which are denied to others. 
Along similar lines, it could also be argued that the criminal law prohibitions, which are in any event 
frequently not adhered to, may in many cases prevent doctors from doing what they think is 
appropriate and in the best interests of patients. A more fundamental concern is that there is a very 
real risk of abuse if the ·Jaw condones what is an unregulated practice. Because of the present 
criminality of the practice of active euthanasia, doctors may engage in the practice without necessarily 
consulting the patient, motivated by benevolent paternalism and in the belief that they are acting in 
the patient's best interests. Indeed, if we examine the few cases of medically administered euthanasia 
which have come before the courts, it is by no means clear that the doctors' actions in these cases 
were performed at the request of the patient 247 For doctors to take these decisions upon themselves 
clearly undermines patient self-determination and the patient's right not to be killed without his or her 
consent. There is, therefore, the possibility that the present state of the law may in effect be 
245 J. Wilson, Death by Decision (1975) 165. 
246 See Kuhse and Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia', 624 where 
they note that for a significant proportion of the respondents who had not acted upon a patient's request 
for active euthanasia, the illegality of the practice had been a factor (65%). 
247 For example, R v Sander (unreported) N.Y. Times 10 March 1950. See above, n. 67. 
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sanctioning such killings without providing adequate protection to unwilling victims.248 If active 
euthanasia is in fact being practised, it is imperative that these decisions are based upon the patient's 
choice rather than the idiosyncratic views of individual doctors. 
PART IV 
Problems with the Characterisation of Certain Aspects of Medjcal Practice 
Other discrepancies between strict legal theory and the law in practice arise in respect of the 
characterisation of certain aspects of medical practice. For the purposes of the present analysis, 
attention will focus on the practices of withdrawing life-support measures and the administration of 
-
pain-relieving drugs in the knowledge that they will cause death. It will be shown that on strict legal 
principles, these practices would potentially attract criminal liability for murder, but they are in fact 
characterised in such a way as to avoid the possibility of criminal liability. 
In the preceding chapter, consideration has already been given to the question whether a doctor's 
compliance with a patient's refusal of treatment could in principle, amount to assisting suicide, and 
the accepted characterisation of this form of medical practice249 so that issue will not be dealt with 
here. Suffice it to say that this is another area where every attempt has been made to interpret the law 
in such a way as to avoid doctors incurring criminal liability. 
Withdrawal of Life-Support 
A noted earlier, doctors may, in a variety of circumstances, be involved in the removal of life-support 
from a patient, either at the direction of a patient who has decision-making capacity or in respect of a 
patient lacking such capacity.250 For the purposes of this discussion it will be assumed that, .as a 
matter of causation, the relevant conduct in withdrawing life-support did, in fact, cause death to occur 
at the time that it did, 251 and further, that the doctor either intended to cause the patient's death or was 
aware that the patient would die at an earlier time than he or she would have if artificial life-support 
was continued. 252 
248 Kutner, 542; P. Foreman, 'The Physician's Liability for the Practice of Euthanasia' (1975) 27 Baylor 
L.Rev. 54, 61. 
249 Chapter ill, 88-106. 
250 See above, 121. For the purposes of this discussion it is assumed that it is the doctor who is physically 
involved in the removal of life-support. It is acknowledged, however, that in practice, medical 
decisions to remove life-support will usually be made by a d\)ctor, but are frequently carried out by the 
attending nurse; Johnstone, 249. 
251 See chapter I, 26-27. For the purposes of the law in South Australia s. 6 of the Natural Death Act 1983 
provides that the non-application or withdrawal of extraordinary measures from a person suffering from 
a terminal illness does not constitute a cause of death. For discussion regarding the scope of this 
provision, see chapter I, 27. 
252 See chapter I, 28-30. 
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Although it is fairly commonplace for doctors to discontinue life-support, and this is generally 
accepted to be proper medical practice in appropriate circumstances, 253 it is far from certain that this 
practice is lawful.254 Significantly, there is considerable uncertainty within the medical profession as 
to the legality of this practice. In order to determine the legality of conduct involving the withdrawal 
of life-support it is necessary to ascertain whether this conduct is in law an act terminating life or an 
omission to provide further life-sustaining therapy. This characterisation is vital, since, as outlined in 
an earlier chapter,255 the criminal law attributes a different status to 'acts' as distinct from 'omissions' 
which can have significant legal implications in respect of the legal consequences of such conduct. 
The approach of the criminal law to 'acts' which cause death is very clear cut; they are unconditionally 
prohibited,256 regardless of the relationship between the defendant and his or her victim, or whether 
the victim had requested that he or she be killed. If, ho~ever, the withdrawal of life-support equipment 
is characterised as an 'omission,' the analysis proceeds more flexibly257 and depends on whether the 
doctor was in all the circumstances under a duty to provide medical treatment. In the absence of a legal 
duty to provide treatment a doctor would not be criminally liable for his or her omission. 
Although the characterisation of withdrawal of life-support as either an 'act' or an 'omission' is of 
central importance in determining the legality of that conduct, there has been relatively little 
consideration of how this conduct should be characterised. Indeed, because the practice is widely 
known to occur, without any question of criminal liability arising, it appears to be frequently assumed 
that this conduct must be an 'omission' in law and therefore lawful. 
On the basis of the earlier analysis of acts and omissions in chapter I,258 it would appear that the 
withdrawal of life-support constitutes an 'act' in the legal sense, since turning off the switch of a 
ventilator,259 or physically removing the tubes supplying the patient with artificial nutrition and 
hydration, clearly involves a 'willed bodily movement' or a 'voluntary muscular contraction'. 260 This 
conclusion does, of course, have significant legal ramifications. Leaving aside for the moment'policy 
253 See above, n. 54. 
254 R. Blanch Q.C., New South Wales Director of Public Prosecutions, 'Withdrawing Life Support - Murder 
or Mercy?,' paper delivered to a meeting of the Medico-Legal Society of N.S.W., 25 March (1991). 
255 See chapter I, 10-11, 20-21. 
256 G. Fletcher, 'Prolonging Life' (1967) 42 Wash.LRev. 999, 1012. 
257 Id. 1006. 
258 See chapter I, 12, 20. 
259 In practice, the withdrawal of artificial ventilation may be accompanied by the administration of drugs 
intended to make the patient comfortable (Schneiderman and Spragg, 987) and this clearly involves 
additional acts quite apart from turning off life-support. 
260 Since ventilators and other similar forms of artificial life-support run on electricity, once a patient is 
placed on such a machine, a bodily movement is required to turn the machine off, unless the machine is 
specially designed otherwise. However, with artificial feeding, it is possible to envisage circumstances 
where such feeding could be terminated without any bodily movement; fot example not refilling the 
bottle supplying artificial nutrition and hydration. More typically, however, the withdrawal of 
artificial feeding would involve the removal of artificial feeding tubes from the patient. So, whilst it is 
conceivable that the withdrawal of artificial feeding could be done by omission, for the purposes of the 
present discussion, it is assumed that it is generally done in a way which does involves a bodily 
movement. 
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considerations, it would mean that the withdrawal of life-support resulting in the patient's death could 
potentially expose doctors to criminal liability for murder.261 
The Debate 
The question of whether turning off of a life-support system should be classified as an 'act' or an 
'omission' has been hotly debated by a number of legal commentators.262 Whilst there is some 
disagreement on the matter, the consensus appears to be that withdrawal of life-support from terminal 
patients should be considered an omission rather than a positive act 263 This is, perhaps, a predictable 
result, if one considers the serious consequences which the contrary view would entail. It has already 
been observed that removal of life-supi>ort is a common and widely accepted medical practice. There 
is, therefore, a natural reluctance to come to the conclusion that doctors performing this practice may 
be committing murder. Consequently, there has been strong motivation to interpret the actions as 
something other than acts of killing264 and every attempt has been made to justify the view that this 
behaviour constitutes an 'omission,' not an 'act'. 
fletcher's Classification: 'Causin2 Death' Versus 'Permittin2 Death to Occur' 
George fletcher265 is one of the principal contributors to this debate. He rejects a strict legalistic 
approach to this issue, which would equate the conduct of a doctor in turning off life-support 
equipment with that of a hired gunman killing in cold blood and urges that a more sensitive 
interpretation of the law be adopted. fletcher proposes that the turning off of a life-support system, 
such as a mechanical respirator, should be classified as an omission, not an act, and he seeks to justify 
this proposition on semantic grounds.266 Whilst acknowledging that turning a respirator off requires 
physical movement, he argues that this should not be the controlling factor. Instead, he proposes a 
test for the classification of acts and omissions based on the common usage of the terms 'causing 
harm' and 'permitting harm to occur•.267 Fletcher contends that we are equipped with 'linguistic 
sensitivity' for the distinction between these terms which reflects a common sense perception of 
reality, and that we should employ this sensitivity in classifying the conduct of a doctor in turning off 
life-support. If a patient is beyond recovery and on the verge of death, turning off a respirator would 
normally be regarded as 'permitting a patient to die' rather than 'causing death•.268 In these 
circumstances, the decision to withdraw life-support is equivalent to not employing it in the first 
place. On this basis, he is able to conclude that turning off a respirator should be classified as an 
261 In circumstances where the patient has decision-making capacity and has requested that life-support be 
removed, the patient's conduct could possibly be characterised as suicidal. (For further discussion, see 
chapter ill, 91-99.) This is turn raises the possibility of the doctor's liability for assisting the suicide 
of the patient. It will be argued, however, that where the doctor turns off life-support this is an act 
directly connected with the patient's death and the appropriate charge would therefore be for murder 
(assuming the necessary mens rea can be established) rather than assisted suicide. 
262 Fletcher, 1005-1014; Williams, 'Euthanasia', 20-21; Textbook of Criminal Law 279-283; Kennedy; H. 
Beynon, 'Doctors as Murderers' (1982) Crim.LRev. 17, 19-23; Gurney, 251-256. 
263 For commentators in support of this view, see, for example, Fletcher and Williams. 
264 President's Commission Report, 71. 
265 'Prolonging Life'. Note also G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978) 602-610. 
266 Beynon, 19. 
267 'Prolonging Life', 1007. 
268 Ibid. 
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omission, notwithstanding that it involves some bodily movement. 269 And whilst he concedes that 
some omissions may cause harm, 270 he argues that in the context of withdrawal of life-sustaining 
therapy, the law must focus on the doctor/patient relationship to define legal consequences, allowing 
customary standards to be the controlling factor. 
Clearly, however, Fletcher's proposed method of classification, based on the common usage of the 
terms 'causing harm' and 'permitting harm to occur,' depends, to a large extent, on the condition of the 
patient. He acknowledges as much by his reference to 'a patient beyond recovery and on the verge of 
death' and his comments to the effect that one would baulk at saying that turning off a respirator in 
these circumstances is causing death. 271 It logi~y follows that in some circumstances, turning off a 
respirator, or other form of life-support, does amount to 'causing death' rather than 'permitting death to 
occur' and would accordingly be classified as an 'act,' not an 'omission'. For example, if someone 
turned off a respirator which had maintained a fully conscious and reasonably healthy poliomyelitis 
patient for several years and which could have continued to do so for years to come, one could quite 
naturally describe such conduct as 'causing death'. 272 It may, therefore, be wondered whether such a 
variable test could operate satisfactorily in practice, particularly where the final determination appears 
to involve a qualitative judgment as to the condition and prognosis of the patient. In the interests of 
certainty and consistency in the application of legal principles, it could be argued that the conduct of 
turning off of life-support must be uniformly classified as either an act or an omission, and should not 
be determined by reference to external considerations. 
Williams' Reference to 'the Substance of the Matter' 
Glanville Williams273 is also of the view that turning off a respirator is an omission but he justifies 
this conclusion on different grounds. The essence of Williams' argument is that the moral and legal 
rule which distinguishes between acts and omissions must be interpreted in accordance with 'the 
substance of the matter•.274 He accepts that giving up trying to keep a patient alive may involve 
positive action, in the sense of willed movement, for example, disconnecting a respirator that is 
keeping the patient alive. He argues, however, that this need not be regarded as an 'act' for the 
269 Id. 1012-104. For other commentators in support of this reasoning see also G.P. Smith, 'All's Well that 
Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?' (1989) 22 
U.C.Davis L.Rev. 275, 350-351; D. Meyers, 'The Legal Aspects of Medical Euthanasia' (1973) 23 Bio. 
Science 467, 469. For criticism of Fletcher's reasoning see P. Skegg, 'The Termination of Life-Support 
Measures and the Law of Murder' (1978) 41 Mod.L.Rev. 423, 430-432 where he argues that it does not 
accommodate those circumstances where the conduct in question could naturally be described in terms of 
either permitting or causing death. Skegg asserts that whilst it is perfectly natural to speak of the 
withdrawal of artificial respiration from a patient who is beyond recovery and on the verge of death as 
'permitting death', many people would probably consider it no less natural to speak of such conduct as 
'causing death to occur at the time when it did'. Note also Beynon, 20 where she draws at!ention to what 
she claims is an internal inconsistency in Fletcher's analysis; if switching off is really an omission, 
since the doctor does not cause but only permits the death, there is surely no need for his further 
analysis regarding the duty concept in respect of omissions; causation is a sine qua non of liability. 
270 'Prolonging Life,' 1013-1014. 
211 Id. 1007. 
272 Skegg, 430. Moreover, according to Skegg, there are some situations which are capable of being 
classified as either causing death or permitting death to occur; see above, n. 269. 
273 Textbook of Criminal Law, 282-283; 'Euthanasia', 20-21. 
274 'Euthanasia,' 20-21. 
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purposes of the moral and legal rule, because in substance it merely puts into effect a decision to take 
no further steps.275 To justify his view that stopping a respirator is not, in substance, an act of 
killing, Williams examines the manner in which such machines operate. He argues that if a respirator 
only worked as long as the doctor turned a handle and the doctor stopped turning, he would be regarded 
as merely omitting to save the patient's life. Alternatively, if the respirator worked electrically but 
was made to shut itself off every 24 hours, a deliberate failure to restart would be an omission. From 
this premise, he argues that it can make no moral difference that respirators are made to run 
continuously and therefore need to be stopped. Thus, he concludes, turning the respirator off is not a 
positive act of killing the patient but rather a decision to let nature take its course. 
On the basis of the test put forward by Williams, the classification of conduct as an act or an 
omission would be made by the court on a case by case basis, according to 'the substance of the 
matter'. There are in fact, distinct similarities between this approach and the test proposed by Fletcher 
which requires consideration of whether the conduct in question can be said to have 'caused death' or 
merely 'permitted death to occur'. Both would ultimately require a determination by the· court, based on 
the particular facts of the case, and the court's inquiry would inevitably turn on the question of 
whether it was in the circumstances appropriate to withdraw treatment 276 
However, Williams' approach is open to the same objection as Fletcher's arguments, namely that 
identical conduct (i.e. physically turning off or withdrawing life-support), could be classified either as 
an act or an omission, depending on the surrounding circumstances. On Williams' analysis, if life-
support is turned off at the request of the patient or pursuant to a bona fide medical decision to cease 
further treatment, a court would be likely to find that any physical acts involved should be disregarded, 
because in substance, the medical staff were merely putting into effect a decision to take no further 
steps. Where, however, a machine is turned off for other than bona fide medical reasons, for example, 
in order to avoid a night shift attendance on the patient, the conduct could be regarded as, in substance, 
an act of killing. 
In view of the general criminal law principles which continue to uphold the acts/omissions 
dichotomy, there is, understandably strong motivation for preferring to classify 'turning off as an 
omission rather than an act so as to avoid the spectre of doctors incurring criminal liability. 
Notwithstanding the commendable motives of legal commentators and jurists in their attempts to 
justify this position, there remains a fundamental difficulty with this approach. Skegg277 has raised 
the objection that this classification only works satisfactorily in circumstances where there is an 
appropriate duty relationship between the patient and the person who switches off the machine and in 
the absence of such a relationship, serious difficulties arise. Taking this reasoning to its logical 
conclusion, it would allow strangers to interfere and kill the patient by turning off life-support 
275 Ibid. 
276 This determination will depend on the condition and prognosis of the patient and, as Williams 
acknowledges (Textbook of Criminal Law, 283), this approach leaves it very much up to the individual 
doctor to determine whether life has any value for the patient. 
277 Skegg, 432. 
155 
equipment; if the removal of life-support is held to be an omission, the stranger would commit no 
crime since he or she was under no legally recognised duty to act. A possible answer to this objection, 
raised by both Williams and Skegg, is that the withdrawal of life-support should only be classified as 
an omission in circumstances where there is a legally recognised duty relationship between the parties. 
So, if an intruder who owes no duty to the patient switches off a life-support system, his conduct will 
be treated as an act of murder.278 But, as Skegg acknowledges, this explanation is open to the 
objection that it is undesirable that the same physical movements should be classified either as an act 
or an omission, depending on who it was that switched off the machine. 279 In the interests of 
certainty and uniformity in the application of the law, it is important that the classification of acts and 
omissions be determined without reference to what are arguably peripheral considerations. 
Keunedy's Analysis 
Not all commentators support these attempts to justify the practice of turning off life-support systems 
by classifying turning off as an omission. Kennedy, for example, rejects this approach as 'elaborate 
and unsatisfactory•.280 In his view, to describe the turning off of life-support as an omission does 
some considerable violence to ordinary English usage and represents an attempt to solve the problem 
by logic-chopping. 281 Kennedy argues that in circumstances where a patient is dependent on life-
support, and the doctor knows that the patient will die if the life-support measures are removed, in 
determining the liability of the doctor in withdrawing life-support, a distinction must be drawn 
between: (i) the situation where the patient requests that further support be terminated; and (ii) where 
life-support is turned off without the consent of the patient In the former case, a doctor's compliance 
with the patient's request would not attract criminal liability; not because it is an omission to treat 
rather than an act of killing, but on a number of other interrelated grounds. First, he argues, there is 
the libertarian premise that a person's position should not be irremediably worsened by another's 
conduct.282 Turning off life-support permits other factors to intercede and thrusts the decision back on 
the patient. Second, because of what he refers to as the 'red light' rule; that it is better to have a clear, 
albeit crude, general rule condemning all acts of killing and inviting leniency in cases of justifiable 
transgression. Third, from an evidentiary point of view, he argues that there is a significant distinction 
between the termination of life-support and other forms of active killing such as stabbing which are 
potentially more open to abuse. Finally, he suggests that since a patient requesting termination of 
life-support is a relatively rare phenomenon, the criminal law can respond to it as a tol~rable and 
justifiable exception to basic criminal law rules. In the second situation, however, where life-support 
is intentionally terminated without the knowledge and the consent of the dependent patient, the 
conduct clearly amounts to murder regardless of the actor's motive. 
278 Williams, 282 where he takes this reasoning further, arguing that the intruder has no responsibility for 
or authority in respect of the patient - he or she does not take part in the decision whether to continue 
medical treatment or not, so what he or she does is a positive act of intervention. An alternative 
analysis is that where an unauthorised person interferes with the treatment of a patient they pull onto 
themselves a duty of care such that they could be liable for an omission to act. 
279 Skegg, 432. 
280 'Switching Off Life-Support Machines: The Legal Implications,' 444. 
281 /d. 445. 
282 Kennedy, 449; Beynon, 23. 
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In effect, Kennedy avoids characterising the relevant conduct of withdrawing life-support as either an 
'act' or an 'omission'. He is, however, at pains to point out that the conduct we are considering 
involves discontinuation of treatment, and that there is an important distinction between a request by a 
patient that treatment be discontinued which is complied with on the one hand. and a request by a 
patient that someone stabs him or her to death which is complied with on the other. Whilst the 
former does not, on his analysis attract liability, the latter does.283 
The truth of the matter is that the acts/omissions dichotomy presents a real dilemma in cases where 
the discontinuation of treatment involves a willed bodily movement. Clearly, steps taken to tum off 
artificial ventilation or remove artificial feeding tubes are performed pursuant to a decision to omit 
further treatment in respect of a patient (either at the patient's direction, or where a decision is made in 
respect of a patient who lacks decision-making capacity) and it is beyond doubt, that in some 
circumstances, this course of action will be appropriate.284 This does not, however, alter the fact that 
technically speaking, these various forms of withdrawal of medical care involve 'acts' in the sense of 
'willed bodily movements' or 'muscular contractions.' The position is, perhaps, clearest in relation to 
the issue of removal of life-support equipment; as one commentator has argued. once life-support 
equipment has begun to operate on a patient, it is fallacious to argue that a cessation of such 
treatment is a mere omission and not an act in the legal sense. 285 The doctor must physically turn 
the switch to the off position and this entails positive action. 286 
The Approach of the Courts: Characterisation in Practice 
It is, in all the circumstances, not surprising that the courts, when faced with difficult questions of 
characterising medical conduct, have generally glossed over the issue or have simply assumed that 
withdrawal of treatment constitutes an omission, notwithstanding that it may involve some p<>sitive 
action. 
Since the issue of withdrawal of life-support has been most frequently litigated in the United States, 
most of the relevant cases come from that jurisdiction. In a number of American cases the courts have 
upheld the right of a patient to refuse treatment, even in circumstances where that involves having 
ventilators or artificial feeding tubes disconnected.287 However, these cases have generally been non-
283 'Switching Off Life-Support Machines: The Legal Implications,' 449. Although not specifically stated 
by Kennedy, a convincing way of distinguishing between discontinuance of treatment and other forms 
of active assistance such as stabbing or the administration of a lethal injection performed at the request 
of the patient, is by relying on the patient's right to refuse treatment and the fact that a doctor may 
lawfully act on the patient's request - indeed is obliged to do so, if he or she is to avoid liability for 
battery. This argument is developed further, see below, 161-163. 
284 See above, n. 54 for references in support of the ethical permissibility of terminating life-support. 
285 W. Cannon, 'The Right to Die' (1970) 7 Hous.LRev. 654, 659. 
286 Ibid. For other commentators who are of the view that turning off life-support is an act, not an 
omission, see, for example, G. Sharpe, The Law and Medicine in Canada (2nd ed., 1987) 303; D. 
Lanham, 'The Right to Choose to Die with Dignity' (1990) 14 Crim.Law.I. 401, 428; J. Riordan (ed.) 
The Laws of Australia, Criminal Law, Homicide, 66-67. 
287 For example Satz v Perlmutter 362 So. 2d 160 (1978); Severns v Wilmington Medical Center 421 A. 2d 
1334 (1980); In re Colyer 99 Wash. 2d 114 (1983); Bartling v Superior Court 163 Cal. App. 3d 186 
(1984); Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital, Inc. 497 N.E. 2d 626 (1986). 
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criminal in nature, so the question of classification of withdrawal of life-support has only been 
indirectly 'addressed, if at all. 288 
A notable exception was the case of Barber v Superior Court289 involving a criminal prosecution of 
two doctors for murder and conspiracy to commit murder for their conduct in removing life-support 
equipment and intravenous tubes supplying nutrition and hydration to a dying patient Quite clearly, 
therefore, determination of whether the doctors' conduct in removing the life-support equipment and 
feeding tubes was an 'act' or an 'omission' was central to the doctors' criminal liability. Although the 
conduct in question involved positive action in the sense of 'willed bodily movements,' the court 
nevertheless held that the cessation of these life-support measures was not an affirmative act but rather 
a withdrawal or omission of further treatment. 290 The approach taken by the court seems to be akin 
to that suggested by Williams' that account must be taken of 'the substance of the matter'. The court 
was of the view that: 
Even though these support devices are, to a degree, 'self propelled', each 
pulsation of the respirator or each drop of fluid introduced in the patient's body 
by intravenous feeding devices is comparable to a manually administered 
injection or item of medication. Hence 'disconnecting' of the mechanical devices 
is comparable to withholding the manually administered injection or 
medication. 291 
Thus, the court held that for the purpose of assessing a doctor's liability, withdrawal of life-support 
equipment or intravenous tubes should be regarded as equivalent to initially withholding the 
procedures.292 Since the conduct could be characterised as an omission, the legality of the conduct 
turned on the question of the scope of the doctors' duty and the doctors were held not to be liable. 
The question of characterisation of withdrawal of life-support, and more particularly, the legality of 
this practice, has not directly arisen for judicial consideration in Australia or the United Kingdom. 293 
288 One explanation for the failure of the courts in the United States to address this issue is the emphasis 
which has been given in many cases to the patient's constitutional right to refuse treatment which has 
led to an assumption by the courts that doctors would not incur criminal or civil liability for taking 
steps in facilitating the exercise of that right. 
289 Barber v Superior Court 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). 
290 Id. 490. 
291 Jbid. 
292 N. Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying (1987) 32. 
293 There has been a recent New Zealand case in which the High Court gave doctors an immunity from 
murder or manslaughter charges in a case involving the withdrawal of life-support from a irreversibly 
brain damaged patient Because of concern about criminal liability, the doctors had applied to the court, 
seeking a declaration that the withdrawal of artificfal ventilatory support would not be unlawful. For 
discussion of this case, see chapter I, n. 92. 
For the purposes of Australian law, should be noted that in R v Crabbe (1985) 58 A.L.R. 417, 421 (a 
case dealing with the mental element for murder at common law; see chapter I, 28-29), the High Court 
expressed the view that not every fatal act done with the knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm 
will probably result is murder, since the act may be lawful, that is, justified or excused by law. This 
possible exception will be discussed below, 171-172 in the context of the legality of administering 
pain-relieving drugs, where it may have greater relevance. 
Whilst the issue of characterisation of withdrawal of life-support has not directly arisen before the 
courts in Australia, there have been publicised instances in which artificial life-support has been 
switched off at the request of the patient; for example, the case which occurred at St. Vincent's Hospital 
in March 1988, in which the doctors, at the request of a patient suffering from fatal motor neurone 
disease, turned off the artificial ventilator which had been keeping the woman alive. See above, n. 51. 
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There have, however, been a number of cases in which the courts have accepted that doctors have acted 
properly in withdrawing artificial life-support from brain-damaged patients.294 Thus, in prosecutions 
of persons whose conduct had led the victim to be dependent on life-support, the courts have held that 
the conduct of the doctor in disconnecting life-support did not break the chain of causation between the 
initial injuries and the death. These cases tend to support the view that the withdrawal of life-support 
is characterised by the courts as an omission to provide further treatment, rather than an act which 
causes death. 295 
Thus, in cases involving the withdrawal of treatment, for example, disconnecting life-support 
equipment296 or the removal of artificial feeding tubes, 297 the courts have usually proceeded on the 
basis that these are essentially cases of omission notwithstanding that they may entail some positive 
action. This conclusion is, however, difficult to justify on strict legal principles. The removal of life-
support clearly does involve an 'act' in the strict legal sense, and, provided the other necessary 
requirements are fulfilled, it would prima facie constitute murder if the patient's death results. 
Policy Considerations 
There are undoubtedly significant policy considerations behind the approach of the courts and the 
views of many commentators in finding that the withdrawal of life-support is in law an omission, not 
an act. As noted earlier, 298 the withdrawal of life-support is now fairly well established medical 
practice, and there is naturally a reluctance to interpret that practice in such a way as to raise the 
spectre of doctors incurring criminal liability. Indeed, it would seem that every possible effort has 
been made to interpret the conduct of the doctors in such a way as to sanction their practices and avoid 
a finding of criminal liability. 
'Killimt and 'Letting Die' 
Quite apart from the issue of criminal liability, the acts/omissions distinction has been influential in 
shaping attitudes in relation to the taking of human life. Commentators have seized on this 
distinction in order to distinguish between the humane termination of medical care on the one hand 
and unlawful killing on the other and this reasoning is also reflected in the official statements of some 
medical organisations with regard to the withholding of treatment and the practice of active 
euthanasia.299 Distinctions have been drawn between 'causing death' and 'allowing death to occur' or 
294 P. Skegg, Law Ethics and Medicine (Revised ed., 1988) 166; Finlayson v H.M. Advocate [1978] S.L.T. 
(Notes) 60; R v Malcherek [1981] 1 W.L.R. 690; R v Steel [1981] 1 W.L.R. 690; R v Kinash [1982] 
Qd.R. 648. 
295 See also F. Galbally, 'Death by Statute' (1981) 55 A.LJ. 339, 343 and the discussion in chapter I, 27. 
296 For example, Satz v Perlmutter 362 So. 2d 160 (1978). 
297 For example, Barber v Superior Court 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). 
298 See above, n. 54. 
299 See, for example, the Statement of the Council of Judicial and Ethical Affairs of the American Medical 
Association, Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment March (1986) which 
states that 'for humane reasons, with informed consent, a physician may do what is medically necessary 
to alleviate severe pain, or cease or omit treatment to permit a terminally ill patient to die when death 
is imminent. However, the physician should not intentionally cause death.' For critical analysis of the 
distinctions relied upon in this statement, see R. Devettere, 'The Imprecise Language of Euthanasia and 
Causing Death' (1990) 1 J.Clin. Ethics 268. 
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between 'killing' and 'letting die'. However, euphemisms such as 'letting die' or 'allowing death to 
occur' are inherently misleading and tend to obscure the real issues. The difficulty is that terms such as 
'killing' or 'allowing to die' are often used not only in a descriptive sense, but are also intended to 
convey normative connotations. For example, 'allowing to die' is often used to communicate approval 
of the fact that death will occur as distinct from 'killing' which has connotations of illegitimate taking 
of life.300 Further, these terms tend to imply a number of invalid assumptions. For instance, these 
distinctions give rise to the assumption that acts of killing cause death, whereas, omissions to provide 
treatment, or 'letting die' do not 301 However, this assumption is clearly unfounded since an omission 
to provide treatment can in some circumstances be properly regarded as a cause of death. These terms 
are also objectionable on the grounds that they appear to suggest that only acts of killing are 
proscribed as unlawful and that omissions to act or passive euthanasia are legally permissible. This 
suggestion is also quite unwarranted since the doctor's duty to his or her patient may also give rise to 
liability for omissions to act. 
Although these distinctions between 'killing and letting die' or 'causing death and allowing death' to 
occur are, to a large extent, based on invalid and unfounded assumptions,302 they have nevertheless 
gained considerable currency. In practice, the usage of these terms would tend to encourage the 
characterisation of the withdrawal of life-support as an omission; (i.e. a 'letting die' or 'allowing death 
to occur' as distinct from 'causing death' or 'killing') in order to convey the broad acceptability of this 
practice. 
Distinction between Withholding and Withdrawing Medical Treatment 
There are also other implic;itions flowing from a strict adherence to the acts/omissions distinction. If 
the withdrawal of life-support is held to be an act, this would result in a distinction being drawn 
between initially withholding treatment, which on any analysis, is clearly an omission, and 
withdrawing treatment once instituted, which would be classified as an act and which would, therefore, 
attract different legal consequences. However, this is thought to be a most unsatisfactory distinction to 
draw in practice.303 As a preliminary objection, although the nature of the distinction may at first 
sight seem clear enough, cases that obscure it abound.304 But, apart from the di~culties in the 
application of such a distinction, its adoption is likely to have serious implications. As pointed out 
by the President's Commission in its Report, Deciding To Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment, if the 
view is taken that treatment, once started cannot be stopped, or that stopping requires much greater 
justification than not starting, this may result in treatment being continued for longer than is optimal 
300 President's Commission Report, 64. 
301 Id. 68-70. 
302 Id. 71. 
303 Id. 73-77. See also the Hastings Center Report, 130-131; R. Weir, Abating Treatment with Critically 
Ill Patients (1989) 401-403; Cantor, 32. 
304 See President's Commission Report, 74 for some examples which tend to obscure the distinction; 
disconnecting a respirator would count as stopping - but if the patient is on a respirator and the power 
fails, does failure to use a manual bellows system count as stopping or not starting? And what of 
medical therapies which require repeated applications of an intervention? Does failure to continue to 
reapply the intervention count as stopping or as not starting? 
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for the patient, even to the point where it is causing positive harm with little or no compensating 
benefit. 305 
According to the President's Commission, an even more troubling wrong occurs when treatment that 
might save life or improve health is not started because the health care personnel are afraid that they 
will find it legally difficult to stop the treatment if it proves to be of little benefit and greatly burdens 
the patient.306 Thus, the commission was concerned that the erection of a higher requirement for 
cessation might unjustifiably discourage vigorous initial attempts to treat seriously ill patients that 
sometimes succeed.307 The commission was of the view that the distinction between withholding and 
withdrawing treatment is not of itself of moral significance; if there is justification for not 
commencing a treatment, the same grounds should also be sufficient for ceasing it.308 The 
commission concluded, neither law nor public policy should mark a difference in moral seriousness 
between stopping and not starting treatment.309 
There are clearly valid reasons why there should be no distinction between withholding medical 
procedures and terminating such procedures once instituted. In some of the American cases the courts 
have recognised these problems and have specifically stated that no such distinction will be made.310 
As we have seen, one way of achieving this result (but not necessarily the only way), is to hold that 
withdrawal of life-support amounts to an omission, in the same way that withholding treatment is in 
law an omission. 311 
A Critique of the Present Legal Analysis 
Although there are clearly significant policy considerations involved, it is submitted that there are 
some fundamental problems inherent in the present legal analysis. To hold that the withdrawal of life-
support constitutes an omission is simply a policy decision which ignores the reality that this 
conduct involves 'willed bodily movements' or 'voluntary muscular contractions'. Problems arise 
because the prevailing interpretation involves legal fictions and the distortion of accepted legal 
principles. This is particularly serious having regard to the importance of the acts/omissions 
distinction in determining criminal liability. There are undoubtedly difficulties with the 
acts/omissions distinction. Not only is the distinction between acts and omissions often very difficult 
to draw in practice, in many cases it fails to provide an adequate foundation for the moral and legal 
305 President's Commission Report, 75. 
306 Ibid. 
307 Id. 61-2, 75-6. Indeed, as argued by the President's Commission, if there is any basis to draw a moral 
distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatment, it should work the opposite way; greater 
justification ought to be required to withhold than to withdraw treatment. This is because the effects of 
treatment will often be highly uncertain before the treatment bas been tried. However, once the 
treatment has been implemented and it is clear that it is not helpful to the patient, there is then actual 
evidence, rather than mere surmise, to support discontinuing the treatment. 
308 President's Commission Report, 61. See also the Hastings Center Report, 130-131. 
309 President's Commission Report, 77. 
310 For example, Barber v Superior Court 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (1983); In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209, 
1234 (1985). 
311 See, for example, the approach taken in Barber v Superior Court 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). 
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evaluation of events leading to death.31 2 One cannot ignore the fact that strict adherence to the 
acts/omissions dichotomy leads to some very fine distinctions, which arguably are morally and 
ethically unsustainable.313 For example, is it valid to hold that the ending of a program of dialysis is 
a mere 'omission', whilst switching off a ventilator is an 'act,' even though they are both directed at 
the same end, namely discontinuing life-support? The overwhelming consensus amongst 
commentators appears to be that in substance, there is no difference between these forms of medical 
practice314 and that it is most inappropriate for liability for homicide to depend on artificial 
distinctions of this kind. 315 As we have seen, the response of most commentators has been to argue 
that although we are here dealing with conduct which can technically be described as acts, it should, 
nevertheless, be classified as an omission.316 The difficulties that have been encountered in this area 
have led other commentators to completely reject the current conceptual framework of acts and 
omissions. 317 However, if we accept the need to operate within the existing legal and ethical 
framework, the conclusion seems inescapable that the withdrawal of life-support must be classified as 
an act not an omission. 
If the withdrawal of life-support is characterised as an act, the obvious conclusion would appear to be 
that the commission of that act will constitute murder if it is accompanied by the necessary mens rea. 
Furthermore, having regard to the rules negating consent to acts which cause death, it would appear to 
be irrelevant that the patient had directed that treatment be withdrawn. Notwithstanding the seeming 
inevitability of these conclusions, it is submitted that there is an alternative method of analysis which 
retains the traditional acts/omissions distinction, but nevertheless, acknowledges that, in some 
instances, doctors may lawfully perform acts which cause death. 
A Possible Solution 
If we are to adhere to the acts/omissions dichotomy, the most acceptable means of overcoming present 
difficulties is to recognise that, in appropriate circumstances, withdrawal of treatment will be 
justifiable and will not result in criminal liability, even though it involves an act in the sense of a 
'willed bodily movement' or 'voluntary muscular contraction' which may have been accompanied by 
the necessary mens rea for murder. This proposition is based upon the patient's fundamental right of 
self-determination. As previously observed, at common law, a patient who has decision-making 
capacity has a right to refuse treatment.318 If this right is taken to its logical conclusion, it should 
enable the patient to refuse further treatment even though the implementation of that refusal may 
require the medical staff to take positive action (for example, the act of turning off life-support 
equipment or the removal of artificial feeding tubes) which is directly connected to the patient's death. 
This was certainly the view of the President's Commission, which stated in unequivocal terms: 
312 President's Commission Report, 64. 
313 Beynon, 20; Williams, 'Euthanasia and Abortion', 183. 
314 Williams, 'Euthanasia and Abortion', 183. 
315 J.C. Smith and B. Hogan, Criminal Law (5th ed., 1983) 44. 
316 See the reasoning of Fletcher and Williams above, 152-155. 
317 For example, Devettere, 273. 
318 See chapter II, 33-37. 
·For competent patients, the principle of self-determination is understood to 
include a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, and to place a duty on providers 
and others to respect that right. Providers, in turn are protected from liability 
when they act to aid a patient in carrying out that right. Active steps to terminate 
life-sustaining interventions may be permitted, indeed required, by the patient's 
authority to forgo therapy even when such steps lead to death.319 
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This statement has subsequently been endorsed by the courts in the United States.320 Not only does a 
patient have the right to refuse treatment, the corollary of this right is that non-consensual treatment 
amounts to a battery. On the assumption that life-support such as artificial ventilation or artificial 
feeding is seen as medical treatment,321 the patient's withdrawal of consent would render the 
continuation of that treatment a non-consensual touching and therefore a battery.322 Thus, a doctor 
would have legal justification for removing life-support at the direction of the patient, 
notwithstanding that such removal may entail conduct of a positive nature. The doctor would simply 
be removing the source of a battery, which in law he or she is required to do, and thereby would be 
respecting the patient's right to refuse treatment.323 Whilst this reasoning has rarely been spelt out it 
is entirely consistent with recent case law from the United States324 and contemporary developments 
regarding the patient's right of self-determination.325 
If we take the step of recognising that the withdrawal of life-support is indeed an act rather than an 
omission, we then have to determine what effect this conclusion has on criminal law principles 
generally regarding acts which cause death. In particular, consideration has to be given to whether this 
necessarily leads to the conclusion that patients can authorise other acts which cause death, such as the 
administration of a lethal injection. Indeed, concern about this very possibility underlies the reluctance 
of many commentators to accept that the withdrawal of life-support is an act, fearing that this would 
result in an erosion of the general legal prohibition of active killing. 
Proponents of active voluntary euthanasia may wish to argue that it logically follows from the 
acceptance of the withdrawal of life-support as an act that a patient who has decision-making capacity 
can authorise any acts which cause death. Realistically, however, any change to the legality of the 
practice of active voluntary euthanasia is unlikely to be achieved in this way. Whilst a number of 
319 President's Commission Report, 72. 
320 In re Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209, 1234 (1985). 
321 This is now the accepted view; see, for example, chapter II, 61. 
322 Some support for this view can be derived from the English case of Fagan v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner [1969] 1 Q.B. 439. 
323 Skegg, Law, Ethics and Medicine 180. See chapter II, n. 280 for consideration of the possible reliance 
by doctors on the defence of necessity in order to avoid criminal liability. 
324 For example, In re Farrel 529 A. 2d 404 (1987). 
325 Respect for the patient's right to refuse treatment may also be reflected in arguments based on lack of 
the necessary mens rea to convict for murder. It could, for example, be argued that a doctor who has 
acted upon the request of a competent patient that artificial life-support measures be removed should not 
be criminally liable even though he or she knew that death would probably result since the doctor's 
intention was to uphold the patient's right to refuse treatment rather than bring about the death of the 
patient. Acceptance of this argument would, however, involve legal recognition of the principle of 
'double effect' which has todate not been accepted lnto the criminal law; for further discussion see 
below, 167-168. 
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commentators have either accepted that the withdrawal of life-support is in fact an act, or have rejected 
outright the acts/omission doctrine as determinative of liability, they have at the same time argued for 
the retention of the general legal prohibition on active killing. This, they claim, can be achieved by 
drawing a distinction between an act of discontinuance of medical treatment and other acts of 
commission, such as giving a lethal injection.326 It is suggested here that one recognises the 
withdrawal of artificial life-support as an act which doctors may lawfully perform at the request of the 
patient in the context of the patient's direction that further treatment be discontinued but, at the same 
time, acknowledging that this does not, of itself, lead to the conclusion that a doctor may perform 
other acts causing death at the request of the patient. This would have the advantage of intellectual 
honesty and consistent legal reasoning, avoiding the distortions and legal fictions which the present 
position entails. 
Although this thesis is concerned with competent patients who have decision-making capacity, the 
implications of the foregoing reasoning for the withdrawal of artificial life-support from incompetent 
patients must be acknowledged. If, as has been argued, the withdrawal of artificial life-support such as 
turning off a ventilator or the removal of artificial feeding equipment is characterised as an act not an 
omission, doctors who perform such acts other than at the direction of a patient who has decision-
making capacity would potentially face criminal liability for murder. This would mean that the 
switching off of artificial life-support in respect of an incompetent patient would be unlawful, even in 
circumstances where the continuation of medical treatment is believed to be medically futile. The only 
exception would be in those jurisdictions in which patients have a statutory right to refuse treatment 
which endures beyond the patient's loss of decision-making capacity.327 Whilst this is, admittedly, an 
unsatisfactory conclusion to draw, it is inescapable if one accepts that the withdrawal of life-support is 
an act not an omission. The solution to this difficulty would lie with the legislature.328 
Administration of Pain-Relieving Drugs 
In the context of the care of terminal patients, cases may arise in which the drugs required to alleviate 
pain may have the effect of shortening the patient's life. Pain-relieving drugs may be administered in a 
wide range of circumstances: they may be administered at the request of or with the consent of a 
patient who has decision-making capacity, or the doctor may determine on behalf of the patient that 
326 Cantor, 34; Kennedy, 449; President's Commission Report, 72-73. 
327 The only Australian jurisdictions to have introduced legislation in this area are South Australia, (Natural 
Death Act 1983); Victoria (Medical Treatment Act 1988, Medical Treatment (Enduring Power of 
Attorney) Act 1990 and the Medical Treatment (Agents) Act 1992); and the Northern Territory (Natural 
Death Act 1988). An important feature of this legislation is to provide legal protection to doctors who 
act upon the patient's prior direction (or in Victoria, at the direction of the holder of the power of 
attorney) that treatment be discontinued. See chapter VII, 296-297, 307, 310-311 respectively. 
328 It should be noted that different considerations may be applicable in the United States in light of the 
courts' attempt to equate the- rights of competent and incompetent patients with regard to the right to 
refuse of treatment, particularly since the United States Supreme Court in Cruzan v Director, Missouri 
Department of Health 110 S. Ct. 2841, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1990) has recognised this right to have a 
constitutional basis. The Cruzan decision does, however, make it clear that States are entitled to insist 
upon a high standard of proof in establishing the prior wishes of a previously competent patient. See 
chapter II, 59-60. 
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such a course is appropriate, for example, in circumstances where the patient lacks the capacity to 
decide.329 Although it appears to be widely accepted amongst the medical profession that the 
administration of life-shortening palliative care is in some circumstances ethical and constitutes 
legitimate medical practice,330 it is open to question whether this practice is in fact lawful. 
Under existing criminal law principles for murder outlined in chapter I, 331 liability will be 
established for acts which cause death if they are performed with an intention to cause death or in the 
knowledge that death will probably result. Provided the necessary mens rea and actus reus can be 
established, the doctor's motive or the fact that the patient consented to the act causing death would be 
irrelevant to the issue of liability. Nor would it make any difference that the patient was in any event 
dying since hastening of death is sufficient to establish criminal liability.332 Thus, upon a strict 
interpretation of the criminal law, doctors are potentially liable for murder if they administer pain-
relieving drugs in the knowledge that death will probably result even though their intention is to 
alleviate the patient's pain.333 This conclusion obviously has far-reaching implications, having regard 
to the realities of medical practice and the wish of doctors to act in their patient's best interests and 
where possible relieve a patient's pain. 
It is widely assumed that doctors are not acting unlawfully if they administer pain-relieving drugs 
which are likely to hasten the death of a patient, provided that the docfor's intention was to alleviate 
pain and not bring about the death of the patient.334 Certainly, no attempt is made to restrict this 
practice, or to prosecute doctors who thereby hasten the death of their patients. 335 
As with the issue of turning off life-support, this assumption regarding the legality of the practice of 
administering pain-relieving drugs which hasten death is largely based on policy considerations. 
Whilst the deliberate administration of a lethal dose clearly constitutes murder, many people see a 
distinction between palliative care and active voluntary euthanasia. Indeed, there is, quite justifiably, 
much resistance to characterising the practice of administering pain-relieving drugs as euthanasia 336 
329 See above, 122. For th~ purposes of this analysis, attention will be focussed on the situation involving 
terminal patients. It should be noted, however, that the issue of pain-relieving drugs which shorten life 
may also arise in respect of non-terminally ill patients who are experiencing pain and suffering. For 
discussion, see D. Caswell, 'Rejecting Criminal Liability for Life-Shortening Palliative Care' (1990) 6 
J.Contemp. Health Law & Pol'y 127, 132-133, and M. Somerville, 'Pain and Suffering at the Interfaces 
of Law and Medicine' (1986) 36 U. Toronto L.J. 286, 299-301. 
330 See above, 122. 
331see chapter I, 12-13, 28-29. 
332 See chapter I, 15-16. 
333 Alternatively, the doctor may face manslaughter charges, e.g. in circumstances where the mens rea for 
murder cannot be established. 
334 N. Cantor, 'A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the 
Preservation of Life' (1972-73) 26 Rutgers L.Rev. 228, 259. For the purposes of this discussion, 
attention is focused on the potential liability of doctors for the administration of pain-relieving drugs 
which may hasten death. It is, however, acknowledged that in practice it may be the case that the doctor 
prescribes the drugs but the nurse is left to actually administer them; see Johnstone, 249. 
335 One of the rare exceptions was the case of R v Lodwig (unreported) (1990) The Times 16 March 1990, 
considered below, 170. 
336 For example, D. Louisell, 'Euthanasia and Biathanasia: On Dying and Killing' (1973) 22 Catholic 
U.L.Rev. 723, 731; Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility, On Dying Well (1975) 61. See 
also Caswell, 129, 131 n. 13 where he argues that palliative care is different from active euthanasia, but 
acknowledges that the distinction often becomes blurred. Note, however, the practice of some 
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Because of the widespread acceptability of the practice, and the natural desire to avoid the possibility 
of doctors incurring criminal liability, the criminal law is assumed not to be applicable. Furthermore, 
it is indisputable that many patients require pain-relieving drugs, often in high dosages. If strict 
criminal law principles were to be invoked, doctors would be encouraged to practice defensive 
medicine and this would result in tighter, less sensitive rationing of pain relief. Thus, there are 
powerful policy considerations which have influenced the legal characterisation of this medical 
practice. 
The Law as Interpreted by the Courts 
Whilst there have been very few cases which have raised the issue of the legality of administering 
pain-relieving drugs which hasten death, the case law which does exist strongly suggests that doctors 
will not incur criminal liability if, in appropriate circumstances, they administer drugs for pain relief 
which hasten death even though the doctor knew that death would probably result 
The Adams Case 
The leading case in this area is the 1957 English case of R v Adams331 which involved the 
prosecution of a doctor, John Bodkin Adams, for having allegedly murdered a patient. The 
prosecution's case was that Adams had deliberately killed an elderly patient by the administration of 
large doses of morphine and heroin in order that he would benefit under her will. The defence case was 
that the morphine had been administered to relieve the patient's pain and it thereby raised the question 
of whether doctors were entitled to adopt a course of treatment which would have the effect of 
shortening the patient's life.338 Adams was in fact acquitted, but the case has become of lasting 
significance because of Justice Devlin's direction to the jury. Whilst a direction to the jury would not 
usually have much precedent force, this case has become something of an exception, largely because 
of the eminence of the judge, the significance of the legal issue under consideration, and because it is 
the only common law authority directly dealing with this issue.339 
Justice Devlin began by pointing out that shortening life constitutes murder and that the law does not 
recognise a special defence of preventing severe pain. His Honour then went on to say: 
But that does not mean that a doctor who is aiding the sick and the dying has 
to calculate in minutes or even hours, and perhaps not in days or weeks, the 
effect on the patient's life of the medicines that he administers or else be in 
peril of a charge of murder. If the first purpose of medicine, the restoration of 
health, can no longer be achieved, there is still much for a doctor to do, and he 
is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, 
even if the measures he takes may incidentally shorten life.340 
commentators to refer to the administration of pain-relieving drugs as 'indirect euthanasia'; see, for 
example, P. MacKinnon, 'Euthanasia and Homicide' (1983-4) 26 Crim.L.Q. 483. 
337 (Unreported) (1957). See Palmer. The Judge in this case, Justice Devlin, as he then was, subsequently 
wrote a book about this trial; P. Devlin, Easing the Passing (1985). 
338 Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 289. 
339 The issue of administration of pain-relieving drugs has been raised in a number of later cases, see for 
example, R v Lodwig and R v Cox, discussed below, 170-171. 
340 For a transcript of the instructions to the jury see Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 
289. 
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Justice Devlin stressed that this was not because there is any special defence for doctors, but simply 
the result of interpreting cause of death in a 'common sense' way. His Honour said that if a patient's 
death is hastened by the administration of medical treatment, no people of common sense would say 
that the doctor caused her death: 
They would say that the cause of death was the illness or the injury or 
whatever it was which brought her into hospital, and the proper medical 
treatment that is administered and has an incidental effect of determining the 
exact moment of death, or may have, is not the cause of death in any sensible 
use of that term. 341 
Whilst the interpretation of this direction to the jury is not without difficulty,342 the clearest 
interpretation is that it rests on the legal doctrine of causation.343 There are, however, limits on the 
scope of the principle expounded by Justice Devlin .. It is only envisaged to apply in circumstances 
where the patient is beyond recovery344 and where the treatment administered is in accordance with 
proper medical practice.345 Within these limits, the decision has been widely cited as authority for the 
proposition that doctors may administer necessary pain-relieving drugs which incidentally shorten life 
without fear of prosecution.346 
Although the practical effect of the decision has received considerable support, Devlin's legal basis for 
arriving at that decision has attracted criticism.347 Williams, in particular, has criticised the causation 
analysis on the grounds that it conceals rather than reveals the valuation that is being made.348 He 
points out that if a terminally ill patient dies from respiratory failure or pneumonia as a result of the 
administration of morphine, medically speaking, the death would not be caused by the underlying 
341 lbid. 
342 For example, Smith and Hogan, 277; Beynon, 18; Kennedy and Grubb, Medical Law (1989) 937-939. 
343 Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 289; Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 385; 
Caswell, 135. That this was in fact what Justice Devlin meant was clarified some years later when, in 
the course of a lecture, he stated that 'proper medical treatment consequent upon illness or injury plays 
no part in legal causation; and to relieve the pains of death is undoubtedly proper medical treatment.' 
See P. Devlin, Samples of Law Making (1962) 95. 
344 The Adams case may, therefore, be of limited assistance in determining the criminal liability of a doctor 
in circumstances where life-shortening pain-relieving drugs are administered to a non-terminally ill 
patient. See above, n. 329 for further references. 
345 This is clear from Justice Devlin's reference to what is 'proper and necessary' to relieve pain and to 
'proper medical treatment'. On the basis of this decision, commentators have suggested that the 
principle would not apply where a larger amount of a pain-killing drug is administered than is necessary 
to reduce the pain to reasonable levels or where safer pain relief alternatives exist to the one actually 
chosen; see, for example A. Dix et al, Law for the Medical Profession (1988) 297; Skegg, Law, Ethics 
and Medicine, 139. 
346 After the decision in the Adams case, the Daily Telegraph published a statement by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions to the effect that he did not wish to challenge Devlin's direction to the jury and that 
he could only agree with it; see L. Harvard, 'The Influence of the Law on Clinical Decisions Affecting 
Life and Death' (1983) 23 Med. Science & Law 157, 161. 
347 Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 289-290; Caswell, 135. Other commentators 
have, however, supported the decision as sound; e.g. Meyers, Medico Legal Implications of Death and 
Dying, 128. 
348 The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 289-290. 
167 
disease but by the morphine and he expresses some difficulty with the view that for legal purposes, 
the causation is precisely the opposite.349 
An Alternative Analysis: The Common Law Doctrine of Necessity 
Williams argues that the common law doctrine of necessity provides a better explanation for 
exempting the doctor from criminal liability.350 In his view, the doctrine of necessity refers to a 
choice between competing values in circumstances where the ordinary rule has to be departed from in 
order to avert some greater evil. He points out that in the context of use of pain-relieving drugs, there 
are situations where the doctor is faced with the choice of administering what is likely to be a fatal 
dose if the patient's pain is to be relieved, or leaving the patient without adequate relief. Williams 
argues that the doctor's actions in administering the fatal dose must be excused on the basis of the 
defence of necessity, since there is no way of relieving the pain without ending life. 35 l 
The approach suggested by Williams has considerable merit It avoids the manipulation of the doctrine 
of causation in order to escape the conclusion that since the doctor had foreseen that death would result 
from the administration of pain-relieving drugs, he or she should be legally responsible for his or her 
conduct It is far preferable to deal with the issue directly and, if necessary, creating a new defence, 
rather than to distort existing legal principles to accommodate a desired outcome. Furthermore, since 
the defence of necessity is only envisaged as an exceptional departure from the normal rule, it 
preserves intact accepted criminal law principles regarding the mens rea and actus reus for murder. 
Although conceptually sound and receiving support from some eminentjurists,352 the doctrine of 
necessity has not, todate, been invoked by the courts to justify the administration of pain-relieving 
drugs which incidentally hasten death and there is case-law, particularly in the United Kingdom, which 
suggests that the defence of necessity is not available as a defence to murder. 353 
R v Adams and the Doctrine of 'Double Effect' 
It has been suggested by some commentators that the effect of the Adams case has been to incorporate 
into English law the doctrine of 'double effect•.354 This doctrine, stemming from Catholic moral 
349 Id. 290. See also Devettere, 269-273 where he critically analyses the Statement of the Council of 
Judicial and Ethical Affairs of the American Medical Associatj.on, Withholding or Withdrawing Life-
Prolonging Medical Treatment March (1986) which, he argues, is based on the underlying assumption 
that alleviations of pain are not a cause of death. 
350 Id. 286, 290. He suggests, however, that the 'commo~ sense' doctrine of causation would help where the 
death of the patient is caused by a combination of the disease and the drug; 290. 
351 Id. 288. Other commentators are less confident that this analysis can provide clear guidance; e.g. 
Caswell, 136-137 where he expresses the concern that the whilst the availability of the defence of 
necessity may help deal with isolated cases it does not provide clear guidance to doctors. 
352 Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 284, 286-8, 290; G. Moore, 'The Common Law 
Doctrine of Necessity' in Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility, Decisions About Life and 
Death (1965) 49, 50. 
353 R v Dudley (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273; R v Howe (1987) 85 Crim. App. R. 32, 39-41. Compare with the 
emerging position in Australia where there appears to be greater willingness to allow the defence of 
necessity in cases of murder; see Howard's Criminal Law (5th ed., 1990 by B. Fisse) 557-558. 
354 See I. Kennedy, Treat Me Right (1988) 325; Kennedy and Grubb, 938 for discussion of this possibility. 
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theology,355 is essentially based on a distinction between results which are intended and those which_ 
are merely foreseen as a non-intended consequence of one's action.356 Under this principle, it may 
sometime be morally legitimate to act while foreseeing, but not intending, an undesirable result of 
one's action, but it is never morally legitimate to act with the intention of producing that result. 357 
Thus, a doctor can legitimately administer pain-relieving drugs which hasten death if his or her 
primary aim is to relieve the patient's suffering though foreseeing that this may indirectly hasten the 
death of the patient. However, a doctor may never deliberately give a patient an overdose with the 
intention of killing him or her. 
One possible interpretation of Justice Devlin's direction to the jury in the Adams case is that in 
circumstances involving administration of pain-relieving drugs, a doctor will not be criminally liable 
unless he or she actually intended to bring about the death.358 However, the difficulty with this 
interpretation is that it is inconsistent with strict criminal law principles. As Williams observes: 
There is no legal difference between desiring or intending a consequence as 
following from your conduct, and persisting in your conduct with the 
knowledge that the consequence will inevitably follow from it, though not 
desiring that consequence. When a result is foreseen as certain it is the same 
as if it were desired or intended.359 
Although the doctrine of double effect is sometimes invoked to justify the administration of pain-
relieving drugs which incidentally hasten death,360 the reality of the matter is that the distinction 
between intending and merely knowing that death will probably result from one's acts is a distinction 
that has never made a difference to the criminal law.361 According to well established principles, 
provided the defendant subjectively knew that the administration of drugs would be life-threatening, 
criminal liability for homicide can theoretically be established even though the doctor's primary 
intention was to relieve the patient's suffering. 
The Law in the United Kingdom in the Light of the Adams Case 
Whilst the analytical basis of the Adams case may be open to interpretation, it does appear to have 
become authority, at least in the United Kingdom, for the following proposition; a doctor may 
lawfully administer to a patient in extremis pain-killing drugs in such quantities to relieve the 
355 For a contemporary statement of the position of the Catholic Church see Pope Pious XII, 'Religious and 
Moral Aspects of Pain Prevention in Medical Practice' (1957) 88 /r. Ecclesiastical. Ree. 193, 193-209. 
356 For discussion of the principle of double effect see G. Kelly, Medico-Moral Problems (1958) 12-16; S. 
Uniacke, 'The Doctrine of Double Effect' (1984) 48 The Thomist 188. For a critical analysis of the 
principle of double effect see H. Kuhse, The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine (1987) 83-165. 
357 S. Potts, 'Looking for the Exit Door: Killing and Caring in Modem Medicine' (1988) 25 Hous.L.Rev. 
493. In order for the principle of double effect to apply, certain conditions must be fulfilled; 1) the 
action, considered by itself and independently of its effects, must not be morally evil; 2) the evil effect 
must not be the means of producing the good effect; 3) the evil effect is sincerely not intended, but 
merely tolerated; 4) there must be a proportionate reason for performing the action, in spite of its evil 
consequences. See Kelly, 13-14. 
358 Kennedy and Grubb, 938. 
359 Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 286. See also Kennedy and Grubb, 938. 
360 For example, B.M.A. Working Party Report, Euthanasia, 40; B. Lo, 'Euthanasia - The Continuing 
Debate' (1988) 149 Western J.Med. 211. 
361 R v Crabbe (1985) 58 A.L.R. 417; R v Moloney [1985) A.C. 905; R v Nedrick [1986] 3 All E.R. 1025. 
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patient's suffering, even though the doctor knows that the patient is likely to die as a result, subject, 
however, to the proviso that those drugs are administered for the purpose of pain relief and not to kill 
the patient. Leaving aside for the moment policy considerations which clearly favour doctors being 
able to administer appropriate pain relief, it is readily apparent that the Adams case represents quite a 
remarkable exception to existing criminal law principles. It is well established that motive or desire is 
not normally relevant to preclude the imposition of criminal liability for conduct which causes death, 
in circumstances where those consequences were intended or at least foreseen. Given the significance 
of this departure from criminal law principles, it is, perhaps, surprising that there has not been a 
clearer statement of the basis of the exception. Indeed, a number of commentators have questioned the 
authority of the Adams case and have suggested that there may still be some uncertainty about the law 
as it concerns the use of pain-killing drugs which incidentally shorten life.362 
There have been a number of cases decided in the United Kingdom since the Adams case, dealing with 
defective newborns, which tend to support the view that doctors may lawfully administer pain-
relieving drugs which have the effect of hastening the patient's death. The first of the these cases was 
R v Arthur363 involving the prosecution of Dr Leonard Arthur, for the attempted murder of a Down's 
syndrome child, by withholding food and administering a narcotic analgesic. On the evidence, there 
was some dispute whether the drug was administered for the purpose of relieving pain or as an appetite 
suppressant. Farquharson J. stated that the administration of a drug by a doctor when it is necessary to 
relieve pain is a proper medical practice even when the doctor knows that the drugs will cause the 
patient's death.364 A more recent decision along similar lines was reached in In re C (A Minor) 
(Wardship: Medical Treatment) arising in the court's wardship jurisdiction.365 The baby in this case 
was born prematurely suffering from hydrocephalus, with severe brain damage and physical disability. 
For reasons unconnected with the child's medical condition she had been made a ward of the court and 
the matter came before the court by way of application regarding the future medical treatment of the 
baby. The court accepted medical opinion that the child's condition was hopeless and held, having 
regard to the best interests of the child, that it was entitled to approve recommendations designed to 
ease the baby's suffering rather than to prolong her life.366 The English Court of Appeal 
subsequently confirmed this approach.367 This approach has continued in the case of In re J 
(Wardship: Medical TreatmentJ368 also arising in the court's wardship jurisdiction. The baby in this 
case was profoundly handicapped but not terminally ill and the question at issue was whether the court 
362 For example, Lord Edmund Davies, 'On Dying and Dying Well: Legal Aspects' (1977) 70 Proc. Royal 
Soc.Med. 71, 74; Trowell, 35-36; Caswell, 137. 
363 (Unreported) (1981) (discussed by M. Gunn and J.C. Smith, 'Arthur's Case and the Right to Life of a 
Down's Syndrome Child' (1985) Crim.L.Rev. 705.) 
364 Transcript, 19 as cited in Gunn and Smith. 
365 [1989) 3 W.L.R. 240. 
366 (Unreported) 14 April 1989 per Ward J. 
367 [1989) 3 W.L.R. 240. Some concern had arisen concerning the wording of the trial judge's original 
order which was to the effect that the baby should be 'treated to die' and contained specific details 
regarding medical treatment. The controversial wording had been amended by the judge by the time the 
matter came before the Court of Appeal and the court upheld the trial judge's decision except in so far as 
it sought to give specific instructions about medical treatment. 
368 [1991) 2 W.L.R. 140 
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could sanction the withholding of future resuscitation by mechanical ventilation. Lord Donaldson 
M.R, who delivered the principal judgment for the court, expressed the following view: 
What doctors and the court have to decide is whether, in the best interests 
of the child patient, a particular decision as to medical treatment should 
be taken which as a side effect will render death more or less likely. This 
is not a matter of semantics. It is fundamental. At the other end of the 
age spectrum, the use of drugs to reduce pain will often be fully justified, 
notwithstanding that this will hasten the moment of death. What can 
never be justified is the use of drugs or surgical procedures with the 
primary purpose of doing so.369 
Although these comments were made in a civil case concerning the medical treatment of a minor, they 
are potentially of wider relevance and appear to endorse the use of pain-relieving drugs which may 
incidentally hasten death on the basis of the doctrine of double effect. 
Notwithstanding these cases, the present immunity of doctors from prosecution for the practice of 
administration of pain-relieving drugs which may hasten death rests on the somewhat tenuous 
authority of the Adams case and the compliance of prosecuting authorities with this state of affairs. A 
number of recent prosecutions of doctors in England has shown that the legal position of doctors in 
administering pain-relieving ~gs is far from certain.370 In 1990, Dr Thomas Lodwig had been 
charged with the murder of a 48 year old male patient who was in the terminal stages of cancer. The 
patient had been receiving heroin in increasing dosages for the purposes of pain relief. However, in the 
days preceding his death, this regimen was no longer effective and the patient was suffering severe and 
uncontrollable pain. In an attempt to relieve the patient's distress, Dr Lodwig gave the patient a 
mixture of potassium chloride ~d lignocaine. The patient died a few minutes later. Potassium 
chloride is known to be lethal, but there was some evidence to suggest that when used in combination 
with pain-killers, it could accelerate their pain-killing effect.371 Dr Lodwig was committed for trial 
but when the matter came before the court the prosecution offered no evidence against him and the 
judge directed that a verdict of not guilty be entered.372 Although the prosecution of Dr Lodwig -was 
eventually dropped, the case has certainly highlighted the legal vulnerability of doctors in these 
circumstances. 373 
The issue of pain-relieving drugs was also raised in the recent prosecution against Dr Cox referred to 
earlier.374 Dr Cox had administered a large and undiluted dose of potassium chloride to his patient, (a 
369 Id. 149. (Emphasis in the original.) 
370 R v Lodwig (unreported) (1990) The Times 16 March 1990. For discussion see D. Brahams, 'The 
Reluctant Survivor' (1990) 140 New L.J. 586, 587. 
371 Two eminent doctors from St. Bartholomew's Hospital, where Dr Lodwig had completed his training, 
had been involved in research regarding the use of potassium chloride with pain-killers to accelerate 
their analgesic effect and reported encouraging results from their clinical trials; The Times 16 March 
1990. 
372 The principle reason that the prosecution was dropped was because of uncertainty regarding the cause of 
death; The Times 16 March 1990. 
373 Recent prosecutions for manslaughter brought against doctors in the United Kingdom based upon 
criminal negligence is further evidence that doctors are not immune from liability; G. Korgaonkar and 
D. Tribe, 'Medical Manslaughter' (1992) 136 Sol.J. 105. 
374 See above, 126-127. 
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drug which has no pain-killing properties) from which the patient died within minutes. Cox had 
argued that his primary intention in administering the drug was not to kill the patient but to relieve 
her suffering. However, this was rejected by the court and the jury's verdict of guilty was premised on 
the assumption that he had intended to kill the patient, albeit for merciful motives. 
The Position in Australia and Other Jurisdictions 
The situation in Australia is even less clear, since there are no Australian authorities expressly dealing 
with this issue.375 In practice, however, no prosecutions have arisen, notwithstanding that doctors are 
frequently taking steps to ease their patient's pain which incidentally shorten life.376 If the matter 
were to come before the Australian courts, the Adams case would be merely persuasive authority. 
Nevertheless, the courts would probably be inclined to take the view that the Adams case also 
represents the position in Australia, particularly in light of the eminence of the judge and the fact that 
the law as set down in that case has been widely accepted as an ethical statement.377 
There may, however, be some difficulty in adopting the Adams decision in the Australian Code 
jurisdictions which have a provision which unequivocally states that a person who is responsible for 
hastening the death of another is deemed to have killed that person.378 Concern about the legal 
position in Western Australia (one of the Code jurisdictions) led the Western Australia Law Reform 
Commission to recommend that legislation be introduced protecting doctors from liability for 
administering drugs or other treatment for the purpose of controlling pain, even though the drugs or 
other treatment may incidentally shorten the patient's life, provided that the consent of the patient is 
obtained and that the administration of the drug or treatment is reasonable in all the circumstances.379 
In Queensland, the Criminal Code Review Committee has also recommended that the Queensland 
Code contain a provision specifically providing that the administration of reasonable palliative care 
will not attract criminal liability, even if it cuts short the patient's life.380 This recommendation was 
based on the recommendations of the Law Reform Commission of Canada. 381 There has, todate, been 
no legislative implementation of these recommendations. 
As an alternative to the Adams case, a possibility which may be explored in the future is the 
exception referred to in R v Crabbe.382 Although only obiter, it was suggested in ajointjudgment of 
375 One possible interpretation of the case of R v Lim (unreported) 25 Jan 1989, P.S. W.A. (see above, n. 
64) is that the morphine which had allegedly caused the patient's death was administered for the 
purposes of pain relief. However, the evidence was very much conflicting and the court did not 
specifically address itself to the question of the doctor's legal liability in these circumstances. 
376 See above, 122. 
377 See also Professor D. Lanham, the Age 4 March 1992 (letter). 
378 Qld. s. 296; Tas. s. 154(d); W.A. s. 273. (There is no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory 
Criminal Code). In the Tasmanian Criminal Code there is a provision which specifically saves common 
law defences except in so far as they are altered by or inconsistent with the Code; sees. 8. 
379 Medical Treatment for the Dying (1991) 25-27. . 
380 Queensland Criminal Code Review Committee Interim Report First Interim Report of the Criminal Code 
Review Committee (1991) clause 69. 
381 Report No. 20, Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and the Cessation of Treatment (1983) 22-23 and restated in 
the later report, Report No. 30, Recodifying Criminal Law (1987) 185-186. 
382 (1985) 58 A.L.R. 417. 
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the High Court that not every fatal act done with the knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm 
will probably result is murder.383 The court went on to say that the act may be lawful, that is, 
justified or excused by law, and gave the example of a surgeon who performs a hazardous but 
necessary operation, in circumstances where he or she could foresee that the patient's death was 
probable.384 After raising this possibility the court stated that this question need not be discussed in 
the present case, but did, with apparent approval, refer to academic writers who have pointed out that 
in deciding whether an act is justifiable its social purpose or social utility is important.385 In light of 
the comments in this case it is possible, at least for the purposes of the Australian common law 
jurisdictions, that the courts would accommodate the practice of doctors administering pain-relieving 
drugs which may incidentally hasten the patient's death within this concept of a socially justifiable 
risk.386 However, there is admittedly a significant difference between the taking of a risk for the 
purpose of saving life (e.g. performing a hazardous operation) and a situation where a doctor causes 
the patient's death in an attempt to relieve pain.387 With the exception of the Northern Territory,388 
there is no corresponding concept of lawful justification under the Criminal Codes in Australia. South 
Australia is the only Australian jurisdiction which presently has legislation offering some tangible 
protection to doctors from liability for the death of a patient following the administration of pain-
relieving drugs, in circumstances where the drugs are administered with the consent of the patient. 
Section 8(1)(b) of the Consent to Medical and Dental Procedures Act 1985 (S.A.) provides that no 
criminal or civil liability shall be incurred in respect of the carrying out of a medical or dental 
procedure389 on a person with his or her consent if the procedure is reasonably appropriate in the 
circumstances having regard to the prevailing medical or dental standards and is carried out in good 
faith and without negligence.390 
Although no American cases have specified the drug exception to homicide, the practice of 
administering drugs to relieve pain, even if it hastens death, is generally accepted as legal in the 
United States, despite the fact that it might technically be regarded as homicide.391 Cantor writes: 
383 Id. 470. 
384 Ibid. 
385 Ibid. 
There is a tacit understanding that prosecution would never be undertaken, 
even if causal connection between the analgesic and death could be established. 
386 See also Riordan, 66. 
387 Ibid., where reference is made to the controversy .as to whether the deliberate taking of life is ever 
justified. 
388 Section 31(2) of the Criminal Code 1983 (N.T.) provides that there will be no liability where the 
accused did not intend to cause death, if a reasonable person, similarly circumstanced, would have 
proceeded with the conduct. 
389 'Medical procedure' is defined in s. 4 to mean any procedure carried out by, or pursuant to directions 
given by, a medical practitioner in the course of practice as a medical practitioner. 
390 See also the recommendations made by the South Australian Select Committee of the House of 
Assembly on the Law and Practice Relating to Death and Dying, Second Interim Report of the Select 
Committee of the House of Assembly on the Law and Practice Relating to Death and Dying (1992) 8-9, 
discussed in chapter vn at? 
391 S. Akers, 'The Living Will: Already A Practical Alternative' (1976-77) 55 Tex.LRev. 665, 671; the 
President's Commission Report, 78-82; Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 35. 
[M]edical practice has won de facto legal acceptance because of widespread 
acknowledgment of its humane grounding.392 
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Similarly in Canada, no cases have come before the courts393 and although the position remains 
uncertain, 394 it is generally assumed that doctors would escape liability in these circumstances. 
A Critique of the Present Law 
It should be stressed from the outset, that there can be no real dispute about the social desirability of 
the practice of administering pain-killing drugs and the recognised need for doctors to be able to 
provide patients with adequate pain relief. Thus, the following critique of the present legal position is 
not in any way aimed at changing current medical practice. Rather, the object is to demonstrate that 
the assumptions regarding the legality of this practice are irreconcilable with established criminal law 
principles and that the law is clearly being manipulated in order to sanction what is widely regarded as 
legitimate medical practice. 
Resort to Le~al Fictions 
Whichever analysis of the Adams case is adopted, (i.e. based on either the causation arguments or the 
principle of double effect,) the case is completely contrary to established legal authority. As Justice 
Devlin himself acknowledged,395 under ordinary criminal law principles the hastening of an 
inevitable death is murder. Whilst there may well be practical difficulties in establishing causation in 
cases where a patient has died following the administration of pain-killing drugs, it is simply legal 
sophistry to say that this is never the relevant cause of death in law. Similarly, with regard to the 
double effect doctrine, the distinction between intending to kill and merely foreseeing that death will 
probably result from one's acts has never been ~elevant for the purpose of establishing criminal 
liability. The reality is that on accepted prindples of causation and intention, a doctor who 
administers pain-relieving drugs which he or she knows will probably hasten the patient's death, does, 
in a legal sense intend the death of the patient and has in fact caused that death. The fact that the 
doctor's motive was to relieve the patient's pain, or that the patient had consented to the treatment, 
would not protect a doctor from criminal liability. 
Thus, there is clearly a wide gulf between strict criminal principles and the law as presently interpreted 
with respect to the administration of pain-killing drugs; although strictly speaking, the practice 
constitutes murder, the law has acknowledged and acquiesced in the practice.396 It is interesting to 
392 Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 35. 
393 See Caswell, 139 where he notes that one doctor had been charged with first-degree murder in such a 
case, but the case was never tried because the doctor left Canada and the Canadian government could not 
obtain the doctor's extradition. See also B. Sneide(r)man, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Model for 
Canada?' (1992) 8 Humane Med. 104, 113 where he notes that a Vancouver physician, who had 
administered a fatal dose of morphine to two patients who had been 'near death' was not prosecuted. 
394 Caswell, 137 and note also the findings and recommendations of the Canadian Law Reform 
Commission, see above, n. 381. The position appears to be the same in New Zealand. 
395 Palmer, 375 where he cites Justice Devlin's summing up to the jury; 'It did not matter whether Mrs 
Morrell's death was inevitable and that her days were qumbered. If her life were cut short by weeks or 
months it was just as much murder as if it were cut short by years.' 
396 Cantor, Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, 35. 
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observe how the courts have almost surreptitiously manipulated the law to accommodate this practice, 
without clearly and unequivocally stating an exception to established criminal law principles. Indeed, 
one detects a distinct reluctance to openly deal with the matter and provide an appropriate defence in 
respect of this practice. 397 This is, perhaps, understandable, in that the courts do not want to be seen 
creating special defences for doctors or to be sanctioning what may be regarded by some as medical 
euthanasia. Nevertheless, these considerations do not justify the use of illogical legal fictions. It is 
simply not valid to reinterpret or gloss over established principles in order to produce a desired result. 
The real danger is that manipulation or distortion of established legal principles tends to undermine 
the credibility of the law and threatens to bring it into disrepute. 
l Jnworkable Distinctions 
The other major criticism of the prevailing legal position is that it involves very fine, and arguably 
unworkable, distinctions. On the authority of the Adams case, there is a distinction between the 
administration of drugs for pain relief and which are known to be likely to hasten the death of the 
patient, and the administration of a lethal dose intended to kill the patient; the former is lawful, 
whereas the latter constitutes the crime of murder. Indeed, the terminology used is in itself significant; 
the incidental 'shortening of life' or 'hastening of death' is often used in contradistinction to 'killing' 
the patient, thereby concealing the reality that the administration of drugs for pain relief may equally 
kill a patient. 
Although the distinction between killing and merely hastening death in the process of relieving the 
patient's pain has gained considerable currency, the dividing line can be impossibly fine. Ultimately it 
seems to depend on what was in the mind of the doctor when he or she administered the drugs in 
question - was it to relieve the patient's pain or to kill the patient? Whilst this may, in many 
instances, be a fairly straightforward proposition, circumstances can be envisaged which tend to blur 
the distinction. For example, what if it is necessary to kill the patient in order to relieve his or her 
pain? It might be suggested that in these circumstances the doctor's primary intention is to relieve the 
patient's pain and the hastening of death is simply an incidental consequence. Realistically, however, 
it is more likely that the doctor's intention in these circumstances is to kill both the pain and the 
patient. 
Furthermore, if administering drugs to relieve pain is permissible despite the possibility that it may 
hasten the death of the patient, but administering drugs with the intention of euthanasing a patient is 
not, it is possible that some doctors will perform active euthanasia under the guise of pain relief, and 
there is evidence to suggest that this does in fact occur.398 Thus, as Williams observes, since many 
of the available analgesics have the effect of hastening death, a situation of benevolent hypocrisy 
prevails.399 
397 Skegg, Law, Ethics and Medicine, 78. 
398 Maguire, 37; Johnstone, 263. 
399 G. Williams, 'Euthanasia' (1970) 63 Proceedings for the Royal Society of Medicine 663, 665. 
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Uncertainty in Practice 
Another major criticism of the present legal position is that it is still precariously uncertain, 
particularly in Australia and other jurisdictions where the issue has not directly come before the 
courts. Whilst it is more than likely that the Adams approach would be accepted, this cannot be 
guaranteed. In a climate of uncertainty regarding the legality of administering pain-relieving drugs 
which may hasten death, there is the risk that doctors may be unwilling to provide adequate pain 
relief, thereby forcing patients to endure unnecessary pain and suffering. 400 
It is clearly undesirable that doctors should face the possibility of criminal liability as a result of 
acting humanely to relieve a patient's pain. Some commentators have stressed that, in any event, it is 
unlikely that these practices are discovered, or if discovered, that they can be proved and successfully 
prosecuted.401 This may well be so but it must be wondered whether the present situation is 
satisfactory. Palliative care and adequate pain relief are of such importance that doctors ought to be 
able to confidently administer to the needs of their patients without raising the spectre of criminal 
liability. It would be far preferable if there were a clearer statement of the legal exception which 
protects doctors from liability in circumstances where drugs are administered for the purpose of pain 
relief, but which may have the effect of hastening the death of the patient.402 
Copclusjon 
The object of this chapter has been to highlight the serious discrepancies which exist between the 
strict legal position and the position in practice with regard to active voluntary euthanasia and where 
relevant, assisted suicide, in order to demonstrate the inadequacies of the present law and the need for 
re-evaluation of the law's approach to these issues. It has been shown that notwithstanding the 
criminal law prohibition of active voluntary euthanasia as murder, there is significant evidence to 
indicate that this practice does occur. However, the likelihood of a doctor being prosecuted and 
convicted of the murder of a patient is fairly remote. The same holds true for doctor-assisted suicide; 
although there is incontrovertible evidence that this practice occurs there are virtually no prosecutions. 
Analysis of cases of mercy killing outside of the medical context reveals that these cases are generally 
dealt with extremely leniently in the criminal justice system and there is every indication that a doctor 
who is prosecuted for having performed active euthanasia at a patient's request or for having assisted 
the suicide of a patient would also be dealt with sympathetically. 
400 See also Caswell, 138; Law Reform Commission of Western Australian Report, 25-26. 
401 See, for example, Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility, On Dying Well, 58. In 
circumstances where the patient is suffering from a terminal condition and is in a debilitated state it will 
often be difficult to establish that the patient died from the drugs rather than the underlying illness. 
Difficulties are compounded in circumstances where the patient has become habituated to the use of a 
drug, with the result that increased dosages would have the same effect as a standard dose would have on 
a normal patient. 
402 Examples of suggested legislative statements creating an exception from liability can be found in the 
recommendations of the West Australian Law Reform Commission Report, 26-27 and the Canadian Law 
Reform Commission, see above, 171. 
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It has also been shown that other aspects of medical practice, such as turning off life-support or the 
administration of drugs knowing that they will cause death, which, although on strict legal principles 
attract criminal liability for murder, have been deliberately characterised in such a way as to avoid such 
liability. 
It is, therefore, evident that significant inconsistencies exist between the law in theory and the law in 
practice. In effect, the criminal justice system has acquiesced in the practice of active voluntary 
euthanasia by manipulating and distorting legal principles to avoid the full rigours of the criminal 
law. It has been argued that the present position is most unsatisfactory and threatens to undermine the 
credibility of the law. There is a need for greater honesty and clarity in this area to overcome the 
existing discrepancies and anomalies. It must be acknowledged that active voluntary euthanasia is 
already being performed, albeit surreptitiously, and that there are other medical practices, which, 
although widely accepted, are strictly speaking contrary to established criminal law principles. The 
law appears to condone some medical 'acts' which hasten the death of a patient such as the removal of 
artificial life-support and the administration of drugs for pain relief yet, theoretically at least, 
maintains a strict legal prohibition on the practice of active voluntary euthanasia. Given the obvious 
similarities between these various medical acts in terms of outcome and intention, and arguably, also 
morality, one may well question whether the line between lawful and unlawful conduct has been 
appropriately drawn. Does it really make sense for the law to permit a patient to direct the 
discontinuance of artificial life-support and thereby bring about an earlier death, yet deny the patient 
direct assistance in the form of a lethal dose? Arguably not, and there are strong arguments to suggest 
that established criminal law principles with regard to homicide are simply inappropriate in the 
contemporary context of medically administered active voluntary euthanasia. The fact that doctors are 
unlikely to be exposed to liability, or if exposed, will almost certainly be dealt with leniently, is not 
an adequate response. It is quite unacceptable that doctors who feel compelled to respond to a patient's 
request for active euthanasia presently run the risk of serious criminal liability. If society has reached 
the stage where such medical conduct is regarded as acceptable and not deserving of punishment, this 
should be more directly reflected in our laws rather than doctors and those involved in the 
administration of the criminal justice system having to rely on subterfuge and questionable techniques 
of liability avoidance. 
Consideration also needs to be given to the rights and interests of patients. So long as active 
voluntary euthanasia remains an illegal and covert practice, its administration will inevitably be 
inconsistent, and it will not equally be available to all who seek it There is also the very real concern 
that whilst the practice of active voluntary euthanasia exists but remains unregulated, patients' rights 
and interests are not adequately protected. 
Since the law already permits certain acts which cause death in connection with implementing the 
withdrawal of life-support and in administering pain-relieving drugs, it is, in fact, only a small step to 
say that, in some limited circumstances, active voluntary euthanasia should also be allowed. In light 
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of the available evidence that death-inducing acts are already taking place, it would be preferable to 
formalise current practices, in order to regulate and protect against abuse and to overcome discrepancies 
between legal theory and practice. The present connivance and hypocrisy of the law is no credit to the 
legal profession and certainly leaves doctors in an untenable position. There is a strong case for the 
law to directly confront the question of active voluntary euthanasia, for instilling greater clarity and 
certainty in this area, and to provide appropriate protection for doctors, who act bona fide in their 
patients' best interests. However, the question of reform is not just a legal issue, and there are 
obviously a whole host of considerations to be taken into account in determining whether the law 
should be changed so as to allow doctors to perform active euthanasia at the request of a patient. It is 
to this issue that attention will tum in the following chapter dealing with the euthanasia debate. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE 
Introductjon 
The object of this chapter is to review and critically analyse the 'euthanasia debate' .1 The debate 
regarding the practice and legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia has existed for many years2 and 
there is already a wealth of literature on this subject from a variety of disciplines, including law, 
medicine, theology, and philosophy. Consequently, this chapter is primarily in the form of a literature 
review to consider the principal arguments that have been advanced both for and against the 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. Although many of the issues are legal in nature, this 
chapter necessarily involves consideration also of non-legal arguments. An attempt will be made to 
critically analyse the competing arguments and arrive at some conclusion as to whether active 
voluntary euthanasia should be legalised. It must be emphasised that the principal concern here is 
what the law ought to be rather than the question of the morality of active euthanasia apart from the 
law. For the purposes of this analysis, the issue of active voluntary euthanasia will be considered in 
general terms only, without reference to any particular proposal for legalisation, leaving for later 
consideration how legalisation could be most appropriately effected. 3 
It must be recognised from the outset that the debate about active voluntary euthanasia is in many 
respects indeterminable and intractable. Euthanasia is a controversial subject which inevitably 
provokes intense emotional debate and gives rise to strong convictions which do not readily lend 
themselves to consensus. Where such conflicts of values exist, with seemingly little middle ground, it 
is unlikely that a resolution can be reached which will meet with universal approval. Indeed, in a 
society with a plurality of widely differing yet moral views and convictions, one cannot expect 
unanimity on this issue. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in this area, there is a pressing need for the issue of active voluntary 
euthanasia to be addressed. Attitudes to death have been changing. What has traditionally been a taboo 




Because of the close relationship between active voluntary euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide much 
of the discussion in this chapter also applies to doctor-assisted suicide. 
For commentators dealing with the historical aspects of the euthanasia debate see G. Gruman, 'An 
Historical Introduction to Ideas About Voluntary Euthanasia' (1973) 4 Omega 87; J. Behnke and S. 
Bok, Dilemmas of Euthanasia (1975) 28-44; R. Weir, Abating Treatment with Critically Ill Patients 
(1989) 220; I. van der Sluis, 'The Movement for Euthanasia, 1875-1975' (1979) 66 Janus 131. See also 
the Introduction to this thesis, 1. 
See chapter IX. 
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emerging. The medicalisation of terminal care and increasing attention to patient rights generally, 
have also encouraged greater interest in the euthanasia debate. Public opinion appears to be 
increasingly in favour of permitting active euthanasia in carefully regulated circumstances, and the 
campaign for reform of the law is gathering momentum.4 Now, more than ever, there is a need to 
dispassionately examine the euthanasia debate and determine whether active voluntary euthanasia 
should be legalised. 
This chapter is divided into three parts: part I dealing with the case for legalising active voluntary 
euthanasia, part II dealing with the case against legalisation, and part III examining the legal 
philosopher's debate; the role of the criminal law. 
PART I 
The Case For Legalisation of Actjye Voluntary Euthanasia 
There have, over the years, been many proponents of active euthanasia, who have campaigned for its 
legalisation including eminent figures such as Williams5 and Fletcher. 6 Whilst all euthanasia 
proponents are in favour of the legalisation of active euthanasia, a difference of opinion exists as to 
whether it should be strictly limited to voluntary euthanasia, or whether, in some circumstances non-
voluntary (as distinct from i~voluntary) euthanasia should also be permitted.7 Consistent with the 
object of this thesis, the arguments considered in this chapter will only be dealing with active 
voluntary euthanasia 
Self-Determination: An Argument from Liberty 
The main argument in support of the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia is based on the 






See chapters VI and VII. 
See, for example, G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (1958); G. Williams, 
'Euthanasia' (1973) 41 Medico-Legal J. 14. 
See, for example, J. Fletcher Morals and Medicine (1979) 172-210, J. Fletcher, 'Ethics and Euthanasia' 
(1973) 73 Am.I. Nursing 670. Other notable commentators who have contributed to the debate in 
favour of active euthanasia include M. Kohl, (ed.) Beneficent Euthanasia (1975); A. Morris, 'Voluntary 
Euthanasia' (1970) 45 Wash.L.Rev. 239; A. Levishon, 'Voluntary Mercy Deaths' (1961) 8 J. Forensic 
Med. 51. 
For example, Kohl; Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 310-312; R. Young, 
'Voluntary and Non-Voluntary Euthanasia' (1976) 59 The Monist 264; J. Rachels, The End of Life 
(1986); P. Singer, Practical Ethics (1979) 127-157. See the Introduction to this thesis, 6 for definition 
of these terms. 
H. Leenen, 'The Right to Health Care and the Right of Self-Determination' (1982) 7 Jus Medicum 1; 
G.P. Smith, 'All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely 
Enlightened Self-Determination?' (1989) 22 U.Calif., Davis 275; J. Arras, 'The Right to Die on the 
Slippery Slope' (1982) 8 Social Theory & Practice 285, 293-294. Other commentators have, however, 
taken the view that the right to self-determination does not extend to allowing an individual to choose 
to be killed; e.g. D. Callahan, 'Can We Return Death to Disease?' (1989) 19 Hastings Center R. 4, 5; D. 
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value and is worthy of respect, is the bearer of basic rights and freedoms, and is the final determiner of 
his or her destiny.9 Proponents argue that an individual who has decision-making capacity, has the 
right to control his or her own body and should be able to determine how and when he or she will die 
as long as this does not interfere with the rights of others. It is this human self-determination, the 
capacity of individuals to choose and pursue their particular life-plan, which is said to give persons 
their special moral status10 and is an essential component of the dignity that attaches to rational 
personhood.11 
A further dimension of the principle of autonomy or self-determination is that its exercise should not 
interfere with the rights of others. Proponents argue that maintenance of the present legal prohibition 
on active voluntary euthanasia is an unjustifiable infringement on the liberty of those persons who 
would choose to be killed.1 2 They argue that in order to uphold the patient's interest in self-
determination, doctors should be free to act upon the request of an informed and mentally capable 
patient for active voluntary euthanasia without fear of criminal liability. 
If the principle of self-determination is accepted as the appropriate foundation for the legalisation of 
active voluntary euthanasia there would be no need to objectively examine quality of life 
considerations - indeed, it would be quiet inappropriate to do so.13 Any attempt to impose a 
qualitative assessment of the patient's life as a basis for active euthanasia would be a violation of the 
requirement of justice14 and would be completely contrary to the principle of patient autonomy. 
Different patients will inevitably have different goals and values which can best be respected by giving 
effect to the patient's interest in self-determination and allowing the patient to. make decisions based 
on his or her own quality of life assessment. IS Thus, the sole consideration should be the patient's 
choice, based on the patient's subjective assessment of his or her circumstances whether motivated by 
a fear of pain, suffering, dependency or whatever. 
Further, it must be understood that strict adherence to the notion of self-determination necessarily 
dispels any reliance upon utilitarian principles as a basis for active euthanasia. The arguments of some 
proponents for the legalisation of active euthanasia rest on a form of utilitarian humanism which 
9 
Shewmon, 'Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Needless Pandora's Box' (1987) 3 Issues Law & Med. 219, 
221. 
R. Gula, 'Moral Principles Shaping Public Policy on Euthanasia' (1990) 14 Second Opinion 73, 78. 
10 J. Rawls, 'Rational and Full Autonomy' (1980) 77 J. Phil. 524; H. Kuhse, 'Active and Passive 
Euthanasia - Ten Years into the Debate' (1986) 1 Euthanasia Rev. 108, 115; D. Richards, 
'Constitutional Privacy, the Right to Die and the Meaning of Life' (1981) 22 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 327, 
412-414. 
11 A. Dyck, 'An Alternative to the Ethics of Euthanasia' in R. Weir, (ed.) Ethical Issues in Death and 
Dying (1977) 281, 285. 
12 Euthanasia Society, A Plan for Voluntary Euthanasia (1962) 5-9. 
13 An analogy can be drawn here with developments in relation to passive euthanasia; it is now widely 
recognised that it is inappropriate for the patient's right to refuse treatment to depend upon an 
objective assessment of the quality of the patient's life. See chapter II, 54-57. 
14 G. Grisez and J.M. Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice (1979) 214-250. 
15 H. Kuhse, 'Taking Patient's Rights and Interests Seriously', submission to the Victorian Social 
Development Committee Inquiry into Options for Dying With Dignity (1986). This proposition is 
well accepted in the context of the common law right to refuse treatment. 
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demands the decriminalisation of certain acts of euthanasia and suicide.16 On pure utilitarian 
principles, active euthanasia would be justified in circumstances where the patient, and persons 
involved in the care of the patient, are suffering a balance of pairi over pleasure and where the killing 
of the patient would, on utilitarian calculations, produce the greatest good for the greatest number. 
However, this reveals a fundamental weakness in utilitarian arguments as a basis for strictly voluntary 
euthanasia, in that they apply with equal force to cases of involuntary euthanasia - a practice which 
must be unequivocally deplored. According to utilitarian principles, provided there is a balance of pain 
over pleasure, active euthanasia would be justified if it could maximise benefits overall, regardless of 
whether the patient can or would give consent.17 Thus, the interests of the individual patient are 
subordinated to the interests of the majority. Because of this possible manipulation of utilitarian 
arguments towards non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia, utilitarianism ought to be rejected as a 
moral theory justifying active voluntary euthanasia.18 In contrast, however, the autonomy-based 
principle of self-determination, essentially anti-utili~an in nature, is at no risk of extension to non-
voluntary or involuntary forms of killing and therefore constitutes the only acceptable basis for the 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 
The Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment: Is there a Morally Valid Distinction 
between Passive and Active Euthanasia? 
In support of arguments based on the patient's interest in self-determination, proponents frequently 
draw attention to the inconsistency of the present law which permits a patient to induce an earlier 
death by refusing treatment, yet categorically prohibits a patient from seeking active assistance in 
dying.19 
As outlined in chapter II, the patient's interest in self-determination finds expression in the important 
legal right to bodily integrity. 20 It is now well accepted that a fully informed patient who has 
decision-making capacity, has the right to refuse any life-sustaining medical treatment, 
notwithstanding that death may result. This right is grounded in the importance of respecting a 
patient's autonomy and self-determination in health care decisions, including decisions concerning the 
manner and timing of death. 21 Proponents argue that if the law recognises the patient's autonomy and 
16 See, for example, Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 277-312 and the analysis of 
Williams' argument by Richards, 335-336. See also Young, 279-282. 
17 Richards, 335-401; Rachels, 154-158; S. Brooks, 'Dignity and Cost Effectiveness: A Rejection of the 
Utilitarian Approach to Death' (1984) 19 J.Med. Ethics 148; Y. Kamisar, 'Some Non-Religious Views 
Against Proposed Mercy-Killing Legislation' (1958) 42 Minn.L.Rev. 969, 1014-1041 where he also 
identifies this weakness in Williams' utilitarian arguments. 
18 Richards, 401; Brooks, 148. Some philosophers have attempted to overcome these objections by 
arguing for the acceptance of rule-utilitarianism rather than act-utilitarianism (for discussion see J. 
Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (1967) 604-612) or by substituting calculations 
based on happiness with consideration of interests; see Rachels, 156-158. 
19 H. Kuhse, 'Euthanasia - Again' (1985) 142 M.J.A. 610; P. Nowell-Smith, 'Death by Request as a Right' 
(1987) 2 Euthanasia Rev. 80, 93; S. Wolhandler, 'Voluntary Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill and the 
Constitutional Right to Privacy' (1984) 69 Cornell L.Rev. 363, 369; P .. Small, 'Euthanasia - the 
Individual's Right to Freedom of Choice' (1970) 5 Suffolk U.LRev. 190; R. Richter, 'The Hastings 
Center and Euthanasia' (1988) 3 Euthanasia Rev. 56. 
20 See chapter II, 33-37. 
21 Hastings Center Report, Guidelines on the Tennination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Care of 
the Dying (1987) 128 (hereafter referred to as the Hastings Center Report); President's Commission for 
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self-determination as justification for passive euthanasia, it is logically inconsistent to refuse to 
recognise' the same interests as a justification for active euthanasia.22 This argument, based on the 
inconsistency of the present law, derives significant support from the claim by many philosophers and 
ethicists that there is no morally relevant difference between passive euthanasia - deliberately letting a 
patient die - and active euthanasia- the killing of a patient; both involve the intentional termination of 
life.23 Moreover, it is argued that to deny active assistance to a patient who seeks it, is not only an 
infringement of that person's interest in self-determination, but may also be contrary to the patient's 
'best interests', since the alternative of letting die may be neither swift nor painless.24 Furthermore, 
since not all terminal or incurable patients are dependent on life-sustaining treatment they do not all 
have the option of inducing death by refusing treatment, except perhaps bY, slowly starving and 
dehydrating themselves to death. It could, therefore, be argued that the present law is discriminatory in 
its operation since it does not offer to all patients the same opportunity of inducing an earlier death. 
Whilst many commentators support the view that tpere is no morally relevant difference between 
active and passive euthanasia, others have argued for the retention of the distinction. Some 
commentators have sought to defend the validity of the distinction on moral grounds arguing that 
there is a morally relevant difference between active and passive euthanasia which justifies 
maintenance of the prohibition against active euthanasia or 'killing'. 25 Others have argued that 
irrespective of philosophical arguments, a distinction is discernible in practice in view of the 
willingness of doctors to allow patients to die, contrasted with their intuitive opposition to active 
voluntary euthanasia. 26 This claim can, however, be quickly countered on the basis that it purports to 
treat a value judgment as evidence and, furthermore, suggests that there is unanimity within the 
medical profession on the issue of active euthanasia which is clearly not the case.27 What this alleged 
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research, Deciding to 
Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment (1983) 72. (Cited hereafter as the President's Commission Report.) 
22 For example, H. Kuhse, 'The Case for Active Voluntary Euthanasia' (1986) 14 Law, Med. & Health Care 
145. 
23 There is a growing body of literature on the moral significance of the killing/letting die distinction, 
much of which was spawned by the argument presented by J. Rachels, in his article 'Active and Passive 
Euthanasia' (1975) 292 New Eng.J.Med. 78 which challenged the conventional doctrine that there is an 
important moral difference between killing and letting die. For other commentators in support of the 
moral equivalence view see H. Kuhse, The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine (1987) 123-135; 
Singer, 147-153; Fletcher, 'Ethics and Euthanasia', 675; J. Ladd, 'Positive and Negative Euthanasia' in 
J. Ladd, (ed.) Ethical Issues Relating to Life and Death (1979) 164-186. 
24 Kuhse, 'Active and Passive Euthanasia - Ten Years-into the Debate', 117; Singer, 152-153; M. Battin, 
'The Least Worst Death' (1983) 13 Hastings Center R. 13, 13-14; P. Admiraal, 'Justifiable Euthanasia' 
(1988) 3 Issues Law & Med. 361, 368-370. 
25 For example, E. Keyserlingk, Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life, Law Reform Commission of Canada 
(1979) 123-126; T. Beauchamp, 'A Reply to Rachels on Active and Passive Euthanasia' in T. 
Beauchamp and S. Perlin, (eds.) Ethical Issues in Death and Dying (1978) 246-258; R. Veatch, Death, 
Dying and the Biological Revolution (1976) 80-93; R. McCormick, 'Notes on Moral Theology' (1976) 
37 Theological Studies 100. 
26 G. Gillett, 'Euthanasia, Letting Die and the Pause' (1988) 14 J.Med. Ethics 61. See also D. Maguire, 
Death by Choice (1984) 98 where he argues that omissions and commissions are different realities and 
since morality is based on reality a real difference could be expected to make a moral difference. 
27 M. Parker, 'Moral Intuition, Good Deaths and Ordinary Medical Practitioners' (1990) 16 J.Med. Ethics 
28, 29. For discussion of the views of the medical profession see chapter VI, 261-290. 
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distinction does, perhaps, reveal is that there is an element of self-deception operative here which may 
assist doctors in justifying their conduct in permitting patients to die. 28 
There are others still, including the influential President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research, in its Report Deciding to Forgo 
Life-Sustaining Treatment, who are prepared to acknowledge that the distinction between acts and 
omissions leading to death is not of itself morally relevant, yet nevertheless argue for maintenance of 
the current prohibition of active voluntary euthanasia on practical grounds.29 For example, concern is 
frequently expressed about the irrevocability of active euthanasia, allowing no opportunity for a 
change of mind or to correct mistakes, but the most serious concerns stem from a fear of abuse and 
other negative social consequences if active voluntary euthanasia was legalised.30 A rebuttal of these 
practical arguments will be presented later in this chapter. 31 
There is no doubt at all that the existing prohibition on active voluntary euthanasia places significant 
limits on the self-determination of some patients. This has been recognised by many of those 
resisting legalisation yet has not been seen as sufficient justification for any change to the present 
law. A prime example of this approach is to be found in the Report of the President's Commission. 
The commission acknowledged that policies prohibiting direct killing may conflict with the important 
value of patient self-determination but nonetheless went on to find this limitation on individual self-
determination to be an acceptable cost of securing the general protection of human life.32 
This reasoning is open to criticism. Particularly if one accepts the force of the argument that there is 
no intrinsic moral difference between active and passive euthanasia, there appears to be no valid 
justification for refusing to uphold the patient's self-determination in cases of active voluntary 
euthanasia. The practical arguments against the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia (e.g. the 
possibility of error and abuse) can be adequately addressed through the introduction of appropriate 
regulations and safeguards and do not justify undermining the patient's right of self-determination. The 
only acceptable limitation on the patient's right to make decisions for him or herself is the 
requirement that the patient has decision-making capacity and is in a position to make an informed 
choice. 
28 G. Robertson, 'Dealing with the Brain Damaged Old - Dignity Before Sanctity' (1982) 8 J.Med. Ethics 
173, 174. See also E. Bates, 'Decision Making in Critical Illness' (1979) 15 A. & N.ZJ. of Sociology 
45, 47 where, in a survey of medical practitioners, many of the doctors are reported to have seized upon 
the distinction between active euthanasia and the cessation of treatment. 
29 The President's Commission Report, 65-73; N. Cantor, 'A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving 
Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life' (1973) 26 Rutgers L.Rev. 228, 
260-262; A. Capron, 'The Right to Die: Progress and Peril' (1987) 2 Euthanasia Rev. 42, 53-59. 
30 See below, 202-206. 
31 See below, 201-221. 
32 The President's Commission Report, 73; the Hastings Center Report, 129. For criticism of these 
reports see Kuhse, 'Active and Passive Euthanasia - Ten Years into the Debate', 117-118; and Richter, 
56-71 respectively. 
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Analogy with Suicide 
Another argument frequently advanced in support of legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 
proceeds by way of analogy to the law of suicide. The argument begins with the proposition that 
since it is not unlawful for a person to commit or attempt to commit suicide,33 the law, implicitly at 
least, recognises the right of an individual to take his or her life. From this premise it is argued that if 
an individual does have the right to take his or her life he or she should be able to seek the assistance 
of others in achieving this end. 34 
A Rii:ht to Commit Suicide? 
Some commentators have argued for a moral right to commit suicide, at least in some 
circumstances.35 The real issue, however, for the purposes of the present discussion, is whether an 
individual has a legal right to commit suicide. The answer to this question must be in the negative, 
particularly in view of the continuing prohibition on assisting suicide and the laws which uphold 
intervention in the suicide of another.36 The most accurate assessment of the current position is that 
the decriminalisation of suicide and attempted suicide has not created any positive or legally 
enforceable right to commit suicide - it has merely given persons the liberty of choosing to end their 
own lives without thereby incurring criminal liability.37 It could, nevertheless, still be argued that if 
persons are at liberty to commit suicide, they should also be free to seek the assistance of others in 
achieving their aim and, if necessary, to authorise another to take active steps to bring about their 
death.38 Further to this argument, if a third person complies with a request for assistance they ought 
not be penalised since they are simply facilitating what the individual is at liberty to do. It must be 
emphasised that this argument does not necessarily entail general endorsement of suicide and suicide 
assistance. In many instances, suicidal persons are psychologically disturbed and should be prevented 
from implementing their plan.39 There are, however, cases where the choice of death is rational and 
where it would be entirely inappropriate to intervene, for example, in circumstances where a terminal 
or incurable patient seeks death as a relief from his or her suffering. 
33 For a discussion of the law dealing with suicide and attempted suicide, see chapter III, 83-87. 
34 J. Rachels, 'Barney Clark's Key' (1983) 13 Hastings Center R. 17, 19; Fletcher, 'The Courts and 
Euthanasia' (1987-88) 15 IAw, Med. & Health Care 223, 228; H. Pohlmeier, 'Suicide and Euthanasia -
Special Types of Partner Relationships' (1985) 15 Suicide & Life Threatening Behaviour 117, 119. 
35 For example, M. Battin, 'Suicide: A Fundamental Human Right?' in M. Battin and D. Mayo, (eds.) 
Suicide (1980) 267-285; and M. Charlesworth, Life, Death, Genes and Ethics (1989) 70-71. For 
commentators arguing against the morality of suicide, see, for example, G. Grisez, 'Suicide and 
Euthanasia' in D. Horan and D. Mall, (eds.) Death Dying and Euthanasia (1980) 742-817. 
36 See chapter III, 83-84, 100. 
37 See also H. Trowell, The Unfinished Debate on Euthanasia (1973) 120-121. It should be noted that 
some commentators have suggested that in the United States a right to commit suicide should be 
recognised by virtue of the United States Constitution; e.g. S. O'Brien, 'Facilitating Euthanatic, 
Rational Suicide: Help Me Go Gentle Into That Good Night' (1987) 31 St. Louis U.LJ. 651, 656, 666-
671; Richards, 403-407. Contra T. Marzen et al, 'Suicide: A Constitutional Right?' (1985) 24 
Duq.L.Rev. 1. 
3 8 Some commentators have, however, drawn attention to the differences between active voluntary 
euthanasia and assisted suicide; see, for example, R. Weir, 'The Morality of Physician-Assisted Suicide' 
(1992) 20 IAw, Med & Health Care 116, 118-119. 
39 A. Browne, 'Assisted Suicide and Active Voluntary Euthanasia' (1989) 2 Can.J.Lluris. 35, 39. 
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Si!ulificaoce of Thjrd Party Inyolvemeut 
On the assumption that there is some validity in the analogy between suicide and active voluntary 
euthanasia, a crucial question which needs to be addressed is what significance, if any, should be 
attached to the fact that active voluntary euthanasia involves the direct assistance of a third party. 
Some commentators have argued that an important distinction exists between suicide on the one hand, 
which is an autonomous and self-regarding act, and assisted suicide or active voluntary euthanasia on 
the other, which requires the involvement and assistance of a third party.40 This third party 
involvement, they argue, constitutes a crucial difference because the conduct changes from being a 
purely private act to a form of public action with ramifications extending beyond the parties 
involved.41 Moreover, it has been suggested that if the argument for active voluntary euthanasia is 
based on dignity of human freedom and self-determination, then it is inconsistent to ask someone else 
to assist.42 However, this objection ignores the practical realities of patients in extremis who are 
often physically unable to secure the means to a quick and easy death and may even be unable to self-
administer the fatal dose if it were made available to them. Furthermore, on humanitarian grounds, it 
could be argued that it would be more compassionate and humane to assist those who wish to die but 
who are unable to kill themselves, or those who desire assistance, to ensure that death is assured and 
achieved in a dignified manner. 
Whilst it is conceded that the involvement of third parties in cases of assisted suicide and active 
voluntary euthanasia does differentiate these cases from autonomous suicide, it is disputed that this 
significantly alters the character of the acts to such a degree that they should necessarily be prohibited. 
The more relevant consideration is whether the patient has requested active euthanasia. If the choice of 
death represents an exercise in patient autonomy and self-determination, this choice ought to be 
respected and it should be permissible to assist the patient in achieving his or her aim. The debate 
regarding third party involvement does, however, draw attention to the need to also respect the 
autonomy of others in dealing with a patient who seeks, death. 
Autonomy of Others 
According to accepted principles of autonomy and liberty, individuals should be free to pursue their 
own life choices, provided that this does not violate the rights of any third parties. In promoting the 
self-determination and autonomy of the patient care must be taken not to interfere with the autonomy 
of others. In particular, doctors should not be required to abdicate their autonomy in favour of that of 
the patient The position of third parties, and their right to remain clear of involvement in the practice 
of active euthanasia, can be ensured by the introduction of appropriate legislation specifying that 
4o Callahan, 4; W. Uren, 'On the Meaning of Life', paper delivered at Calvary-Hospital Hobart, Bioethics 
Seminar, 'On the Meaning of Life' 22 Oct. (1988) 16-17. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Linacre Centre, Report of a Working Party, Euthanasia and Clinical Practice (1982) 28-29. 
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doctors are under no duty to perform active euthanasia at the request of a patient, but may, in 
appropriate circumstances, be free to do so if they choose.43 
A Right to Die? 
Any attempt to analyse whether there is a 'right to die', or whether such a right should exist 
encounters enormous difficulties. To begin with, the popular notion of a 'right to die' is virtually 
meaningless in view of the fact that ultimately, death is inevitable for everyone. Moreover, the right 
to die is ambiguous in that it can mean anything from a right not to be kept alive against one's will 
or a more positive right to seek assistance to die. 44 For the purposes of the present discussion, it will 
be assumed that the expression 'right to die' is intended to convey a right to active assistance in 
bringing about one's death. Understood in this way, it can be categorically stated that there is at 
present no legal 'right to die'.45 Moreover, on the basis of current human rights instruments, there is 
no positive human 'right to die' and it is generally accepted that such a right cannot properly be 
inferred from the existence of a 'right to life'.46 
If one accepts the principle of self-determination as the basis for active voluntary euthanasia, it 
remains to be determined what legal status should be given to the patient's interest in choosing an 
earlier death. In particular, it must be decided whether patients should have a 'right to die', either 
expressed in terms of a basic human right47 or even a legal right.48 Apart from problems of 
definition, there are serious difficulties in adopting a strict rights-based model as the basis for 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. Although the notion of 'rights' is expansive and, in its 
wider sense, can be used to encompass a variety of legal concepts, 49 strictly speaking, rights (as 
distinct from liberties of privileges) are correlative with duties. Thus, the creation of any right to 
active euthanasia implies a corresponding duty on the part of someone to become actively involved in 
43 But see the view of Grisez and Boyle, 163 where it is argued that the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia would infringe on the liberty of citizens to stand aloof from the practice regardless of 
whether they are personally involved in its administration. 
44 Ibid. See also the Parliament of Victoria Social Development Committee, Second and Final Report 
Inquiry into Options for Dying with Dignity (1987) 96, 138-139 for acknowledgment of the 
difficulties involved in interpreting a 'right to die'. 
45 The position in the United States requires special consideration in light of the attempts by some 
commentators to argue that the constitutional right of privacy should encompass determination of the 
manner and timing of one's own death; e.g. R. Delgado, 'Euthanasia Reconsidered - the Choice of Death 
as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy' (1975) 17 Ariz.L.Rev. 474; Wolhandler. However, in light of 
recent case-law developments in the United States it is extremely unlikely that the United States 
Supreme Court would extend the constitutional right of privacy to encompass a patient's right to die. 
(See chapter Il, 47-48.) 
46 Bailey, 9-10, 267-268. Article 6 (para. 1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
which Australia has ratified provides that: 'Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right 
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.' 
47 For example, R. Russell, Freedom to Die (Revised ed., 1977) 232; R. Mitchell, 'Euthanasia: A Human 
Right?,' paper delivered to the ANZAAS Symposium, 'Modem Technology and the Right to Die' (1985) 
No. 276; C. Hadding, 'Right to Die - a Corollary to the Right to Live and the Right to Leave' (1989) 7 
Med. Law 511. 
48 Arras, 293-294. It should be noted that not all human rights are necessarily legal rights; see P. Bailey, 
Human Rights (1990) 5. 
49 W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1919) 6-7, 36-38. 
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the inducement of death.5o There is broad agreement amongst euthanasia advocates that it would be 
inappropriate to impose a duty on any person to talce tlie life of another. Although such a duty would 
uphold the autonomy of the patient who requests assistance, it is recognised that it would be an 
unjustifiable interference with the autonomy of others. It is primarily to avoid the implication of any 
such duty and the resulting infringement of the autonomy of third parties that the rights-based model 
has been widely rejected as a'ri appropriate basis for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia.51 
Self-Determination and the Liberty to Choose an Earlier Death 
The dilemma which confronts us is to find some way to give effect to the autonomy and self-
determination of the patient, but, at the same time, to protect the autonomy of others. This dilemma 
can best be resolved by holding that the patient's right of self-determination does not necessarily 
translate into an enforceable legal right_to demand assistance to die. The patient's interest in self-
determination can be appropriately protected by recognising a liberty52 to choose an earlier death and 
having the assistance of a doctor in bringing it about. If the patient's interest is expressed in terms of 
a liberty rather than a legal right it would not be enforceable by the courts and would not create any 
duties upon others to accede to a patient's request for death. 53 Thus, a doctor willing to assist would 
be permitted to perform active euthanasia at the request of a patient without being under any duty to 
do so. The creation of a liberty would nevertheless be significant in that persons desiring active 
voluntary euthanasia would not be restrained from exercising that choice, and provided they have a 
doctor willing to comply with their request, they may lawfully secure a quick and painless death. 
Indeed, the mere knowledge that active voluntary euthanasia is available in the event that suffering 
becomes unbearable would in many instances be sufficient to put patients in control and remove the 
fear of having to endure intolerable pain or other distress.54 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the principle of self-determination is central to the case for 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. Consideration will now turn to a number of other 
arguments which support the case for legalisation. 
50 For example, T. Campbell, 'Euthanasia and the Law' (1979) 17 Alta L.Rev. 188, 189; S. Potts, 
'Looking for the Exit Door: Killing and Caring in Modern Medicine' (1988) 25 Hous.L.Rev. 493, 509; 
P. Williams 'Rights and the Alleged Rights of Innocents to be Killed' (1976-77) 87 Ethics 383, 384. 
51 For example, P. Williams; F. Maher, 'Euthanasia' (1985) 59 Law Inst.I. 445; Trowell, 116-121. 
52 For a definition of a 'liberty', see, for example, Grisez and Boyle, 453 (defined as the absence of 
imposed constraints to pursuing one's own purposes in one's own way); J. Feinberg, The Moral Limits 
of the Criminal Law Vol. I Hann to Others (1984) 7 (the absence of legal coercion). 
53 See Trowell, 120-121; Hohfeld, 7, 38-50. 
54 This proposition is supported by the findings of the Remmlink study in the Netherlands; see chapter 
vm. 382-383, 392. 
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Prevention of Cruelty: An Argument from Mercy 
Another argument, which is a cornerstone of the case for the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia, is the need to alleviate pain and suffering and to prevent cruelty.55 Proponents argue that 
to maintain the legal prohibition on active voluntary euthanasia amounts to cruel and degrading 
treabnent and that cruelty is an evil which must be avoided so far as possible. They argue that in 
circumstances where there is no reasonable prospect of meaningful recovery, considerations of 
commonsense and compassion demand that patients should be allowed a merciful release from 
prolonged and useless suffering. Further, as noted earlier, reliance on the passive form of euthanasia 
will not necessarily guarantee a swift and painfree death. If, however, active voluntary euthanasia were 
legalised, doctors would be able to comply with a patients' request to die and the merciful and kindly 
treabnent of patients would be promoted. 
A potential conflict exists between the duty to prevent cruelty and relieve suffering, and the doctor's 
duty to save life. This conflict can best be resolved by holding that where a patient has voluntarily 
requested active euthanasia, the greater duty is to accede to the patient's request and avoid unnecessary 
suffering.56 Although legalising active voluntary euthanasia would not totally eliminate all pain and 
suffering associated with terminal illness, it would significantly reduce the burden on patients by 
placing the power to end a miserable existence under the patient's own control.57 This empowerment 
of the individual may in turn improve the quality of the remaining time, and may in fact assist the 
patient to live longer, confident in the knowledge that assistance is available if needed. 
The argument from prevention of suffering and cruelty has been more positively stated by Kohl who 
has advocated the principle of 'beneficent euthanasia'. 58 Kohl argues that active euthanasia is 'kind' 
treabnent and since society and its members have aprimafacie obligation to treat members kindly, it 
follows that beneficent euthanasia is a primafacie obligation.59 The value of Kohl's contribution to 
the debate has been to highlight that active euthanasia is a means of minimising suffering and 
maximising kind and loving treabnent of patients. However, for the reasons outlined above, 60 the 
notion of a prima facie obligation to provide euthanasia must be rejected, at least in so far as it 
implies that a duty is cast upon any particular individual to perform an act of euthanasia. 
55 For example, G. Williams, 'Euthanasia Legislation: A Rejoinder to the Non-Religious Objections', in 
A. Downing and B. Smoker, (eds.) Voluntary Euthanasia (1986) 156, 156-157; Morris, 254; A. Flew, 
'The Principle of Euthanasia' in Downing and Smoker, 40, 43; H. Leenen, 'Dying with Dignity: 
Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in the Netherlands' (1989) 8 Med. Law 517, 518; Rachels, The 
End of Life, 152-154. 
56 More detailed consideration of the role of the doctor is presented below, 217-220. 
57 Morris, 254. 
58 See M. Kohl, The Morality of Killing (1974) 106 where he sets out the conditions for beneficent 
euthanasia; the act must involve a painless inducement of a quick death, the act must result in beneficial 
treatment for the recipient, the act is intended to be helpful and is done so that if there is any 
expectation of receiving remuneration (or the like), the individual would still act in that manner, even 
if it becomes apparent that there is little or no chance of his expectation being realised. 
59 The Morality of Killing, 96, 106; 'Voluntary Beneficent Euthanasia', in Kohl, Beneficent Euthanasia 
130, 135. 
60 See above, 186-187. 
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Opponents of euthanasia have sought to undermine these arguments based upon the prevention of 
cruelty and need for merciful treatment by suggesting that the concepts of 'mercy' and 'prevention of 
cruelty' are flexible, capable of differing interpretations, and that this may, with time, result in an ever 
increasing category of candidates for active euthanasia 61 Further, it is claimed that the concern of 
proponents is often not with the pain and suffering of the patient but of the family, relatives and 
friends who must witness the patient's last days. 62 However, these arguments ignore the fact that 
what is being considered here is voluntary euthanasia, firmly based on the fundamental principle of 
self-determination. The crucial issue is not whether the doctors believe it would be merciful to 
terminate life, or the need to relieve the understandable anguish of loved ones, but whether the patient 
seeks active euthanasia as a release from his or her suffering. 
Promotion of Human Dignity 
Closely related to the foregoing arguments based on self-determination and the prevention of cruelty is 
the argument that legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia is necessary in order to promote human 
dignity. Proponents argue that the notion of human dignity demands that individuals have control over 
significant life decisions, including the choice to die, and that this control is acknowledged and 
respected by others.63 This argument is well encapsulated by Fletcher where he states that 'to prolong 
life uselessly, while the personal qualities of freedom, knowledge, self-possession and control, and 
responsibility are sacrificed, is to attack the moral status of a person'. 64 
Advances in medical technology have greatly increased the capacity of the medical profession to 
prolong life. In many cases, however, death can be merely forestalled and patients may face the 
prospect of a prolonged and agonising death. For many patients, the principal fear is not of pain or 
even death itself, but of loss of control of bodily and mental functions and the resulting helplessness 
and dependence on others - in short the depersonalisation of the dying. Patients may understandably 
wish to spare themselves and their loved ones the indignity of a prolonged death and creeping mental 
and physical deterioration. Indeed, it is this concern for the circumstances of one's dying that has 
largely fuelled the campaign for 'death with dignity•.65 
The present law permits passive euthanasia, but this will not guarantee a patient a humane and 
dignified death. On the contrary, a 'natural death' achieved by the refusal of treatment may be 
61 For example, A. Dyck, 'The Good Samaritan Ideal and Beneficent Euthanasia: Conflicting Views of 
Mercy' (1975) 42 Linacre Q. 176, 180-181. 
62 For example, G. Parker, 'You are a Child of the Universe: You Have a Right to be Here' (1977) 7 
Man.LI. 151, 155. For consideration of some of the other arguments of opponents regarding the issue 
of prevention of cruelty and suffering, see E. Kluge, The Ethics of Deliberate Death (1981) 39-42. 
63 For example, M. Moore, 'The Case for Voluntary Euthanasia' (1974) 42 U.M.K.C.L.Rev. 327, 332; 
Browne, 38; Morris, 251-255. 
64 Morals and Medicine, 191. 
65 For discussion of legislative developments with regard to 'dying with dignity' see chapter VII. 
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particularly unpleasant and undignified.66 Preservation of human dignity can only be assured with the 
acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia, and the recognition of the liberty of the individual to 
determine the manner and timing of his or her death. 
Opponents of euthanasia have challenged this reasoning on two fronts. First, they claim that all 
individuals have intrinsic worth and dignity and it would therefore be immoral to sanction the death of 
any individual. Indeed, they argue, it is because of their respect for human worth and dignity that they 
steadfastly disapprove of active voluntary euthanasia.67 Second, they assert that the argument based 
on the notion of human dignity logically entails that all who live in an unalterably undignified form 
of existence ought to be killed. 68 Both of these arguments are misconceived. The first argument. is 
flawed because it proceeds on a different notion of 'dignity' than that which is being claimed here, 
namely the power to control important aspects of one's life including matters of life and death. 
Acceptance and preservation of human dignity in this sense in no way purports to deny the intrinsic 
worth and dignity of all human beings regardless of their health or condition. 69 The second argument, 
reminiscent of the objections raised against the prevention of cruelty argument, also fails because it 
ignores the important correlation between preserving human dignity and upholding the patient's 
interest in self-determination. If self-determination is accepted as the touchstone, there can be no 
suggestion that persons will be disposed of, on the basis of some objective assessment of whether 
their life lacks dignity. 
What is Morally Right Should be Made Legally Permissible 
Another argument advanced by some proponents, is that since active voluntary euthanasia is 
acknowledged by many to be nwrally right, it should be made legally permissible.70 In furtherance of 
this argument, attention is drawn to the conflicting demands placed on individual doctors faced with a 
request for active euthanasia; on the one hand, the desire to act mercifully and relieve the patient's 
suffering and on the other, the concern to be a law-abiding citizen and avoid violation of the criminal 
law. Proponents argue that this places doctors in an intolerable situation and that society has a duty to 
make legally permissible conduct that is merciful and widely recognised as morally right.71 
It is certainly true that notwithstanding the forceful objections of some commentators, there has been 
widespread support from a variety of sources for the view that in certain circumstances, active 
66 For example, Battin, 'The Least Worst Death', 13-14; Admiraal, 368-370. 
67 For example, British Medical Association (B.M.A.) Working Party Report, Euthanasia (1988) 40; L. 
Gormally, 'A Non-Utilitarian Case Against Voluntary Euthanasia', in Downing and Smoker, 72, 82-88. 
68 See E. Kluge, The Practice of Death (1975) 154-157 for an analysis of this argument. A number of 
commentators have also drawn attention to the variable understandings of dignity; see Dyck, 180-181; 
Kluge, The Ethics of Deliberate Death, 42-44. 
69 Kohl, 'Voluntary Beneficent Euthanasia', 132-134 where he examines the different interpretations of 
'dignity'. 
7° For example, Russell, 235-236; G. Williams, 'Euthanasia and Abortion' (1966) 38 U.Colo.L.Rev. 178, 
182. 
71 Russell, 235. 
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voluntary euthanasia is morally justified.72 Subject to possible negative consequences which may 
flow from the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, which will be dealt with below,73 a strong 
argument can be made that the law should reflect prevailing morality. This argument will be 
developed later in this chapter in the part dealing with the role of'the criminal law.74 It should be 
noted, however, that the arguments in this thesis do not necessarily depend on the acceptance of the 
morality of active voluntary euthanasia. 
One possible counter-argument which will be dealt with more fully in the context of the case against 
legalisation is that an important distinction exists between the morality of the individual case and the 
appropriateness of developing a public policy permitting active voluntary euthanasia.75 In fact, many 
opponents of legalisation are prepared to concede the morality of active voluntary euthanasia in 
exceptional circumstances, but vigorously reject the introduction of legislation to cover such cases. 
The validity of this position in turn depends on an ,assessment of the practical objections to the 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia which will be undertaken later in this chapter. 76 
Formalise Current Practices 
A further argument in support of the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia is that we need to 
formalise existing practices. There are two separate aspects of this argument: first, the argument that 
since the practice of active euthanasia already occurs, we need to institutionalise and regulate the 
practice with the adoption of proper safeguards in order to protect against the risk of abuse; and 
second, that the practice should be legalised to overcome existing discrepancies between legal theory 
and practice. Both of these arguments will now be considered in turn. 
The Need to Regulate and Protect Against Abuse 
Reference was earlier made to available evidence which indicates that some doctors, at least, are already 
involved in the practice of active voluntary euthanasia even though this contravenes the criminal 
law.77 As many of-the opponents of legalisation have pointed out, the mere fact that the law is being 
broken is not of itself a valid ground for legal change.78 There are, however, certain difficulties 
inherent in the present situation which call for a re-evaluation of the prohibition of active voluntary 
euthanasia. Because the practice is presently illegal, it is performed secretively without any 
opportunity for consultation or regulation. Particularly in light of the paternalistic nature of the 
72 Support has come from theologians; e.g. J. Fletcher, (Episcopal Minister), D. Maguire, (Catholic 
philosopher); lawyers (e.g. G. Williams); doctors (e.g. R. Syme and M. Parker); and ethicists and 
philosophers (e.g. M. Kohl and R. Young). 
73 See below, 201-221. 
74 See below, 222-228. 
75 For example, Hamel, R. (ed.) Active Euthanasia, Religion and the Public Debate (1991) 93-109. 
76 See below, 201-221. 
77 See chapter IV, 117-121. 
78 For example, Grisez and Boyle, 146; C. Dessaur and C. Rutenfrans, 'The Present Day Practice of 
Euthanasia' (1988) 3 Issues Law & Med. 399, 405. 
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medical profession, this creates a very real risk that active euthanasia may be performed by a doctor on 
the basis of what he or she perceives to be the patient's best interests, but without the consent of the 
patient This is clearly contrary to the fundamental principle of self-determination and the requirement 
of voluntariness in the practice of active euthanasia. Further, since some doctors may be more willing 
than others to contravene the criminal law, the option of active euthanasia is not presently available 
to all patients, thereby causing potential injustice to some.79 
The essence of the proponents' argument is that if the practice already occurs, it is preferable for it to 
be legalised and brought out into the open in order that appropriate safeguards can be implemented to 
protect against abuse.80 There is good reason to believe that acts of non-voluntary euthanasia would 
be reduced if a form of active voluntary euthanasia was legally available and the need for secrecy was 
overcome. Legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia would promote open discussion of the issues 
and would thereby contribute to the quality of decision-making. Legalisation would also ensure that 
active voluntary euthanasia would be an option available to all patients subject only to the right of a 
doctor to decline to become involved in the practice. Patient self-determination would thereby be 
promoted. 
The Need to Overcome Discrepancies between Legal Theory and Practice 
The second part of the proponents' argument concerns the need to overcome existing discrepancies 
between legal theory and practice. Proponents point out that even though there is evidence to suggest 
that some doctors are engaged in the practice of active voluntary euthanasia which constitutes murder, 
if one has regard to the realities of the law in practice, it is unlikely that a doctor would be prosecuted, 
or if prosecuted, that he or she would be convicted. From this premise, they argue that the law in 
operation in effect condones the practice of active voluntary euthanasia. Proponents go on to assert 
that the present disparity between legal theory and the law as it operates in practice is unsatisfactory, 
encouraging cynicism and disrespect for the law. 81 Further, it is argued, that whilst it is most 
unlikely that a doctor would be prosecuted and convicted, there is, nevertheless, no guarantee of 
this;82 indeed the very informality of the present situation invites arbitrary and capricious results. 
Moreover, it is argued to be unsatisfactory that doctors who are acting bonafide and at the request of 
the patient should be exposed to the risk of prosecution. Thus, proponents are of the view that active 
voluntary euthanasia ought to be legalised in order to close the gap between theory and practice, and to 
ensure that doctors who perform active voluntary euthanasia are not vulnerable to criminal 
prosecution. 83 
79 For example, D. Humphry, 'Euthanasia for the Elite' (1986) 1 Euthanasia Rev. 203; Institute of Medical 
Ethics, Working Party on the Ethics of Prolonging Life and Assisting Death, Discussion Paper 
'Assisted Death' (1990) 336 Lancet 610, 611 (hereafter referred to as the Institute of Medical Ethics, 
Working Party Discussion Paper). 
80 A. Levisohn, 'Voluntary Mercy Deaths' (1961) 8 J. Forensic Med. 51, 69; Institute of Medical Ethics, 
Working Party Discussion Paper, 611. 
81 See chapter IV, 146-150. 
8 2 This has been demonstrated by the recent prosecution and conviction of Dr Cox in the United Kingdom 
for the attempted murder of his patient. For discussion see chapter IV, 126-127. 
83 For example, Levisohn, 69. 
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The problems which stem from the present disparity between law and practice are serious and 
constitute good cause to re-evaluate the present criminal law prohibition on active voluntary 
euthanasia A strong case can be made out that legalisation of the practice is necessary in order to 
overcome these difficulties and to provide legal guidance for the making of medical and ethical 
decisions regarding the termination of life. 
Arguments have also been advanced against legislating to overcome the present discrepancies between 
law and practice. 84 It has, for example, been argued that notwithstanding the occasional contravention 
of the law, the existing prohibition plays an important part in preventing many more cases of active 
euthanasia, a significant proportion of which would be non-voluntary and which would not in any 
event be legalised. 85 The validity of this argument depends in turn on the so-called 'wedge argument' 
which will be considered later in this chapter.86 For present purposes, it can be stated that the 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia would not necessarily affect the incidence of cases of active 
non-voluntary euthanasia; active non-voluntary euthanasia is currently prohibited by the criminal law 
and would remain so. 
Resource Considerations 
Another argument in support of legalisation is based on economic considerations.87 The essence of 
this argument is that to introduce a law enabling patients to seek active voluntary euthanasia would 
indirectly assist to ease the financial burden of health care for the patient, the patient's family and the 
community generally. 
Reference has previously been made to the remarkable advances in medicine and medical technology in 
recent decades which have significantly extended the general life expectancy of the population and the 
capacity to prolong the life of dying patients.88 There are, however, enormous financial costs 
involved in providing appropriate health care to the elderly and the chronically and terminally ill, and 
these costs are likely to increase in the future with the gradual ageing of the population. 8 9 
84 For an analysis of arguments against change of the law on grounds of discrepancy between theory and 
practice, see Grisez and Boyle, 148-149. 
85 For example, Grisez and Boyle, 148; Kamisar, 1042. 
86 See below, 202-205. 
87 See H. Hayry and M. Hayry, 'Euthanasia, Ethics and Economics' (1990) 4 Bioethics 154; A. Wickett, 
'Health Care Costs and Euthanasia' (1986) 1 Euthanasia Rev. 158; J. Richardson, 'The Accountant as 
Triage Master: An Economist's Perspective on Voluntary Euthanasia and the Value of Life Debate' 
(1987) 1 Bioethics 226; H. Lander, 'Some Medical Aspects of Euthanasia' (1984) M.J.A. 173, 176; M. 
Battin, 'Age Rationing and the Just Distribution of Health Care: Is there a Duty to Die?' (1987) 97 
Ethics 317. 
88 See the Introduction to this thesis, 1. 
89 E. Bates and H. Lapsley, The Health Machine (1985) 133; B. Pollard, Euthanasia (1989) 67-71; G. 
Alexander, 'Death by Directive' (1988) 28 Santa Clara L. Rev. 61, 70-74 (referring to the position in 
the United States.) 
In 1986, 1.68 million people in Australia were aged 65 and over; 10.5% of the total population of 16 
million. It is estimated that by the year 2005, 2.4 million people will be over 65; 11.9% of a total 
population of 20.2 million. By 2025 it is estimated that 3.8 million people will be over 65, 16.1 % of 
a total population of 23.8 million. (the Bulletin April, 1988.) Health care expenditure by individuals 
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Notwithstanding growing demands, health care resources are finite, and difficult questions inevitably 
arise about their appropriate distribution. It is beyond-the scope of this thesis to deal with the issue of 
equitable allocation of limited health care resources.90 The one issue which does need to be addressed 
here is what economic advantages may accrue from the acceptance of a law which permits a doctor to 
act upon a patient's request for active euthanasia. 
There is a natural reluctance of proponents to raise the resource dimension of the euthanasia debate, 
particularly because of the willingness of their opponents to unfairly manipulate such arguments to 
their own advantage. However, matters of costs and economics in health care cannot and should not be 
ignored.91 What must be emphasised is that economic considerations are of secondary importance to 
the fundamental principle of individual self-determination which lies at the heart of the proposed 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. This is not to say that the financial implications of 
continued health care are irrelevant; in some instances, such considerations may influence the way in 
which patients exercise their right of self-determination, be it to refuse medical treatment or to seek 
active assistance in bringing about their death. But such considerations would never, on their own, be 
sufficient justification for the introduction of a policy of active euthanasia. The principle of self-
determination demands that the individual decide the timing of his or her own death. Any suggestion 
that active euthanasia could be used as a means of cost containment in circumstances other than 
strictly voluntary euthanasia would be completely contrary to this principle and should therefore be 
categorically rejected. 
Provided that it is clearly understood that active voluntary euthanasia is firmly based on the principle 
of self-determination, it is legitimate to recognise that legalisation would have certain advantages in 
preserving limited health care resources. Doctors would be able to satisfy the wishes of some patients 
by performing active voluntary euthanasia, and at the same time free up health care resources which 
can be made available to other patients who need and desire to have the maximum treatment available. 
It seems eminently sensible to ensure that health care resources are directed to where they are both 
wanted and required,92 and this is best achieved by not only respecting the patient's decision to refuse 
treatment, but to make active voluntary euthanasia an option available to all patients who have 
decision-making capacity. 
and governments in Australia has increased in real terms approximately 25% from 1984-5 to 1990-1; 
Note, 'Australian Health Care Expenditure to 1990-1' (1992) 7 Health Care Expenditure Bull. 1-2. 
90 For consideration of this issue see, for example, D. Horvath, 'The Ethics of Resource Allocation' 
(1990) 153 M.J.A. 437; M. Somerville, 'Should the Grandparents Die?: Allocation of Medical 
Resources with an Aging Population' (1986) 14 Law, Med. & Health Care 158; Battin, 'Age Rationing 
and the Just Distribution of Health Care: Is there a Duty to Die?'; E. Pellegrino, 'Rationing Health Care: 
The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping' (1986) 2 J.Contemp. Health Law & Pol'y. 23; R. Bayer, et al, 'The 
Care of the Terminally Ill: Morality and Economics' (1983) 309 New Eng.J.Med. 1490; G. Smith, 
'Death be Not Proud: Medical, Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in Resource Allocation' (1987) 3 
J.Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y. 47; M. Mehlman, 'Rationing Expensive Life-Saving Treatments', 
(1985) 2 Wis.L.Rev. 239; H. Kuhse and P. Singer, 'Age and the Allocation of Medical Resources' 
(1988) 13 J.Med. & Phil. 101. 
91 Hayry and Hayry, 155. 
92 Alexander, 102-103; Battin, 'Age Rationing and the Just Distribution of Health Care: Is there a Duty to 
Die?,' 336-340. 
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Public Demand and Support for Active Voluntary Euthanasia 
The case for legalisation is further bolstered by evidence of growing public demand and support for 
active voluntary euthanasia. Public opinion polls have been periodically conducted in Australia, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Canada to gauge public attitudes to whether active voluntary 
euthanasia ought to be legalised, and the results of these polls indicate increasing public support for 
its legalisation.93 
Opponents have been quick to challenge the relevance of such polls. At one level, they are critical of 
the manner in which the polls are conducted, particularly the way in which questions are framed.94 
More fundamentally, however, some opponents have challenged the relevance of opinion polls in 
shaping law and public policy, arguing that it is not necessarily appropriate to base the law on the 
opinion of the majority. 95 There is, they argue, no guarantee that the opinions polled are based on an 
informed understanding of the issues, and even if opinions are informed and valid, opponents question 
whether the moral worth of an argument is to be judged by the number of those who subscribe to 
it.96 
Apart from the opinion polls, further evidence of public support and demand for legalisation of active 
voluntary euthanasia is to be found in the emergence and growth in all jurisdictions of voluntary 
euthanasia societies actively campaigning for reform of the law in this area97 Moreover, the issue of 
active voluntary euthanasia has increasingly been brought before the public by the media, and the 
community response has generally been favourable.98 
Whilst it is, admittedly, very difficult accurately to assess the state of public opinion, available 
evidence regarding opinion polls and the growth of the voluntary euthanasia movement would appear 
to indicate that there is significant and increasing public demand and support for legalisation of active 
voluntary euthanasia. Since the role of the law is, at least in part, to meet the real needs of the 
community, evidence of public demand and support for legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia can 
only operate to strengthen the case for reform. More detailed consideration will be given to the 
relevance of public opinion and the role of the law later in this chapter. 99 
93 S. Waller, 'Trends in Public Acceptance of Euthanasia Worldwide' (1986) 1 Euthanasia Rev. 33. For 
further discussion see chapter VI, 229-239. 
94 For example, B.M.A. Working Party Report, Euthanasia, 41-42; Pollard, Euthanasia 59-62; Pollard, 
'Killing the Dying - Not the Easy Way Out' (1988) 149 M.J.A. 312, 314; E. Keyserlingk, 'Public 
Opinion on Legalizing Active Euthanasia' (1987) 3 Humane Med. 139, 139. 
95 For example, B.M.A. Working Party Report, Euthanasia, 42. 
96 Pollard, Euthanasia, 62; B.M.A. Working Party Report, Euthanasia, 42. 
97 See chapter VI, 240-257. 
98 See chapter VI, 258-259. 
99 See below, 222-228. 
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The Case For Legalisation: An Evaluation 
In the foregoing part, an attempt has been made to present and analyse the various arguments that 
have been raised in support of the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia It has been demonstrated 
that a number of powerful and convincing arguments can be raised in support of such legalisation, the 
most important of which is undoubtedly the libertarian principle of patient self-determination. On the 
strength of these arguments, taken together, a prima facie case exists for changing our laws to permit 
doctors to take active steps to end the lives of their patients at the patient's request 
An important aspect of the proponents' argument is that their claim for active voluntary euthanasia 
concerns a liberty; a claim to be free to seek assistance in determining the manner and timing of one's 
death. Proponents argue that in a free society, it is the restraint of liberty that must be justified, not 
the existence of liberty and that the criminal law should not be invoked to repress conduct unless this 
is demonstrably necessary on social grounds.100 Thus, it is argued, the onus lies upon those 
objecting to the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia to demonstrate why there should be 
restrictions on the liberty of the individual to seek and receive assistance in bringing about his or her 
death. In other words, opponents will have to convince proponents what compelling public interest 
demands that patients are denied a choice of a painfree and dignified death.101 If the opponents fail to 
discharge this onus, then we are left with compelling arguments for legalisation which ought to be 
acted upon. 
Consideration must now turn to the case against legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, to 
determine whether any of the objections raised by opponents are of sufficient force to justify the 
restraint of individual liberty and self-determination. 
PART II 
The Case Against Legalisation of Actjye Voluntary Euthanasia 
The arguments advanced by the opponents can be divided into two categories; doctrinaire or 
deontological arguments on the one hand, and pragmatic or consequentialist objections on the 
other.102 Arguments falling into the first category are absolutist and theoretical in nature, whereas 
pragmatic or consequentialist arguments focus on the practical consequences of legalisation. According 
to the doctrinaire approach, active voluntary euthanasia is intrinsically wrong, regardless of the 
circumstances. Many of the religious and moral arguments fall within this category. This category 
also includes a number of moral and philosophical arguments against legalisation of active voluntary 
100 Williams, 'Euthanasia Legislation: A Rejoinder to the Non-Religious Objections', 157; Morris, 254-
255; Flew, 40, 42; Moore, 330. 
101 Browne, 40; Williams, 'Euthanasia Legislation: A Rejoinder to the Non-Religious Objections', 157. 
102 Fletcher, 'The Courts and Euthanasia', 228. 
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euthanasia. Opponents of euthanasia adhering to this approach, the most notable of whom are 
Sullivan and Kelly, argue that in view of the inherent wrongfulness of active voluntary euthanasia, it 
should remain subject to unqualified prohibition.103 
However, a significant proportion of opponents are willing to concede that there are powerful 
arguments for the toleration of active voluntary euthanasia in individual cases, but contend that the 
institutionalisation of the practice is so fraught with risks and difficulties that it cannot be 
countenanced. Thus, the objection to active voluntary euthanasia is not necessarily based on the 
alleged wrongfulness of the individual act, but because of the undesirable consequences which it is 
feared may result if the practice is legaliSed.104 These arguments are best characterised as pragmatic or 
consequentialist objections. It is proposed to deal with these different categories of objection in tum. 
Doctrinaire Arguments Against Active Voluntary Euthanasia 
Religious Arguments Against Active Voluntary Euthanasia 
The following discussion will be focused on the Judaeo-Christian tradition which is the principal 
source of religious opposition to the practice of active voluntary euthanasia.105 Notwithstanding 
some individual dissenters, l06 the Judaeo-Christian tradition has consistently condemned the practice 
of active voluntary euthanasia, and of all denominations, the Catholic Church has been most 
prominent in its opposition.107 
Sanctity of Human Life 
Central to this opposition to active voluntary euthanasia is the fundamental belief in the sanctity of 
human life. Although no longer an exclusiv~ly religious concept, 108 the principle of sanctity of life 
clearly does have religious origins. Essentially, this principle holds that human life is sacred, having 
intrinsic value and must therefore be respected and preserved.109 According to Christian tradition, life 
is a gift from God, and supreme dominion over life belongs to God alone.11 O Human responsibility 
for life is one of 'stewardship'; man does not have absolute control over his own life, but merely holds 
103 J. Sullivan, The Morality of Mercy Killing (1950); G. Kelly, Medico-Moral Problems (1958) 115-116. 
104 For example, Kamisar, 975; Potts, 504-509; R. Weir, Abating Treatment with Critically Ill Patients, 
417. 
105 For a discussion of other religious viewpoints regarding the practice of euthanasia, see G. Larue, 
Euthanasia and Religion (1985); D. Meyers, Medico-Legal Implications of Death and Dying (1981) 
572-588. . 
106 For example, Joseph Fletcher, an Episcopal minister, and Daniel Maguire, a Catholic philosopher, 
who have been prominent advocates for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. 
107 The opposition of the Roman Catholic Church to euthanasia dates back to the time of St. Augustine. At 
various times in the history of the Catholic Church, official church pronouncements have condemned 
euthanasia; see Kelly, 115-118. Note also the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 
Declaration on Euthanasia (1980). 
108 J. Dedek, Human Life (1972) 12. 
109 The principle of sanctity of life is, however, not an absolute principle and is, therefore, 
distinguishable from 'vitalism' which holds that human life is an absolute value in itself and that every 
effort must be made to preserve life. See Keyserlingk, Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life, 30-35. 
110 Meyers, 572-588. 
198 
it on trust for God. Only God, the Creator of life, has the right to decide at what moment a life shall 
cease, and any direct killing of the innocent without the authority of God is wrong and against the 
natural law.111 The fact that the individual killed had given his or her consent does not alter the 
wrongfulness of the act Similarly, suicide has always attracted religious sanction. Thus, man has the 
use of life, but may not destroy it at will, and to choose to do so involves a rejection of God's 
sovereignty. 
The objection has been raised that if this 'divine monopoly theory' is carried through to its logical 
conclusion, it would mean that it is immoral to prolong life, since this is just as much an interference 
with God's sovereignty as is prematurely ending life.112 However, according to Christian tradition, 
the prolongation- of life by human intervention is justified on the grounds that it demonstrates respect 
for the value of human life, thereby confirming, rather than denying God's dominion. 
Probibition Ai:ainst Intentional Killini: 
Closely related to the principle of God's sovereignty is the prohibition against killing contained in the 
Ten Commandments. The Sixth Commandment states 'thou shalt not kill' which would seemingly 
prohibit all intentional killing, even for merciful motives. It has, however, been argued that the 
interpretation 'thou shalt not kill' is an inaccurate translation from the original Hebrew and that a 
more precise translation would be 'thou shalt do no murder', i.e. unlawful killing.113 On this view, 
active euthanasia performed at the request of a patient would not be in contravention of the Sixth 
Commandment. 
Furthermore, examination of the biblical prohibition against direct killing in its proper context 
reveals that it was never understood as an absolute prohibition on the taking of human life.114 
Judaeo-Christian tradition has always recognised that in certain circumstances intentional killing may 
be permissible, for example, in the context of just war, capital punishment and legitimate self-
defence.115 Thus, the biblical prohibition on killing is not an absolute principle but rather reflects 
the need to protect human life from arbitrary killing without community sanction. However, in the 
context of life and death decisions, the Commandment prohibiting killing has been understood as 
preventing the termination of human life, even for merciful reasons.116 
The Yalue of Human Sufferini: 
Another ground of religious objection to the practice of active voluntary euthanasia stems from the 
Christian belief in the value of human suffering. According to Christian teaching, physical suffering 
111 R. Gula, 'Euthanasia: A Catholic Perspective' (1987) 68 Health Progress 28, 29; Sullivan, 40. 
112 Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, 192-193; Magurie, 118-119; Rachels, The End of Life, 163-164. 
113 Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, 196; Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 279; 
Rachels, The End of Life, 161-162. 
114 Gula, 'Euthanasia: A Catholic Perspective,' 30. 
115 Sullivan, 33-39; Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, 196. 
116 For interpretation of the commandment under Roman Catholic teaching see, for example, the Linacre 
Center, Working Party Report, Euthanasia and Clinical Practice, 40-42. Compare with the position of 
the Anglican Church; Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility, On Dying Well (1975) 23. 
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is not an absolute evil, devoid of purpose. Rather, it is seen as having a special place in God's divine 
plan for the universe, allowing an opportunity for the sufferer's spiritual growth and a means of 
redemption.117 Furthermore, those who are in contact with a suffering patient are given an 
opportunity to practice Christian charity.1 18 Thus, the practice of active voluntary euthanasia is 
rejected as a denial of the spiritual significance of suffering. 
However, this objection to the practice of active voluntary euthanasia based on a belief in the value of 
human suffering has been subject to vigorous attack from a number of commentators.119 Williams 
points out that for anyone acquainted with the reality of suffering in illness, this argument must seem 
both absurd and intolerant 120 Further, as Fletcher observes, if suffering were indeed part of God's 
divine plan which must, therefore, be accepted, we should not be able to give our moral approval to 
anaesthetics or to provide any medical relief of human suffering.121 This inconsistency regarding the 
place of suffering is itself reflected in Christian teaching; although the value of redemptive suffering is 
extolled, it is widely accepted that suffering can, in appropriate circumstances, be relieved, and the 
choice of whether or not to do so is a personal decision of conscience.122 However, active voluntary 
euthanasia as a means of relieving suffering is unequivocally rejected. 
Status of Religious Objections to Euthanasia 
It is evident from the foregoing review that religious opposition to the practice of active voluntary 
euthanasia is based on a number of interrelated arguments including adherence to the principle of the 
sanctity of life, the biblical prohibition against direct killing, and the value of human suffering. 
However, by their very nature, religious arguments based upon absolute adherence to faith are not 
really open to ethical reasoning or debate and may not accord with public opinion.123 Consequently 
no attempt will be made to debate the merits of these religious arguments. Rather, it will be argued 
that religious objections are of limited practical relevance in determining whether the practice of active 
voluntary euthanasia should be legalised. 
Religious arguments will naturally be convincing to those who accept the religious viewpoint but 
they clearly do not have universal relevance. Religion is a matter of personal commitment, and 
objections to active voluntary euthanasia based purely on religious views should not dominate the law 
nor impinge on the freedom of others. Whilst the convictions of believers must obviously be 
117 Kluge, The Ethics of Deliberate Death, 32-33. 
118 Sullivan, 47. 
119 For example, Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, 196; Williams, 'Euthanasia and Abortion', 180; Maguire, 
194; B. Smoker, 'A Rejoinder to Religious and Non-Consequentialist Objections to Euthanasia' in 
Downing and Smoker, 96, 99-100; Rachels, The End of Life, 164-165. 
120 Williams, 'Euthanasia and Abortion', 180. 
121 Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, 196-198. See also Rachels, The End of Life, 165. 
122 For a statement of the position of the Catholic Church, see the address of Pope Pious the XII, 'Religious 
and Moral Aspects of Pain Prevention in Medical Practice' (1957) 88 Jr. Ecclesiastical Ree. 193. Note 
also the Anglican position; Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility, On Dying Well, 21, 
39-50. This inconsistency argument can be taken further by reference to the Churches' approach to the 
withholding or withdrawing of treatment, particularly the position of the Catholic Church with regard 
to ordinary and extraordinary treatment. See chapter IV, 64-65. 
123 Fletcher, 'The Courts and Euthanasia', 228-229. 
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respected, it must be recognised that in a pluralistic and largely secular society, the freedom of 
conviction of non-believers must also be upheld.124 It was stressed in the earlier part of this chapter 
that the main argument in the case for legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia is the principle of 
autonomy or self-determination.125 Taking this principle into account, a powerful argument can be 
advanced to the effect that prohibitions on active voluntary euthanasia based purely on religious 
beliefs should not be applied by law to those who do not share that belief where this is not required 
for the welfare of society generally .126 Only if the legal prohibition on active voluntary euthanasia is 
removed will everyone be able to live according to their own convictions; those who oppose active 
voluntary euthanasia could reject it for themselves, and those who are in favour of the practice are not 
forced to live against their convictions. It is entirely inappropriate for adherents to religious views to 
insist that their beliefs should be binding on all others. 
Active Voluntary Euthanasia Inconsistent with the Inalienable Right to Life 
Another doctrinaire argument against active voluntary euthanasia is that it is inconsistent with the 
inalienable right to life. According to this argument, derived from human rights philosophy, 127 
individuals have certain inherent and inalienable rights including the right to life.128 Consequently, 
active euthanasia performed at the request of a patient is never morally justifiable since it is a 
violation of this inalienable right. For strict adherents to a right to life philosophy, this argument 
would appear to be beyond controversy. The present criminal law which prevents a person from 
giving a legally effective consent to his or her own death can certainly be understood as supporting the 
view that individuals have an inalienable right to life.129 However, some philosophers, including 
Feinberg, have persuasively argued that active voluntary euthanasia can be reconciled with the 
inalienable right to life.130 Feinberg points out that if the opponents' argument regarding the 
impermissibility of active voluntary euthanasia is correct, it would effectively mean that the so called 
'right to life' is in fact a mandatory right which entails a duty to live.131 This conclusion reveals the 
fallacy of the initial premise. It stands to reason that if something is a right at all then it must be 
capable of being given up. The right to life can be reconciled with acceptance of active voluntary 
euthanasia by recognising that although the right to life is inalienable, it can be waived in the exercise 
of one's discretion whether to continue to live. Thus, a rational request for active euthanasia is simply 
124 H. Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands' (1987) 8 
Health Policy 197, 205; Leenen, 'Dying with Dignity: Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in the 
Netherlands,' 518-519. 
125 See above, 179-187. 
126 Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal lAw, 278; Morris, 248-251. 
127 For example, in the works of Locke, Second Treatise, in Two Treatises of Government (P. Laslett ed. 
1960); Rosseau, The Social Contract, in the Social Contract and Discourses (G. Cole translation 
1950); Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1959). 
128 Support for the existence of a right to life can also be derived from international human rights 
instruments; see above, n. 46. 
129 See chapter I, 16-18. 
130 J. Feinberg, 'Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life' in J. Feinberg, Rights, Justice, 
and the Bounds of Liberty (1980) 220- 275. See also M. Kohl, 'Euthanasia and the Right to Life', in S. 
Spicker and H. Engelhardt, (eds.) Philosophical Medical Ethics (1975) 73. 
131 Kluge, Ethics of Deliberate Death, 103. 
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an exercise of one's right to life, in the sense of being able to exercise one's own choice, rather than 
an attempt to alienate the inalienable.132 
Acceptance of Active Voluntary Euthanasia Would Create a Duty to Kill 
Another fundamental objection to active voluntary euthanasia is that the creation of a right to seek 
active euthanasia would impose on others a correlative duty to kin.133 It is certainly true that the 
concept of rights, in its strict sense, has generally been understood to entail correlative duties or 
obligations.134 However, as an absolute argument agiiinst the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia, it is seriously flawed, since it proceeds on the assumption that a scheme of legalised 
euthanasia would necessarily create legal rights and duties. As was earlier observed, a rights-based 
model is not a suitable basis for implementing active voluntary euthanasia. If active voluntary 
euthanasia were to be legalised, it would 1?e far preferable to avoid this rights/duties analysis altogether 
by vesting in patients a liberty to seek active euthanasia and permitting doctors to perform active 
euthanasia at the request of a patient without creating any duty to do so. 
Practical Arguments Against Active Voluntary Euthanasia 
As noted earlier, the objections of many opponents of euthanasia are based, not on the inherent 
wrongfulness of individual acts of active voluntary euthanasia, (which they concede may be moral and 
in the interests of the individual in exceptional cases,) but arise out of concern for the long term 
consequences if the practice of active voluntary euthanasia is institutionalised.135 On the basis of this 
argument, no matter what view one takes of individual instances of active voluntary euthanasia, as a 
matter of social policy we ought to enforce a rigorous rule against it.136 The leading opponent of 
active voluntary euthanasia on pragmatic grounds is undoubtedly Kamisar, through his much 
celebrated work, 'Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation' in 
which a range of practical objections to the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia are raised.137 
Unlike doctrinaire objections, which can more readily be dismissed on the grounds that they are 
'uncritical universal negatives, not open to ethical reasoning or conscientious judgment,'138 
132 Feinberg, 'Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life,' 220-275; D. Brock, 'Voluntary 
Active Euthanasia' (1992) 22 Hastings Centre R. 10, 14. For a contrary view, see D. Callahan, 'Aid-In-
Dying: The Social Dimension' (1991) 118 Commonweal 476, 477-478. 
133 A number of opponents of legalisation have raised this objection; e.g. T. Campbell, 'Euthanasia and 
the Law' 17 (1979) Alta.L.Rev. 188, 189; Potts, 509; H. Caton, 'Difficulties of Dying' (1991) Policy 
32, 35; N. Tonti-Fillippini, 'The Right to Die - Philosophical Aspects,' paper delivered at the Pro-Life 
Victoria Seminar - Death With Dignity: Is Living Will Legislation the Answer? 27 Aug. (1983) 6. 
134 See above, 186-187. 
135 For example, Kamisar, 975; Potts, 504-509; Callahan, 'Aid-In-Dying: The Social Dimension', 476-
480; R. Weir, Abating Treatment with Critically Ill Patients, 417; P. Foot, 'Euthanasia' (1977) 6 Phil. 
& Public Affairs 85-112. For a discussion of the distinction between iqdividual cases of active 
voluntary euthanasia and the development of a social policy, see Gula, 'Moral Principles Shaping 
Public Policy on Euthanasia', 74-82. 
136 Rachels, The End of Life, 172. 
137 (1958) 42 Minn.L.Rev. 969. 
138 Fletcher, 'The Courts and Euthanasia', 229. 
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objections based on pragmatic considerations are, by their very nature, of greater practical relevance, 
requiring close and careful examination. 
The Wedge Argument 
The most popular objection to the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia is the 'slippery slope' or 
'thin edge of the wedge' argument. The wedge argument against active voluntary euthanasia has two 
forms. One form of the argument is that the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia logically 
entails non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia.139 It will be demonstrated that this form of the 
argument ignores the vital distinction between voluntary euthanasia and non-voluntary and 
involuntary euthanasia.140 The second form of the wedge argument is that whilst the legalisation of 
active voluntary euthanasia does not logically entail involuntary euthanasia, this will inevitably be 
the result if the first domino is allowed to falt 141 Thus, the wedge argument is essentially that the 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia would lead to widespread involuntary euthanasia and the 
termination of lives no longer considered socially useful. The classic statement of the wedge argument 
is to be found in the scholarly writing of .Kamisar, but it is also a basis of Christian opposition to 
euthanasia.142 The argument has gained new impetus in the modern medical context where there is 
growing concern over limited medical resources and escalating health care costs.143 The fear is that 
the perceived economic benefits which may be derived from the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia could result in an expanding category of patients for whom active euthanasia is permitted. 
Proponents of the wedge argument refer, almost inevitably, to the atrocities which took place in Nazi 
Germany in support of their contention that taking the first, albeit small, step on the slippery slope, 
will result in wrongs of ever increasing magnitude.144 However, closer examination of German 
history reveals that the concept of euthanasia from which the Nazi atrocities allegedly developed, was 
completely removed from the contemporary notion of active voluntary euthanasia as a merciful release 
from suffering performed at the patient's request 
The program of euthanasia in Germany had its origins in a highly influential book written by Binding 
and Hoche in 1920 entitled, 'Permission to Destroy Life not Worth Living•.145 In this work, Karl 
Binding, a leading jurist, and Alfred Hoche, a well known psychiatrist, advocated the killing of 
'worthless people' in order to relieve society of the burden of their care. The book was immensely 
popular and its underlying concept of 'a life not worth living' was to subsequently shape German 
medical and ethiCal thinking. The essence of this concept was that some lives are completely devoid of 
139 See J. Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Vol. ill, Harm to Self (1986) 346; and Rachels, 
The End of Life, 172-175; where they both discuss the forms of the argument. 
140 See the Introduction to this thesis, 6 for consideration of this distinction. 
141 See discussed in Feinberg, Harm to Self, 346. In this context, opponents refer mainly to involuntary 
euthanasia. 
142 Sullivan, 54-57; N. St. John Stevas, Life Death and the Law (1961) 273-274. 
143 For an example of the expression of this concern, see R. Twycross, 'Assisted Death: A Reply' (1990) 
336 Lancet 196, 797. 
144 Kamisar, 1030-1041. 
145 K. Binding and A. Hoche, Die Freigabe der Vernichtung Lebensunwerten Lebens. Ihr Mass and ihre 
Form Verlag von Felix Meiners in Leipzig (1920). 
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value and should therefore be terminated. Initially, in the 1930s, programs were introduced for the 
elimination of incurables, the mentally-ill and defective. However, with the growth of Nazi 
fanaticism, the concept of 'a life not worth living' later came to be used as a justification for 
genocide.146 The argument of euthanasia opponents is that the atrocities of Nazi Germany had started 
from small beginnings, namely with the acceptance of the attitude that there is such a thing as 'a life 
not worth living•l47 and therefore, active voluntary euthanasia must not be legalised, lest the same 
consequences result 
The Nazi experience is undeniably a lasting blemish on humanity, and no attempt will be made to 
diminish the horror or significance of this period in German history. However, the Nazi analogy is 
simply inapplicable to the contemporary notion of active voluntary euthanasia. As we have seen, the 
Nazi programme of euthanasia developed from the concept of 'a life not worth living'. It was neither 
voluntary nor based on compassion but, rather, was motivated by the desire to preserve the purity of 
the 'Volk' and rid the country of useless eaters. The Nazi experience certainly serves as a salutary 
warning of the dangers inherent in a policy of euthanasia based on the concept of 'a life not worth 
living' which, because of its indeterminacy, invites extension and abuse. However, the contemporary 
notion of active voluntary euthanasia which is being advanced in this thesis, is based upon quite a 
different premise, namely the patient's freedom of choice and right of self-determination. The 
suggestion made by some commentatorsl48 that the concept of active voluntary euthanasia 
necessarily involves acceptance of a policy that certain lives are not worth living is flatly rejected as 
being both misleading and inaccurate. As was stressed earlier, respect for a patient's right of self-
determination does not involve an objective assessment about the value or worth of that life.149 
It is frequently alleged that proponents of active voluntary euthanasia have a broader secret agenda, 
with objectives extending well beyond voluntary euthanasia. Indeed, it has been suggested that the 
strategy of the euthanasia movement has been to deliberately use the wedge principle to their own 
advantage; to secure initially the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, and once this becomes 
accepted as standard practice, they will introduce more ambitious and far-reaching reforms.150 Whilst 
the general thrust of the euthanasia movement in recent years has been confined to legalisation of 
active voluntary euthanasia, there are undoubtedly some extremists amongst euthanasia advocates, 
particularly those drawing their support from utilitarian arguments, who would be in favour of a 
146 For detailed analysis of the history of euthanasia in Germany, see; van der Sluis, 137-148, 154-160; L. 
Alexander, 'Medical Science Under Dictatorship' (1949) 241 New Eng.J.Med. 39; F. Wertham, 
'Euthanasia Murders' in Horan and Mall, 602-641. 
147 Alexander, 44. 
148 For example, R. Sherlock, 'Public Policy and the Life Not Worth Living: The Case Against Euthanasia' 
(1980) 47 Linacre Q. 121; C. Rice, The Vanishing Right to Life (1969) 61; Gormally, 72, 74-76. A 
number of Australian commentators have expressed similar views; e.g. N. Tonti-Fillippini, 'Death and 
Dying - The Ethical Issues' 15, 17 in Proceedings of a Public Meeting on Euthanasia and Infanticide, 
St. Vincent's Bioethics Centre, 4 March (1986). Note also K. Andrews, 'The Refusal of Medical 
Treatment Bill and the 'Living Will' Legislation' (1984) 2 Lawyer 13. 
149 See above, 180. 
150 For example, Kamisar, 1015. 
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broader basis for active euthanasia.151 However, a very real and significant distinction exists between 
voluntary euthanasia on the one hand, and involuntary or even non-voluntary euthanasia on the other, 
and this distinction must be firmly borne in mind in evaluating the wedge argument. Provided that the 
individual's choice is treated as determinative, there is a sufficiently clear line to prevent the 
imposition of active euthanasia on non-consenting patients. What must be emphasised is that the 
objective of active voluntary euthanasia is the promotion of individual autonomy and self-
determination rather than any sinister aim of human disposal. Recognition of patient autonomy and 
self-determination is thus a clear limiting principle against abuse. So long as this crucial distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary/non-voluntary euthanasia is understood, the first form of the wedge 
argument, namely that legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia logically entails involuntary 
euthanasia, can be unequivocally rejected.152 
The wedge argument in its second form, based upon the inevitable slide towards involuntary 
euthanasia, is a stronger argument and seemingly more difficult to refute. Notwithstanding the 
popularity of this argument, there has been wide recognition that it is an argument which must be 
treated with caution since it could be used as a basis for the opposition of virtually any social 
policy.153 Furthermore, since we are dealing with the fundamental notion of self-determination, it 
becomes necessary to weigh up whether the risks posed by the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia are both sufficiently grave and sufficiently certain to outweigh the patient's right of self-
determination. There would be little dispute regarding the gravity of the risk of involuntary and even 
non-voluntary euthanasia. However, in order for the wedge argument to be persuasive, it must be 
evident that the feared consequences which are alleged to flow from the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia are reasonably likely to occur. The mere possibility that a law permitting active voluntary 
euthanasia may be broadened in the future is not a sufficient justification for refusing to allow its 
enactment. Furthermore, since a strong moral case can be presented for the legalisation of active 
voluntary euthanasia, it is incumbent on the opponents of reform to provide convincing evidence that 
these feared consequences are indeed likely. It is at this point that the wedge objection fails to stand up 
to scrutiny. Having earlier dispensed with the Nazi analogy, there is simply no empirical evidence to 
suggest that the acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia on a strictly limited basis would be the 'thin 
edge of the wedge.' Indeed, there is significant evidence to the contrary; since 1970, active voluntary 
euthanasia has been practised in the Netherlands yet there is no evidence to suggest that this has 
represented a step onto the slippery slope, leading to involuntary euthanasia.154 Furthermore, it could 
be argued by analogy that the liberalisation of the law with regard to infanticide and suicide during the 
course of this century has not resulted in a diminution in respect for human life. In the final analysis, 
151 For example, Kohl, The Morality of Mercy Killing; G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal 
Law, 310-312; Young; 279-282; Rachels, The End of Life; P. Singer, 127-157. 
152 See also Rachels, The End of Life, 172-173. 
153 For example, Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal law, 280-281; G. Williams, 'Euthanasia 
Legislation: A Rejoinder to Non-Religious Objections', 156, 165-166; President's Commission 
Report, 29-30; Brock, 19-20. 
154 See chapter Vill, 387-392. 
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the wedge objection is an argument easily raised, but totally unsupportable and should therefore be 
dismissed.155 
Some commentators have sought to refute the wedge objection on different grounds; they point out 
that passive euthanasia is now common practice and since there is no intrinsic moral difference 
between active and passive euthanasia, they argue that if indeed there is a 'slippery slope' then we are 
already on it.156 Thus, it is argued, there is no logical basis for objection to active voluntary 
euthanasia since it is essentially equivalent to the existing practice of passive euthanasia It is further 
argued that rather than seeking to prohibit active voluntary euthanasia, it would be better to bring all 
life and death decisions out into the open where there can be the widest possible debate and public 
scrutiny.157 
The validity of this argument depends on acceptance of the view that there is no morally relevant 
difference between passive and active euthanasia - a view which is by no means universally 
endorsed.158 This line of argument does, however, highlight the artificiality in maintaining rigid 
distinctions between active and passive voluntary euthanasia, when they are often so similar in 
relevant respects.159 
For all of the foregoing reasons, slippery slope arguments do not provide a sufficient justification to 
retain the existing prohibition on active voluntary euthanasia; while the possibility of bad 
consequences should encourage us to proceed cautiously; it should not prevent us from proceeding at 
an.160 
Effect on Social Fabric of Society 
Closely connected with the wedge argument is the objection that the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia would have the effect of substantially damaging the moral and social fabric of society.161 
It is argued that any lessening of the traditional common law prohibition on killing would 
155 Commentators have sought to find support for their rejection of slippery slope arguments by drawing 
on other examples of deliberate killing which have defied the slippery slope analysis. See, for 
example, Rachels, The End of Life, 174-175; Browne, 47; Williams, 'Euthanasia and Abortion,' 181. 
One predictable way in which attempts may be made in the United States to extend the practice of active 
euthanasia if it were legalised would be in the direction of non-voluntary euthanasia for incompetent 
patients; see Callahan, 'Aid-In-Dying: The Social Dimension', 478-479. As noted in an chapter II, the 
courts in the United States have sought to equate the rights of competent and incompetent patients and 
it is quite possible that if active voluntary euthanasia were legalised, attempts would be made to extend 
the same opportunity to incompetent patients, for example, through the doctrine of substituted 
judgment. However, this does not constitute an insurmountable objection to the legalisation of active 
voluntary euthanasia, since legislation could be framed in such a way that it that would apply only to 
presently competent patients. 
156 H. Kuhse, 'Taking Patient's Rights and Interests Seriously,' 18-19; H. Kuhse, 'The Alleged Peril of 
Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Reply to Alexander Morgan Capron' (1987) 2 Euthanasia Rev. 60, 67-
70. 
157 Kuhse, 'Taking Patient's Rights and Interests Seriously', 19. 
158 For discussion, see above, 181-183. 
159 For example, in relation to intention and outcome. 
160 Rachels, The End of Life, 175. 
161 A number of commentators have advanced this argument; e.g. Shewmon, 221; M. Heifetz with C. 
Mangel, The Right to Die (1975) 108-109; Grisez, 803; Potts, 506; D. Louisell, 'Euthanasia and 
Biathanasia: On Dying and Killing' (1973) 22 Catholic U.LRev. 723, 742. 
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dehwnanise society and result in a reduced respect for human life.162 There is particular concern that 
persons involved in the practice of active euthanasia, whether directly or indirectly, would become 
brutalised and less caring and vigilant about the value of human life. 
In a sense this is simply a restatement of the wedge argwnent; it is feared that if the barriers to killing 
are lowered, the practice of active euthanasia may be extended beyond that which is originally 
envisaged. However, apart from concerns about 'slippery slopes,' this argument also appears to 
suggest that a society which allows active voluntary euthanasia is inevitably morally and socially 
inferior to a society which prohibits its practice. To begin with, one may wonder how the moral and 
social quality of society can reliably be gauged, and there is a temptation to summarily reject this 
objection on the grounds that it is impossibly vague and indeterminable. But even if this objection 
were to be taken seriously, it can be countered on the basis that existing laws allow the practice of 
passive euthanasia, as well as certain forms of killing which have been deemed justified, for example, 
killing in war, or in self-defence, yet there has been no convincing evidence to suggest that this has 
damaged .the essential fabric of society. It therefore seems invalid (particularly in the light of 
arguments that there is no morally relevant difference between active and passive euthanasia) to 
categorically assert that to allow active euthanasia performed at the request of the patient in order to 
relieve the patient's pain and suffering will necessarily diminish respect for the sanctity of life and 
result in the moral and social decline of society. In fact, if we look to the Netherlands, where active 
voluntary euthanasia is now openly practiced by doctors, there has been no evidence of such 
decline.163 Indeed, it could be argued that facilitating a gentle and easy death at the patient's request is 
a moral advance rather than a moral decline; active euthanasia, at the patient's request, is a merciful 
and benevolent act which promotes desirable virtues in society, and since it furthers the principle of 
individual self-determination it enhances, rather than diminishes, respect for human life.164 According 
to this view, it is the present prohibition of active voluntary euthanasia which amount to 
brutalisation of society. For the foregoing reasons, this objection to the practice of active voluntary 
euthanasia ought to be rejected. 
Problems in Ascertaining Patient Consent, Feared Abuses and Risk of Error 
Consideration will now tum to a number of objections to legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 
which focus on the problems of ascertaining a truly voluntary consent from the patient as well as 
concerns about feared abuse and risk or error if active voluntary euthanasia were legalised. It will be 
demonstrated that these are essentially paternalistic arguments which, if accepted, would have the 
effect of unjustifiably limiting patient autonomy. 
162 See, for example, Grisez, 803; Veatch, 86-90. 
163 See chapter Vill, 391. Note also the view in the Institute of Medical Ethics, Working Party Discussion 
Paper, 611 where it is noted that cases of doctors occasionally assisting the deaths of their patients 
have occurred without any consequent moral decline. 
164 M. Angell, 'Euthanasia' (1988) 319 New Eng.J.Med. 1348, 1350. 
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Yoluntariness and Patient Consent 
A major objection which has been raised to the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia relates to 
the issue of patient competence and decision-making capacity, and the difficulties involved in 
determining whether the patient's request for death represents a free and rational choice.165 There are a 
number of facets to this argument. One aspect of the argument is that if consent is not given until the 
final painful stages of a terminal illness, the patient may be so effected by pain, mental anguish or the 
stupefying effects of pain-relieving drugs that he or she is incapable of giving a free and rational 
consent. The mental and physical condition of a seriously ill patient may fluctuate and the patient 
may be subject to confusional states166 impairing the patient's decision-making capacity. Even where 
an apparently clear request for active euthanasia has been made, the patient may subsequently vacillate 
in his or her decision. It is argued by opponents that as a result of possible confusion, impairment and 
vacillation, it often becomes very difficult to accurately gauge the reliability of a patient's request. 
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for terminal patients to suffer from depression,167 and opponents 
maintain that a request for death may simply be an impulsive and transient response to the patient's 
difficult circumstances and may, therefore, be inherently unreliable.168 
If, on the other hand, consent is given in advance of the onset of pain and administration of 
medication, it is argued by opponents that the consent cannot be sufficiently informed and will not 
necessarily represent the true wishes of the patient at a later stage.169 
Opponents also claim that there may be problems in interpreting a patient's request: what may appear 
to be a voluntary request to die' may in fact be a call for help or support and may, therefore, not reflect 
the patient's autonomous choice.170 
These objections must be taken seriously., since the voluntariness of the patient's consent is 
undoubtedly of vital importance to the question of legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. There 
are, however, inherent limitations in this area and it is unrealistic to strive for absolute certainty. At 
the same time, the problems concerning the reliability of a terminal patient's request for death should 
not be overstatec1. l 7l 
165 For example, Kamisar, 985-990; Rice, 55-57; Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper No. 
28, Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and the Cessation of Treatment (1982) 46-47 (hereafter referred to as the 
Law Reform Commission of Canada Working Paper on Euthanasia). A Report of the same title was 
subsequently released, but references are to the Working Paper where there is more detailed analysis of 
these issues. 
166 For example, A. Stedeford, 'Confusional States' in R. Twycross and V. Ventafridda, (eds.) The 
Continuing Care of Terminal Cancer Patients (1980) 179-192. 
167 See E. Kubler-Ross, On Death and Dying (1969) where she identified five emotional stages that a dying 
patient could experience, including depression (75-98). 
168 Some evidence can be cited in support of these claims; in a study of patients who had requested to die, 
many were found to be depressed. See H. Brown et al, 'Is it Normal for Terminally Ill Patients to Desire 
Death?' (1986) 143 Am.J. Psychiatry 208. 
169 See Kamisar, 989-990. 
170 H. Zwart, 'Psychology, Self-Determination and the Veil' in 0. Aycke and M. Smook (eds.) Right to 
Self-Determination (1990) 33; J. Lynn, 'The Health Care Professional's Role When Active Euthanasia 
Is Sought' (1988) 4 J. Palliative Care 100, 100. 
171 Some support for the stability of patient preferences can be derived from a study conducted by M. 
Everhart and R. Pearlman dealing with patients' attitudes to life-sustaining treatment; 'Stability of 
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With regard to the first basis of the objection, the decision-making capacity of patients cannot be 
categorically denied simply because they are in a terminal state. This would represent an unjustifiable 
infringement of patient autonomy. Whilst some patients may be so affected that they are no longer 
able to exercise an autonomous choice, there will be others who will be capable of doing so even in 
the terminal stages of their illness. Further, it should be pointed out that these problems are not 
unique to the issue of active voluntary euthanasia The issues of patient decision-making capacity and 
voluntariness of consent arise in virtually all areas of medical practice, including cases of refusal of 
treatment Although there may be difficulties in determining whether a patient has decision-making 
capacity in a particular case, it would be unrealistic to suggest that a patient can never give a valid 
consent to the withdrawal of treatment. Similarly with active voluntary euthanasia; although 
difficulties will inevitably be encountered in ascertaining the voluntariness of a patient's consent, 
these difficulties are not insurmountable and certainly do not justify a blanket prohibition on the 
practice. Indeed, it would be inconsistent to accept that a patient can voluntarily choose passive 
euthanasia by refusing treatment, but not active euthanasia, since both involve the choice of an earlier 
death.172 
The second aspect of the opponents' argument can also be countered. It is simply unreasonable to 
contend that a patient can never be sufficiently informed to make an advance request to die. Whether an 
advance request to die in a particular case is sufficiently informed will of course depend on the 
circumstances, but provided the patient is given adequate information about his or her condition and 
prognosis, there is no reason to suggest that the patient is incapable of making an informed decision. 
Particularly where the earlier request to die is subsequently reiterated after the onset of pain and 
medication, there is every justification for assuming that the patient has made an informed and 
voluntary choice. 
Concerns regarding the interpretation of a patient's request for active euthanasia can also be countered. 
Whilst some situations are truly ambiguous, serious requests for active euthanasia can be separated 
from those that reflect symbolic gestures for assistance or attention.173 
The various concerns of the opponents regarding voluntariness of patient consent can be adequately 
addressed through appropriate regulation of the practice of active voluntary euthanasia.174 Such 
regulation would include requirements that: 1) a professional assessment is made of the patient's 
decision-making capacity; 2) the patient is appraised of sufficient facts to give an 'informed consent'; 
3) that the patient's request must be repeated on several occasions over an extended period of time 
Patient Preferences Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatments' (1990) 97 Chest 159. In this study it was 
found that despite significant changes in health status and mood, treatment preferences were stable 
over time. 
172 H. Kuhse, 'The Case for Active Voluntary Euthanasia,' 147. 
173 L. Churchill, 'Examining the Ethics of Active Euthanasia' (1990) 5 Med. Ethics for the Physician 16, 
17. 
174 For further discussion, see chapter IX, 412-425. 
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before it is acted upon; and 4) that the patient be allowed to revoke the request at any time, regardless 
of the patient's physical or mental condition.175 Such measures would largely reduce the possibility 
of doctors acting upon mistaken or inappropriate requests.176 
One question which may be raised is whether the patient's request for active euthanasia must be 
objectively reasonable before it can be regarded as a valid and voluntary consent. From the outset it 
should be acknowledged that in the majority of cases, a patient's request for death which is the product 
of reflection and made in circumstances where the patient has no prospect of recovery, is likely to be a 
rational and reasonable request. This conclusion is supported by evidence form surveys of doctors who 
have been confronted with such requests.177 However, as was argued earlier in this chapter, provided 
the patient has decision-making capacity, his or her self-determination ought to be respected and it is 
not appropriate for others to become involved in judging the objective reasonableness of the patient's 
request.178 An analogy can be drawn here with the refusal of treatment of cases; in that context, it has 
been accepted by the courts that a patient who has decision-making capacity has a right to refuse 
treatment, no matter how unreasonable or foolish that refusal may seem to the patient's medical 
advisers.179 Moreover, the courts have recognised that the apparent unreasonableness of a patient's 
decision does not justify the conclusion that he or she is incompetent in the legal sense.180 If this 
position is accepted in the context of the patient's right to refuse treatment there is no justification for 
denying the same recognition to the patient's right of self-determination in the context of active 
euthanasia. 
Feared Muses and Other Problems 
Possibility of Abuse by Unscrupulous Parties 
Closely connected with the issue of voluntariness of the patient's consent is the objection that the 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia would result in abuses of the practice.181 In particular, 
there is concern that unscrupulous doctors or family members may take advantage of the law to 
conceal a conspiracy to mtirder a patient 182 
175 See also Arras, 300. 
l 7 6 Churchill, 17. 
177 H. Kuhse and P. Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia' (1988) 148 
M.J.A. 623, 623-624; T. Robertson and S. Tobin, 'A Survey of the Attitudes of Doctors and Medical 
Students Towards Active Voluntary Euthanasia', (unpublished manuscript, Flinders Medical Centre 
1989) 34, 54. 
178 See above, 180. 
179 See McHugh J. of the High Court in Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v J. W.B. 
and S.M.B. 6 May 1992 F.C. 92/010, 91-92, (at the time of writing this decision had not yet been 
published); Smith v Auckland Hospital Board [1965] N.Z.L.R. 191, 219; Lane v Candura 376 N.E. 2d 
1232 (1978). 
180 Lane v Candura 376 N.E. 2d 1232 (1978). 
181 President's Commission Report, 79-80. 
182 For example, L. Kass, 'Neither for Love Nor Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill' (1989) 94 Public 
Interest 25, 35-36. 
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It cannot be disputed that abuses may occur if active voluntary euthanasia were legalised; the reality is 
that all laws are potentially open to abuse. All the same, the opponents' objection does not appear to 
be compelling. First, it could be argued that the present practice of active euthanasia in an illegal and 
unregulated form is likely to involve some degree of abuse and there is every reason to believe that 
legalisation of the practice, with appropriate regulatory procedures, would reduce the possibility of 
covert and improper practices.183 In any event, as a number of commentators have pointed out, 184 
the possibility of abuse already exists with respect to passive euthanasia. which ~ay in fact offer a 
greater opportunity for abuse since the patient's death may be easier to conceal than from a killing by 
more direct means. 
The possibility, or even the strong likelihood, of some abuse occurring if active voluntary euthanasia 
is legalised is not of itself sufficient to completely prohibit the practice, if, as has been suggested, 
there are powerful arguments for legalisation. Whilst abuses will inevitably result, the risk of abuse 
can be minimised by the imposition of stringent safeguards regulating the practice.185 
Pressure on the Patient 
Some opponents argue that abuse may take a more subtle form of pressure being exerted on the 
patient to request active euthanasia.186 Their argument is that chronically and terminally ill patients 
are often vulnerable and perceive themselves to be a burden on others. If active voluntary euthanasia 
were to become readily available, eligible patients may feel under a duty to request it, particularly if 
relatives or hospital staff exert pressure on patients to do so and thereby relieve them of the financial 
and social burden of their care. Thus, it is argued that legalising active voluntary euthanasia would be 
to risk putting to death many patients who do not genuinely wish to die but who are pressured into 
requesting active euthanasia. 
This is essentially an argument relating to the voluntariness of the patient's consent and reflects the 
paternalistic stance of many of the opponents of legalisation. There is no doubt that in some instances 
patients may be pressured or feel obliged to request active euthanasia. However, given the benefits 
which would flow from the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. and the fact that abuses can be 
adequately guarded against, this should not be taken as a decisive objection to the practice. In other 
areas of the law, including refusal of treatment, problems of coercion and consent have had to be dealt 
with. As part and parcel of the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. it would not be impossible 
to devise procedures which would minimise the risk of the patient's consent being undermined by 
18 3 For example, Leenen, 'Dying with Dignity: Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in the 
Netherlands,' 519; H. Kuhse and R. Young, 'A Rejoinder to Some Common Objections to the 
Legalisation of Euthanasia,' paper delivered at the ANZAAS Symposium, 'Modem Medical Technology 
and the Right to Die' (1985) 16; N. Newman, 'Euthanasia: Orchestrating "The Last Syllable of.. .. Time"' 
(1991) 53 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 153, 177; Nowell-Smith, 90. 
184 For example, Kuhse, 'The Alleged Peril of Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Reply to Alexander Morgan 
Capron', 65; Richter, 65-66. 
185 Morris, 259. Safeguards could, for example, include the requirement that the patient's request be 
witnessed by two independent persons, that official records be kept, and that the attending doctor's 
diagnosis is confirmed by another doctor. See further, chapter IX, 412-425. 
186 For example, Kamisar, 990-991; Potts, 505-506; I. van der Sluis, 'How Voluntary is Voluntary 
Euthanasia?' (1988) 4 J. Palliative Care 107, 107-108. 
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subtle familial coercion or influence. For example, as part of the procedure for the assessment of a 
patient's request for active euthanasia, possible sources of coercion would have to be investigated to 
ensure that the patient's request is truly voluntary.187 It is far more appropriate and consistent with 
principles of self-determination to try and guard against coercion and improper influence, rather than to 
deny to all the possibility of electing an earlier death. 
Possibility of Error 
A number of the arguments that have been advanced against legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 
have been based on the possibility of error in diagnosis or prognosis or the possibility of a cure being 
discovered which may save the life of the patient These objections can, however, readily be countered 
on the grounds that they are unjustifiably paternalistic and are completely contrary to the fundamental 
principle of patient self-determination. 
Possibility of Mistaken Diagnosis 
A common objection to the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia is that doctors are fallible and 
may be mistaken in their diagnosis of illness or in their assessment of prognosis for recovery.188 
Opponents point out that if a doctor mistakenly diagnoses a patient as terminal, and on the basis of 
that diagnosis, the patient requests and receives active euthanasia, a life will have been unnecessarily 
and irreversibly extinguished. Unlike in the case of passive euthanasia, where a patient may survive a 
prognostic mistake, if active euthanasia is administered, the mistake becomes self-fulfilling.189 
Accordingly, it is argued, in order to avoid the risks of mistaken diagnosis or prognosis, active 
voluntary euthanasia must be completely prohibited. 
While the chance of mistaken diagnosis or prognosis in cases of advanced terminal illness is highly 
improbable, it cannot be ruled out entirely; the possibility of error exists in all human actions. These 
risks can, however, be minimised by requiring that the patient is seen by more than one doctor before 
active voluntary euthanasia is authorised. But most importantly, the patient must be informed of the 
possibility of error, in order that he or she can make an informed and rational choice.190 It is a 
fundamental part of autonomous decision-making that the patient be allowed to weigh up the available 
information and elect to act upon it even if there is a small chance that the information may be 
187 See also the Institute of Medical Ethics, Working Party Discussion Paper, 611 where it is suggested 
that it would not normally be difficult for the doctor to discern that family pressure is the reason for the 
request. But see also the criticism of this view by Twycross, 'Assisted Death: A Reply', 797. In any 
event it could be argued that the fact that a patient's request for active euthanasia is in part based on a 
desire to relieve emotional and financial pressures on family, should not, of itself, render the patient's 
consent inoperative; see also J. Glover, Causing Death, Saving Lives (1977) 187 where he questions 
whether a paternalistic refusal to carry out the patient's wishes in these circumstances would be 
justified. See also Young, 270; Williams, 'Euthanasia Legislation: A Rejoinder to the Non-Religious 
Objections,' 156, 160. 
188 For example, Kamisar, 993-998; Rice, 57-59; Keyserlingk, Sanctity of life or Quality of Life 126; Law 
Reform Commission of Canada Working Paper on Euthanasia, 46. 
189 Capron, 55. But see the response of Kuhse, 'The Alleged Peril of Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Reply 
to Alexander Morgan Capron', 62-62 where she points out that there are also m.any cases where a 
patient's decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment will make a mistaken prognosis equally self-
fulfilling. 
190 Arras, 301-302. 
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incorrect. Whilst the possibility of mistaken diagnosis or prognosis requires extreme caution before a 
patient's condition is declared 'hopeless,' it does not constitute an adequate objection to the legalisation 
of active voluntary euthanasia 
Possibility of a Cure 
A related clinical objection is that a cure or some measure of relief may be discovered within the 
natural life expectancy of the patient l91 Supporters of this argument contend that the administration 
of active voluntary euthanasia would foreclose the possibility of the patient being able to benefit from 
any new discovery and that it should, therefore, be prohibited. 
It is certainly true that medical science is constantly advancing and the possibility always exists that a 
cure may be found for a condition previously considered hopeless. However, from a practical point of 
view, this possibility will only be of relevance to patients who have undergone euthanasia shortly 
before the discovery became readily available for use192 and who would have been able to expect a 
complete recovery from their condition. The reality is that usually, a considerable time elapses 
between the announcement of a new medical discovery and its implementation and availability for use. 
Even if the cure were immediately available, it would be unlikely to be able to reverse the condition 
of those patients with advanced terminal illness who are most likely to be seeking active voluntary 
euthanasia.193 Ultimately, it comes down to a question of patient choice. As part of the counselling 
that a patient would receive before a request for active euthanasia is acted upon, the patient should be 
informed of the possibility (albeit remote) of a cure being discovered for his or her particular 
condition. This would be especially important in circumstances where a doctor is aware of a new 
medical break-through which is soon to become available. In this way, the patient can be fully 
informed before a decision is made with respect to active voluntary euthanasia. It is then for the 
patient, in the exercise of his or her self-determination, to evaluate the possible advantages of waiting 
for a possible cure as against seeking an early release from his or her suffering. It would be most 
unreasonable to deny all patients the freedom to elect active voluntary euthanasia on the ground that 
for some this interference with their free choice may mean the possibility of a cure. 
The foregoing analysis of objections based on problems in ascertaining patient consent, feared abuses 
and risk of error gives rise to fundamental questions regarding patient autonomy. Opponents of 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia are undoubtedly sincere in their wish to protect patients 
from the risk of error or abuse and to avoid a request being acted upon which does not reflect the 
patient's genuine wishes. The question which must, however, be addressed is whether such objections 
are justifiable. More particularly, this involves the need to balance, on the one hand, the liberty 
interests of those patients who voluntarily seek active euthanasia and, on the other, the need to protect 
those who may be vulnerable to abuse or coercion from others or who may be mistakenly killed if 
191 Kamisar, 998-1005; Law Reform Commission of Canada Working Paper on Euthanasia, 46. 
192 Morris, 261. 
193 Morris, 261-262. 
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active voluntary euthanasia were legalised.194 If the present prohibition on active voluntary 
euthanasia is retained, the choice of some patients will be denied and they will be forced to suffer 
against their will.195 If, however, active voluntary euthanasia is legalised, there will be some risk of 
unwilling casualties as a result of error and abuse. The approach of opponents of legalisation has been 
to sacrifice the autonomy of patients genuinely seeking active euthanasia for the benefit of those who 
may be harmed if active voluntary euthanasia is legalised. Some opponents have attempted to justify 
their conclusion with claims that in numerical terms, the number of vulnerable persons who would be 
at risk if active voluntary euthanasia were legalised would be greater than those who would be forced 
to suffer against their will if the present prohibition is retained.196 Apart from the fact that such 
numerical claims are purely speculative and may in fact be completely unfounded, it could be argued 
that the question raised is, in any event, far more complex, involving a balancing of values.197 
Ultimately, the principle of patient autonomy must prevail, notwithstanding that this may entail 
some risk of error and abuse, particularly since these risks can be adequately guarded against by the 
introduction of appropriate safeguards. It is also quite possible that legalisation would not in fact 
produce more mistakes and abuse than non-legalisation.198 
Practical Difficulties in Formulating Criteria for Active Voluntary Euthanasia 
Another objection, which is really an extension of some of the preceding arguments, is that even if 
the concept of active voluntary euthanasia were accepted in principle, it would be extremely difficult, 
if not impossible, to formulate a legislative provision sufficiently precise to allow active voluntary 
euthanasia in appropriate cases, yet providing adequate safeguards against abuse.199 Put more bluntly, 
it is sometimes contended that specific plans for active voluntary euthanasia are simply unworkable; if 
adequate provision were to be made to ensure that the patient has given a voluntary and informed 
consent, that the patient's condition has been confirmed by consultation with other doctors, and that 
potential mistakes and abuses have been guarded against, the procedure would become so cumbersome 
and time-consuming that it would be unable to fulfil its objective of providing the means for a swift 
and painless death. Indeed, Kamisar, one of the most forceful critics of legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia, has suggested that euthanasiasts are seeking a goal which is inherently inconsistent: a 
procedure for death which provides ample safeguards against abuse and mistake and which is, at the 
same time, 'quick' and 'easy' in operation.200 
The fact that it would be difficult to devise guidelines applicable in all cases does not mean that this 
cannot or should not be undertaken. Whilst it is inevitable that an appropriate regulatory procedure for 
194 See also J.C. Fletcher, 'Is Euthanasia Ever Justifiable?' in P. Wiemik, (ed.) Controversies in Oncology 
(1982) 297, 314, 318; Lynn, 102; J. Feinberg, 'Overlooking the Merits of the Individual Case: An 
Unpromising Approach to the Right to Die' (1991) 4 Ratio Juris. 131. 
l 95 Lynn, 102. 
196 For example, J.C. Fletcher, 314; Lynn, 102. 
197 See also J. Feinberg, 'Overlooking the Merits of the Individual Case: An Unpromising Approach to the 
Right to Die', 140-151. 
198 For development of this argument, see Newman, 177-178. 
199 Kamisar, 978-985; Law Reform Commission of Canada Working Paper on Euthanasia, 47. 
200 Kamisar, 982. 
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the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia will, to some extent, cause delays in providing the 
desired result, this is not a valid reason to completely deny active voluntary euthanasia. Furthermore, 
opponents have tended to exaggerate the extent of the regulatory machinery necessary to effectively 
implement active voluntary euthanasia and the degree to which this will impede delivery of the service 
desired. 
Euthanasia is an Unnecessary and Inappropriate Response 
An alternative form of argument proceeds on the basis that active voluntary euthanasia is an 
unnecessary and inappropriate response to the patient's circumstances. There are a number of distinct 
components to this line of reasoning; that in light of developments in modem palliative care, there is 
no significant qualitative nor quantitative need for active voluntary euthanasia, that the final days of a 
patient's life may bring unexpected joy and fulfilment which the patient should not be denied and that 
in any event, legislative change is unnecessary sin~e the present laws deal adequately with the 
situation. Each of these assertions will be examined in tum. 
Capacity for Pain Relief 
Opponents of euthanasia are frequently heard to say that legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia is 
unnecessary in light of modem developments in palliative care. 201 It is alleged that modem analgesics 
and narcotics can control pain and represent a safer and more positive response to the problems of the 
terminally or incurably ill than active voluntary euthanasia 202 
Whilst it is true that there have been significant advancements in recent years in the area of palliative 
care, and that in most instances, dying patients can be made comfortable and their pain can be relieved, 
specialists in the area concede that it is not possible to eliminate pain in all cases.2°3 Furthermore, 
the practical realities of medical care often fall far short of the results achievable through optimal 
treatment 
However, more fundamentally, even if it were possible to relieve all physical pain, that would not 
obviate the need for active voluntary euthanasia. 204 For many patients, there are aspects of dying that 
drugs and other forms of palliative care cannot alleviate, including the suffering and distress of their 
condition, 205 the mental and emotional anguish, and the fear of dependency and degradation. 206 
201 Id. 1008-1011; Pollard, Euthanasia 4, 37-38, 65, 132-133; Capron, 58; M. Connolly, 'Alternatives to 
Euthanasia: Pain Management' (1989) 4 Issues I.Aw & Med. 497. 
202 Law Reform Commission of Canada Working Paper on Euthanasia, 48. See also R. Twycross, 
'Voluntary Euthanasia' in S. Wallace and A. Eser (eds.) Suicide and Euthanasia (1981) 88-98. 
203 This conclusion is based upon extensive interview work with specialists and is confirmed in the 
medical literature; e.g. J. Hockley, R. Dunlop and R. Davies, 'Survey of Distressing Symptoms in 
Dying Patients and their Families in Hospital and the Response to a Symptom Control Team' (1988) 
296 B.M.J. 1715, 1715-1717. 
204 See also M. Parker, 30; M. Ashby and B. Stoffell, 'Therapeutic Ratio and Defined Phases: Proposal of 
an Ethical Framework for Palliative Care', paper delivered at the Australian Bioethics Association 
Conference, 'Bioethics and the Wider Community' (1991) 9, 15. 
205 Williams, 'Euthanasia Legislation: A Rejoinder to Non-Religious Objections', 156, 164. 
206 For medical recognition of unrelieved pain and other distressing symptoms in the dying, see Hockley, 
Dunlop and Davies, 1715-1717. 
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Significantly, the available evidence suggests that the factors prompting a request for active euthanasia 
are not intractable physical pain but unbearable or senseless suffering. 207 As a matter of personal 
dignity, autonomy, and self-determination, patients in such circumstances should have the liberty to 
choose death. Whilst palliative care clearly constitutes a vital part of the overall care for terminal 
patients and may, if made widely available, help to reduce the need for active voluntary euthanasia, it 
can by no means obviate the need for it entirely. Knowledge that the possibility of active voluntary 
euthanasia is available may offer to patients the opportunity to live their final days in peace. 208 
Quantitative Need for Euthanasia Not Larie 
Another argument raised by the opponents of euthanasia is that legalisation is unnecessary since there 
is no great demand for active euthanasia in practice.209 Although there are enormous difficulties 
involved in accurately quantifying the extent of demand for active voluntary euthanasia, evidence was 
presented in chapter II that some patients do request active euthanasia, notwithstanding the present 
illegality of the practice, 210 and if it were to be legalised, more patients would undoubtedly articulate 
such requests. In the light of the available information, it is reasonable to assume that if active 
voluntary euthanasia were legalised it would be an option sought by only a small minority of 
patients.211 Even so, that arguably already constitutes sufficient justification for legalising the 
practice. 212 The arguments advanced in support of active voluntary euthanasia are based on 
fundamental principles and do not rely for their validity on claims regarding the extent of demand for 
the practice. 
AdeQuacy of Present Position 
A rather interesting argument advanced by some opponents is that legislation covering active 
voluntary euthanasia is unnecessary since present law and practice adequately deal with the situation 
and any legislative change would open the floodgates to unnecessary deaths.213 
Essentially this is an argument for retaining the status quo, but on closer examination this argument 
discloses the blatant hypocrisy of many of the opponents. It seems that they are willing to 
acknowledge that doctors may, in appropriate cases, administer active euthanasia without attracting 
legal sanction, yet are unwilling to condone any change in the law which legalises this practice. This 
puts doctors in an impossible situation; the conflicting message that they are given is that although 
207 Sneide(r)man, B. 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Model for Canada?' (1992) 8 Humane Med. 104, 
108. See, for example, the findings of the Remmelink survey in the Netherlands (discussed in chapter 
vm, 378-385) which found that for a majority of patients, loss of dignity was the principal reason 
behind the request and in only a small minority of case was pain the sole reason. 
208 R. Finley 'Euthanasia Debate' (letter) (1991) 323 New Eng.J.Med 1771. 
209 Kamisar, 1011. 
210 See chapter Il, 114-116. 
211 Some guide as to the demand for active voluntary euthanasia if it were legalised can be gleaned from the 
Netherlands where the practice, although not actually legal, has received some official support. The 
Remmelink survey (discussed in chapter Vill, 378-385) found that there are approximately 9,000 
explicit requests for active euthanasia or assisted suicide each year in the Netherlands which has a 
population of approximately 14 million and an annual total of approximately 130,000 deaths. 
212 See also Williams, 'Euthanasia Legislation: A Rejoinder to Non-Religious Objections', 156, 164. 
213 Kamisar, 1041-1042. 
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active voluntary euthanasia is unlawful, the law may tum a blind eye to its administration in 
practice.214 Whilst it is unlikely that a doctor would be prosecuted for murder it is undesirable that 
doctors should be exposed to the risk of criminal liability. The recent conviction of Dr Cox in the 
United Kingdom for the attempted murder of his patient has brought into sharp focus the legal 
vulnerability of doctors who respond to a patient's request for active euthanasia. 215 Moreover, the 
present practice of active euthanasia is necessarily informal and covert, and is, therefore, more likely 
to be discriminatory and subject to abuse. If, as a society, we have reached a situation where we accept 
the practice of active voluntary euthanasia in appropriate cases but wish doctors to avoid prosecution, 
it would be much more satisfactory to formalise the situation by legalising active voluntary 
euthanasia in carefully regulated circumstan,ces. As suggested in the preceding chapter, there are 
powerful arguments in favour of closing the gap between the law on the books and the law in 
practice.216 
The Patient Can Always Commit Suicide 
Another basis on which some opponents of euthanasia argue that legislative change is unnecessary is 
that patients who are serious about wanting death always have the option of committing suicide.217 
Some opponents regard suicide as preferable to active voluntary euthanasia since it removes doubt as 
to the voluntariness of the act and avoids the problems associated with third party involvement 
Committing suicide is by no means an easy thing to do. Information about the means of committing 
suicide may be difficult to obtain218 and suicide attempts without medical information and/or help are 
often messy, undignified and ultimately unsuccessful. In many instances, those patients who would be 
likely to seek active voluntary euthanasia (i.e. patients who have reached an advanced stage of terminal 
illness) are no longer in a position to take their own lives. They are often immobilised by their 
condition and simply do not have the means available to commit suicide without the co-operation of 
others.219 Moreover, some persons may find the concept of suicide repugnant, yet would willingly 
avail themselves of the option of active voluntary euthanasia administered by a doctor. Further, it 
could be argued that if suicide is to be the only option available to patients, it would tend to 
encourage persons who are aware of their hopeless condition to act while they are still physically able 
to do so, thereby possibly depriving them of extra time which they may have enjoyed had medically 
administered active voluntary euthanasia been available.220 
214 Nowell-Smith, 86; Williams, 'Euthanasia Legislation: A Rejoinder to Non-Religious Objections', 156, 
157-158; Flew, 40, 45-46. For criticism of this position see also the Institute of Medical Ethics, 
Working Party Discussion Paper, 611. 
215 For further discussion of this case, see chapter IV, 126-127. 
216 See chapter IV, 146-150. 
217 For example, Kamisar, 1011; Grisez, 'Suicide and Euthanasia', 742, 803. 
218 In the United States a number of so-called 'suicide manuals' have been published by the Hemlock 
Society, (a pro-euthanasia advocacy group); D. Humphry, Let Me Die Before I Wake (5th ed. 1987); D. 
Humphry, Final Exit (1991). This latter book, which is quite explicit in setting out drug dosages and 
techniques on how to commit suicide, was initially banned for distribution in Australia by the Film and 
Literature Board, but following considerable criticism of this decision the ban has been lifted and the 
book will be available to persons of 18 years and over as a restricted publication. 
219 Williams, 'Euthanasia Legislation: A Rejoinder to Non-Religious Objections', 164-165; Moore, 336. 
220 See also J.C Fletcher, 307, 318. 
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Bual Days 
A further argument, possibly with religious overtones, is that one can never know what the final days 
of life for a dying patient will hold and that by allowing active voluntary euthanasia, we may 
foreclose the possibility of some profound good such as reconciliation, reaffirmation or 
realisation. 221 
Undoubtedly for some patients, their final days in the face of impending death may yield unexpected 
and invaluable experiences. However, this is not a valid argument for denying the individual the 
liberty to choose an earlier death. It would be unjustifiably paternalistic to insist that patients must 
endure a prolonged dying in the hope that this will be a rewarding experience. The wishes of a patient 
who has decision-making capacity ought to be respected, even though this may result in lost spiritual 
or emotional opportunities for him or her. 
Effect on the Doctor/Patient Relationship 
A further objection which is frequently raised by opponents to euthanasia is that any change to the 
law permitting doctors to administer active voluntary euthanasia. would have serious implications for 
the relationship between doctor and patient 222 This argument is often supported with claims that the 
doctors are opposed to active voluntary euthanasia and do not wish to become involved in its 
practice. 223 
Opponents argue that the doctors' traditional role in the community, based on the Hippocratic 
Oath, 224 has been that of healer, trusted with the responsibility of saving and prolonging life and that 
to cao;t doctors in the role of administering active euthanasia would undermine and compromise the 
objectives of the medical profession and destroy the trust and confidence that is essential to the success 
of the doctor/patient relationship. 225 Doctors would be viewed by their patients as killers instead of 
healers, and patients - in any event a vulnerable group - would feel threatened because of their doctor's 
possible participation in active euthanasia. Thus, opponents argue, the prohibition on active 
euthanasia must remain in order to preserve the doctor/patient relationship and to ensure that patients 
can at all times feel that their doctor will act as the guardian of life. 226 Apart from the need to protect 
the doctor/patient relationship, concerns have also been raised regarding the possible psychological 
consequences to doctors if they participate in the practice of active voluntary euthanasia. 227 For 
221 Gillett, 67. 
222 Pollard, Euthanasia, 73-75; Trowell, 128-131; St. John Stevas, 275; Church Assembly Board for 
Social Responsibility, On Dying Well, 59; Rice, 58. 
223 For example, St. John Stevas, 275. 
224 Inter alia, the Oath provides; 'I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such 
counsel'. For a modern translation of the Hippocratic Oath see L. Edelstein, '/'he Hippocratic Oath 
(1943). 
225 For example, Capron, 55; Kass, 35; Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility, On Dying 
Well, 59; Keyserlingk, Sanctity of life or Quality of Life, 128; President's Commission Report, 79; 
B.M.A. Working Party Report, Euthanasia, 18-20. 
226 Trowell, 130-131. 
227 For example, R. Misbin, 'Physicians' Aid-in-Dying' (1991) 325 New Eng.J.Med. 1307, 1309. Note 
also D. Schiedermayer, R. Shapiro and J. Puma, 'Euthanasia' (letter) (1989) 321 New Eng.J.Med. 120. 
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example, fears have been expressed that to allow a doctor to kill a patient. even at the patient's 
request. is to desensitise the doctor to the value of human life.228 
First of all it should be noted that the objection based on the potential damage to the doctor/patient 
relationship is not an absolute argument against the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia; 
euthanasia need not necessarily be performed by the medical profession and it would be possible to 
frame legislation in such a way so that doctors are not involved.229 However, doctors are clearly the 
most appropriate group of persons to administer active voluntary euthanasia in view of their contact 
with and knowledge of the patient. and their medical expertise which is necessary to facilitate a 
painless and dignified death. Moreover, doctors practice under well-recognised codes of ethics and have 
the professional integrity and organisation to administer and monitor the implementation of active 
voluntary euthanasia.230 And whilst it is true that professional medical associations are 
overwhelmingly opposed to active voluntary euthanasia, 231 surveys indicate that a significant 
proportion of doctors would be willing to participate in the practice if it were legal.232 Furthermore, 
as outlined above, there is evidence to suggest that some doctors already perform active euthanasia. 233 
As was argued earlier, if this is indeed the case, it would be preferable for the practice to be open and 
regulated.234 It is important. however, to emphasise that proper legislation would not impose upon 
doctors a duty to kill - it would simply allow a willing doctor to comply with the patient's request for 
active euthanasia without the fear of incurring criminal liability.235 
Assuming then, that if active voluntary euthanasia were to be legalised, doctors would be the ones to 
administer it. consideration needs to be given to the substance of the opponents' argument that 
permitting doctors to perform active voluntary euthanasia would be contrary to the traditional role of 
the medical profession and would adversely effect the doctor/patient relationship. 
Properly understood, the goals of medicine are to prolong and preserve life and cure diseas~, but at the 
same time, to relieve pain and suffering.236 These goals are potentially conflicting: the prolongation 
of life may prolong suffering, and conversely, in order to relieve pain and suffering, it may· be 
228 Misbin, 1309. 
229 See also Flew, 44-45. Provision could, for example, be made for active euthanasia to be performed by 
friends or relatives of the patient, or by trained lay persons. One suggestion, which would avoid the 
involvement of ordinary medical practitioners, has been advanced by R. Crisp, 'A Good Death: Who 
Best to Bring It?' (1987) 1 Bioethics 14, 77-79 where he suggests that if active voluntary euthanasia 
were to be legalised it should become part of an area of medical specialisation in the care of the 
terminally ill. 
230 See also Brock, 21; South Australian Voluntary Euthanasia Society, Voluntary Euthanasia and the 
Medical Profession: An Invitation to Dialogue (1990) 27. 
23 1 With the exception of the Doctors' Reform Society in Australia and the Royal Dutch Medical 
Association in the Netherlands. 
232 See Kuhse and Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia,' 625; Medical 
Practitioners Concerned with Assisted Dying, Media Release, 'South Australian Doctors Help Incurable 
Patients to Die' 28 July 1992; Center for Health Ethics and Policy Graduate School of Public Affairs, 
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235 P. Key, 'Euthanasia: Law and Morality' (1989) 6 Auckland U.L.Rev. 224, 240. 
236 E. Cassel, 'The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine' (1982) 306 New Eng.J.Med. 639. 
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necessary to shorten life.237 Importantly, it must be recognised that in some cases, life cannot be 
saved nor disease cured. In these circumstances, the doctor's role in alleviating suffering is of 
paramount importance and the administration of active euthanasia at the patient's request can be seen 
as a legitimate part of the doctor's role as health care professional; the principle of patient autonomy 
should be sufficient to override the imperative to save life while still honouring the doctor/patient 
relationship in continuing to relieve suffering.238 And whilst opponents frequently argue that the 
Hippocratic Oath prohibits doctors from acceding to patient's requests for active voluntary euthanasia, 
this objection has little force in contemporary society, where a literal interpretation of the Oath is of 
limited practical relevance. 239 
Further, it can be argued that legalisation of doctor administered active voluntary euthanasia would not 
necessarily have adverse effects on the doctor/patient relationship. If one has regard to the position in 
the Netherlands, where active voluntary euthanasia is ~ow openly practiced, there does not appear to 
have been any erosion of the trust between patients and their doctors. 240 In fact, for many people, the 
knowledge that their doctor could assist in administering active euthanasia at their request would have 
a positive effect, fostering greater confidence, and relieving anxiety about an agonising and undignified 
death.241 Thus, contrary to the claims of opponents, the legalisation of doctor administered active 
voluntary euthanasia could have the effect of strengthening the doctor/patient relationship. Support for 
this view can be derived from public opinion polls which show overwhelming support for doctors 
being able to administer active voluntary euthanasia.242 To suggest that doctors performing active 
voluntary euthanasia would be viewed as 'killers' ignores the fact that the legalisation of active 
euthanasia would be subject to stringent safeguards, requiring patient consent, and providing that any 
termination of life not in accordance with those requirements would remain unlawful and punishable 
as homicide.243 There is good reason to believe that the public's trust and confidence in the medical 
profession will not decrease if its members are sure that active euthanasia will not be administered 
237 M. Parker, 32. 
238 Ibid. 
239 See R. Winton, The Doctors' Oath (1987) 9 where he points out that medical students in Australia are 
not required to recite the Hippocratic Oath when they graduate. Quite a number of commentators have 
cast doubt on the status of the Hippocratic Oath; some have suggested that even in its day, the Oath did 
not represent the views of the majority of doctors (e.g. D. Humphry and A. Wickett, The Right to Die 
(1986) 327; R. Devettere, 'Reconceptualising the Euthanasia Debate' (1989) 17 Law, Med. & Health 
Care 145, 147; others have suggested that notwithstanding the terms of the Oath, the Hippocratic 
tradition was not opposed to active voluntary euthanasia; e.g. P. Carrick, Medical Ethics in Antiquity 
(1985) 154-159. 
Quite apart from the issue of active euthanasia, evidence of the irrelevance of the Hippocratic Oath for 
practical purposes can be found with regard to the abortion issue; although prohibited under the Oath, 
abortion is a fairly common medical practice. 
240 See the Institute of Medical Ethics, Working Party Discussion Paper, 611 and chapter VIII, 391-392 
dealing with the position in the Netherlands. 
241 H. Cohen, 'Euthanasia as a Way of Life' (1991) 43 Hemlock Q. 1, 7-8; Russell, 223; Kuhse, 'The 
Alleged Peril of Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Reply to Alexander Morgan Capron', 63-64; Institute 
of Medical Ethics, Working Party Discussion Paper, 611. 
242 See chapter VI, 229-239. 
243 See also J. Davies, 'Raping and Making Love are Different Concepts: So are Killing and Voluntary 
Euthanasia' (1988) 14 J.Med. Ethics 148, 148-149. 
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without their explicit request. 244 Doctors are bound by strict codes of ethics and can be trusted to act 
responsibly if empowered to perform active voluntary euthanasia. 
The final aspect to the opponents' objection to the involvement of doctors in the practice of active 
voluntary euthanasia based on the possible detrimental psychological effects on doctors can also be 
rejected. There is simply no evidence to support this argument and in fact the experience in the 
Netherlands suggests the contrary.245 Even if one were to accept the possibility of potential 
psychological damage if doctors become involved in the practice of death, the risk of such damage 
would be minimised by ensuring that doctors' participation in active euthanasia at the patient's request 
would be entirely voluntary. It must ais-o be borne in mind that active euthanasia would be an option 
sought by only a small minority of patients so the occasions that a doctor would be involved in its 
performance would be few and far between. In any event, the concept of active voluntary euthanasia 
cannot be judged in isolation. It has been argued earlier in this thesis that doctors are already involved 
in conduct which hastens death in the form of omissions to provide treatment and the administration 
of some pain-relieving drugs. 246 In these circumstances, it is difficult to allege that the voluntary 
participation of a doctor in active euthanasia at the request of a patient would be likely to have a 
detrimental psychological effect on doctors. Moreover, it could be argued that there are also problems 
in retaining the status quo; doctors may become desensitised to human suffering if they feel they are 
denied by law the means to alleviate that suffering.247 For the foregoing reasons, the objections of 
opponents to doctors' participation in active voluntary euthanasia are largely without foundation. 
Legalisation Would Discourage Medical Research and Developments 
in Palliative Care 
A further argument which has been advanced against the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia is 
that it would discourage the search for new c~es and progress in palliative care. 248 Opponents argue 
that the prohibition on active euthanasia has been an important impetus in the development of 
humane terminal care and research for cures for terminal conditions. If we now permit active voluntary 
euthanasia. we will be jeopardising future developments in these areas to the detriment of the majority 
of patients. 
Few would wish to disagree with the proposition that research efforts should be encouraged and that 
every attempt should be made to devise more humane forms of terminal care; indeed this may help to 
reduce the number of patients who would request active euthanasia as a solution to their situation. 
However, it cannot be assumed, as the euthanasia opponents appear to have done, that legalisation of 
244 See also Leenen, 'Dying with Dignity: Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in the Netherlands', 
519; Kuhse, 'The Alleged Peril of Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Reply to Alexander Morgan Capron', 
64. 
245 See chapter Vill, 391-392. 
246 See chapter N, 121-122. For analysis of these practices, see chaper N, 150-175. 
247 Misbin, 1309. 
248 See, for example, Potts, 504-505; S. Wolf, 'Holding the Line on Euthanasia' (1989) 19 Hastings Center 
R. 13; R. Twycross, 'Debate: Euthanasia - A Physician's Viewpoint' (1982) 8 J.Med. Ethics 86, 91; 
J.C. Fletcher, 297-321; Grisez and Boyle, 151. 
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active voluntary euthanasia would necessarily have the effect of discouraging medical research and 
progress in palliative care. Since active voluntary euthanasia would more than likely be an option 
only sought be a small minority, justification would remain for continuing research and 
improvements in terminal care for the great majority of patients. It is, in any event, misguided to 
regard active voluntary euthanasia as in any way competing with medical research and developments. 
Rather, what opponents wish to achieve is to expand the options available to patients, by offering 
active voluntary euthanasia alongside other forms of care and treatment 249 
Eyaluatjon of the Case For and Against Active Voluntary Euthanasia 
In the preceding part, attention has focused on the objections that have most frequently been raised 
against the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. In assessing these arguments, it must be 
emphasised that we are dealing with the issue of legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. So, 
whilst many of the arguments may be perfectly valid objections to non-voluntary or involuntary 
euthanasia, the crucial distinction between voluntary euthanasia on the one hand, and involuntary or 
non-voluntary euthanasia on the other, must be firmly borne in mind. 
The basis for opposition to legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia has come from a variety of 
sources, including religious, moral and philosophical objections, but the most serious challenge to 
the pro-legalisation case undoubtedly stems from objections based on practical arguments. There is, in 
fact, a significant area of common ground in the euthanasia debate in that many commentators would 
agree that legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia would give rise to the risk of abuse, mistake and 
other undesirable consequences. However, a fundamental difference of opinion exists as to the 
appropriate response in these circumstances. Opponents vigorously argue that legalisation, even under 
strict conditions, would create unacceptable risks and that the benefits which would be gained would 
be far outweighed by the dangers to society. 250 Thus, they argue, the risks and dangers are too great 
to warrant a change to the existing law. Proponents, on the other hand, emphasise the importance of 
patient autonomy. They contend that the risks and dangers associated with legalisation do not justify 
an absolute prohibition of active voluntary euthanasia and can be adequately dealt with by appropriate 
regulation and the imposition of rigorous safeguards. Further, they argue that the criminal law should 
not intervene in the exercise of individual liberty unless there are compelling social interests requiring 
it to do so.251 
249 Glover, 187~188. 
250 For example, Kamisar, 976; Law Reform Commission of Canada Working Paper on Euthanasia, 46-48. 
251 For example, Morris, 254. 
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PA~T III 
The Legal Philosophers' Debate; The Role of the Criminal Law 
The euthanasia debate gives rise to fundamental questions about the rights and interests of individuals 
weighed against the values and interests of society as a whole. The aim of this part is to examine the 
role of the criminal law and ascertain the circumstances in which State intervention in individual 
autonomy is justified. Specific consideration will then be given to the proper scope of the criminal 
law with regard to active voluntary euthanasia. 
The Libertarian Premise; The Prevention of Harm 
Of the competing views regarding the appropriate basis for criminal law intervention,252 the most 
convincing argument is the libertarian premise that individuals should be free to do as they please, 
provided that their conduct does not cause harm to others; in short, the 'harm principle•.253 The 
classic exposition of this view is by John Stuart Mill, in his now famous On Liberty,254 where he 
wrote that: 
The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member 
of a civilised community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully 
be compelled to do or to forbear because it will be better for him to do so, 
because it will make him happier, because in the opinion of others, to do so 
would be wise or even right. 255 
According to this view, the principal role of the criminal law is to protect society and its members 
against harm and to punish behaviour which threatens or harms public interests. This involves 
protection, not only from physical injury, but also the protection of fundamental social values and 
interests. 256 Individual freedom is qualified only by the restraint necessary for the protection of the 
bodily integrity and freedom of others. Prevention of self-caused harm is not a valid ground for 
intervention with a person's autonomous choices. As was seen in an earlier chapter the common law 
has traditionally accorded the highest value to the preservation and protection of human life. 257 The 
common law tradition, as reflected in the criminal law sanctions, regards human life as sacred and 
inalienable and prohibits anyone from licensing their own self-destruction. The prohibition of 
252 For discussion of some of the possible justifications for State intervention in the affairs of the 
individual, see, for example, J. Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, a four volume series 
comprised of Vol. I Harm to Others (1984); Vol. II Offense to Others (1985); Vol ID Harm to Self 
(1986); and Vol. IV Harmless Wrongdoing (1988). 
253 For detailed analysis of the meaning of 'harm', see Feinberg, Hann to Others, 31-64. 
254 (2nd ed., 1859). 
255 72. - ~ -
256 Canadian Law Reform Commission, Our Criminal Law (1976) 16. 
257 See chapter I, 15-16, 17-18. 
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homicide constitutes a fundamental component of the criminal law's protection of human life. This 
prohibition is obviously necessary for the protection of society and its members, since killing is 
normally a harm, violating the right to life of the person killed. Thus, a clear rule against active 
killing is entirely justified. 
The question arises as to whether a merciful killing at the patient's request should be treated as any 
other homicide. Although killing will usually constitute a harm, this is not always the case. Killing 
of a person is only wrongful and constitutes a harm where it deprives a person of their right to 
life. 258 Where, however, a person bas a rational interest in dying and has expressed a clear wish to do 
so, the killing of that person violates no rights and therefore, does not constitute a 'harm' in the 
accepted sense. 259 In the absence of harm to any individual, there is arguably no need for the criminal 
law prohibition of murder to apply. Furthermore, even if it were accepted as a general proposition that 
the State has a legitimate interest in the lives of its citizens such that it may prevent a healthy person 
from taking bis or her life,260 in the circumstances where a person is terminally or incurably ill and 
expresses a wish to die, the State can claim no compelling social interests justifying interference with 
the individual's liberty to choose a quick and painless death.261 Indeed, in the case of active voluntary 
euthanasia, it is difficult to see bow acceding to the request of a terminal or incurable patient for a 
release from suffering can in any practical sense endanger society. If we are to respect the individual's 
right to liberty, we must allow him or her to seek an earlier death with the assistance of others.262 
Opponents will, once again, seek to rely on the 'wedge argument' as a basis of justifying the 
maintenance of the existing prohibition on active voluntary euthanasia, arguing that the present law 
provides a valuable barrier against unlawful killing which we must be careful to preserve. 
Consideration has already been given to the counter-arguments to the wedge objection and no attempt 
will be made here to retrace that ground. What may be observed, however, for the purposes of the 
present analysis, is the inconsistency of the present law which permits human life to be deliberately 
taken in some circumstances without criminal consequences, yet categorically prohibits the taking of 
life at the request of a fully informed patient who has decision-making capacity. So, for example~ in 
cases of war, capital punishment and self-defence the criminal law has made some concession to the 
sanctity of life principle and accepts that there may be good reason for the intentional termination of 
life. Some important public interest seems to have been recognised sufficient to justify these cases of 
killing, despite the general presumption of the law against the taking of life.263 Yet, according to 
258 B. Brody, 'A Non-Consequentialist Argument for Active Euthanasia' in B. Brody and T. Engelhardt, 
Bioethics (1987) 161-165; Richards, 358-359; Kohl, 'Euthanasia and the Right to Life', 80. 
259 Feinberg, Hann to Others, 116; R. Young, 'What is So Wrong with Killing People' (1979) 54 Phil. 
515, 518, 524. 
260 Any such claim is objectionable in so far that it implies that citizens have a duty to live and contribute 
to society. For further criticism, see also T. Engelhardt and M. Malloy, 'Suicide and Assisting Suicide: 
A Critique of Legal Sanctions' (1982) 36 Sw.L.J. 1003, 1009-1010; Richards, 376-378. 
261 Williams, 'Euthanasia Legislation: A Rejoinder to the Non-Religious Objections', 157; Moore, 330; 
Small, 200; Arras, 293. -
262 Note also Rachels, The End of Life, 181-182 where he argues that Mill's principle applies not only to 
acts which are entirely self-regarding (e.g. suicide) but also to individuals who voluntarily agree to act 
together; this is still a private affair and no one else's interests need be involved. 
263 Grisez and Boyle, 190. 
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current criminal law principles, the consent of the patient is not regarded as sufficient justification to 
absolve another person from criminal liability for assisting the patient to die. 
The Present Limits of Consent 
In the earlier analysis of the criminal law in chapters I and II, attention was drawn to the very 
significant limits that are placed on consent for the purposes of the criminal law.264 It was shown 
that on the basis of established principles, one cannot licence the infliction of death on oneself by 
another. 265 Indeed, the consent of the victim is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to the issue of liability 
for homicide. The question arises, however, why an individual should not be able to validly dispose of 
his or her right to bodily integrity by consenting to be killed, provided that no harm is thereby caused 
to others? In other contexts the consent of the individual is all important, for example with regard to 
medical treatment with the consequence that the administration of treatment without the consent of a 
patient who has decision-making capacity would generally be unlawful. It could, accordingly, be 
argued that an individual should have the same right to consent or not to consent to active voluntary 
euthanasia and consent ought not be vitiated on questionable public policy grounds.266 
It must be understood that what is being claimed here is not a general right that all individuals be free 
to lawfully consent to their own death. Indeed, it is acknowledged that the State has a direct interest in 
maintaining the lives of healthy and productive citizens and maintaining social order and that the 
introduction of a general right to consent to one's death could undermine these legitimate State 
interests. Rather, what is being claimed is a more limited entitlement for terminal and incurable 
patients that they may give a legally effective consent to a doctor to bring about their death. In these 
circumstances, the State does not have a sufficient interest in the timing and manner of the patient's 
death to justify negating the patient's consent. 
Relationship between Law and Morality 
It was suggested earlier that the principle role of the criminal law is to protect society and its 
members against harm and to punish behaviour which threatens or harms public interests.267 Another 
issue which must be addressed is the relationship between law and morality, and what bearing this has 
upon the question of legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. Is active voluntary euthanasia 
immoral, and further, is the answer to this question determinative of whether it should be subject to 
criminal sanction? 
There has been a longstanding debate about the proper role of the criminal law, and more particularly, 
whether the criminal law should be used to attempt to enforce morality, even though immorality will 
264 See chapter I, 16-18, and chapter II, 70-81. 
265 G. Williams, 'Consent and Public Policy' (1962) Crim.L.Rev. 74 (Part 1), 154 (Part 2). 
266 Cf G. Fletcher, Rethinking the Criminal Law (1978) 770-771 where he seeks to explain why 
autonomy gives way to competing social values in these circumstances. 
267 See above, 222. 
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cause no tangible harm to others.268 The leading exponent of the view that the criminal law does 
have a role in enforcing morality has been Lord Devlin in his much acclaimed work, The Enforcement 
of Morals.269 Devlin's thesis is that the law exists for the protection of society, not merely for the 
benefit of the individual, and in order to discharge its function, the law must protect the community of 
ideas, political and moral, without which no society can exist. 270 In support of his thesis, Devlin 
seeks to demonstrate that the criminal law is in fact based upon moral principles and to illustrate this 
proposition, he refers to the attitude which the criminal law adopts towards consent. He argues the 
reason that an individual cannot consent to an offence agmnst himself is because it is an offence 
against society, in that it threatens one of the great moral principles upon which society is based - the 
sanctity of human life. Thus, he concludes, there is only one explanation of what has hitherto been 
accepted as the basis of the criminal law; that there are certain standards of behaviour or moral 
principles which society requires to be observed, the breach of which is an offence not merely against 
the person who is injured but against society as a whole. 271 
However, many commentators disagree with the proposition put forward by Devlin that the 
enforcement of a common morality is within the proper scope of the criminal law.272 The primary 
objection to Devlin's moral theory is that the legal enforcement of morals will seriously impinge 
upon individual freedom and self-determination. The view is widely held that there are some areas of 
private morality and individual conscience which simply ought not to be subject to legal sanction. 
With particular reference to Devlin's reasoning regarding the irrelevance of consent, it has been argued 
that the rules excluding the victim's consent as a defence to criminal charges do not necessarily 
support his contention that the function of the law is to enforce moral principles and instead may 
perfectly well be explained as a piece of paternalism, designed to protect individuals against 
themselves. 273 
Even if one disagrees with Devlin's principal thesis, one has to recognise that morality is not 
completely irrelevant to the criminal law. It seems obvious that some relationship between law and 
morality exists, in that much of what is criminal conduct will also incur the moral condemnation of 
the community, and conversely, the law draws its strength from the common morality. There can, 
however, be no one for one correspondence;274 the fact that something is immoral does not 
necessarily mean that it should consequently be unlawful, and conversely, whether or not something 
is lawful is not of itself determinative of the morality of that conduct. 
268 For the principal contributors to the debate, see the Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences 
and Prostitution (1957) Cmnd. 247 (hereafter referred to as the Wolfenden Report); Mill, (On Liberty); 
P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1965); H. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (1962). Note also 
Lord Hailsham, 'The Law, Politics and Morality' (1988) Denning L.J. 59. 
269 (1965). 
27o Id. 1-25. 
211 [d. 6-1. 
272 For example, the Wolfenden Report and Hart. 
273 Hart, 30-34. 
274 Hailsham, 60-61. 
226 
In the light of the foregoing analysis, we are now in a position to consider the issue of active 
voluntary euthanasia and the proper role of the criminal law in this area. Is active voluntary euthanasia 
immoral? The position taken in this thesis is that it is not, and that would certainly be the view of 
most of proponents of active voluntary euthanasia 275 However, in our pluralistic society, there is no 
community consensus regarding the morality of active voluntary euthanasia. But, the significant point 
is that once one accepts that there is no one for one correspondence between law and morality, it 
becomes unnecessary to pronounce decisively on the morality of active voluntary euthanasia. Thus, 
even if active voluntary euthanasia is immoral, that does not in itself constitute sufficient justification 
for maintaining the existing legal prohibition of the practice.276 By the same token, it is accepted 
that evidence of the morality of active voluntary euthanasia will not of itself be a decisive argument 
for its legalisation. Indeed, as we have seen, there are many opponents who argue that although active 
voluntary euthanasia may be moral in isolated cases, it ought nonetheless be prohibited.277 However, 
the practical arguments against legalisation have already been countered and in the absence of 
convincing evidence of likely harm to others resulting from a patient's choice to opt for an earlier 
death, the question of active euthanasia is essentially a matter of private choice which should be left to 
the individual patient in the exercise of his or her self-determination. 
Furthermore, in assessing the appropriate relationship between law and morality, it should not be 
overlooked that it is possible that the enforcement of morality may itself lead to harm, far in excess of 
any possible harm that the prohibited practices themselves may entail. In the context of the law's 
continuing prohibition of active voluntary euthanasia this is a very real possibility. The prohibition 
is aimed at protecting the sanctity of life, but denying the patient the choice of an earlier death may 
violate the patient's dignity and self-determination and cause unnecessary suffering. Thus, in any 
analysis of the role of the law and the relationship between law and morality, one cannot ignore the 
costs involved in invoking the criminal law. 
Relationship between Law and Public Opinion 
Related to the foregoing discussion about law and morality is the issue of public opinion and the 
extent to which the law should reflect the wishes of the community. This is a relevant issue in the 
euthanasia debate, in view of growing public support for the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia 278 
The appropriate relationship between the law and public opinion has long been a matter for dispute. 
There is, for example, debate as to whether the law ought to follow behind public opinion, so that it 
can count on the support of the community as a whole or whether its role is to lead or fortify public 
275 As Kohl notes, (Beneficent Euthanasia, xvi) it is possible to take the view that active voluntary 
euthanasia is morally wrong but should nevertheless be legalised. He points out, however, that this is 
not widely argued for in the literature. 
276 Kohl, Beneficent Euthanasia; Flew, 40-41. 
277 See above, 201. 
278 See above, 195. 
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opinion.279 From the outset it should be acknowledged that the mere fact that there is public support 
for something cannot be taken as evidence that it ought be legalised. The relevance of public opinion 
must be more carefully justified than crude reliance on support in numbers. 
While the criminal law obviously fulfils a number of roles, it has been argued in this thesis that its 
primary role is to protect society and its members from harm. This protective function is 
complemented by the criminal law's educative role, seeking to encourage law-abiding behaviour, and 
punishing those who threaten or harm public interests. Because of the criminal law's role in primarily 
protecting, and also educating the community, public support for the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia can never, of itself, be sufficient justification for reform of the law. Public opinion may 
quite possibly be misguided or misinformed, or may have failed to take into account the full 
implications of legalisation. Before the case for reform is made out, it must be shown that the 
consequences of legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia have been addressed, and that no harm is 
likely to result to society or its members if the practice is legalised. Within these confines, public 
opinion should have a role in shaping the law, indicating, as it does, prevailing moralify and the needs 
of the community. After all, ultimately, the law must serve the community and it must, therefore, be 
responsive to real social needs. It is widely recognised that if a law is markedly out of tune with 
public opinion it will quickly fall into disrepute.280 Thus, while evidence of community support for 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia is not of itself decisive, it is undoubtedly a relevant factor 
in determining the appropriateness of legalisation and in the chapter which follows, evidence will be 
provided of growing public support for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 281 
In the preceding analysis an attempt has been made to demonstrate that active voluntary euthanasia 
differs significantly from other proscribed forms of killing and that in light of these differences, the 
present criminalisation of active voluntary euthanasia is beyond the proper scope of the criminal law. 
On libertarian principles, it has been argued that the State may only impose criminal sanctions in 
respect of conduct which is likely to cause serious harm to others. As there is no evidence that 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia would be likely to cause harm, retention of the existing 
prohibition cannot be justified. 
The present law which prohibits active voluntary euthanasia is a violation of the individual 's liberty 
and self-determination. The choice whether to live or die is essentially a private choice, and individuals 
should be permitted to live their lives according to their own life choices, free of coercion or 
paternalistic interference. 282 The liberty of the individual is paramount and must be preserved to the 
extent that it does not constitute a danger to society. The optimum way of maximising individual 
freedom with regard to active voluntary euthanasia, but at same time, ensuring protection of society 
and its members, is through the creation of a carefully defined exception to the general prohibition 
279 The Wolfenden Report, para. 16. 
280 Ibid. 
281 See chapter VI, 229-239. 
282 See also Arras, 292. 
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against killing. Recognition of such an exception is not inconsistent with the fundamental belief that 
human life has value and must be protected wherever possible. Indeed the criminal law's prohibition of 
murder will continue to protect the right to life of all patients who choose not to avail themselves of 
active voluntary euthanasia Further, removal of the present prohibition would tend to promote justice 
and equity in that the opportunity to seek active assistance in dying would become openly available to 
all and the practice of active voluntary euthanasia would be subject to rigorous safeguards to protect 
against abuse. 
Conclusjon 
As noted at the outset of this chapter, differences of opinion will always exist as to whether or not 
active voluntary euthanasia ought to be legalised. In the final analysis, the objections raised by the 
opponents are not sufficiently compelling to undermine the strong prima facie case which has been 
established for legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. The practical concerns which have been 
raised about the effects of legalisation do not warrant a blanket prohibition and can be met by the 
implementation of appropriate regulations and safeguards. Further, having regard to the proper scope 
of the criminal law, it has been shown that there are no pressing social interests which demand 
retention of the criminal law prohibition. In our pluriform society, the most appropriate course to 
maximise individual freedom and self-determination is to remove the present legal prohibition so that 
all individuals will be free to live according to their own beliefs.283 
Thus, it is submitted, active voluntary euthanasia is acceptable in principle, and re-evaluation of the 
criminal law prohibition is required. However, the practical objections which have been raised must be 
given serious consideration in any process of reform. The challenge which lies ahead is to formulate a 
legislative proposal which reduces the potential risks to an acceptable level, without interfering too 
severely with individual autonomy and self-determination. 
283 See also Leenen, 'Dying with Dignity: Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in the Netherlands', 
518; Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands', 205. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE CHANGING CLIMATE FOR REFORM 
lntroductjon 
The object of this chapter is to examine the changing climate for reform with regard to active 
voluntary euthanasia. This involves consideration of a number of related issues: (i) public opinion 
which appears to be increasingly in support of the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 
performed by doctors for terminally ill or incurable patients; (ii) the emergence of voluntary 
euthanasia organisations campaigning for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia; and (iii) 
developments within the medical profession indicating growing support for the concept of active 
voluntary euthanasia. Although these areas of change are very much interrelated, for the purposes of 
exposition, it will be necessary to deal with them separately. This chapter is accordingly divided into 
three parts: part I dealing with opinion polls, part II dealing with the voluntary euthanasia movement, 
and part m tracing changes within the medical profession. Whilst attention will primarily be focussed 
on changes in Australia, consideration will also be given to relevant developments in New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. (The situation in the Netherlands will be dealt 




Although there have, over time, been some fluctuations ill public opinion on the issue of active 
voluntary euthanasia, opinion polls indicate growing public support in Australia and the other 
jurisdictions under consideration in favour of its legalisation. 2 
Australia 
Since the early 1960s, opinion polls have been conducted regularly in Australia by the Morgan 




See chapter VIll. 
S. Waller, 'Trends in Public Acceptance of Euthanasia Worldwide' (1986) l Euthanasia Rev. 33. 
Morgan Gallup Polls have been conducted in Australia in 1962, 1978, 1983, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990 
and 1991 dealing with both passive and active euthanasia. There have been other polls conducted in 
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poll conducted over a long period of time by a reputable research organisation enhances the 
significanee of the poll results which can be taken as a fairly accurate guide as to Australian public 
opinion on the issue of active voluntary euthanasia over this period. Those surveyed in this series of 
polls were asked: 'If a hopelessly ill patient, in great pain with absolutely no chance of recovering, 
asks for a lethal dose, so as not to wake again, should a doctor be allowed to give a lethal dose, or 
not?' Whilst there has been some vacillation in public attitudes over time,4 the results of the Morgan 
Gallup Polls over the past two decades reveals an increase in public support in Australia for allowing 
a doctor to give a patient a lethal dose at the patient's request. (See Table A) 
Table A 
For Against Undecided 
1962 47% 39% 14% 
1978 67% 22% 11% 
1983 67% 21% 12% 
1986 66% 21% 13% 
1987 75% 18% 7% 
1989 71% 20% 9% 
1990 77% 17% 6% 
1991 74% 20% 7% 
1992 76% 18% 6% 
The most recent Morgan Gallup Poll, conducted in 1992, indicates that 76% of those surveyed were in 
favour of active voluntary euthanasia, with only 18% against and 6% undecided.5 This represents a 
significant increase from the 1962 Gallup Poll results according to which 47% of those surveyed were 
in favour of active voluntary euthanasia, 39% against and 14% undecided: a 29% increase in public 
acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia over a 30 year period. Not only has there been a distinct 
increase in levels of support, with a corresponding decline in those opposed to active voluntary 
euthanasia, but the proportion of respondents who are undecided has decreased substantially, (from 
14% in 1962 to 6% in 1992), suggesting that more people have made up their minds on the issue. 
The results do not reveal any consistent trends with regard to federal voting intention or with regard to 
the sex of those polled, though in the more recent polls, there appears to be evidence of greater 
support for active voluntary euthanasia amongst men than women. 6 Analysis of the results on the 
basis of the age of the respondents indicates that the nombers in favour of active voluntary euthanasia 




Australia on the subject of euthanasia but differences in questions and sampling techniques makes 
comparison difficult and attention will be confined to the Morgan Gallup Polls. 
There have been a number of down-turns in public support, for example, in the period 1987-1989 and 
1990-1991. 
Similar results have been obtained in New Zealand. The 1991 Morgan Gallop Poll was also conducted 
in New Zealand; 72% of respondents were in favour of allowing a doctor to give a lethal dose, 20% 
against and 7% undecided. 
See, for example, the Morgan Gallup Poll results for 1987, 1989 and 1990. 
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allowed to administer a lethal dose. 1 The religious affiliation of respondents is also a relevant factor in 
determining their attitudes to active voluntary euthanasia, although perhaps not as significant a factor 
as one might expect. There is evidence which suggests that regular church-goers are much less likely 
to support active voluntary euthanasia than non-regular churchgoers, agnostics or atheists. 8 Of those 
who are religiously affiliated, Roman Catholics are less likely to support active voluntary euthanasia 
than are Anglicans or members of the Presbyterian or Uniting Church.9 Nevertheless, despite the 
Catholic Church's opposition to euthanasia, recent polls indicate that a significant majority of 
Catholic respondents are in favour of a doctor being allowed to give a patient a lethal dose.10 
United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, opinion polls on the subject of active voluntary euthanasia date back to the 
1930s. During that decade, the issue of legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia had been brought to 
public attention through the activities of the newly established Voluntary Euthanasia Society in 
London and the concerted attempts at legislative reform made in 1936. According to a Gallup Poll 
conducted in 1938, 62% of those polled believed that 'those suffering from an incurable disease should 
be allowed the option, under proper medical safeguards, of voluntary death', compared to 22% who 
disagreed.11 By 1950, however, when Gallup conducted the same poll, the support for active 
voluntary euthanasia had dropped to 55%, with 24% of those polled disagreeing with the proposition 
that incurable patients should have the option of a voluntary death.12 Although attempts to explain 
this decline in support for active voluntary euthanasia are merely speculative, it is quite possibly 
attributable to the negative connotations of the concept of euthanasia following the experience in Nazi 
Gennany. 
Since 1950, public acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia has gradually been increasing in the 
United Kingdom, although survey results reveal some fluctuations in public attitudes.13 It is 
impossible to ascertain whether these fluctuations are attributable to a distinct shift in public opinion 





See, for example, the Morgan Gallup Poll results for 1986, 1987 and 1990. 
1982 Age Poll, The Age 15 Nov. 1982. Respondents were asked: 'If an adult has a terminal or chronic 
illness and wishes to end his or her life, should the doctor help such an adult to die if asked to do so, or 
refuse to help such an adult to die if asked to do so?' Whilst overall 69% of those surveyed were in 
favour of allowing a doctor to help a patient to die, analysis by religion revealed that only 43% of 
churchgoers were in support of such assistance (47% against) compared with 74% of non-regular 
churchgoers (18% against) and 82% of agnostics or atheists (12% against). See also the Morgan Gallup 
Poll results for 1991. 
See, for example, the Morgan Gallup Poll conducted in Victoria in May 1986, commissioned by the 
Victorian Voluntary Euthanasia Society and discussed by the Parliament of Victoria Social 
Development Committee in its Second and Final Report, Inquiry into Options for Dying with Dignity 
(1987) 133-135. Of those who had responded-yes to the question of whether a doctor should be able to 
assist a patient to die the religious break up was as follows; Catholic 66.3%, Anglican 80.3%, 
Presbyterian/Uniting 71.1%, other Christians 68.5%, no religion 82.9%. 
See, for example, the Morgan Gallup Poll results for 1991. 
11 16% undecided; see Waller, 42. 
12 21 % undecided; see Waller, 42. 
13 Note, for example, the decline from 69% in 1976 to 62% in 1979 in the National Opinion Polls. 
14 For example, although the 1976 and 1979 polls were both conducted by National Opinion Polls, a 
different question was used. 
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In a 1976 National Opinion Poll, responses were sought to the following question: 'Some people say 
that the law should allow adults to receive medical help to .an immediate peaceful death if they suffer 
from an incurable physical illness that is intolerable to them, provided they have previously requested 
such help in writing. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with this?' Of those polled, 69% 
indicated their agreement with this statement, 17% disagreed and 14% were undecided. Another survey 
was conducted thr~ years later, also by National Opinion Polls, but asking quite a different question. 
Respondents were asked: 'Do you agree that, if a patient is suffering from a distressing and incurable 
illness, a doctor should be allowed to supply that patient with the means to end his own life, if the 
patient wishes to?' Sixty-two percent of those surveyed agreed, 22% disagreed and 16% were 
undecided. Because of the difference in survey question used in the 1976 and the 1979 polls, little 
weight can be attached to any apparent trend arising from these results. Of greater statistical relevance 
are the 1985 and the 1989 surveys conducted by National Opinion Polls, where a question of identical 
wording was used to that in the 1976 National Opinion Poll. The results of these polls, when 
analysed in connection with the 1976 poll, provide some indication of changes in public attitudes on 
the subject of active voluntary euthanasia in the United Kingdom over this period. {See Table B) 
During the intervening 13 years since the 1976 survey, the proportion of the population in agreement 
with the statement had risen from 69% to 75%, a 6% increase for that period, with only 16% against. 
There was also a significant reduction in the category of 'don't knows', from 14% in 1976 down to 9% 
indicating that by 1989, more people had formed an opinion on the issue. 
Table B 
For Against Undecided 
1976 69% 17% 14% 
1985 72% 21% 8% 
1989 75% 16% 9% 
The results of the 1976, 1985 and 1989 National Opinion Polls do not show any statistically 
significant difference in terms of sex or economic class, but there is a definite age divergence, with 
younger respondents tending to be more in favour of active voluntary euthanasia than the older age 
groups. Religious affiliation is also clearly a significant factor. Although members of all the main 
religious denominations, (including Roman Catholics), show a majority in favour of active voluntary 
euthanasia, Roman Catholics are less likely to support active voluntary euthanasia than are members 
of the Church of England or atheists.15 
Because of the lack of consistency in the United Kingdom in the assessment of public opinion on the 
subject of active voluntary euthanasia both in terms of the frequency of the polls and the survey 
15 In the 1976 poll, 54% of Roman Catholics supported active voluntary euthanasia compared with 72% 
support from members of the Church of England, 71 % support from Methodists and 77% support from 
members of the Church of Scotland. In the 1985 poll only 54% of Roman Catholics supported active 
voluntary euthanasia compared with 75% support from members of the Church of England, 72% of 
Methodists and 89% of atheists in favour of active voluntary euthanasia. By 1989, support from. 
members of the Roman Catholic Church had increased to 68% as compared with 78% of members of the 
Church of England in favour and 86% of atheists. 
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questions used, some caution is required in analysing the available results. It can, nevertheless, be 
concluded, particularly having regard to the series of National Opinion Polls conducted in 1976, 1985 
and 1989, that there is growing· public support in the United Kingdom for active voluntary euthanasia 
United States 
Numerous polls have been conducted in the United States by a number of research organisations over 
the past 40 or so years to assess public attitudes on the subject of active voluntary euthanasia.16 The 
principal research organisations to conduct opinion polls on this subject in the United States have 
been Gallup, (Gallup National Opinion Research Center) Roper, and Harris, each using their own 
survey question.17 Although there are some discrepancies in the results as between research 
organisations, 18 quite possibly attributable to the different questions being asked of respondents, 19 
the overall results of the various polls indicate a substantial growth in acceptance of active voluntary 
euthanasia by the American public since the late 1940s. (See Table C) 
Table C 
Gallup Poll/National Opinion Research Centre 
For Against Undecided 
1947 37% 54% 9% 
1950 36% 54% 10% 
1973 53% 40% 7% 
1982 61% 34% 5% 
1983 63% 32% 3% 
1990 65% 31% 4% 
16 For discussion of opinion poll results in the United States with regard to active voluntary euthanasia, 
see R. Russell, Freedom to Die (Revised ed., 1977) chapters 4-7, (and supplement to first edition, 387-
389) D. Humphry and A. Wickett, The Right to Die (1986) 123-124; J. Ostheimer, 'The Pulls: 
Changing Attitudes Towards Euthanasia' (1980) 44 Public Opinion Q. 123. 
It should be noted that there were some early polls conducted in the United States in the late 1930s 
dealing with active euthanasia but they were not confmed in their terms to voluntary euthanasia; for 
discussion, see J. Wilson, Death by Decision (1975) 28-36; Russell, 84-85; Humphry and Wickett, 20. 
17 Gallup Poll question: 'When a person has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think that doctors 
should be allowed by law to end the patient's life by some painless means if the patient and his family 
request it?' 
Roper Poll question: 'When a person has a painful and distressing terminal disease, do you think 
doctors should or should not be allowed by law to end the patient's life if there is no hope of recovery 
and the patient requests it?' 
Harris Poll question: 'Do you think that the patient who is terminally ill, with no cure in sight, ought 
to have the right to tell his doctor to put him out of his misery, or do you think this is wrong?' 
18 Compare, for example, the results of the Gallup and Harris Polls conducted concurrently in 1973 and 
1977 which indicate that respondents to the Harris Poll were significantly less supportive of the 
concept of active voluntary euthanasia than the respondents to the Gallup Poll. 
19 Dissatisfaction has been expressed with the nature of some of these questions; see Ostheimer, 124, 
where he asserts that the wording used in the Gallup Poll question, particularly, the reference to ending 
the patient's life 'by some painless means' is ambiguous. He also suggests that the reference in the 
Harris Poll question, to 'put out of one's misery' is unsatisfactory because of its tendency to 
precondition a negative response. Other commentators agree that the Harris Poll question has a 
negative connotation as compared to the wording of the Gallup Poll question and that this could effect 
the opinions and thus account for the lower acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia in the Harris 
Polls; see Waller, 43-44. 
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Harris Poll 
For Against Undecided 
1973 37% 53% 10% 
1977 49% 38% 13% 
1981 56% 41% 3% 
1985 61% 36% 3% 
Roper Poll 
For Against Unledded 
1986 62% 27% 10% 
1988 58% 27% 14% 
1990 63% 24% 13% 
For example, in a series of nationwide Gallup Polls in which attitudes were gauged with respect to 
medically administered active voluntary euthanasia, 20 public approval had grown from 37% in 1947 
(54% disagreeing and 9% undecided) to 65% in 1990 (with 31 % disagreeing and only 4% undecided). 
Similarly, Harris Polls, which have been conducted at regular intervals since 1973, reveal a marked 
increase in support for active voluntary euthanasia in the period 1973-1985 from 37% in favour in 
1973 (53% against and 10% undecided) to 61 % in favour in 1985 (36% against and 3% undecided).21 
Roper Polls, which have been conducted in the United States in recent years, also indicate an overall 
increase in the level of public support for active voluntary euthanasia.22 In a separate survey 
conducted in 1985 by Associated Press-Media General, results indicated that 68% of the population 
believed that 'people dying of an incurable painful disease should be allowed to end their lives before 
the disease runs its course' - 22% disagreeing and 10% undecided.23 
There are obviously difficulties in analysing the results of polls which have been derived from a 
number of separate surveys, using different survey questions. It is, nevertheless, possible to make 
some general observations regarding trends in survey results obtained.24 According to the research by 
Gallup National Opinion Research Center, acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia has grown 
among all major population subgroups, but change has been greatest among Catholics and the 
younger age groups. 25 There appear to be no significant differences in responses based upon sex, 
20 See above, n. 17 for reference to the survey question. 
21 Waller, 43-44. 
22 The Hemlock Society commissioned a series of· Roper Polls in 1986, 1988' and 1990. The results of 
these polls show an increase in levels of support for active voluntary euthanasia from 62% in 1986 to 
64% in 1990. (See Table C) A Roper Poll of the West Coast was conducted in. 1991 according to which 
68% of respondents were in favour of active voluntary euthanasia, 23% against and 8% undecided. 
23 Associated Press-Media General, Poll No. 4. Richmond, Va.: Media General February 1985. 
24 For general commentary and analysis, see D. Jorgenson and R. Neubecker, 'Euthanasia: A National 
Survey of Attitudes Towards Voluntary Termination of Life' (1980-81) 11 Omega 281. 
25 Ostheimer, 124. 
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political affiliation or geographical area of the respondents. 26 The results of some polls indicate that 
age of the respondents may be a factor, with a higher approval rating amongst younger age groups. 27 
Religious affiliation is of some significance, in that Catholics are less likely to support active 
voluntary euthanasia than Protestants, or non-religious persons.28 Respondents with higher 
education, professional status and income tend to be more accepting of the concept of active voluntary 
euthanasia 29 The race of the respondents appears to also be a relevant factor, with substantially fewer 
black Americans supporting active voluntary euthanasia.30 
Whilst there are some discrepancies in the results as between the various research organisations, 
possibly attributable to the different question put to respondents, overall, the polls which have been 
conducted in the United States over an extended period of time by a number of research organisations, 
reveal a steady growth in community acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia from 37% in 1947 to 
approximately 64% in 199031 which represents a 27% increase in public acceptance of active 
voluntary euthanasia over a 43 year period 
Canada 
Polls conducted in Canada over the past two decades also indicate a significant increase in support for 
active voluntary euthanasia. Since 1968, Gallup Canada have regularly conducted polls using the same 
poll question in which respondents were asked: 'When a person has an incurable disease that causes 
great suffering, do you, or do you not think that competent doctors should be allowed by law, to end 
the patient's life through mercy killing, if the patient has made a formal request in writing?' Although 
there have been some fluctuations, 32 these polls of Canadian public opinion reveal growing public 
support for active voluntary euthanasia. (See Table D) In the most recent poll, conducted in 1991, 
75% of Canadians surveyed supported the view that a doctor should be allowed by law to end the life 
of an incurable suffering patient at the patient's request, with only 17% opposed and 9% undecided. 
Analysis of the Canadian Gallup Poll results over recent years suggests that a number of factors 
appear to be relevant in determining people's attitudes to active voluntary euthanasia. Age of the 
respondents is clearly a relevant factor, with the proportion of respondents in favour of active 
assistance to die being significantly lower among those over 50 years than among younger people.33 
26 See, for example, the results of the 1986 Roper Poll discussed by T. Marzen, 'Euthanasia: The 
Handwriting on the Wall' (1988) 3 Euthanasia Rev. 44, 46. 
27 See, for example, the analysis of the Gallup Polls by Ostheimer, 124 and Waller, 45. 
28 See, for example, the analysis of the 1973 Gallup Poll results in Russell, 198-199; the 1986 Roper 
Poll discussed by Marzen, 46; and analysis of the 1990 Roper Poll results, Note, 'The 1990 Roper Poll' 
(1990) 39 Hemlock Q. 9. 
29 See, for example, the results of the 1986 Roper Poll, discussed by Marzen, 46. 
30 See, for example, the results of the 1986 Roper Poll, discussed by Marzen, 46 which indicated that 
only 46% of black Americans supported active voluntary euthanasia, with 39% against and 15% 
undecided. Note also the analysis of the Gallup Polls by Ostheimer, 124 where he states that the poll 
results show race to be important, but notes that racial differences on most political issues are usually 
dismissed as merely a function of the fact that non-whites are less educated and more fundamentalist. 
31 This figure is based on the average for the 1990 Gallup and Roper Poll results. 
32 Note, for example, the slight decline in support for active voluntary euthanasia in 1984 and 1991. 
33 See, for example, the Gallup Reports for 1989, 1990 and 1991. 
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Other factors which appear to relevant include the sex of the respondents, with males marginally more 
in favour of allowing a doctor to end the life of a patient than are females,34 as well as education and 
income, with the better educated and· higher earning respondents more likely to be in favour of 
allowing a doctor to end the life of a patient at the patient's request. 35 There also appear to be some 
regional variations, with the highest proportion giving an affirmative answer in Quebec and the 
lowest in the prairie States.36 
Table D 
For Against Undecided 
1968 45% 43% 12% 
1974 55% 35% 10% 
1979 68% 23% 9% 
1984 66% 24% 10% 
1989 77% 17% 6% 
1990 78% 14% 8% 
1991 75% 17% 9% 
The Gallup Polls regularly conducted in Canada since 1968, using the same survey question, represent 
a fairly accurate guide as to changing community attitudes in Canada to the issue of active voluntary 
euthanasia. These polls reveal a marked shift in public opinion since the 1968 poll, from a 45% rate 
of approval to 75%: this represents a 30% increase in public acceptance during the 23 year period 
1968-1991. 
Evaluation of Opinion Poll Results 
It is evident from the foregoing review of opinion polls conducted in Australia, the United Kingdom, 
the United States and Canada that there has been growing public support.for active voluntary 
euthanasia in all jurisdictions under consideration. In Australia, Gallup Polls indicate there has been a 
29% increase in public support for active voluntary euthanasia since 1962, from 47% in favour in 
1962 to 76% in favour in 1992. In the United Kingdom, National Opinion Polls conducted since 
1976 show a steady increase in public support, with a shift from 69% in favour in 1976 to 75% in 
favour in 1989, a 6% increase for the 13 year period 1976-1989. In the United States reliable poll 
results (obtained by Gallup/N.0.R.C.) dating back to 1947 indicate a marked shift from 37% in 
favour in 1947 to 65% in favour in 1990; an increase of 28%.37 Finally, in Canada, polls conducted 
by Canadian Gallup indicate a shift in public opinion since 1968 from a 45% rate of approval to 75% 
in favour in 1991, representing a 30% increase in public acceptance during the 23 year period 1968-
1991. 
34 See, for example, the Gallup Reports for 1984, 1989 and 1990. 
35 See, for example, the Gallup Reports for 1979, 1984, 1989 and 1990. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Note also the 1990 Roper Poll result of 64% in favour. 
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Caution must be exercised in comparing poll results from different countries, where the polls have 
been conducted by different organisations, using different survey questions. Notwithstanding these 
limitations, it is possible to make some general observations, regarding trends in public opinion in 
all jurisdictions under consideration. There is, in fact, a remarkable degree of consistency in the public 
opinion results on the issue of active voluntary euthanasia obtained in Australia, the United Kingdom 
and Canada According to the most recent results,38 76% in favour in Australia, 75% in favour in the 
United Kingdom, and 75% in favour in Canada. The level of community support appears to be 
somewhat less in the United States; on the basis of the most recent figures (Roper Poll 1990), 64% 
of those surveyed were in favour of active voluntary euthanasia However, as in other jurisdictions, 
this represents an increase in the level of public support for active voluntary euthanasia. The 
unavoidable conclusion is that these polls reflect a growing demand for law reform to allow active 
voluntary euthanasia with an overwhelming majority of respondents in favour of legalisation. Indeed, 
to have public support in the range of 75%, as the poll results suggest, reflects quite a remarkable 
degree of agreement on the issue. 
Apart from the overall trend towards greater acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia evident in all 
jurisdictions, there are a number of more specific similarities which should be noted. There is some 
evidence to suggest that the age of the respondent is a relevant factor in determining attitudes to active 
voluntary euthanasia. Younger persons are more likely to support active voluntary euthanasia, and 
support decreases as the age of the respondent increases.39 Another factor which seems to be relevant 
in influencing attitudes to active voluntary euthanasia is the religious affiliation, if any, of the 
respondent. Whilst there has been a noticeable increase in support for active voluntary euthanasia from 
Catholics evidenced in the poll results, 40 there still appears to be some correlation between religious 
affiliation (particularly Catholic) and anti-euthanasia attitudes; generally speaking, persons who are 
religious are less likely to support active voluntary euthanasia than persons who are not; and more 
particularly, Catholics are less likely to support active voluntary euthanasia than members of other 
religious denomirn~tions or persons who are not religiously affiliated. The sex of the respondent is yet 
another factor which appears to be of some, albeit marginal, significance in influencing attitudes to 
active voluntary euthanasia, with males slightly more inclined than females to be in favour of 
allowing a doctor to assist a patient to die. 
In taking an overview of all jurisdictions, it is also interesting to observe the decrease over time in the 
percentage of persons who were unable to answer the survey question; in Australia, it has declined 
since 1962 from 14% to 7% in 1991; in the United Kingdom it has declined since 1976 from 14% to 
9% in 1989; in the United States the v~ous polls also indicate an overall decline, (for example, on 
the basis of the Gallup Poll results there has been a decline from 9% in 1947 to 4% in 1990);41 and 
3 8 Based on figures obtained in 1991, 1989, and 1991 respectively. 
39 See Waller, 44-6 also for possible reasons behind these variations. 
40 See, for example, Ostheimer, 124 commenting on the results from the United States. 
41 This is not supported by evidence from the Roper Polls which in fact indicate an increasing proportion 
of undecided respondents, but these results are not necessarily representative since they were taken 
over a short period (1986-1990). 
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in Canada it has declined since 1968 from 12% to 8% in 1990. This reduction in the number of 
people who are undecided on the issue of active voluntary euthanasia can probably be attributed to 
increased public debate on the subject over the past decade or so, with the result that more people have 
considered the matter and formed an opinion as to whether active voluntary euthanasia ought to be 
made lawful. 
In sum, the clear message to law reformers is that the public is overwhelmingly in favour of active 
voluntary euthanasia and would support the introduction of legislation to legalise this practice in 
certain circumstances. As was noted in an earlier chapter, inevitably, there are those who question 
reliance on public opinion polls, either on the grounds that the poll questions are so vague and 
ambiguous that they produce unreliable results or on the ground that public opinion is an inherently 
unsafe and inappropriate basis for developing law and social policy.42 
It must be conceded that some of the survey questions used could have been more clearly and 
appropriately expressed43 and that this in turn may have some bearing on the responses that those 
questions would elicit. In part, the problem stems from the need for consistency in the survey 
question if one is attempting to follow trends in public opinion over an extended period of time. 
Thus, once a survey question has been in use for a time, it gains a certain currency, and is unlikely to 
be changed, even though a contemporary compilation of the issues would perhaps be differently 
expressed. However, having conceded some difficulties with some of the survey questions currently in 
use, these difficulties must not be overstated, and certainly cannot be legitimately invoked to 
undermine or discredit the overall impact of the opinion polls which provide overwhelming evidence 
of growing public support for active voluntary euthanasia. 
More fundamental is the objection that notwithstanding widespread public support for active voluntary 
euthanasia, it is, in any event, not appropriate to base the law on the opinion of the majority.44 In 
response it can be argued that although in general, strength of numbers for a particular reform is 
clearly not, of itself, a valid basis for a change in the law, where, as is the case with regard to active 
voluntary euthanasia, there are weighty substantive arguments in favour of reform, evidence of public 
demand for such change can only operate to strengthen the case for reform. 
The literature is sparse on reasons behind this shift in public opinion. Whilst any explanation as to 
the basis for growing public support for active voluntary euthanasia can at best be speculative, a 
number of inferences can be drawn. In recent decades, the issue of active voluntary euthanasia has been 
42 B. Pollard, Euthanasia (1989) 59-62; G. Grisez and J.M. Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice 
(1979) 14; British Medical Association (B.M.A.) Working Party Report, Euthanasia (1988) 42. For 
further discussion, see chapter V, 195. 
43 Some commentators, for example Pollard, 59-62, have been critical of references in some of the poll 
questions to patients being 'helped' or 'assisted' to die since this could be taken to cover either active 
voluntary euthanasia or palliative care or both. Indeed, some opponents of euthanasia who challenge 
the validity of polls results have suggested that in many instances the survey question is deliberately 
framed to conceal the real issues and obtain a favourable response; see Grisez and Boyle, 13-14. 
44 Pollard, 62; B.M.A. Working Party Report, Euthanasia, 42. See chapter V, 195. 
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increasingly brought to the attention of the public. The media has played a significant role in 
promoting the debate about active voluntary euthanasia as have the voluntary euthanasia societies 
which have been established in all jurisdictions. As a result of growing community debate on the 
subject, the public is better informed about the issue and has increasingly swung its support behind 
the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. Other factors contributing to the increasing 
preparedness of the public to sanction active voluntary euthanasia are the changing attitudes to death 
and the diminishing effectiveness of religious and cultural strictures against the taking of life. 
Accompanying this changed outlook to death and dying, there has been increased attention to patients' 
rights and the principles of patient autonomy and self-determination. There is evidence of growing 
concern amongst members of the public that they may fall victim to developments in medical 
technology. This has resulted in a desire for individuals to re-establish control over the manner of their 
dying. The public is also likely to be sensitive to changing attitudes within the medical profession on 
the subject of active voluntary euthanasia, with media reports of doctors indicating their support for 
the practice and on occasion being involved in its administration. 
It must be emphasised that these changes in community attitudes have come about over a number of 
decades,45 so the process of change has been gradual. On the basis ~f poll results, there is some 
evidence to suggest that the pace of change has accelerated in the past decade, 46 reflecting the increased 
level of public interest in the subject of active voluntary euthanasia and the growing momentum of 
the voluntary euthanasia movement during this period. 
PART II 
The Voluntary Euthanasia Movement 
The upsurge in public support for active voluntary euthanasia has also been manifest in growing 
community action. Voluntary euthanasia societies have been established in Australia and overseas for 
the purpose of working towards the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, and they have greatly 
contributed to the growing momentum of the voluntary euthanasia movement. In response to these 
developments, there has also been organised opposition to the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia from various right to life groups as well as other anti-euthanasia organisations specifically 
established to counter the growing campaign for legalisation. 
45 For example, the Morgan Gallup Poll results gauging the attitudes of Australians to active voluntary 
euthanasia have been conducted since 1962. 
46 See, for example, the Morgan Gallup Poll results for Australia in the period 1986-1990 during which 
there was a 10% increase in public support. Note also a similar development in Canada for the period 
1984-1990 during which there was a 12% increase. 
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Voluntary Euthanasia Societies 
Australia and New Zealand 
Since the mid 1970s, a number of voluntary euthanasia societies have been established in Australia 
and New Zealand. With the exception of the Northern Territory, voluntary euthanasia societies now 
exist in all Australian States and Territories, and societies have been established in a number of cities 
in New Zealand. The first Australian societies to be established were the Australian Voluntary 
Euthanasia Society, based in New South Wales, (later renamed the Voluntary Euthanasia Society of 
New South Wales) and the Voluntary Euthanasia Society of Victoria, both of which were established 
in February 1974.47 Similar developments occurred in New Zealand with the establishment in 1978 
of voluntary euthanasia societies in Auckland and Wellington. In the 1980s, a number of further 
societies were formed in Australia; the West Australian Voluntary Euthanasia Society (W.A.V.E.S.) 
established in March 1980, the South Australian Voluntary Euthanasia Society (S.A.V.E.S.) 
established in 1983, the Voluntary Euthanasia Society of Queensland established in 1987 and the 
Voluntary Euthanasia Society of Tasmania established in 1992. Branches of the Voluntary Euthanasia 
Society of New South Wales have been formed in Canberra in 1986 and in Newcastle in 1988. Most 
of the voluntary euthanasia societies are incorporated. 
The justification for the creation of separate societies in Australia is primarily because of this 
country's federal structure and of the fact that the reforms being sought are in the criminal law field 
and are therefore a matter within the responsibility of the State and Territory legislatures. As a result, 
the campaign for reform has been focussed at the State and Territory levet48 However, with the rapid 
expansion of the voluntary euthanasia movement in the 1980s, there was growing recognition of the 
need for closer co-operation between the State organisations, and in 1987 the Australian societies 
joined in a Federation of Australian Voluntary Euthanasia Societies (F.A.V.E.S.) in an attempt to co-
ordinate their activities.49 In 1988 V.E.S. (Auckland) was admitted to F.A.V.E.S., which then 
became the Federation of Australasian Voluntary Euthanasia Societies. However, this organisation did 
not operate as effectively as was hoped, and has since been disbanded. 
Thus, although all of the Australian and New Zealand societies pursue similar objectives and policies, 
each is a separate and independent body and they have generally pursued their activities independently. 
Most of the societies are, however, affiliated with the World Federation of Right to Die Societies, 
formed in 1980.50 The main objective of all the Australian and New Zealand societies is, essentially, 
to promote public understanding and acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia and to secure reform of 
47 Voluntary Euthanasia Society (V.E.S.) Vic. Voluntary Euthanasia (Revised ed., 1982) 5. 
48 V.E.S. Vic. Voluntary Euthanasia, 5. 
49 The terms of reference for F.A.V.E.S. were as follows; To present the views of member societies at a 
national level, to co-ordinate and facilitate the activities of voluntary euthanasia societies throughout 
Australia, to promote and assist the formation of further voluntary euthanasia societies, to arrange 
national and regional conferences, to publish a national newsletter and other literature relevant to 
voluntary euthanasia and to represent the Australian voluntary euthanasia movement internationally. 
50 V.E.S. Vic. Voluntary Euthanasia, 5. 
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the law so that active voluntary euthanasia should become lawful.51 The statement of ~ms contained 
in the literature for the Victorian, News South Wales and Queensland societies is fairly representative: 
The aim of the Society is to promote legislation giving effect to the widely held 
public opinion that any person suffering, through illness or disability severe 
pain or distress for which no remedy is available, should be entitled by law to a 
painless and dignified death in accordance with that person's expressed 
direction. 52 
However, the executive bodies of most of the societies have recognised that the legalisation of active 
voluntary euthanasia is realistically a long-term goal, and they have consequently set themselves more 
readily achievable objectives for the more immediate future. These objectives include encouraging 
people to make a 'living will' or advance directive, increasing patients' awareness of their rights, 
ensuring that pain control education is an integral part of medical training, and lobbying governments 
to set up more hospices.53 In some States, the voluntary euthanasia societies have played an active 
role with regard to the passage of legislation dealing with the refusal of treatment and passive 
euthanasia. 54 
In more recent years, the societies have been very active in their attempts to secure reform with regard 
to active voluntary euthanasia, engaging in a wide range of activities. To a large extent, their 
activities are directed at increasing public awareness and acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia In 
pursuit of these aims, the societies issue regular newsletters, 55 handle many telephone calls and 
inquiries56 and generally seek to disseminate information to the community about active voluntary 
euthanasia.57 All of the societies have published educational material outlining their aims and the 
relevant issues in the debate regarding legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia.58 Many of the 
societies have secured notable patrons to assist in promoting their societies objectives.5 9 
Representatives of the societies frequently present lectures at the request of various groups and 
51 See, for example, the S.A.V.E.S. Constitution. 
52 See, for example, the newsletters of the V.E.S. of Vic., V.E.S. of Qld. and the V.E.S. N.S.W and their 
memorandum and articles of association. 
53 This is, for example, the position adopted by the V.E.S. of N.S.W. Executive; see the Editorial (1989) 
50 V.E.S. of N.S. W. Newsletter 2. 
54 This was the case particularly in Victoria with regard to the major inquiry by the Parliament of Victoria 
Social Development Committee into Options for Dying with Dignity and the resulting Medical 
Treatment legislation. W.A.V.E.S. has also played a role in the Law Reform Commission of Western 
Australian reference on Medical Treatment for the Dying. For further discussion of these developments, 
see chapter VII, 301-313. 
55 The newsletters for the Australian societies are as follows; V.E.S. V. Report; S.A. V.E.S.Bull.; V.E.S. of 
N.S. W. Newsletter; V.E.S.Q. Newsletter; V.E.S. Tas. Newsletter, W.A. V.E.S. News. 
56 This information was obtained as a result of interviews with representatives from all of the Australian 
voluntary euthanasia societies conducted in 1989-1992. 
57 Indeed, difficulties often arise when an individual phones the society, seeking specific information on 
how to commit suicide. Society representatives are very much aware of potential criminal liability for 
assisting suicide if they divulge such information. In the literature of some of the societies it is made 
clear that in view of the present law regarding assisted suicide, the society can under no circumstances 
help anyone to commit suicide; e.g. Note, 'Sorry - Can't Help' (1989) Vol. 9 No. 3 W.A. V.E.S. News 1. 
58 For example, booklets such as the V.E.S. Vic., Voluntary Euthanasia V.E.S. of N.S.W., Voluntary 
Euthanasia (1991) as well as brochures and information sheets. 
59 Professor Peter Baume A.O. is the patron for V.E.S. of N.S.W.; the Honourable R.A. Mackenzie M.L.C. 
is the patron for V.E.S. Vic.; Sir Mark Oliphant is the patron for S.A.V.E.S; and Janet Holmes a Court 
is the patron for W.A.V.E.S. 
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organisations, appear on television and give radio interviews. Public meetings are regularly arranged 
by the societies, often with well-known guest speakers, ·as well as seminars, workshops and educative 
displays.60 In furtherance of this ongoing educative program, all societies endeavour to send 
representatives to the regular international voluntary euthanasia conferences.61 The societies are also 
involved in more direct attempts at securing reform for active voluntary euthanasia, including political 
campaigning62 and the preparation of submissions to governmental and law reform commission 
inquiries. 63 In recent years, a number of the societies have undertaken specific steps towards the 
introduction of legislation for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia.64 Efforts have also been 
made by some societies to promote dialogue within the medical profession on the subject of active 
voluntary euthanasia and to encourage the interchange of views with society representatives. 
Invitations have been extended to the medical profession to the societies' public meetings and 
seminars, and the societies have also been responsible for the publication and distribution of material 
directed at the medical profession, such as the booklet Voluntary Euthanasia and the Medical 
Profession: An Invitation to Dialogue produced by the S.A.V.E.s.65 A number of the societies have 
now set up groups of doctors and nurses to work on health care aspects of voluntary euthanasia 66 
Membership to these societies is open to all adults who are in agreement with the societies' aims. 
Over the years, the societies have attracted members from a wide range of social, economic, political, 
philosophical and religious backgrounds.67 Membership has increased substantially since the societies 
60 For example, the Speakers' Corner Display arranged by the S.A.V.E.S. in the Old Parliament House 
Building, April 1988. 
61 The World Federation of the Right to Die Societies established in 1980, holds an International 
Conference every two years. 
62 A popular method has been to write to politicians to inform them of the aims of the voluntary 
euthanasia societies, to seek their views on the subject and generally to encourage support for the 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. Some societies have also been involved in the collection 
of signatures for a parliamentary petition; see Note, 'The Parliamentary Petition' (1989) Vol. 9 No. 4 
W.A. V.E.S. News 2. 
63 For example in Victoria, the submission by the V.E.S. Vic. in 1986 to the Parliament of Victoria 
Social Development Committee in connection with the Inquiry into Options for Dying with Dignity; 
the submission by W.A.V.E.S. to the West Australian Law Reform Commission in connection with its 
reference on Medical Treatment for the Dying in 1988; and the submission by S.A.V.E.S. to the South 
Australian Parliamentary Select Committee on the Law and Practice Relation to Death and Dying in 
1991. For further discussion of these inquiries see chapter VII, 297-313. 
64 For example, S.A.V.E.S. established a Task Force in 1988 to examine and report on the possibilities 
for legislative reform and to formulate plans for introducing active voluntary euthanasia legislation in 
South Australia; see Note, 'Proposals for Legislative Change: S.A.V.E.S. Task Force Report' (1989) 
Vol. 6 No. 2 S.A. V.E.S.Bull. 5-1. The Task Force has drafted a paper entitled, a 'Discussion Paper on 
Decriminalising Voluntary Euthanasia in South Australia' (1989); see discussed in Note, 'Task Force 
Progress Report' (1990) Vol. 7 No. 2 S.A. V.E.S.Bull. 6. A number of the societies, including V.E.S. of 
N.S.W. and V.E.S. of Vic. have been working on proposals for the legalisation of doctor-assisted 
suicide as an intermediate goal. 
65 (1990). 
6 6 In South Australia, a group of doctors has been established called the Association of Medical 
Practitioners Concerned with Assisted Dying. At the time of writing, moves were underway to set up of 
a group of doctors and a group of nurses in Victoria; Note, 'Voluntary Euthanasia Groups of Doctors and 
of Nurses Proposed' (1992) 76 V.E.S. V. Report 5. According to recent figures, membership numbers 
for the various Australian voluntary euthanasia societies are as follows; S.A.V.E.S. 780; V.E.S. 
N.S.W. 2,250; V.E.S. Qld. 526; V.E.S. Vic. 1,500; and W.A.V.E.S. 1303. At the time of writing, the 
newly established V.E.S.Tas. already had approximately 50 members. 
67 V.E.S. Vic. Voluntary Euthanasia, 5; S.A.V.E.S. The Right to Choose (2nd ed. 1990) 36. 
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were first established, with particular growth having been experienced since the 1980s coinciding with 
increased media exposure and public debate on the subject.68 
United Kingdom 
There are two voluntary euthanasia societies in the United Kingdom; the Voluntary Euthanasia 
Society (Britain) based in London, and the Voluntary Euthanasia Society of Scotland based in 
Edinburgh.69 The history of the voluntary euthanasia societies in the United Kingdom, particularly 
the British Voluntary Euthanasia Society, is of special interest because of the early origins of the 
society and its active involvement since the mid 1930s in efforts to secure legislative reform. Also of 
interest is the controversy surrounding the society in the early 1980s in connection with the 
publication of a suicide manual and the imprisonment of some members of the society for having 
assisted the suicide of a number of persons. 
British Yoluntazy Euthanasia Society 
The origins of the British Voluntary Euthanasia Society established in 1935 and the early attempts at 
legislative reform in 1936 are well documented.70 Most commentators agree that the contemporary 
movement for active voluntary euthanasia in the United Kingdom began with a Presidential address by 
Dr C. Millard in 1931 to the Society of Medical Officers of Health, entitled 'A Plea for the 
Legalisation of Voluntary Euthanasia'.71 Millard's address was subsequently published,72 together 
with a proposed draft Bill for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 73 and it received 
widespread publicity. In the years which followed, Millard communicated with members of the 
medical and other professions who were interested in his proposal and in 1935, the Voluntary 
Euthanasia Legalisation Society (Britain) was officially formed under the Presidency of Lord 
Moynihan, with the specific purpose of promoting the draft Bill which Millard had proposed.74 Under 
the guidance of Millard, in his capacity as Honorary Secretary, and Lord Moynihan as President - both 
well respected doctors - the society enjoyed the support of many of Britain's most distinguished 
doctors, public figures and clergymen.75 Although the Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 
introduced by Lord Ponsonby in the House of Lords in November 1936 was ultimately unsuccessful, 
68 In fact, the societies have, on occasion, reported significant increases in membership following some 
well publicised case or incident which raises the public awareness with respect to active voluntary 
euthanasia. See, for example, the Bulletin 19 April 1988, 43 referring to a report of the V.E.S. of 
N.S.W. to the effect that 200 people joined the society as a result of the debate on 'death with dignity' 
which followed the double suicide of Sir John and Lady Phillips. 
69 For a number of years there was a third organisation in the United Kingdom, called New Exit. It was 
established in 1983 as a splinter group of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society (Britain) but ceased to 
exist in 1988. 
70 For literature tracing the history of the society, see, for example, I. van der Sluis, 'The Movement for 
Euthanasia' (1979) 66 Janus 131, 148-154; H. Trowell, The Unfinished Debate on Euthanasia (1973) 
14-15; G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (1956) 293-302. 
71 For example, Williams, 294; van der Sluis, 148; J. Gould and Lord Craigmyle, (eds.) Your Death 
Wa"ant? (1971) 24. 
72 Millard's address was published in Public Health Nov. (1931) and was released as a pamphlet shortly 
afterwards. 
73 The Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill. For discussion of this Bill see chapter Vll, 318-319. 
74 The stated aim of the society was 'to create a public opinion favourable to the view that an adult person 
suffering from a fatal illness, for which no cure is known, should be entitled by law to the mercy of a 
painless death if and when that is his expressed wish: and to promote this legislation'; see Trowell, 15. 
75 Williams, 295; Russell, 67. 
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it stimulated considerable public interest and discussion of the issue, and brought many new members 
and supporters to the society.76 In the ensuing years, the society, with Millard as its chief 
spokesman, continued to campaign for legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, though it was in 
fact some decades before voluntary legislation was again introduced into parliament.77 
With the outbreak of World War II and the negative connotations given to the word 'euthanasia' as a 
result of the Nazi atrocities, there was a definite reduction in action and publication pertaining to 
euthanasia in the early 1940s and a perceived shift in public sentiment away from active voluntary 
euthanasia.78 The Voluntary Euthanasia Society nevertheless remained active during this time 
continuing in its efforts to secure reform.79 The society, which had begun as the Voluntary 
Euthanasia Legalisation Society, had at one time discarded the words 'Voluntary' and 'Legalisation' 
from its name but in 1969 reinstated the word 'Voluntary', so that it became The Voluntary 
Euthanasia Society. 80 
In 1979, following its annual meeting, the society changed its name to 'Exit,' for the sake of 
modemity.81 One commentator82 has suggested that the change of name was more a product of the 
society's growing disillusionment with its failure to secure reform and signalled the adoption of more 
direct tactics in pursuing the society's objectives. In the same year, a proposal had been mooted for the 
publication by the society of a practical guide to rational suicide - a do-it-yourself manual as a stopgap 
expedient pending the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. 83 Although the majority of 
members supported this proposal, the executive of the newly named Exit society was divided over the 
matter. 84 After the election of a new executive and appropriate amendments to the society's 
constitution so as to bring such a publication within its purview,85 the society eventually proceeded 
with the publication of a booklet in 1981 on methods of suicide entitled A Guide to Self-Deliverance. 
Sales of the booklet were restricted to members of three months standing who were over 25 years of 
age and each copy was numbered so that its purchaser could be traced if necessary. 86 However, the 
legality of the publication and distribution of .this booklet was subsequently challenged by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions. Initially, criminal prosecution was threatened on the grounds of 
contravention of s. 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (Eng.). The proceedings which did in fact result took the 
16 A. Downing and B. Smoker, (eds.) Voluntary Euthanasia (1986) 256. 
77 In 1950, the activities of the society had resulted in a debate in the House of Lords on a motion in 
favour of the principle underlying voluntary euthanasia, however, the motion was withdrawn without a 
vote due to strong opposition. It was not until 1962 that a new Bill was drafted and publicly proposed, 
and this Bill was not introduced into Parliament and voted on until 1969 (Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 
1969 ); see Russell, 111. 
78 Russell, 87. 
79 Id. 110-111. 
80 Downing and Smoker, 256. 
81 Ibid. See also Note, 'The Voluntary Euthanasia Society: A Historical Note' (1985) 24 V.E.S. Newsletter 
4-5. 
82 S. Potts, 'Looking for the Exit Door: Killing and Caring in Modern Medicine' (1988) 25 Hous.L.Rev. 
493, 494. . 
83 Downing and Smoker, 256. 
84 Id. 256-257. 
85 Id. 257. 
86 Humphry and Wickett, 220. 
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form of an application brought by the Attorney-General to the High Court for a declaration of 
illegality tinder s. 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (Eng.). In a: hearing which came before the court in April 
1983, Justice Woolf refused to grant the Attorney-General's application holding that the publication of 
such material was not of itself unlawfut.87 However, he held that whether or not the distribution of 
these booklets was legal would depend on whether there was, at the time, an intent to assist those 
who are contemplating suicide and further, that the person contemplating suicide was in fact assisted 
or encouraged, by reading the booklet, to attempt to take his or her own life.88 Justice Woolf was of 
the view, that the legality of publication and distribution could not be determined in advance based on 
hypothetical circumstances - in each case the jury would have to decide whether the necessary facts 
were proved. 89 In the light of this decision, the society decided against further publication and 
distribution of the booklet90 However, the publicity surrounding the publication of the booklet, even 
prior to its actual release, and then in connection with the resulting litigation, proved to be a boon to 
the society, resulting in a substantial increase in the society's membership.91 
At about the same time, the society attracted adverse publicity, when the then Secretary of the society, 
Nicholas Reed, and a long-time volunteer worker for the society, Mark Lyons, were tried for their 
involvement in assisting suicide and conspiracy to assist suicide.92 Reed was found guilty on four 
counts and was sentenced to two and a half years imprisonment. On appeal, this was later reduced to 
eighteen months. Lyons was also found guilty on a number of counts, but since he had been in 
custody awaiting trial for nearly a year, he was released on a two year suspended sentence.93 Although 
the society was quick to dissociate itself from the Reed-Lyons affair, affirming its intention to operate 
within the limits of the law, its public image was seriously damaged as a result of this case. The 
society's objectives had never endorsed the concept of active euthanasia or assisted suicide for depressed 
or disturbed people, so it was particularly damaging when evidence at the trial revealed that some of 
the individuals who had been helped or offere.d help to commit suicide were mentally ill, depressive or 
alcoholics.94 Indeed, according to the former chairman of the executive committee, the society 
subsequently found it an uphill struggle to regain its reputation as a respectable pressure group rather 
than as a 'suicide club' as The Times newspaper had dubbed it.95 
In 1981, the society dropped the name 'Exit' and reverted back to its former name (The Voluntary 
Euthanasia Society) primarily in an attempt to distance itself from the adverse publicity that the 
87 Attorney-General v Able [1983] 3 W.L.R. 845. For more detailed analysis of this case, see chapter ill, 
85-87. 
88 Id. 858. 
89 Id. 858-859. 
90 Downing and Smoker, 257-258. 
91 The pre-publication publicity brought a sudden surge of membership from about 2,000 to 11,000; see 
Downing and Smoker, 257. 
92 Humphry and Wickett, 215-220; Downing and Smoker, 256. 
93 Humphry and Wickett, 218. 
94 Id. 219. 
95 The Times, 31 Oct. 1981. 
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society had sustained as a result of the Reed-Lyons case. In fact it is only in more recent years that the 
society has recovered from the negative public image that it acquired as a result of that case. 96 
The principal object of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society is to promote legislation which would allow 
an adult person, suffering from a severe illness to which no relief is known, to receive an immediate 
painless death, if that is the patient's expressed wish. 97 Over the years, the society has been very 
active in its efforts to secure reform of the law in this area, having been responsible for 
commissioning opinion polls, lobbying politicians, campaigning for reform,98 and preparing draft 
legislation for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia.99 The society publishes a quarterly 
newsletter and accepts frequent invitations to speak to various groups and conduct media interviews to 
discuss the society's aims and activities. I OO The society is also active in the promotion and 
distribution of 'advance directives•lOl and has prepared draft legislation for the statutory recognition of 
such directives.102 
Membership of the society is steadily increasing and is open to all who sympathise with the society's 
objects. In the wake of the activities of the British Medical Association Working Party on Euthanasia, 
the society established a medical group made up of doctor members of the society .103 This group has 
extended its membership to include nurses, and other health care workers.104 
Yoluntazy Euthanasia Society of Scotland 
The Voluntary Euthanasia Society of Scotland (originally named Scottish EXIT), was established in 
1980 as a breakaway organisation from EXIT (England) as it was then known. Prior to that time, a 
Scottish regional branch of EXIT (England) had been operating in Scotland - 'Scottish Region EXIT'. 
However, disagreement had arisen between the executive of EXIT (England) and the Scottish branch 
over plans by the Scottish branch to publish a booklet on self-deliverance. When the Acting 
Chairman of EXIT (England) forbade publication of the proposed booklet, the Scottish members 
decided to declare independence from EXIT (England) and to continue as a separate entity. Thus, the 
newly created Scottish EXIT, taking advantage of more lenient conditions that prevail under Scottish 
law, became the first organisation to publish a booklet on self-deliverance.105 The publication 
96 Note, 'The Tide Begins to Turn' (1988) 33 V.E.S. Newsletter 1. 
97 Booklet published by the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, The Last Right (1988) 1. 
98 For example, the society has conducted questionaries of M.P.s and active members of the House of 
Lords for their views on active voluntary euthanasia and through its newsletters, has encouraged 
members to write to their M.P.s to urge them to support steps for reform in this area; e.g. Note, 'Your 
Help Needed' (1990) 38 V.E.S. Newsletter 1. 
99 See chapter Vll, 318-320. 
100 Information from interview with society representatives. The activities of the society are well 
documented in its newsletters. 
101 See, for example, the Voluntary Euthanasia Society booklet, The Last Right, 7 and other literature 
distributed by the society. 
102 Medical Treatment (Advance Directives) Bill. See also J. Davies, 'The Advance Directive' (1991) 4 J. 
Med. Defence Union 92. 
103 Minutes of the Annual General Meeting 1988 (1988) 35 V.E.S. Newsletter 2. 
104 Note, 'To All Nurses' (1989) 36 V.E.S. Newsletter 6. 
105 Downing and Smoker, 257. For further consideration of the legal position in Scotland, see chapter ill, 
n. 11. 
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entitled How to Die with Dignity106 was first released in September 1980, and since then has been 
available for strictly private distribution amongst members of the society .101 In 1983, the society 
changed its name from Scottish Exit to its present name, the Voluntary Euthanasia Society of 
Scotland. The aims are much the same as for other voluntary euthanasia societies, namely to 
ultimately secure reform of the law so as to permit active voluntary euthanasia.108 The society is 
involved in a wide range of activities, including public meetings, media interviews, press publicity 
and lobbying of politicians.109 
United States 
In the wake of developments in the United Kingdom, the Euthanasia Society of America was founded 
in 1938. The founder and first President of the society was the Reverend Chari~ Francis Potter, a 
humanist and prolific writer of books on religion. As had been the case in the United Kingdom, the 
Euthanasia Society of America was involved in early, but unsuccessful attempts to introduce 
legislation to legalise active euthanasia. A euthanasia Bill was prepared by the society formulated 
broadly along the same lines as the 1936 English Bill and was submitted, with some differences in 
content,110 to the New York State and Nebraska assemblies in the late 1930s.111 However, neither 
Bill was enacted. Initially, the aims of the Euthanasia Society of America had extended to the 
legalisation of non-voluntary euthanasia in certain circumstances.112 In the light of the results of a 
survey of doctors conducted by the society in 1941, which indicated substantial approval for voluntary 
as distinct from non-voluntary euthanasia, 113 it was decided to confine the activities of the society to 
strictly voluntary euthanasia, notwithstanding that some polls of public opinion had shown support 
for euthanasia of grossly defective infants.114 
During the 1940s and early 1950s, concerted efforts were made by the society to introduce legislation 
in New York to permit active voluntary euthanasia but these efforts were repeatedly thwarted for lack 
of a sponsor for the legislation.115 Parallel attempts in other American States also proved 
fruitless.116 In view of the previous failed attempts at legislative reform, the society decided that 
further attempts to introduce legislation would be futile until a more favourable climate of opinion 
106 G. Mair, (1980). 
107 See How to Die with Dignity, 5 for the conditions of circulation and use of the booklet. 
108 See booklet produced by the V.E.S.S. Voluntary Euthanasia (1990). 
109 Information obtained through correspondence with society representatives, 1990-1992. 
110 The Nebraska Bill differed from both the New York Bill and the legislation which had been proposed in 
the United Kingdom on the grounds that it authorised a limited form of non-voluntary euthanasia of 
minors and incompetent adults. It was also broader in scope in that it provided that active euthanasia 
could be performed even where the illness was not terminal. See R. Kaplan, 'Euthanasia Legislation: A 
Survey and a Model Act' (1976) 2 Am.J.L. & Med. 41, 53. 
1 l 1 Williams, 296. 
112 Gould and Craigmyle, 26 referring to the proposal to advocate compulsory euthanasia of 'monstrosities 
and imbeciles;' Humphry and Wickett, 16; Russell, 72-74 referring to individuals connected with the 
society (including its founder and President, Rev. Charles Potter) who had supported the concept of 
non-voluntary euthanasia in some circumstances. 
113 Humphry and Wickett, 36; Russell, 89-90. 
114 Humphry and Wickett, 36; Russell, 90. 
115 For fuller consideration of the various early attempts at legislative reform in the United States see 
chapter VII, 324-326. 
116 Russell, 133-135 referring to developments in the 1950s in New Jersey and Connecticut. 
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had been created.117 However, the society's efforts at legislative reform had at least succeeded in 
drawing attention to the society and its objectives and attracting some prominent supporters for its 
cause, including many doctors and clergy. 118 
During the 1960s, under the new Presidency of Donald McKinney, a Unitarian minister, there was 
some reassessment of the organisation's goals with increasing emphasis on the right of the individual 
to consent to and refuse treatment.119 Although there were some who still believed in pressing for 
legislation for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, the majority of the then board of 
directors saw education of the public and the health care professions as the primary need and the 
activities of the society were directed towards education rather than legislation.120 Pursuant to this 
shift in focus, the society established the Euthanasia Educational Fund in 1967, (subsequently named 
the Euthanasia Educational Council in 1972), a tax-exempt branch of the society, the function of 
which was to disseminate information and promote discussion on the issues involved in death and 
dying.121 In the mid 1970s, when the prospects of introducing legislation had improved, the 
politically active counterpart of the council, the Euthanasia Society of America, was reactivated as the 
Society for the Right to Die to promote State 'right to die' legislation. In 1978, the Euthanasia 
Educational Council changed its name to Concern for Dying. For some years, the Society for the 
Right to Die and Concern for Dying were affiliated, operating as separate arms of the American right 
to die movement and sharing the same office premises.122 Because of the Euthanasia Educational 
Council's tax exempt non-profit status, euthanasia supporters were encouraged to send donations 
which were in tum partly used to finance the activities of the Society for the Right to Die.123 
However, the tensions underlying the differing orientations of the two groups eventually led to a 
complete split in 1979. 124 
Concern for Dying, with its essentially educational outlook, continued with its program of public and 
professional education and dissemination of its living wm.125 In addition to the publication of a 
quarterly newsletter which commenced in 1975, and reports on legal, medical and ethical developments 
in the care of the dying, Concern for Dying produced a significant amount of literature on the subject 
of death and dying126 as well as a number of educational films and videotapes.127 A major program 
activity of Concern for Dying was the Interdisciplinary Collaboration on Death and Dying. First 
established in 1978, the Interdisciplinary Collaboration on Death and Dying (known as the 
117 Id. 132-.133, 180. 
118 Wilson, 37; Humphry and Wickett, 37; J. Sullivan, The Morality of Mercy Killings (1950) 18-21. 
119 Concern for Dying, A Twenty - Year History 1967-1987. 
120 Ibid. See also Russell, 180. 
121 Humphry and Wickett, 95; Russell 180; Wilson, 41. 
122 Society for the Right to Die, The First Fifty Years 1938-1988, 3; Humphry and Wickett, 119. 
123 Humphry and Wickett, 119. 
124 For more detailed coverage of the breakdown in the organisations' working relationship and the 
litigation which ensued, see Humphry and Wickett, 119-120. 
125 See Concern for Dying, A Twenty- Year History 1967-1987. 
126 See, for example, the Legal Guide to the Living Will (1978) and The Living Will and Other Advance 
Directives (1986). 
127 See pamphlet, Concern for Dying, Films and Videotapes. 
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Collaboration) is a professional educational program on terminal care decision-making for students and 
practitioners in law, medicine, nursing, social work, theology, health care administration and related 
professions with the aim of improving participants' understanding and skill in dealing with the needs 
of the terminally ill and their families.128 Another initiative introduced by Concern for Dying was 
the establishment of a living will registry in 1983, whereby individuals can, for a small fee, have a 
copy of their living will kept on a computerised file in a central location.129 During the 1980s, 
Concern for Dying began to diversify its activities into the judicial and legislative areas. A legal 
advisory service was established to handle the numerous inquiries from attorneys for information 
about the legal status of non-statutory advance directives and other legal questions pertaining to the 
terminally ill. Concern's staff attorney and committee members have been involved in a number of 
court cases, giving legal advice as well as filing amicus briefs in a number of landmark cases.130 The 
organisation has also been involved in drafting model 'right to refuse treatment' legislation. 
Following its official separation from Concern for Dying in 1979, the more politically active group, 
the Society for the Right to Die, continued with its campaign for right to die legislation and has been 
instrumental in securing reform in this area.131 However, the split between the two organisations 
resulted in an expansion of the society's program into educational and judicial arenas, while 
continuing with its legislative activities.132 In addition to the publication and distribution of its 
newsletters, the society produced numerous publications dealing with living wills and relevant 
legislation and generally on the subject of 'death with dignity'.133 In 1984, a legal department was 
established and the society has been involved in many 'right to die' court cases, with staff attorneys 
acting as advocates or more usually, submitting amicus briefs in support of the patient's right to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment.134 The society has also been active in the medical field. In 1985, the 
society established a medical relations department, with the aim of promoting closer contact between 
the society and health care facilities. 135 The society has also regularly sponsored conferences for 
doctors to foster the exchange of views on right to die issues among medical practitioners. In 1982 the 
society convened a conference of ten of the nation's most prominent doctors with the aim of 
establishing comprehensive guidelines on the doctors' responsibility towards hopelessly ill patients 
and their families. This initiative led to the publication of an authoritative article in the New England 
Journal of Medicinel36 which was subsequently also incorporated in the society's own publication, 
128 See Concern for Dying, A Twenty - Year History 1967-1987. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Concern for Dying, The Living Will and Other Advance Directives (1986) 4. 
131 In 1978 the society was involved in drafting model living will legislation in conjunction with the Yale 
Legislative Services at the Yale Law School. The draft legislation has subsequently been used as a 
legislative model in a number of jurisdictions; Society for the Right to Die, The First Fifty Years 1938-
1988, 4-5. 
132 Society for the Right to Die, The First Fifty Years 1938-1988, 5. 
133 The society's publications include Death with Dignity: Legislative Manual (1975); Handbook of 
Living Will Laws 1981-1984; The Handbook of 1985 Living Will Laws (1985); Handbook of Living 
Will Laws (1987 edition); and The Physician and the Hopelessly Rl Patient (1985). 
134 Society for the Right to Die, The First Fifty Years 1938-1988, 9. 
135 Id. 1. 
136 S. Wanzer et al, 'The Physician's Responsibility to the Hopelessly Ill Patient' (1984) 310 New 
Eng.J.Med. 955. 
250 
The Physician and the Hopelessly Ill Patient: Legal, Medical and Ethical Guidelinesl31 and has been 
widely distributed amongst the health care community. Encouraged by the success of the 1982 
conference, the doctors were convened by the society for a second time in 1987 in order to continue 
their analysis of the doctors' appropriate role with dying patients. Nine of the original ten participants 
were present (one of the doctors had since died) and there were three additions. This second conference 
resulted in a follow up publication in the New England Journal of Medicine, 138 once again attracting 
considerable publicity and interest from both within and outside the medical profession. 
Unlike the founders of the original Euthanasia Society of America, neither Concern for Dying nor the 
Society for the Right to Die have openly advocated active voluntary euthanasia. They have, instead, 
focused their activities on recognition of the patient's right to refuse treatment, acceptance of living 
wills and matters generally falling within the category of 'passive' euthanasia. Although there was a 
marked difference in strategy between the two organisations in the late 1970s, by the end of the 
1980s, both organisations had recognised the respective merits of educational and legislative 
initiatives in achieving their aims, and this was reflected in the diversification of their activities. This 
had, however, resulted in a duplication of programs and ineffective use of limited resources. In 1990, 
Concern for Dying and the Society for the Right to Die began negotiations for the merger of the two 
organisations and in September 1991 the two organisations merged to create a new organisation under 
the name Choice in Dying. The main advantages of the merger for both organisations is that it 
enables them to combine their resources and streamline duplicate programs, thereby creating a more 
efficient and influential organisation.139 
The Hemlock Society 
In 1980 Derek Humphry, a journalist and author who had emigrated from England some two years 
earlier, and his second wife, Anne Wickett, established the Hemlock Society. In a media interview, 140 
Humphry, long-time Executive Director of the society, explained that his motivation behind the 
formation of the society was the experience of helping his first wife, who was suffering from cancer, 
to commit suicide and later publishing a book on the subject entitled Jean's Way.141 According to 
Humphry, the experience of writing the book, and the reactions he received to it, got him caught up 
in the whole issue and led him to establish the Hemlock Society as a way to pursue the issue 
intelligently through research, writing and publishing books.142 The Hemlock Society derives its 
name from the root plant Hemlock, a poisonous umbelliferous plant. It was decided to use this name 
for the newly created organisation because of its connotations with rational suicide which the society 
supports.143 Unlike the other societies in the United States which have limited their activities to the 
137 Society for the Right to Die (1985). 
138 S. Wanzer et al, The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second Look' (1989) 
320 New Eng.J.Med. 844. 
139 Note, 'Why Merger: The History and Reasons Behind the Decision' (1990) 17 Concern for Dying 
Newsletter l, 5. 
140 Medicine in the News 2 April 1986. 
141 (1978). 
142 Ibid. 
143 Note, 'Q and A on the Hemlock Society' (1990) 37 Hemlock Q. 12. 
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pursuit of passive euthanasia, the Hemlock Society supports the option of active voluntary euthanasia 
for the terminally ill and has been the leading proponent of active voluntary euthanasia in North 
America. In 1981, the Hemlock Society was granted status as a non-profit, educational corporation, 
which means that all donations, gifts and legacies made to the society are tax deductible. This was a 
development of considerable practical significance, since the society is financially dependent on 
donations, as well as membership fees and the sale of its books. 
Membership of the Hemlock Society has steadily grown since its establishment in 1980. As the 
influence and popularity of the Hemlock Society has increased, many chapters of the society have 
been set up throughout the United States. The Hemlock Society is a founder member of the World 
Federation of the Right to Die Societies. The stated principles of the society are to seek to promote a 
climate of public opinion which is tolerant of the right of people who are terminally ill to end their 
lives in a planned manner.144 The Hemlock Society believes that the final decision to terminate life 
is ultimately one's own. It believes this action, and most of all its timing, to be an extremely 
personal decision, wherever possible taken in concert with family and friends. The society speaks only 
to those people who have mutual sympathy with its goals. However, views contrary to its own which 
are held by other religions and philosophies are respected.145 
Amongst the principal objectives of the society is the promotion of dialogue to raise public 
consciousness of active voluntary euthanasia through the news media, public meetings and with the 
medical and legal profession and others, and to support the principle of legislation to permit a dying 
~rson to lawfully request a doctor to help him or her to die.146 In pursuit of its stated principles and 
objectives, the society engages in a wide range of activities. Its representatives, particularly Derek 
Humphry, founder and for many years Executive Director of the society, has developed a high profile 
with the media, frequently giving interviews as well as engaging in many television and radio debates 
with ethicists, doctors and lawyers throughout the country as well as abroad.147 A quarterly 
newsletter148 is issued to members, providing up todate information on issues of death and dying. 
The society also produces and distributes its own advance declaration.149 The Hemlock Society is 
particularly notable for its numerous publications on suicide, assisted suicide, active voluntary 
euthanasia, and related issues.150 It boasts many of its own titles, including the first United States 
144 The society does not encourage suicide for any primary emotional, traumatic, or financial reasons in 
the absence of terminal illness. It approves of the work of those involved in suicide prevention. 
145 See the statement of general principles in the society's literature, including in each issue of the 
newsletter, the Hemlock Q. 
146 Hemlock Q. (Permanent Supplement). 
147 R. Risley, Death with Dignity (1989) 74. Derek Humphry has recently resigned from his position as 
Executive Director. 
148 Hemlock Q. 
149 For detailed analysis of the Hemlock Society's version of the living will and how it compares with that 
distributed by the other organisations in the United States see R. Weir, Abating Treatment with 
Critically Ill Patients (1989) 183-184. 
150 Titles include D. Humphry, Jean's Way (1978); D. Humphry, Let Me Die Before I Wake (1981); D. 
Portwood, Commonsense Suicide (1983); G. Larue, Euthanasia and Religion (1985); D. Humphry and 
A. Wickett, The Right to Die (1986); D. Humphry, (ed.) Compassionate Crimes, Broken Taboos 
(1986); G. Johnson, The Right to Die, Voluntary Euthanasia (1987); R. Risley, Death with Dignity 
(1989); D. Humphry, Final Exit (1991). 
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guide to self-deliverance; Let Me Die Before I Wake, by Derek Humphry which was released in 1981. 
This book talces the form of case histories that illustrate the concept of active voluntary euthanasia. 
Thus, in the context of true stories of suicides by terminally ill people, lethal drug dosages are 
disclosed. The publication of this book caused considerable controversy, including condemnation from 
other voluntary euthanasia organisations in the United States, primarily on the grounds that such 
material is likely to be the subject of abuse.151 Let Me Die Before I Wake was initially only 
available to Hemlock members, l52 but was subsequently released for general sale. It has proved to be 
the society's best selling title, with over 60,000 copies sold in the first five years of its release as well 
as reportedly being a heavily borrowed item in public libraries.153 Humphry has since written another 
book on the subject, Final Exit: The Practicalities of Self-Deliverance and Assisted Suicide for the 
Dying which has also proved to be enormously successful.154 Final Exit is a detailed manual on how 
to commit suicide, explicitly setting out information about drug dosages, as well as giving guidance 
to doctors and nurses about helping people to die. As with the earlier publication Let Me Die Before I 
Wake, Final Exit has been the subject of controversy, primarily because of fears that it would be 
abused by people suffering depression or severe anxiety. The book was initially banned for sale in 
Australia on the grounds that it promoted assisting suicide (an offence in all Australian 
jurisdictions 155) but after widespread criticism, 156 this decision has been reversed. 
In addition to its own publications, the society also sponsors a journal entitled the Euthanasia Review 
which publishes articles on a range of subjects connected with euthanasia.157 A number of 
educational video programs on the subject of active voluntary euthanasia have also been produced by 
the society.158 Since its inception in 1980, the society has sponsored a number of conferences on 
active voluntary euthanasia and related issues including the 7th biennial international conference of the 
World Federation of Right to Die Societies which was held in San Francisco in 1988. 
Reflecting on the achievements of the society, Humphry has explained that the first five years of its 
work were devoted to raise public consciousness of the issue through its books, newsletters, 
conferences and media briefings.159 By 1985, the view was talcen by the representatives of the society 
that public support for active voluntary euthanasia was at a level sufficient to prompt legislative 
activities160 and since then, the society has been pressing for legislation which would permit 
'physician aid-in-dying'.161 In planning a strategy for legislative activity, it was decided to retain the 
151 Humphry and Wickett, 122. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Id. 183, 221. 
154 (1991) reported by Publishers Weekly to be a best selling non-fiction book and for some time held top 
position in the advice category of the New York Times best-seller list. 
155 See chapter ill, 83-84 
l56 See, for example, H. Kuhse, 'Editorial' (1992) Vol. 11 No. 3 Bioethics News 1-4. 
157 Edited by D. Humphry and A. Wickett. 
15 8 A Time to Die and The Right to Choose to Die. For further information see Hemlock Society's 
promotional literature. 
159 D. Humphry, 'Physicians and Euthanasia' (1988) 3 Euthanasia Rev. 79, 81-82. 
160 Id. 82. 
161 See chapter VII, 339-343. 
253 
Hemlock Society as the intellectual underpinning of the movement, specialising as it does, in research 
and publication, and to start a new organisation which would have the appropriate legal status to 
substantially engage in active politics.162 The Hemlock Society provided financial support for the 
creation of a sister organisation163 for the purpose of changing State law to permit physician-aid-in 
dying for the terminally ill. The new organisation, Americans Against Human Suffering (A.A.H.S.) 
which was established in 1986, is the political arm of the Hemlock Society, with a different tax status 
which allows it to engage in law reform activities. In collaboration with A.A.H.S, the Hemlock 
Society has campaigned for the introduction of physician aid-in-dying legislation in a number of 
American States.164 
Canada 
There are presently four voluntary euthanasia societies in Canada; Dying with Dignity; Goodbye, A 
Right to Die Society; The Right to Die Society of Canada; and Fondation Responsable Jusqu'a la fin, 
(Foundation Responsible Until the End). The largest of the organisations, Dying with Dignity 
80 0 /'t .o. established in 19 , is a national organisation based in Toronto, ntar· . Notwithstanding its 
relatively short history, it has already made considerable progress in pursuing its objectives. In its 
promotional literature, Dying with Dignity describes itself as 'a Canadian society concerned with the 
quality of dying'. The stated aims of the society are to inform and educate Canadians about the right to 
a good death, to promote a better understanding among the general public and health care professionals 
regarding the issues of death and dying, to distribute and encourage recognition of the living will in 
Canada and to encourage medical and legal recognition of active voluntary euthanasia. 165 Dying with 
Dignity is a non-profit registered charitable organisation and donations to the society are consequently 
tax deductible. 
Dying with Dignity engages in a wide range of activities in pursuit of its objectives. The society 
issues a quarterly newsletter, provides speakers for meetings, and offers its library resources to the 
public. Its staff, principally consisting of an Executive Director, sµpplemented by volunteer 
assistance, handle numerous telephone inquiries and letters166 and also seek to provide a counselling 
service about options for the terminally m .167 In furtherance of its stated aims, the society is also 
involved in the promotion and distribution of its own living will and durable power of attorney and 
has endorsed legislative developments to give legal recognition to the these forms of advance 
directive.168 
162 Ibid. 
163 At the Hemlock Society's 1986 Convention, Derek Humphry announced a grant of $50,000 to 
establish Americans Against Human Suffering. 
164 For discussion of these legislative developments, see chap VII, 339-343. 
165 See Dying with Dignity pamphlet. (A statement of aims also appears in some of the newsletters .) 
166 (1989) Vol. 6 No. 1 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 8. 
167 Report of the Executive Director (1990) Vol. 7 No. 3. Dying with Dignity Newsletter 3. 
168 See chapter VII, 348. 
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In its efforts to educate Canadians about the right to a good death and to promote a better 
understanding among the general public and health care professionals regarding the issues of death and 
dying, the society has played an active role in the media. Representatives of the society are regularly 
invited to appear on radio and television interviews and talkback shows and frequently hold interviews 
with the print media.169 Apart from its own media involvement, the society has been closely 
monitoring media coverage on the issue of euthanasia generally which it reports to members through 
its newsletter. Particularly in recent years, there has been a tremendous increase in the media attention 
on the subject of active voluntary euthanasia in Canada, generating and reflecting a lot of interest in 
the country about these issues. 
Other educationally orientated activities organised by the society include a regular public forum on 
health care issues which attract considerable interest and are usually very well attended. 170 The society 
also sponsors other conferences, and in 1989 hosted t,he inaugural conference of the members of the 
World Federation of the Right to Die Societies located in the Western Hemisphere, a biennial event, 
to be held in the year between the W~rld Federation meeting.171 
Dying with Dignity has been actively fostering a co-operative working relationship with the medical 
profession in Canada.172 The society has established dialogue with a number of medical organisations 
and has conducted a number of surveys of doctors to gauge respondents' awareness of and attitudes to 
the living will, which have generally promoted a positive response from the doctors surveyed. 173 The 
extent of this co-operative relationship is reflected in the fact that the medical organisations have been 
co-sponsors of the public forums organised by the society which often feature speakers from the 
medical profession. The society has also been involved in various other initiatives intended to 
promote an appreciation of the role and aims of the society within the medical community. 17 4 In 
1989, Dying with Dignity convened a special meeting of doctors and lawyers, with the aim of 
informally exchanging ideas on topics of mutual concern, including patients' rights within the health 
care system, medical and legal recognition of the living will and durable power of attorney for health 
care, and the need, if any, for protective legislation for doctors honouring the wish of a patient 'to die 
with dignity .175 Further combined medico-legal initiatives are underway with the support of the 
society, to formulate legislation on the living will. 
169 Since 1988, the society's newsletter features a regular column detailing members involvement in the 
media. 
170 For example Public Forum 1987, (see Note, 'Choices: The Quality of Dying' (1988) Vol. 5 No. 1 Dying 
with Dignity Newsletter 4); Public Forum 1988, 'A Community Response to the Quality of Dying' (see 
Note, 'Forum, October 17, 1988' (1989) Vol. 6 No. 1 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 2), Public Forum 
1989, 'No Heroics Please', (see Note, 'Listen to Patients Says Forum Speaker' (1990) Vol. 7 No. 1 
Dying with Dignity Newsletter 2). 
171 Note, 'A Good Turnout' (1989) Vol. 6 No. 3 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 2. 
172 Note, 'Report on the 7th Biennial Conference of the World Federation of the Right-to-Die Societies' 
(1988) Vol. 5 No. 3 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 5. 
173 Note, 'Ontario Physicians Respond' (1987) Vol. 4 No. 4 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 1. 
174 For example, the society co-operated with a program on Dying with Dignity arranged by the Medico-
1.egal Society of Toronto; Note, 'Medico-Legal Society Learns About DWD' (1990) Vol. 7 No. 1 Dying 
with Dignity Newsletter 5. 
175 Note, 'Impressions of the Doctors/Lawyers Meeting' (1989) Vol. 6 No. 2 Dying with Dignity 
Newsletter 6. 
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Over its relatively short history, Dying with Dignity has enjoyed growing acceptance and support for 
its aims, evidenced by increasing membership, financial contributions, and attendance at meetings and 
public forums. However, there have, in the past, been complaints from some members on the grounds 
that the society was not sufficiently vocal or active in promoting the issue of active voluntary 
euthanasia. No doubt encouraged by evidence of growing community and professional support, there 
has, in recent years, been some reassessment of the society's policy position with regard to the issue 
of active voluntary euthanasia This has resulted in a shift of emphasis in the aims and activities of 
the organisation, with a strengthening of the organisation's commitment to active voluntary 
euthanasia.176 Active voluntary euthan~ia is now more openly advocated and a voluntary euthanasia 
declaration has been prepared and distributed.177 The society has also established a registry for the 
durable power of attorney for health care and the voluntary euthanasia declaration.178 
Membership in Dying with Dignity has been increasing steadily over recent years, much of which the 
society attributes to its media activities, as well as to a growing awareness in the community of the 
issues that it espouses.179 The organisation also reports an increase in institutional membership 
which, it believes, reflects growing social acceptability of the organisation in Canada.180 Dying with 
Dignity has established branches in a number of centres across Canada for the purpose of providing a 
closer contact for members in these communities.181 The national body provides resources to assist 
these groups in their operation. Dying with Dignity is the Canadian representative in the World 
Federation of the Right to Die Societies. 
In the past few years a number of new right to die societies have been established in Canada. 
Goodbye, A Right to Die Society was established in March 1991. The aims of this organisation are 
to promote public awareness of the right to die with dignity, to disseminate information to the public 
and to advocate legislation which will allow individuals the freedom to choose to die with dignity and 
permit their doctors to assist in implementing their patients' choice. The society promotes the 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia and has an arrangement with the Hemlock Society enabling 
it to sell that society's books and pamphlets.182 
Another newly established society which also promotes the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 
is the Right to Die Society of Canada, a non-profit organisation which has its headquarters in 
Victoria, British Columbia. The Right to Die Society of Canada, established in 1991, is also in 
alliance with the Hemlock Society and sells the Hemlock Society's books and publications.183 
176 (1989) Vol. 6 No. 1 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 5. 
177 Note, 'Voluntary Euthanasia Declaration' (1988) Vol. 5 No. 2 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 1. 
178 Report of the Executive Director (1988) Vol. 5 No. 3 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 4. 
179 Note, 'We Continue to Grow' (1990) Vol. 7 No. 2 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 3. 
180 Report of the Executive Director (1990) Vol. 7 No. 3 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 3. 
181 Branches presently ~xist in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto and London. 
182 Goodbye, A Right to Die Society pamphlet. 
183 Right to Die Society of Canada pamphlet. 
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The fourth voluntary euthanasia society operating in Canada is Fondation Responsable Jusqu'a la fin 
(Foundation Responsible Until the End), based in Neufchatel, Quebec. The principal aim of this 
organisation which was established in 1986, is to promote the right to die in accordance with the 
existing laws in the Province of Quebec and to secure recognition of the living will. The Foundation 
does not promote active voluntary euthanasia 184 
International Developments: The World Federation of Right to Die Societies 
The first international meeting on voluntary euthanasia was held in Tokyo in 1976 followed by a 
meeting in San Francisco in 1978. As a result of these early meetings, the World Federation of Right 
to Die Societies was founded in Oxford, 1980, with 27 groups from eighteen countries joining as 
founding members. Whilst there have been some fluctuations, membership in the federation has 
remained fairly constant and presently stands at 30 with representation from most voluntary euthanasia 
organisations throughout the world.185 The World Federation of Right to Die Societies, deliberately 
named in such a way that it would cover all voluntary euthanasia and right to die societies - whether 
proponents of passive and or active euthanasia, aim to establish voluntary euthanasia organisations in 
every country and to secure throughout the world, the legalisation of the right of self-determination in 
dying.186 As a federation, its major role is the co-ordination on an international basis of the member 
societies.187 Its major organisational activity is the biennial meeting held in connection with the 
biennial international euthanasia conference. These conferences, hosted by members of the federation, 
have been held in 'Melbourne (1982), Nice (1984), Bombay (1986), Los Angeles (1988), and 
Maastricht (1990) and Kyoto (1992). The meeting of representatives of the member societies at the 
international conferences is regarded as invaluable, offering the opportunity for reporting of news from 
each member society and acting as a medium for dialogue and exchanging ideas among member 
organisations. The federation publishes a World Right to Die Newsletter twice a year. Under the 
World Federation's Constitution, its affairs are to be managed by its Board of Directors. The Board of 
Directors has recently been enlarged from 8 to 10 people, 188 and consists of a President, Vice 
President, Secretary, Newsletter Editor and Treasurer plus five Directors at large. The current President 
is Jean Davies, (former President of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, London) replacing Derek 
Humphry. Other positions are held by individuals from a number of jurisdictions, including Australia, 
New Zealand, the United States and Canada.189 
184 Fondation Responsable Jusqu'a la fin pamphlet. 
185 See Note, 'Profiles of World Federation of Right to Die Societies Members' (1989) 15 World Right-to-
Die Newsletter 2-5. 
186 See the By-Law of World Federation of Right to Die Societies, Article II setting out the purposes of the 
World Federation. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Note, 'Federation Developments - 1976 to the Present' (1990) 16 World Right-to-Die Newsletter 3. 
189 Id. 1, 3. Dr Helga Kuhse, Director of the Monash Center for Human Bioethics, Victoria is a Director; 
Frank Dungey, Honorary Secretary of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, Wellington holds position as 
Secretary; Derek Humphry, former Executive Director of the Hemlock Society, is a Director; and 
Marilynne Seguin, Executive Director of Dying with Dignity, Canada was, for a number of years, the 
Editor. 
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As a world federation, the various member societies are able to present a unified policy position on 
particular issues, in circumstances where a co-ordinated international approach is required. A good 
example is the federation's submission to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations. 
This initiative emerged from the 8th conference of the World Federation of Right to Die Societies held 
in 1988. Dr Helga Kuhse of Australia, philosopher and well-known active voluntary euthanasia 
advocate, undertook the task of preparing the statement on behalf of the federation. In the spirit of 
compromise, it was agreed that the submission be confined to passive euthanasia, so that the views of 
all member societies could be represented.190 The object of this submission was for the incorporation 
of the Right of Dying with Dignity as an Appendix to the Charter of Human Rights of 1948 in the 
hope that the United Nations would subsequently encourage its member countries to introduce 
suitably reformed laws which affirm the patients' right to die with dignity.191 
Voluntary Euthanasia Societies: A Global Perspective 
It is evident from the foregoing review that in the past few decades there have been significant 
developments in the voluntary euthanasia movement with the emergence and expansion of voluntary 
euthanasia societies in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and-Canada. 
The developments in these jurisdictions have been parallelled by similar developments in other parts 
of the world.192 In the jurisdictions under consideration, most of the voluntary euthanasia 
organisations have as their aim the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia although there are a 
number of organisations in the United States whose objectives are confined to legalisation of passive 
euthanasia and the right of an individual to die with dignity.193 Virtually all of the societies report 
steadily increasing membership and growing community support and acceptance of their cause. There 
is a widely held view amongst members and supporters of these societies that this is a movement 
'whose time has come.'194 This in turn has been reflected in increased reform activity, with ongoing 
initiatives in a number of jurisdictions for the introduction of legislation permitting active voluntary 
euthanasia. Although the voluntary euthanasia societies in Australia and New Zealand are of fairly 
recent origin in comparison with other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the United 
States, they are fairly forthright in their aim of promoting legislation which permits active voluntary 
euthanasia Todate their activities have primarily been focused on increasing community awareness 
and acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia, but in more recent years there has been some shift 
towards more direct efforts to introduce legislative reforms. 
190 Note, 'World Federation Submission to United Nations' (1988) Vol. 5 No. 2 Dying with Dignity 
Newsletter 1. 
191 Note, 'Following Up on the World Federation's Statement to the United Nations' (1988) 13 World 
Right-to-Die Newsletter 1. 
192 For coverage of international developments generally see the World Right-to-Die Newsletter. 
193 Choice in Dying (formerly 'Society for the Right to Die' and 'Concern for Dying'). 
194 For example, Note, 'Voluntary Euthanasia - An Idea Whose Time Has Come' (1990) 70 V.E.S. V. Report 
1-2; Note, 'Now is the Time' (1990) Vol. 7 No. 1 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 1; Note, 'Voluntary 
Euthanasia is 'an Idea Whose Time Has Come' Says Derek Humphry' (1992) 78 V.E.S. V. Report 3. 
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Increased Media Coverage and Public Figures in Support 
Another factor contributing to the public awareness and acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia is 
the substantial increase in media coverage of the issue in the form of radio and television programs 
and press reports.195 Not only has there been a significant increase in the extent of the media 
coverage but there appears also to be growing sympathy in the media's treatment of the subject.196 
The publicity surrounding the issue of active voluntary euthanasia and the public interest in the 
subject has been stimulated by a variety of items regularly presented through the media, including 
coverage of reform initiatives, 197 reports of increasingly favourable opinion poll results, frequent 
claims in the media that active euthanasia is already being practiced by some doctors, 198 accounts of 
poignant pleas for legalised active voluntary euthanasia by the sick and elderly,199 and reports of 
heart-rending cases before the courts involving family 'mercy killings•.200 Widespread publicity and 
concern about the AIDS epidemic has also contributed to the momentum of the voluntary euthanasia 
movement, with media reports of AIDS sufferers seeking active euthanasia accompanied by claims 
that these requests are generally dealt with sympathetically by the medical profession. 201 
Over the years, the voluntary euthanasia cause has also been promoted by prominent public figures 
who have indicated their support for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia For example, in 
1988 the acclaimed Australian author, Kylie Tennant whilst suffering from terminal cancer, made an 
impassioned plea for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia in Australia. In the much 
publicised 'last letter to a friend,' she expressed a desire to be allowed to die with dignity and urged all 
Australians to do what they can to bring about change in this area.202 Other prominent Australi~ 
public figures to endorse active voluntary euthanasia have been Sir Mark Oliphant, well-known 
scientist and patron of the South Australian Voluntary Euthanasia Society,2o3 and Justice Michael 
Kirby, former chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission and a frequent advocate of reform 
in this area.204 Much publicised support for the voluntary euthanasia cause in Australia was also 
195 See also Russell, 194-195 commenting on the position in the United States. 
196 This is exemplified by an editorial in The Times, 'Rights and Wrongs of Dying' 28 Oct. 1991 which 
suggested that the issue of active voluntary euthanasia should not be left unresolved indefinitely and 
that it should be the subject of a full-scale public inquiry. More recently, in response to the conviction 
of Dr Cox in the United Kingdom, (discussed in chapter IV, 126-127) there were a number of newspaper 
items which dealt with the case very sympathetically; see, for example, the Sunday Telegraph 20 Sept. 
1992; The Times 21 Sept. 1992; the Guardian 22 Sept. 1992; Daily Express 23 Sept. 1992. 
197 For discussion or reform developments, see chapter VU. 
198 For example, through reports on surveys of the medical profession (e.g. 'Doctors in Survey Back 
Euthanasia' the Age 5 March 1988) and admissions by individual doctors. ('Doctor Says he Helped 
Terminal Patients to Die' the Mercury 9 March 1992). There have also been some interesting historical 
claims which have emerged only relatively recently, of active euthanasia having been practiced on 
members of the British Royal family, namely, King George V (the Bulletin 9 Dec. 1986) and Queen 
Mary (the Mercury 18 Oct. 1990). 
199 For example, the letter published in the Australian 13 July 1988 from Mrs Fenakel to the then New 
South Wales Premier, Mr Griener. 
200 See chapter IV, 129-146. 
201 For example, Sydney Morning Herald 5 April 1987 and the Australian 7 April 1987. 
202 Sydney Morning Herald 6 Feb. 1988. 
203 Note, 'Our Front Cover' (1990) Vol. 7 No. 3. S.A. V.E.S.Bull. 7. 
204 His publications include 'The Right to Live and the Right to Die' (1983) 57 Law Inst.J. 1192; 
'Euthanasia - Old Issue; New Debate' (1984) 14 A.&N.ZJ. Med. 691. 
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forthcoming from Ian Temby Q.C., in a paper presented to the Australian Academy of Forensic 
Sciences during his term as Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.205 
Similarly, in other jurisdictions, the voluntary euthanasia movement has been fuelled by statements 
of support from well-known figures. For example, in the United Kingdom, the acclaimed writer 
Arthur Koestler did much to contribute to public awareness and acceptance of active voluntary 
euthanasia through his support of the British Voluntary Euthanasia Society,206 and through his much 
publicised suicide pact with his wife after he became incurably ill with Parkinson's disease and 
leukemia. 207 Numerous other prominent figures have over recent years indicated their support for the 
voluntary euthanaslli cause, including Katherine Hepburn208 and Dirk Bogarde. 209 
To some extent the discernible increase in media coverage of the issue of active voluntary euthanasia 
in recent years is a reflection of changing community attitudes on the issue, and the media is quite 
naturally tapping into an increasingly interested market. However, the media also plays a role in 
informing and shaping public opinion and there can be little doubt that extensive media coverage of 
the issue, particularly with a pro-euthanasia slant, is a significant contributing factor in the changing 
climate for reform. 
Organised Opposition to the Legalisation of Active Voluntary Euthanasia 
While the voluntary euthanasia movement has clearly been advancing, so has the opposition to 
euthanasia from certain groups.210 Since the commencement of the modem voluntary euthanasia 
movement, any public support for euthanasia, and attempts to introduce legislative reform have 
invariably attracted protest from certain sources. Anti-euthanasia sentiment was particularly strong in 
the 1950s, attributable at least in part, to the revuision to the Nazi crimes.211 
As previously noted, 212 the churches, especially the Roman Catholic Church, have traditionally been 
opposed to the notion of active voluntary euthanasia, and have, particularly during the early 1950s, 
been quite vocal in their condemnation of any proposals for its legalisation.213 Notwithstanding the 
churches' opposition, there have always been individual dissenters who have been willing to publicly 
205 'Euthanasia - Is it Murder' presented in Sydney, 19 July 1988 and published in the Australian Journal of 
Forensic Sciences; (1988) 21 A.J.F.S. 2. 
206 Koestler was for a time Vice-Chairman of the Society and had written the preface to the society's 
booklet, A Guide to Self-Deliverance. 
207 Time 21 March 1983. 
208 Sun/Telegraph 30 Aug. 1987. 
209 Note, 'The Right to Die With Dignity' (1991) 43 V.E.S. Newsletter 2. 
210 For historical coverage of the opposition to euthanasia, see Russell, 59-214; .Wilson, 28-45; Humphry 
and Wickett, 14-136. 
211 Russell, 104; van der Sluis, 161. 
212 See chapter V, 197-199. 
213 Russell, 109, 200. 
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indicate their support for legalisation.214 However, even the churches themselves have, in more 
recent times, indicated a willingness to re-examine traditional views pertaining to life and death.215 
Some churches have, for example, introduced their own initiatives to examine the problems associated 
with death and dying, including the issue of euthanasia.216 Since the mid 1960s, there has been 
increasing discussion of the issue of euthanasia in church sponsored periodicals including articles 
openly supporting active voluntary euthanasia.217 Today, the churches have generally come to accept 
the practice of passive euthanasia, in recognition of the problems associated with medical 
advancements and the futile prolongation of life.218 Support has also been given to the practice of 
administering to a dying person drugs for the alleviation of pain, even though they may hasten 
death.219 More significantly, there haS even been support for active voluntary euthanasia, at least in 
some circumstances, from a number of notable Catholic and Protestant theologians.220 In recent 
years, there have been quite a number of ordained clergy from a broad spectrum of denominations who 
have indicated their support for active voluntary euthanasia221 
In addition to the traditional opposition from the churches, right to life groups have also been vocal 
opponents of euthanasia.222 Alongside their campaign efforts to prohibit abortion, right to life 
organisations have vigorously opposed any legislative proposals for the legalisation of active 
voluntary euthanasia, and even 'natural death' and 'living will' legislation which permits only passive 
euthanasia in some limited circumstances has attracted opposition.223 Whilst upholding the general 
right of patients to control their own treatment, right to life organisations are opposed to any 
214 For example, Sullivan, 19-21. 
215 Russell, 200-214. 
216 For example the Church of England, National Assembly Board for Social Responsibility established an 
inquiry and in 1965 published a report entitled, Decisions about Life and Death. See also the Church 
Assembly Board for Social Responsibility,. On Dying Well (1975). 
217 Russell, 209. 
218 Id. 202- 206. Note, however, resistance is sometimes encountered to the use of the word euthanasia. For 
further discussion, see the Introduction to this thesis, 3-5. 
219 Id. 205. With specific reference to the Catholic Church, see Pope Pious XII, 'Religious and Moral 
Aspects of Pain Prevention in Medical Practice' (1957) 88 Jr. Ecclesiastical Ree. 193. 
220 For example, D. Maguire, (Professor of Theology); R. McCormick, (Catholic moral theologian); P. 
Ramsey, (Protestant Minister, Professor of Religion). For reference to the views of these 
commentators see chapter V. 
221 For two recent Australian examples, note Reverend John Best, retired Anglican priest who was, until 
his recent death, Vice-President of the Western Australian Voluntary Euthanasia Society (see Note, 
'Cleric Campaigns for Euthanasia' (1991) Vol. 11 No. 4 W.A. V.E.S. News 6); and Mr Kenneth Ralph, 
Minister of the Uniting Church in Australia (see K. Ralph, 'Religious Dimensions to Voluntary 
Euthanasia' (1992) 76 V.E.S. V. Report 1). There have been similar reports in the United Kingdom; see, 
for example, Note, 'Support from Bishop of Durham' (1992) 46 V.E.S. Newsletter 3. There was also 
considerable support from the clergy for 'Initiative· 119', the proposal to introduce physician aid-in-
dying legislation in Washington State; see Note, 'Clergy for Voluntary Euthanasia' (1992) Vol. 11 No. 
1 Bioethics News 4. See chapter VII, 342. 
222 In Australia there are two national right to life organisations; Right to Life Australia, (a national 
organisation with State branches), and the Australian Federation of Right to Life Associations which is 
an affiliation of State right to life bodies. For general coverage of the right to life viewpoint 
(particularly in the United States) see Humphry and Wickett, 170-178. 
223 In Australia, efforts to introduce refusal of treatment legislation in Victoria and natural death 
legislation in Tasmania, met with concerted opposition from right to life groups. Similar resistance 
has been encountered in the United States with regard to 'living will' and euthanasia legislation; see 
Humphry and Wickett, 172. (For further discussion of these legislative developments, see chapter VII.) 
In the United Kingdom, right to life societies emerged in response to the concerted efforts of the 
Euthanasia Society in England in 1969 to enact voluntary euthanasia legislation; Russell, 186. 
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deliberate termination of life; whether by passive or active means. 224 As the voluntary euthanasia 
movement bas gained in intensity, a number of new organisations have been established for the 
purpose of counteracting this development and fighting against the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia.225 For example, in 1987, the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force was established in 
the United States, which bas, as its stated purpose, inter alia, to promote and defend the right of all 
' 
persons to be treated with respect, dignity and compassion and to resist attitudes, programs and 
policies which threaten the lives and rights of those who are medically vulnerable.226 In the United 
Kingdom a new organisation was established in 1991 under the name of ALERT which aims to 
campaign against the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. ALERT issues a regular 
newsletter227 and is affiliated with the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force. 
These anti-euthanasia developments can be seen as a direct response to the modern voluntary 
euthanasia movement and to the growing success of the campaign for the legalisation of active 
voluntary euthanasia 
PART III 
Si&ns of Chan&e from Wjtbjn the Medical Profession 
As noted earlier, although passive euthanasia is now widely accepted as an appropriate form of medical 
practice, the medical profession bas traditionally been opposed to the concept of active voluntary 
euthanasia and has steadfastly resisted efforts to secure its legalisation.228 However, notwithstanding 
the medical profession's traditional opposition to active voluntary euthanasia, some prominent and 
respected doctors have openly supported the voluntary euthanasia cause and have in fact played a 
significant role in the establishment and development of the voluntary euthanasia movement.229 
Developments within the medical profession in more recent years indicate that professional medical 
organisations need to re-examine their official stance on the issue of active voluntary euthanasia Not 
only are there continuing reports of some more outspoken members of the profession indicating their 
support for legalisation of the practice,230 there is also growing evidence to suggest that attitudes to 
the issue of active voluntary euthanasia have undergone considerable change within the profession 
generally. Reliable surveys of the medical profession conducted in Australia and other jurisdictions 
have shown that a substantial proportion of doctors are in favour of the legalisation of active 
224 See generally right to life literature; e.g. pamphlet 'What is Pro-Life Victoria?' 
225 Note also the World Federation of Doctors Who Respect Human Life, which publishes a monthly 
newsletter, entitled News Exchange. 
226 See pamphlet, International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force, Human Life Center, University of 
Steubenville. 
227 ALERT Euthanasia Update. 
228 See chapter IV, 112-113 
229 See above, 243-244 for discussion regarding the establishment of the V.E.S. U.K .. For detailed 
historical coverage of the position in the United States and the United Kingdom, see Russel, chapters , 
4-7; Humphry and Wickett, chapters 1-7. 
230 For example, Dr Rodney Syme (see below, 270) and Dr Timothy Quill, (see below, 287). 
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voluntary euthanasia, and have indicated that they would be willing to engage in the practice if it were 
made legal. In the light of this evidence, it is becoming increasingly evident that the professional 
medical associations no longer represent the views of their members on this issue and that a major 
reassessment of the associations' traditional opposition to active voluntary euthanasia is now long 
overdue. 
Some progress towards reform has already been made at the official levels of the medical profession. 
The widespread acceptance of medical conduct which involves passive euthanasia as being consistent 
with legitimate medical practice can be seen as a step towards the reform of the law with regard to 
active voluntary euthanasia. 231 The practical endorsement of passive euthanasia by the medical 
profession does, to a large extent, reflect growing recognition of the practical limits of modem 
medical technology and of the importance of patient autonomy and self-determination in deciding upon 
treatment choices. As argued in an earlier chapter, 232 these principles apply with equal force to active 
voluntary euthanasia so the foundation has been laid for broader recognition of patients' rights in this 
area. 
There are also other indications that the medical profession may, in the longer term, be amenable to 
reform_ on the issue of active voluntary euthanasia. In recent years, there appears to be greater 
willingness on the part of the profession to re-evaluate its stance with regard to active voluntary 
euthanasia and openly debate the issues involved. This is clearly evidenced by the increased attention 
to the issue of active euthanasia in the medical literature, 233 as well as the growing number of 
medical conferences, symposia, seminars, and meetings where the issue has been discussed. Further, 
in a number of jurisdictions, medical associations have actually initiated inquiries to reassess their 
traditional opposition to the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. 234 The significance of these 
developments must be considered against the traditiona!J.y accepted view that active euthanasia is no 
part of the work of doctors and the resulting sensitivity of the medical profession in broaching this 
subject. 
There have also been a number of other factors operating within the medical profession which have, in 
a more general way, contributed in the process of reform towards recognition of active voluntary 
euthanasia. One such factor is the increasing attention being given to the subject of medical ethics 
generally. Over the past ten years or so, quite a number of research centres and institutions have been 
established in Australia (and other jurisdictions) devoted to teaching and research in this field,235 and 
231 This proposition derives support from but does not depend on the 'moral equivalence argument' 
discussed in chapter V, 181-183. It should be noted, however, that members of the medical profession 
may object to the use of the term 'passive euthanasia' to describe the withholding or withdrawing of 
treatment. (See the Introduction to this thesis, 5.) 
232 See chapter V, 179-183. 
233 Russel, 119-123, 139. 
234 For discussion of the S.A. branch of the A.M.A. and the B.M.A. working parties on euthanasia, see 
below, 268-269 and 273-279 respectively. 
235 For example in Australia, the establishment of the Monash Centre for Human Bioethics; in the United 
States, the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University, Washington and the Hastings 
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institutional ethics committees have also come into prominence. Growing recognition of the 
importance of medical ethics has resulted in a reassessment of medical curricula in most jurisdictions 
to include some teaching of medical ethics.236 The significance of these developments with regard to 
active voluntary euthanasia has been its effect in stimulating debate on the issue within the medical 
profession. 
Another development within the medical profession, which has indirectly assisted the voluntary 
euthanasia cause has been growing attention to the needs of the dying, embracing not only medical 
matters but also the emotional and psychological needs of terminal patients. Though previously a 
much neglected area, since the 1960s, there has been a significant upsurge in research and interest on 
this subject. The practical limits of modem medical technology are increasingly being recognised, and 
there has been a recasting of priorities from attempting to preserve life at all cost to easing the 
passing of dying patients. This development has been manifest in a number of ways, including an 
outpouring of literature on the subject of death and dying, 237 increasing attention to the subject in the 
medical curriculum, growing recognition of the importance of appropriate pain control for terminal 
patients, and the development of hospice and palliative care facilities. Whilst these factors do not of 
themselves necessarily point to the acceptance of legalised active voluntary euthanasia, they have, 
nevertheless, been of relevance to the voluntary euthanasia cause in that they reflect a changed attitude 
within the medical profession to the needs of the dying. 
It should be noted, however, that although there has been a shift towards greater understanding and 
acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia within the medical profession, there have also been elements 
within the profession which remain steadfastly opposed to the concept and have vigorously countered 
any proposals for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia.238 
Separate consideration will now be given to the position in Australia and to the main aspects of 
change in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Center, New York; in the United Kingdom the Institute of Medical Ethics; and in Canada, the Center for 
Bioethics, Clinical Research Institute of Montreal. 
236 According to a survey conducted by the Rev. Dr John Morgan, all medical schools in Australia have 
made ethics a compulsory part of the curriculum; Sydney Morning Herald 9 Jan. 1991. For literature 
reflecting the changing approach of the medical profession to the teaching of medical ethics, see D. 
Chambers, 'Ethics or Medical Ethics' (1984) 24 Med. Science & law 17 and the Report of a Working 
Party on the Teaching of Medical Ethics (The Pond Report) (1987). 
237 For example, E. Kubler-Ross, On Death and Dying (1969); J. Hinton, Dying (1967). For more detailed 
consideration of the increased attention to the subject of death and dying, see Humphry and Wickett, 
68-84; Russel, 168-175. 
238 For example, in Australia, Dr Brian Pollard, who has published quite a number of articles arguing the 
case against active voluntary euthanasia, and has published a book entitled Euthanasia (1989). At the 
international level, an organisation of doctors has been established (World Federation of Doctors who 
Respect Human Life) to prevent the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. 
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Australian Developments 
The Australian Medical Association (A.M.A.) is the largest medical association in Australia.239 As 
noted earlier, the official position of the A.M.A with regard to active voluntary euthanasia has always 
been one of opposition.240 However, recent events in Australia indicate that in adopting this 
position, the association may not be reflecting the views of its members, nor of doctors generally in 
Australia. 
Whilst there have, from time to time, been expressions of support for active voluntary euthanasia 
from members of the medical profession in Australia, 241 by far the most significant development in 
recent years has been the evidence of attitudes and practices of Australian doctors revealed in surveys of 
the medical profession undertaken in Victoria and South Australia The first and most comprehensive 
survey to be undertaken was the 1987 survey of a~titudes and practices of doctors in Victoria, 
conducted by the Monash Centre for Human Bioethics.242 In an earlier chapter, it has already been 
noted that one of the survey questions sought to ascertain the proportion of doctors who have taken 
active steps at the patient's request to hasten his or her death.243 Those doctors who had indicated that 
they had never taken active steps to bring about the death of a patient at his or her request were asked 
if they had rejected the request solely, primarily, or in part because it would have been illegal to act 
upon it. The responses indicated that the illegality was a factor in the rejection of the request with 
65% of the doctors; 5% indicated that they rejected the request solely on this ground; and a further 
15% said that they rejected the request primarily for this reason, leaving 45% of doctors for whom 
illegality was 'in part' a reason for the rejection of the request. For 35% of the doctors, it was not a 
reason at all. 244 
Another of the survey questions was directed at ascertaining doctors' attitudes to taking active steps to 
bring about a patient's death. Respondents were asked: Do you think that it is sometimes right for a 
doctor to take active steps to bring about the death of a patient who has requested the doctor to do 
this?' Of those surveyed, 62% believed that this was sometimes right, whilst 34% thought that it was 
not. Support for a doctor to take active steps came from doctors in all age groups but was greatest 
among the younger doctors. There was also majority support amongst most religious groups except 
Roman Catholics. Doctors who were members of the A.M.A. tended to have similar views to doctors 
239 There are approximately 40,000 doctors in Australia of whom approximately 20,000 belong to the 
A.M.A. The other main medical associations in Australia are the Royal Australian College of General 
Practitioners (with a membership of approximately 7,000), the Royal Australasian College of 
Surgeons (5,000) and the Royal Australasian College of Physicians (4,000). 
240 See above, 261. 
241 For example, Dr John Woolnough (see the Australian 22 June 1973); Dr Malcolm Parker, President of 
the Queensland Voluntary Euthanasia Society; see M. Parker, 'Moral Intuition, Good Deaths and 
Ordinary Medical Practitioners' (1990) 16 J.Med. Ethics 28; J. Ellard, 'Euthanasia and the Death of 
Freud' (1990) Mod.Med.Aust. (May) 14; R. Syme, 'A Patient's Right to a .Good Death' (1991) 154 
M.J.A. 203. 
242 H. Kuhse and P. Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia' (1988) 148 
M.J.A. 623. Information regarding the survey methodology has been set out in chapter IV, 115. 
243 See chapter IV, 115-116. 
244 Kuhse and Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia', 623. 
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as a whole. Sixty-four percent of doctors who were members of the A.M.A. were of the view that it 
was sometimes right for a doctor to take active steps to bring about the death of a patient at bis or her 
request compared with 62% of doctors who were not members of the association. 245 
The survey also sought to ascertain doctors' views of the Netherlands situation. Following a brief 
description of the situation existing in the Netherlands doctors were asked: Do you think it would be 
a good thing if such a situation were to exist in Australia?' More than half of the doctors indicated that 
they did think that it would be a good thing - 59% compared with 37% who answered no to this -
question. In order to determine doctors' attitudes to the position taken by their professional 
organisation, doctors were asked a further question: 'The Royal Dutch Medical Association believes 
that it is proper for doctors to take active steps to bring about a patient's death under the above 
circumstances. Do you think your professional organisation should take a similar stand?' Of those 
surveyed, 52% of doctors thought that their professional organisation should take a similar stand to 
that of the Royal Dutch Medical Association, whilst 43% of doctors did not think so. Although this 
question referred generally to the doctors' 'professional organisation', the only professional association 
that was mentioned in sufficient numbers in the responses to provide useful data was the A.M.A. 246 
Analysis of results on the basis of A.M.A. membership yielded similar results: 52% of doctors who 
were members thought that the A.M.A. should change its stance on this issue whilst 47% did not 
think so. 24 7 
Another of the survey questions focussed on the desirability of law reform. Respondents were asked: 
Do you think that the law should be changed to allow doctors to take active steps to bring about a 
patient's death under some circumstances?' Responses to this question were consistent with the similar 
question that was asked about the desirability of introducing into Australia a situation such as that 
which exists in the Netherlands. Sixty per cent of the respondents answered yes, 37% answered no.248 
When asked whether they would practice active voluntary euthanasia if it were legal, 40% of the 
doctors said that they would, 41 % said that they would not and the remainder did not answer this 
question. 249 
The authors of this survey regarding the practices and attitudes of Victorian doctors on the subject of 
active voluntary euthanasia have also completed a related survey to gauge the attitudes and practices of 
nurses in Victoria. 250 The results of the survey of Victorian nurses, based on a questionnaire sent to 
2,000 respondents, are generally consistent with the findings of doctors' practices and attitudes, 
indicating even stronger support for active voluntary euthanasia among nurses.251 This suggests that 
245 Id. 625, Table 2. 
246 Kuhse and Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia', 624. 
247 Id. 625. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Kuhse and Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia', 625. 
250 Kuhse and Singer, 'Euthanasia: A Survey of Nurses' Attitudes and Practices'. 
251 Seventy-five percent of the nurse respondents (compared with 60% of the doctors in the earlier survey) 
supported the introduction in Australia of legalised active voluntary euthanasia under conditions like 
those in the Netherlands. Similarly, 68% of nurses, in comparison to 40% of doctors, were willing to 
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the evidence of support for active voluntary euthanasia amongst doctors is part of a broader trend 
towards recognition amongst health care professionals and the community generally. 
The results of the Monash survey have since been confirmed in a number of surveys conducted in 
South Australia In 1989 a study was conducted at the Flinders Medical Centre in South Australia, 
with the aim of generating results which could then be compared with those found by Kuhse and 
Singer in their survey of Victorian doctors.252 The survey questions were closely modelled on the 
Victorian questionnaire and were distributed amongst doctors and medical students at the Flinders 
Medical Centre. Although there are some significant differences between the two surveys, 253 the 
results obtained from the Flinders Medical Centre survey support the findings of Kuhse and Singer. 
For example, in response to the question: Do you think that it is ever right for a doctor to take active 
steps to bring about the death of a patient who has requested the doctor to do this?' 70% of the 
respondents answered yes compared with 62% of respondents in the Victorian survey.254 Similar 
results were also obtained with regard to the question aimed at ascertaining whether respondents 
considered that the situation in the Netherlands should be introduced in South Australia: 65% answered 
yes; 31 % answered no; and 4% were unsure. 255 This compared with a response rate of 59% of doctors 
in favour, 37% against, in relation to an equivalent question in the Victorian survey. 
Another survey has recently been conducted in South Australia to ascertain the views of South 
Australian doctors on assisted dying.256 The findings of this survey, based on a sample of 1,000 
South Australian doctors, has also tended to confirm the results of the more extensive Monash survey. 
Sixty-one percent of the respondent doctors were of the view that it is sometimes right for a doctor to 
take active steps to bring about the death of a terminally ill or incurable patient who has requested the 
doctor to do this. Over half of the respondent doctors (56%) indicated that they would like to see a law 
introduced based on the judicial guidelines allowing actively assisted dying in the Netherlands. 
Approximately half of the respondent doctors (48%) indicated that they would be prepared to actively 
assist an incurably ill patient to die if they were asked by the patient and the law permitted it 
Although these surveys have been confined to Victoria and South Australia, there is no reason to 
suggest that the responses from the doctors in these States, randomly selected, would not be broadly 
be involved in the practice of voluntary euthanasia; Kuhse and Singer, 'Euthanasia: A Survey of Nurses' 
Attitudes and Practices,' 22. The authors suggest that the greater support for active voluntary 
euthanasia among nurses may reflect the closer relationship they often form with incurably ill patients 
and the resultant understanding of the patients' plight. 
252 T. Robertson and S. Tobin, 'A Survey of the Attitudes of Doctors and Medical Students Towards Active 
Voluntary Euthanasia' (unpublished manuscript, Flinders Medical Centre 1989). 
253 Kuhse and Singer surveyed a random sample of 2,000 doctors throughout Victoria whilst in the Flinders 
Medical Centre survey, doctors and medical students were surveyed within one South Australian 
hospital. The Flinders Medical Centre survey also involved a much smaller sample covering all first 
year medical students (65 students), all fifth year medical students (55 students), all Flinders Medical 
Centre interns (31 interns) and one third of all Flinders Medical Centre doctors (90 doctors from a 
possible 268) totalling 241 persons surveyed. See Robertson and Tobin, 31. 
254 Robertson and Tobin, 35, 53-54. 
255 Id. 35-37, 55. 
256 Medical Practitioners Concerned with Assisted Dying, Media Release, 'South Australian Doctors Help 
Incurable Patients to Die' 28 July 1992. 
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representative of the views of doctors generally in Australia. The overwhelming conclusion to be 
drawn from these surveys is that the majority of doctors support active voluntary euthanasia.257 This 
is consistent with the views of the public generally, although the level of support is slightly less 
amongst the medical professi~n.258 The authors of the Victorian survey, Dr Helga Kuhse and 
Professor Peter Singer, found it particularly noteworthy that. notwithstanding the present illegality of 
active voluntary euthanasia, some doctors were prepared to admit that they had taken active steps to 
hasten death at the request of the patient and that they believed that they were right to do so.259 The 
preparedness of doctors to make such admissions may in part be due to increasing community support 
for active voluntary euthanasia. Even more remarkable was the fact that nearly half of those who made 
such admissions signed the questionnaire, and did not avail themselves of the opportunity to respond 
anonymously.260 This was also the case in the survey of South Australian doctors:261 19 of the 43 
doctors who acknowledged taking active steps to bring about the death of a patient who requested it 
identified themselves to the group carrying out the survey. This suggests a significant level of 
commitment to their decision to assist patients by performing active voluntary euthanasia at the 
patient's request Furthermore, for the majority of the Victorian doctors who indicated that they had 
rejected a request for active voluntary euthanasia, the present illegality of the practice was stated to be 
at least 'in part' a reason for the rejection.262 This clearly suggests that more doctors would be 
willing to perform active voluntary euthanasia if it were legal - a conclusion borne out by the fact that 
when specifically asked whether they would practice active voluntary euthanasia if it were legal, 40% 
of the doctors in the Victorian survey and 48% of the respondent doctors in the South Australian 
survey indicated that they would. These figures must be compared with the significantly smaller 
proportion of doctors who admitted to having already practiced active voluntary euthanasia: in both the 
Victorian and the South Australian survey, 29% of respondent doctors who had been asked by patient 
to actively assist him or her to die had helped at least one patient to do so. 263 However, the survey 
results also reveal that many more doctors would be prepared to support active voluntary euthanasia in 
principle (62% Monash survey, 61 % in the survey of South Australian doctors) and even endorse its 
legalisation (60% Monash survey, 56% in the survey of South Australian doctors), but would not 
themselves be willing to become involved in the practice - 41 % of the respondent doctors in the 
Monash survey and 48% of the doctors in the South Australian survey said that they would not 
practice active voluntary euthanasia, even if it were legal. 264 
257 Kuhse and Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia', 626; Robertson 
and Tobin, 53. 
258 Approximately 60% compared with approximately 75% amongst the general public. 
259 Kuhse and Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia', 626. 
260 Ibid. where it is noted that 51 of the 107 doctors who said that they had taken active steps signed their 
questionnaires. 
261 This and subsequent references to the survey of South Australian doctors are to the 1992 survey 
undertaken by the Medical Practitioners Concerned with Assisted Dying; see above, n. 256. 
262 See above, 264. The results of the Flinders Medical Centre survey also suggested that the present 
illegality of active voluntary euthanasia may be preventing a substantial proportion of doctors from 
engaging in the practice; Robertson and Tobin, 59. 
263 It can be assumed that most of the doctors who have already practiced active voluntary euthanasia would 
probably be willing to do so again if the practice were made legal. 
264 Kuhse and Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia', 625. 
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A very significant outcome of the survey was the fact that a majority of the doctors who responded to 
the questionnaire, (most of whom were members of the A.M.A.), thought that their professional 
association should take a similar stand to that which has been taken by the Royal Dutch Medical 
Association. As the authors of the survey have suggested, this result must raise serious questions 
about the current policies of the A.M.A. on the subject of active voluntary euthanasia. 265 Following 
the release of the results of the Victorian survey of doctors' practices and attitudes, one of the authors 
of the survey, Professor Peter Singer, called on the A.M.A. to review its ban on active voluntary 
euthanasia.266 He argued that although active voluntary euthanasia would still be illegal even if the 
A.M.A. ethical rules were changed, A.M.A. pressure could influence a change in the law.267 This 
call for review was, however, promptly rejected by the A.M.A.. The federal President of the A.M.A., 
Dr Bryce Phillips is reported to have said that the association would continue to support the World 
Medical Association position on active euthanasia - that active euthanasia is an act of killing and as 
such was fundamentally against the basic oath of the medical profession. Further, he said that the 
survey, while interesting, did not lead him to believe that there was a widespread desire among 
members to change the A.M.A.'s ethical position on the matter, and that the profession and the 
community should view such a suggestion with great concern and caution.268 Similar comments 
were also made by the Executive Director of the A.M.A., 269 and the President of the Victorian 
branch.270 
Although the issue of active voluntary euthanasia has, from time to time, been raised at council 
meetings, neither the A.M.A. nor other professional medical associations in Australia have conducted 
any surveys or polls of their members or doctors generally concerning attitudes to active voluntary 
euthanasia, and in view of the existing survey results, and the stir which those results created, they 
may well be reluctant to do so. The situation clearly poses a dilemma for the A.M.A .. 
~otwithstanding convincing evidence to suggest that members of the association support active 
voluntary euthanasia, the association is obviously reluctant to publicly advocate a position which is 
in conflict with the criminal law. Though the reaction from the association's leadership to the survey 
results is, in all the circumstances, perhaps understandable, to deny that these results present a case for 
review is to blatantly ignore the weight of the evidence. In the light of this evidence, the onus is now 
on the medical profession in general and the A.M.A. in particular, to review their official opposition 
to active voluntary euthanasia. 271 Todate, the only branch of the A.M.A. which bas undertaken a 
review of its position with regard to active voluntary euthanasia has been the South Australian 
265 ld. 626. 
266 The Daily Telegraph 21 June 1988. 
267 Ibid. 
268 Note, 'Intervention Still Constitutes Murder' (1988) Med. Practice 3. 
269 The Age 20 June 1988, in which Mr Ron Hastings is reported to have said that the results of the survey 
should be 'viewed askance' because they contradicted bis knowledge of doctors' views and the ethical 
basis of the medical profession. 
270 The Daily Telegraph 21 June 1988 in which Dr Ken Sleeman is reported to have said that although the 
survey would stimulate useful public debate it was inadequate and did not provide a case for changing the 
A.M.A.'s ethical rules. 
271 See also the call for a review made by Dr Rodney Syme ('A Missing Voice in the Euthanasia Debate') the 
Age 21 March 1992. 
269 
Branch. In 1991 the Branch Council of the A.M.A. in South Australia established a working party on 
euthanasia. However, the efforts of the working party were for some time directed to the preparation of 
a submission to the South Australian Select Committee Inquiry into Death and Dying272 and the 
working party is yet to release its report on the subject of euthanasia. 
In sharp contrast to the position taken by most Australian medical organisations, the Doctors' Reform 
Society has publicly endorsed active voluntary euthanasia. Established in 1973, the Doctors' Reform 
Society is an organisation which aims to promote reform and improvement in Australian health 
services and changes in Australian society conducive to the health of the Australian people. It seeks to 
pursue these aims by promoting informed debate among doctors, by publication of the journal 'New 
Doctor,' and by participation in the democratic processes of our society. 273 At its national conference 
in Brisbane in 1988, the society formally adopted a policy statement in which inter alia, it supported 
the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. 214 The society has advocated the creation of a patients' 
bill of rights, which would include the right to be able to request a medically assisted death when 
suffering a fatal and distressing illness.275 The statement goes on to provide that patients' rights 
should be protected by legislation, particularly with regard to the 'right to die•.276 On the specifics of 
implementation of such a proposal, it is stated that legislation allowing both passive and active 
euthanasia should be based on the Netherlands criteria: 
-only doctors may carry out euthanasia; 
-individual doctors are free to refuse to carry out euthanasia; 
-there must be an explicit request by the patient which leaves no room for doubt 
concerning the patient's desire to die; 
-the patient's decision must be well-informed, free and enduring; 
-there is no acceptable alternative (for the patient) to improve his/her condition; 
-the doctor must exercise due care in making the decision and consult another 
independent medical practitioner. 277 
In view of its status as a reform society, it is perhaps not surprising that it should advocate the 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia alongside other reforms including introduction of a total 
ban on the promotion of smoking and alcohol, the development and implementation of a national 
nutritional policy, and a broadening of the medical curriculwn. 
Another noteworthy development has been the establishment in South Australia of a doctors 
organisation entitled Medical Practitioners Concerned with Assisted Dying, This organisation, 
working in consultation with the South Australian Voluntary Euthanasia Society, has put forward a 
272 Note, 'AMA's Recommendation to Inquiry into Death and Dying' (1991) S.A.Med.Rev. (Aug.) 22. 
273 See the statement of aims and philosophy in the society's journal, New Doctor. 
274 Note, 'Doctors' Reform Society Policy Statement' (1988) 49 New Doctor para.. 3.1.12 and 3.3. 
275 Ibid. para. 3.1.12. See also para. 3.1.11 recommending recognition of the right not to have life 
needlessly prolonged when suffering a fatal and distressing illness. 
276 Id. 2. Other areas for which the society recommended legislative protection included health complaints, 
informed consent, confidentiality and access to records. 
277 Id. 3.3. 
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proposed law for medical aid-in-dying along similar lines to the position prevailing in the 
Netherhuids.278 Plans are underway for the formation of a similar group of doctors in Victoria 279 
Apart from the survey results discussed above280 and information obtained from interviews with 
members of the medical profession which have confirmed the survey findings, 281 there are a number 
of other more general indicators of the attitudes of doctors in Australia with regard to active voluntary 
euthanasia. These include more extensive and open discussion of the subject in recent years both in 
the context of formal and ·informal meetings of professional medical associations282 and at medical 
conferences. 283 There has also been increasing coverage of the issue in Australian medical journals, 
including the prestigious Medical Jourizal of Australia. Numerous articles have been published on the 
subject which adopt a neutral and even-handed stance, and in the past few years, more and more doctors 
have been writing in defence of active voluntary euthanasia 284 
' 
There have also been other developments within the medical profession in Australia which have, in a 
more general way, impacted upon the voluntary euthanasia movement in this country. One such 
development has been the recognition of the importance of palliative care and the need to better 
promote this area of medicine. Although palliative care is, in many respects, a traditional part of 
medicine, it has, in recent times, acquired the status of a discipline in its own right. As interest in the 
area has grown, numerous palliative care programs have been established in Australia.285 There is, 
however, still widespread lack of information and understanding of palliative care in this country, not 
only within the community, but even amongst the medical profession.286 These shortcomings in 
palliative care and, in particular, lack of appropriate medical education in this area, are now 
increasingly being recognised. 287 In an attempt to address some of these perceived deficiencies, efforts 
278 Medical Practitioners Concerned with Assisted Dying, Media Release, 'South Australian Doctors Help 
Incurable Patients to Die' 28 July 1992. 
279 Note, 'Voluntary Euthanasia Groups of Doctors and of Nurses Proposed' (1992) 76 V.E.S. V. Report 5. 
280 See above, 264·268. 
281 In the course of interviews conducted by the writer with doctors involved in the care of elderly and 
terminal patients, there was clear support, from some doctors for a change in the law to allow for active 
assistance in certain carefully defined circumstances. 
282 On the basis of correspondence with the major medical associations in Australia it appears that the 
issue of active voluntary euthanasia has been raised and discussed at meetings from time to time. 
283 For example, in 1984, the Annual Scientific Meeting of the Royal Australasian College of Physicians, 
where a number of papers were devoted to the subject of euthanasia; see J. Hickie, 'Euthanasia 1984' 
(1984) 141 M.J.A. 140; Note, 'Standing Room Only at Euthanasia Seminar' (1991) Tastalk A.M.A. 
Newsletter (Sept.) reporting on a very well attended seminar on euthanasia arranged by the Tasmanian 
Palliative Care Foundation held in Hobart, Tasmania. 
284 See also Note, 'Voluntary Euthanasia - An Idea Who~ Time Has Come' (1990) 70 V.E.S. V: Report 1-2. 
For recent examples, see Ellard, 'Euthanasia and the Death of Freud'; Syme, 'A Patient's Right to a Good 
Death'. 
285 I. Maddocks, 'Changing Concepts in Palliative Care' (1990) 152 M.J.A. 535. 
286 Parliament of Victoria Social Development Committee, Second and Final Report, Inquiry into Options 
for Dying with Dignity (1987) 221-222. 
287 Ibid. See also J. Buchanan et al, 'Medical Education in Palliative Care' (1990) 152 M.J.A. 27; 
Maddocks, 535; South Australian Select Committee of the House of Assembly on the Law and Practice 
Relating to Death and Dying, Interim Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly on the 
Law and Practice Relating to Death and Dying (1991) Appendix E, Summary of Evidence, 2; and the 
recommendations made by the committee in the Second Interim Report of the Select Committee of the 
House of Assembly on the Law and Practice Relating to Death and Dying (1992) 15-27. 
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are underway to clarify the role of the doctor in palliative care in Australia288 and to ensure that the 
subject of palliative care is incorporated within the curriculum for undergraduate medical students.289 
Closely connected with developments in the area of palliative care has been the growth of the hospice 
movement in Australia. Considerable overlap exits between the concepts of 'palliative care' and 
'hospice care•:290 indeed. the terms are sometimes used interchangeably.291 The modern hospice 
movement emerged in the 1960s and 70s by way of humanitarian response to concerns about the 
human costs of advancements in medical technology, and has, as its paramount aim, the improvement 
of the quality of life for the terminally ill. Dame Cicely Saunders, of St. Christopher's Hospice, 
London, is generally credited as being the founder of the modern hospice movement. 292 Although 
there had been some pioneering work in Australia by religious orders such as the Little Company of 
Mary, established as early as the beginning of this century, the main stimulus for the hospice 
movement in Australia came from the developments in the United Kingdom and other 
jurisdictions.293 The Melbourne City Mission Hospice Program, established in the late 1970s, was 
the first modern hospice program introduced in Australia based on the model of St. Christopher's 
Hospice in London, and since then, numerous hospice programs of various models have been 
established. 294 
These developments in palliative and hospice care in Australia are, indirectly at least, of significance 
for the voluntary euthanasia movement in that they reflect growing recognition within the medical 
profession of the needs of the dying. It must be noted, however, that many of those involved in the 
provision of palliative and hospice care are opposed to the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 
and they unequivocally reject any alliance with the voluntary euthanasia movement. 295 Proponents of 
active voluntary euthanasia in Australia, on the other band, whilst welcoming developments in 
palliative and hospice care, maintain that these developments do not obviate the need for active 
voluntary euthanasia. They argue that there is a genuine need for both improved terminal care as well 
as active voluntary euthanasia, and that the work and objectives of the hospice care movement and the 
voluntary euthanasia societies should accordingly be seen as complementing one another rather than 
being in competition. 
Another relevant development within the medical profession which has contributed in the process of 
reform towards recognition of active voluntary euthanasia in Australia bas been the increased emphasis 
288 D. Allbrook, 'Doctors' Role in the Australian Hospice Movement' (1982) M.J.A. 502. 
289 For developments in the State of Victoria, see Buchanan et al. 
290 Maddocks, 535. 
291 For example, Department of Health, Tasmania, Discussion Paper 'Palliative Care Service Development 
Group' (1990) 6. 
292 See S. Du Boulay, Cicely Saunders (1984). 
293 See Maddocks, and J. Cavanaugh and F. Gunz, 'Palliative Hospice Care in Australia' (1988) 2 Palliative 
Med. 51 for an outline of the beginnings of palliative care services in Australia. 
294 Cavanaugh and Gunz; I. Renzenbrink, 'The Challenge of Hospice Care,' paper delivered at a 
hospice/palliative care conference 'Living Through Dying' Hobart, Nov. (1988). 
295 For example, Dr Brian Pollard, who has for some years been in charge of a palliative care service at a 
large teaching hospital in Sydney. For an outline of his perspective, see his book, Euthanasia. 
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on the subject of medical ethics. Although at one time, doubt existed as to whether this represented a 
distinct field of study,296 the importance of the subject is now beyond dispute. In recent years, a 
number of research centres and institutions have been established in Australia which are involved in 
teaching and research in this field, 297 as well as numerous institutional ethics committees vested with 
the responsibility of ethical decision-making. 298 Recognition of the importance of medical ethics has 
also prompted reappraisal of medical school curricula with a view to including some teaching of 
medical ethics as part of the undergraduate program. 299 This developing conception of medical ethics 
has contributed to the movement for voluntary euthanasia in Australia by stimulating debate on the 
issue within the medical profession, together with related matters such as informed consent, patient 
autonomy, self-determination and medical paternalism. Informed debate in this area is to be 
encouraged, and, in the longer term, can only assist in promoting widerstanding and acceptance of the 
concept of active voluntary euthanasia. 
To a large extent, developments within the medical profession in Australia with regard to the issue of 
active voluntary euthanasia mirror developments which have occurred in other jurisdictions. Brief 
consideration will now be given to the main developments which have taken place in recent years in 
the United Kingdom and the United States. 
United Kingdom 
As was noted earlier,300 the origins of the modern voluntary euthanasia movement in the United 
Kingdom stem from the work of Dr Millard in the 1930s, and since that time, many British doctors 
have publicly expressed their support for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 3o1 However, 
the official position of the medical profession has been to consistently condemn any such proposal. 
There have, nevertheless, been a number of significant developments, prominent amongst which have 
been the inquiries initiated by the British Medical Association (B.M.A.) first in 1969, and more 
recently, in 1988, to examine the problem of euthanasia. Although the legalisation of active 
voluntary euthanasia was ultimately rejected by both of these inquiries, the fact that these inquiries 
were even undertaken is a matter of some significance, demonstrating a willingness on the part of the 
B.M.A. to undertake a review of its traditional opposition to active voluntary euthanasia. Apart from 
the review undertaken by the South Australian branch of the A.M.A., the B .M.A. is the only 
296 Chambers, 23. 
297 For example, the Monash Centre for Human Bioethics and the St. Vincent's Bioethics Centre, 
Melbourne. 
298 P. McNeill, C. Berglund and I. Webster, 'Reviewing the Reviewers: A Survey of Institutional Ethics 
Committees in Australia' (1990) 152 M.J.A. 289. 
299 For example, N. Hicks, 'Last Place in the Intensive Curriculum: Ethics for Health Service Students' in 
Issues in Ethics (1982) l, 8. 
300 See above, 243. 
301 Since the inception of the V.E.S. (U.K.) in 1935, doctors have been actively involved in the running of 
the society, with a number of well-known doctors holding senior positions in the society; e.g. Lord 
Moynihan, eminent surgeon, was the first President of the society and more recently, Dr Jonathon 
Miller, has held office as Vice-President. 
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professional medial association to undertake a review of this kind in the common law jurisdictions 
under consideration. That this occurred in the United Kingdom can best be understood in light of the 
repeated efforts by voluntary euthanasia proponents in that jurisdiction dating back to the mid 1930s 
to introduce legislation permitting active voluntary euthanasia. 
Another significant development in the United Kingdom, which parallels developments within the 
Australian medical profession, has been the growing evidence from surveys that substantial support 
exists for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia amongst members of the medical profession. 
These survey results contradict the findings of the B .M.A. reports that the medical profession remains 
opposed to the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. Moreover, the B.M.A. purports to 
represent the majority of doctors in the United Kingdom.302 However, on the basis of these survey 
results, there is strong evidence to suggest that the rejection of active voluntary euthanasia in the 
official reports of the B.M.A., most recently in 1988, is contrary to the views of the medical 
profession in the United Kingdom as a whole. 
The B.M.A. policy, first declared in 1950, has been to unequivocally condemn active voluntary 
euthanasia.303 In 1969, the representative body of the B.M.A. passed a resolution confirming this 
position and instructing the B.M.A. council to give this view full publicity.304 Pursuant to this 
resolution, the Board of Science and Education of the B.M.A. appointed a panel of ten doctors, chaired 
by Dr Hugh Trowell, to consider the problem. However, the panel was effectively bound by the earlier 
resolution of the representative body in 1969 condemning active voluntary euthanasia, so its role was 
not really to examine the problem afresh, but simply to supply suitable arguments in support of the 
decision which had already been made.305 It was, in all the circumstances, not surprising that the 
report of the special panel,306 released in 1971, roundly condemned active voluntary euthanasia.307 
The report contained most of the standard arguments which had previously been raised in the 
euthanasia debate. It was, for example, claimed that most people, even those suffering from cancer, die 
in peace and dignity, thereby implying that active voluntary euthanasia was unnecessary and that 
doctors saw no need for legislation. In response to suggestions that some doctors were already 
performing active voluntary euthanasia, the panel expressed the view that if this does occur, it is 
confined to the very few and cannot be condoned. In rejecting legislation permitting active voluntary 
euthanasia, much emphasis was placed on the perceived dangers of such legislation and the 
impossibility of providing adequate safeguards. The report concluded that: 
302 Approximately 80% of doctors in the United Kingdom belong to the B.M.A. 
303 See Trowell, 19-20; B.M.A, Handbook of Medical Ethics (1984) 65 para. 10.33 which states that 
'. .. the profession condemns legalised active voluntary euthanasia.' 
304 Trowell, 19-20; G. Williams, 'Euthanasia and the Physician' in M. Kohl, (ed.) Beneficent Euthanasia 
(1975) 145-146. 
305 Williams, 'Euthanasia and the Physician,' 145-146; Voluntary Euthanasia Society, 'Doctors and 
Euthanasia: A Rejoinder to the British Medical Association's Report "The Problem of Euthanasia,"' 
(1971) (Extracted in Trowell, Appendix B, 161-171, hereafter referred to as the V.E.S. Rejoinder to the 
B.M.A.'s Report.) 
306 British Medical Association, The Problem of Euthanasia: (1971) (Extracted in Trowell, Appendix A, 
151-158). 
307 Ibid. For commentary on the report, see Trowell, 21; Note, 'Against Euthanasia' (1971) Lancet (Jan-
March) 220. 
Euthanasia legislation would be a licence for the killing of human 
beings .. .Euthanasia cannot be accepted by the medical profession; in rejecting it 
doctors will be supported by the majority of laymen, who share the belief that 
the deliberate killing of a helpless person can never be condoned .... Killing 
patients is no part of the work of doctors and nurses.308 
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The report met with sharp criticism from the Voluntary Euthanasia Society.309 The society accused 
the panel of having reached its conclusions even before it had commenced to sit, and claimed that in 
doing so, the panel bad failed to adequately address fundamental issues, including the patient's right of 
self-determination.310 The society also alleged that the panel had ignored relevant information from 
National Opinion Poll surveys of general practitioners conducted in 1964 and 1965. These surveys 
revealed that nearly half of the practitioners polled had been confronted with a request for active 
euthanasia (48.6%), many believed that if active voluntary euthanasia were made legal in certain 
circumstances, appropriate safeguards could be devised (44.3% answered yes, 43.5% answered no to 
this question) and further, more than one-third of the respondents (35.8%) said that they would be 
prepared to administer active voluntary euthanasia if it became legally permissible. 311 
For many years, the 1971 report of the special panel was taken to represent the position of the 
BM.A., and it was not until 1986 that steps were taken for a review of the association's guidelines on 
euthanasia. At the 1986 annual representative meeting of the B.M.A., a resolution was passed urging 
the B.M.A. 'to reconsider its policy on euthanasia'. The B.M.A.'s council subsequently approved a 
recommendation from the association's central ethical committee providing for the establishment of a 
working party on euthanasia and setting out its terms of reference.312 The working party, chaired by 
Sir Henry Yellowlees, met during 1987/88. In May 1988, its report was considered at a meeting of 
the B.M.A.'s council at which the council agreed that the report should be published to restate the 
association's advice on euthanasia. It is interesting to see how history has virtually repeated itself with 
the emergence of this report, some 17 years after the initial report condemning euthanasia, which has 
also attracted criticism. 
As with the earlier B.M.A. report, the 1988 report of the working party restates many of the well 
established arguments against active voluntary euthanasia.313 The report314 upholds the distinction 
308 Trowell, 157-158. 
309 V.E.S. Rejoinder to the B.M.A.'s Report. 
310 Trowell, 160, 162. 
311Jd.161, 167. 
312 The terms of reference for the Working Party were: 'to examine: a) problems relating to euthanasia, 
terminal illness and suicide; b) U.K. law relating to suicide and homicide; c) guidance and instructions 
given by different religions, e.g. Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist; d) the present 
theoretical position in the U.K. as stated in the B.M.A. Handbook of Medical Ethics; and e) current 
practice and trends in euthanasia in other countries, for example the Netherlands'. (See the Foreword to 
the Report.) 
313 For example, that euthanasia is unnecessary (at 12); that its legalisation would be socially dangerous 
and would undermine the doctor/patient relationship (at 17-20, 59). For analysis of these arguments, 
see chapter V, 201-221. 
314 B.M.A., Working Party Report, Euthanasia (1988). 
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between active and passive euthanasia315 and recommends that an active intervention to terminate 
another person's life should remain illegal. Whilst acknowledging the importance of patient autonomy 
and the right of patients to decline treatment, the working party was of the view that patients do not 
have the right to demand treatment which doctors cannot in good conscience provide. The working 
party stated that requests for active voluntary euthanasia are requests for doctors to act in ways that are 
at variance with all their training and inclinations and that the medical profession has a right to limit 
patient autonomy where the patient demands some treatment or action that runs counter to settled and 
informed medical opinion.316 It was found that an active intervention by a doctor to terminate a 
patient's life falls within this category and patients should not be able to require their doctors to 
collaborate in their death. 317 In the wo;ds of the working party: 
We do not, at present, see that any general policy condoning medical 
interventions to terminate life can be reconciled with the commitments of good 
medical practice. As a profession, we must stand by the commitments that lead 
us to preserve life and meet suffering creatively.318 
Evidence of public opinion polls indicating widespread agreement with the idea of active voluntary 
euthanasia was summarily dismissed, inter alia, on the grounds that the working party did not accept 
that 'tailoring what is morally right to the opinion of the majority is necessarily correct•.3l9 
The working party sought to bolster its views by invoking the distinction between intention and 
consequences, which it described as an important reference point in the moral assessment of any 
action.320 Thus, the distinction between active and passive euthanasia was justified on the basis that 
a decision to withdraw treatment, which has become a burden and is no longer of continuing benefit to 
a patient, has a different intent to one which involves ending the life of a person.321 On the same 
grounds, the working party was prepared to accept drug treatment which may involve a risk to the 
person's life if the sole intention is to relie~e illness, pain, distress or suffering.322 However, the 
working party warned that any doctor, compelled by conscience to intervene to end a person's life, 
would have to be prepared to face the closest scrutiny of this action that the law might wish to 
make.323 
The report concludes with a restatement of the central position of the working party: 
The law should not be changed and the deliberate taking of a human life should 
remain a crime. This rejection of a change in the law to permit doctors to 
intervene to end a person's life is not just a subordination of individual well 
315 Note the Working Party's definitions of active and passive euthanasia; B.M.A. Working Party Report, 
Euthanasia, 3. 
316-/d. 18. 
317 Id. 61. (Emphasis in the original.). 
318Id.19-20. 
319 Id. 41-42. 
320 Id. 24-26, 68. 
321 Id. 68. 
322 Ibid. 
323 Id. 69. 
being to social policy. It is instead, an affirmation of the supreme value of the 
individual, no matter how worthless and hopeless that individual may feel. 324 
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The report of the working party is undoubtedly of significance, ostensibly involving a thoroughgoing 
review of the B.M.A.'s guidance on euthanasia. This is to be contrasted with the report prepared by 
the special panel in 1971, since the panel was effectively bound by an earlier resolution of the 
representative body condemning euthanasia. The working party report therefore represents the first 
major review of lhe association's guidelines ever to be undertaken. 
The report has, however, attracted considerable criticism from a variety of sources.325 It has been 
criticised on the grounds that it is a superficial document which fails to fairly present the arguments of 
the opponents, even to the point of misrepresenting the opponents' position.326 Furthermore, the 
report has been criticised for its conservatism and lack of originality.327 In particular, it has been 
attacked on the grounds that it perpetuates traditional, but arguably irrelevant, distinctions between 
active and passive euthanasia, and between intention and consequences. Critics claim that, as a result, 
the report is flawed by inconsistencies and fails to adequately deal with the complex problems in this 
area.328 
A particularly disturbing criticism which has been levelled at the report is that it gives the impression 
of bias towards a predetermined outcome leaving the reader in some doubt as to whether there was a 
genuine attempt to critically review the BM.A.'s guidance on euthanasia.329 Because the traditional 
opposition of the medical profession to active voluntary euthanasia is so deeply entrenched, it was all 
the more necessary for the inquiry to be conducted objectively and impartiality. One of the specific 
complaints made by the Voluntary Euthanasia Society which illustrates its concern in this regard was 
that when it became necessary for one of the members of the working party (Dr Jonathon Miller, 
known for his pro-euthanasia views) to withdraw from the project, the chairman of the working party 
refused to accept a doctor sympathetic to, or at least open-minded about active voluntary euthanasia as 
a substitute.330 
Aside from these criticisms, probably the most serious shortcoming of the report is its cursory 
treaunent of opinion poll results gathered in the United Kingdom. Over the years, a number of 
324 Jbid. 
325 For example, J. Davies, 'Euthanasia' (1988) 297 B.M.J. 131; P. Nowell-Smith, 'Euthanasia and the 
Doctors - A Rejection of the B.M.A.'s Report' (1989) 15 J.Med. Ethics 124; R. Higgs, 'Not the Last 
Word on Euthanasia' (1988) 296 B.M.J. 1348; J. Beloff, 'Why the B.M.A. is Wrong' (1989) Jan. 
V.E.S. of Scotland Newsletter 1; L. Kennedy, Euthanasia (1990) 21-27; Note, 'Reports Encourage 
Respect for Dying Patients' Wishes' (1988) 38 lM.E.Bull. 13. 
326 For example, Nowell-Smith, 124-126; Higgs, 1348; Note, 'Reports Encourage Respect for Dying 
Patients' Wishes,' 17; Beloff, 1-3; Davies, 131. 
327 Note, 'Reports Encourage Respect for Dying Patients' Wishes,' 19. 
328 For example, Nowell-Smith, 124-128; Note, 'Reports Encourage Respect for Dying Patients' Wishes,' 
19. 
329 For example, Higgs, 1348; Nowell-Smith, 128; Kennedy, 21. 
330 Minutes of the Annual General Meeting (1988) 35 V.E.S. Newsletter 2; Note, 'Letter from Jonathon 
Miller' (1988) 34 V.E.S. Newsletter 2; Note, 'Voluntary Euthanasia: Bridging the Credibility Gap' 
(1991) 41 V.E.S. Newsletter 6. 
277 
opinion polls have been commissioned by the Voluntary Euthanasia Society to ascertain the views of 
general practitioners and the public generally on the issue of active voluntary euthanasia.331 Of 
particular relevance to this report was a telephone survey of some 300 British general practitioners, 
commissioned by the Voluntary Euthanasia Society and carried out by National Opinion Poll Market 
Research Ltd in 1987.332 As part of that survey, general practitioners where asked: 
Some people say that the law should allow adults to receive medical help to an 
immediate peaceful death if they suffer from an incurable physical illness that is 
intolerable to them, provided they have previously requested such help in writing. 
Do you agree or disagree with this? 
Thirty percent of respondent general practitioners said that they agreed with this statement, 59% said 
that they disagreed with it and 9% had mixed views. A further question was then put to the general 
practitioners to gauge whether they would consider performing active voluntary euthanasia if the law 
were changed: 
At the moment euthanasia is illegal. Suppose the law is changed to permit 
voluntary euthanasia and there was a patient on your list, whose case you knew 
well, who suffered from an incurable physical illness that was intolerable to 
them. If that patient made a signed request that you end his/her life, would you 
consider doing so or not? 
Thirty-five per cent of the general practitioners polled _said that they would definitely consider 
euthanasia in these circumstances and 10% said that they might possibly do so. The remainder said 
that they would not consider euthanasia in these circumstances. Though not quite registering the same 
level of support revealed in the survey of doctors undertaken in Australia,333 these results 
nevertheless indicate considerable support within the medical profession in the United Kingdom for 
active voluntary euthanasia and consequently cast serious doubt on some of the assumptions made in 
the working party report. 
To a large extent, the arguments raised in the report against active voluntary euthanasia were based on 
the need to uphold the traditions of the medical profession, with various references to active euthanasia 
running counter to doctors' intuition, counter to settled and informed medical opinion and the basic 
ethical commibllents of medicine.334 Such comments clearly imply that a consensus exists within 
the profession on the issue of active voluntary euthanasia, indeed, the whole tenor of the report is to 
categorically assert that active voluntary euthanasia is condemned by the medical profession as a 
whole. Significantly, however, no attempt was made by the working party to provide evidence in 
support of these assertions, by, for example, conducting a survey of its members to actually gauge 
their views on the subject 
331 See above, 231-233 for reference to public opinion polls conducted in the United Kingdom. 
332 National Opinion Poll Market Research. Attitudes Towards Euthanasia Among Britain's G.P.s. London. 
N.O.P. Market Research Ltd. (1987). 
333 For description and analysis of the Australian surveys, see above, 264-266. See Kuhse and Singer, 
'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia', 626 for possible explanations for 
the differences in levels of support for active voluntary euthanasia as between the doctors surveyed in 
Victoria and in Britain. 
334 B.M.A. Working Party Report, Euthanasia, 19-20. 
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In presenting its case for reform, the Voluntary Euthanasia Society had submitted results of opinion 
polls to the working party as evidence of support for active voluntary euthanasia amongst both the 
general public and general practitioners in the United Kingdom. The treatment of this evidence in the 
report is unsatisfactory, to say the least Not only is the crucial evidence from the survey of general 
practitioners completely omitted, but the position of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society is seriously 
misrepresented.335 The report states: 
The Voluntary Euthanasia Society (V.E.S.) has attempted to strengthen the case 
for active termination of life by conducting public opinion polls which purport 
to show widespread agreement with the idea of voluntary active euthanasia 336 
The language used here, in particular, the word 'purport' carries overtones that the results were 
somehow manipulated or fabricated and incorrectly suggests that the Voluntary Euthanasia Society had 
itself conducted the polls in question, when in fact the working party had been given documentation 
which clearly indicated that the polls had been conducted by National Opinion Poll Market Research 
Ltd.337 Further, the report sought to attack the form of questions used in the polls without fairly 
presenting the full picture.338 The report is also to be criticised for its bald claim that opinion poll 
evidence is in any event suspect The working party stated that 'we do not accept that tailoring what is 
morally right to the opinion of the majority is necessarily correct'.339 This may well be true, but the 
report fails to acknowledge that this argument can work both ways: if doctors views are not in accord 
with the general population, they cannot plead their own majority opinion as having any more weight 
than their arguments warrant. 340 Instead, the report reflects double standards, with frequent reliance 
being made on arguments based on majority medical opinion. 
E,ven more telling was the complete failure of the report to address the opinion poll evidence which 
indicates a substantial minority of doctors in the United Kingdom support active voluntary euthanasia 
and would consider practicing it if it were made legal. To suggest that there was a deliberate 
suppression of the evidence regarding polls of general practitioners is admittedly a serious charge; but 
in all the circumstances this conclusion appears unavoidable. Evidence had been made available to the 
working party regarding attitudes of British general practitioners on the subject of active voluntary 
euthanasia which would have been particularly relevant in light of the fact that the working party had 
made no attempt to gather its own evidence with regard to these matters. The complete omission of 
this material in the report can only be explained on the grounds that the working party deliberately 
avoided information which would cast serious doubt on the view expressed in the report that the 
medical profession universally condemns legalised active euthanasia 
335 See also Nowell-Smith; 125-126 and Davies, 131. 
336 B.M.A. Working Party Report, Euthanasia, 41. 
337 Nowell-Smith, 125-126; Davies, 131. 
338 See the B.M.A. Working Party Report, Euthanasia, 41-42 and criticism by Nowell-Smith, 125-126. 
339 B.M.A. Working Party Report, Euthanasia, 41-42. 
340 Higgs, 1348. 
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Although the report has attracted considerable criticism, the process of inquiry undertaken by the 
B.M.A. has nevertheless been significant, indicating some preparedness on the part of the British 
medical profession to re-evaluate its stance with regard to active voluntary euthanasia. Although 
ultimately reiterating the medical profession's traditional opposition to active euthanasia, the report 
has undoubtedly made some contribution to the reform process by fostering debate on the issue within 
the medical profession and the community generally. However, in the light of the evidence regarding 
medical opinion on the subject, serious doubt must be cast on the underlying assumption in the report 
that active voluntary euthanasia is condemned by the medical profession as a body. This evidence, and 
its notable omission in the report, must clearly affect the credibility and validity of the report as a 
whole. 
The reaction to the recent prosecution of Dr Cox is evidence of the changing attitude of the British 
medical profession to the issue of active voluntary euthanasia As noted in an earlier chapter, Dr Cox 
was convicted of the attempted murder of one of his patients who had died following the 
administration of a lethal dose of potassium chloride.341 His conviction, and the imposition of a 12 
month suspended prison sentence came as a shock to many doctors who had tended to assume that a 
jury would not convict in these circumstances. The Cox case has, as a result, been cause for serious 
reflection within the medical profession regarding the state of the present law. In an editorial in the 
leading British Medical Journal, the editor, Richard Smith, writes that it is time for the British to 
think deeply about euthanasia. 342 Commenting on the reaction to the verdict and sentence, he notes 
that the law is in effect the codification of the will of the people, and when there is such tension 
between a legal verdict and the people's thinking then it is time to reconsider the law. He suggests 
that a Royal Commission for the British to examine this issue and goes on to foreshadow the need for 
legislation to bring the law in step with modern thinking and to clarify what is acceptable.343 
Dr Cox's case has recently come before the General Medical Council's professional conduct committee 
which is the doctors' regulatory body. Cox pleaded guilty to the charge but told the committee that 
although he had expedited the death of his patient, it was in any case imminent. The committee, 
which has wide powers, inter alia, to strike a doctor off the medical register, reprimanded and 
admonished Dr Cox but gave permission for him to continue working as a hospital consultant.344 
This is unquestionably a very lenient outcome and suggests that the committee sympathised with, if 
not condoned, the doctor's actions. 
341 See chapter IV, 126-127. 
342 R. Smith, 'Euthanasia: Time For a Royal Commission' (1992) 305 B.M.J. 728. 
343 Id. 129. A similar call for review was made in the Nursing Times; see Nursing Times 30 Sept. 1992. 
344 The Mercury 19 Nov. 1992. 
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United States 
As _has been the case in the United Kingdom, many notable and respected doctors in the United States 
have given their support to the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia and have contributed 
significantly to the voluntary euthanasia movement.345 However, the American Medical Association 
(the largest medical association in the United States346) and other professional medical associations, 
whilst endorsing passive euthanasia in some circumstances,34? have consistently rejected active 
v~luntary euthanasia.348 
Notwithstanding the official rejection of active voluntary euthanasia by the professional medical 
associations in the United States, there are clear indications of growing support within the medical 
profession generally for legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, or 'physician aid-in dying,' as it is 
sometimes referred to. Some of the most reliable indicators of changing attitudes on this issue are the 
various opinion poll surveys which have been conducted over the years. These surveys provide fairly 
unequivocal evidence that a growing number of doctors are in favour of legalisation, and would be 
prepared to practice active voluntary euthanasia if it were made legal. In addition to these opinion poll 
surveys there have been a number of other developments in recent years paralleling developments in 
Australia and the United Kingdom, which reflect growing interest and support within the medical 
profession for active voluntary euthanasia. These developments strongly suggest that the traditional 
opposition of the American Medical Association and similar organisations to active voluntary 
euthanasia may no longer reflect the views of the majority of their members. Whilst no official 
inquiry has yet been undertaken by the professional medical associations in the United States to 
review the profession's traditional opposition to active voluntary euthanasia, there is some evidence of 
a possible softening of the official position of the American Medical Association. 
Over the years, quite a number of surveys of doctors' attitudes to active voluntary euthanasia have 
been conducted in the United States.349 In the late 1980s a number of surveys were conducted of the 
medical profession in California in the light of a reform initiative being proposed in that State for the 
345 For detailed historical coverage of the position in the United States see Russel, chapters 4-7; Humphry 
and Wickett, chapters 1-7. 
346 In 1991 the American Medical Association membership was 286,477. (Written communication, 
research Association, Department of Membership Information Services, May 1992.) 
347 See chapter N, n. 2. 
348 See chapter N, 113. 
349 One of the earliest reported surveys was that conducted by the Euthanasia Society of America in 1941 
involving a questionnaire sent to all the doctors of New York State. Approximately 80% of the 
respondents, comprising some 4000 doctors (a response rate of about 16%), answered that they were in 
favour of the legalisation of active euthanasia for incurable adult sufferers who asked for it; see Russel, 
89-90. A number of studies were also conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s; see R. Williams, 
'Our Role in the Generation, Modification and Termination of Life' (1969) 124 Arch. Internal Med. 215 
(survey of the members of the Association of American Physicians and the Association of Professors 
of Medicine in which 15% of those questioned favoured 'positive' euthanasia i.e. active euthanasia); N. 
Brown et al, 'The Preservation of Life' (1970) 211 J.A.M.A. 16 (mailed questionnaires sent to the staff 
doctors at two hospitals in Seattle; 31 % favoured changes permitting 'positive' euthanasia and 27% 
percent said that they would practice it, with a signed statement by the patient or family, if there was a 
more tolerant climate.) 
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legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia.350 In 1987,1 a survey of Californian doctors was 
commissioned by the Hemlock Society to gauge doctors' attitudes and practices with regard to active 
voluntary euthanasia. The survey questions were identical to those used in the Monash survey of 
doctors conducted by Kuhse and Singer in Victoria,351 thus permitting some useful comparisons to 
be drawn between the results obtained in the two jurisdictions.352 
In response to a question regarding the practice of active voluntary euthanasia, nearly 23% of the 
respondents in the Californian survey indicated that they had taken active steps to bring about the 
death of a patient who had requested such action.353 This compares with a 29% affirmative response 
rate in the Monash survey. Of the Californian doctors who had rejected a patient's request to hasten 
death, 16.5% did so solely because the action was illegal, 23% gave this as the primary reason for 
rejecting the request, while 40% said that this was part of the reason. 354 Twenty percent said that the 
illegality of the action was not at all the reason for rejecting the request.355 In the results for the 
Monash survey: 5% of respondents gave this as their sole reason, 15% as the primary reason, 45% as 
part of the reason and 35 % indicated that it was not a reason at all. 
The Californian survey also sought to ascertain doctors' attitudes to taking active steps to bring about 
a patient's death at the patient's request. When asked if it was sometimes right to agree to hasten a 
patient's death, of the 600 doctors who responded to the poll, 62.5% said it was sometimes right to do 
so, while 37.5% disagreed.356 This is comparable with the results for the Monash survey; 62% 
answered yes while 34% answered no. 
Having been provided with a description of the condition under which doctors in the Netherlands may 
end the life of a patient without attracting criminal prosecution, respondents were asked whether it 
would be a good thing if a similar situation existed in California. Sixty-seven per cent of the 
respondents agreed that it would be a good thing.357 This is significantly higher than the response to 
the same question for the Monash survey which. was 62%. When asked about the appropriate role of 
their professional medical association with regard to this matter, 58% of the Californian doctors felt 
that their professional medical association should take a similar stand to that taken by the Royal 
Dutch Medical Association.358 Here again, the affirmative response was higher than amongst the 
Victorian doctors in the Monash survey of whom 52% felt that their professional medical association 
should take a similar stand to that of the Royal Dutch Medical Association. The Californian doctors 
350 For discussion of these developments, see chapter VII, 339-341. 
351 See above, 264-266 and chapter IV, 118. 
352 Because of the similarity in survey questions as well as the proximity in time between these two 
surveys, attention will be focussed on a comparison of these results and reference will only indirectly 
be made to the more recent survey of South Australian doctors. 
353 Note, 'Most California Doctors Favour New Euthanasia Law' (1988) 31 Hemlock Q. 1-2. 
354 Id. 2. 
355 Ibid. 
356 Id. 1. 
357 Id. 2. 
358 Ibid. 
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were also asked whether the law should be changed to permit active voluntary euthanasia. More than 
two-thirds (68.7%) believed that the law should be changed,359 as compared with()()% in the Monash 
survey. Over one half (51 % of the respondents) said that they would practice active voluntary 
euthanasia if it were legal,360 significantly more than the 41 % of respondents in the Monash survey 
who indicated that they would be prepared to do so. 
Whilst there are clear parallels to be drawn between the results obtained from the surveys conducted in 
California and Victoria, there are also some interesting differences to be noted. For example, in the 
Monash survey, significantly more doctors indicated that they had taken active steps to end a patient's 
life at the request of the patient (29% as compared to 23% in the Hemlock survey). Further, for those 
doctors who said that they had rejected a patient's request for active euthanasia, it appears that the 
present illegality of the practice was generally a more relevant factor in the minds of the doctors in the 
Californian survey than it was for the Victorian doctors.361 One possible explanation for these 
differences is that the United States is a more litigious society which may generally discourage doctors 
in that jurisdiction to act in contravention of the law. Doctors in California may be particularly wary, 
following the case of Barber v Superior Court362 in which two Californian doctors were charged with 
murder for disconnecting mechanical ventilation and intravenous lines from a severely brain-damaged 
comatose patient. Although the charges were ultimately dismissed, the case did highlight the potential 
criminal liability of doctors for passive euthanasia let alone for active interventions intended to end the 
life of a patient 
It is also interesting to note that although a very similar proportion of doctors in California and 
Victoria were of the view that it was sometimes right for a doctor to take active steps to hasten the 
death of a patient at the patient's request; (62.5% in the Hemlock survey compared with 62% in the 
Monash Survey), the doctors sampled in the .Californian survey appear to be more in favour of change 
in this area. A consistently higher level of approval was recorded amongst the Californian doctors 
sampled in the Hemlock survey compared with Victorian doctors in response to questions with regard 
to: adopting the situation in the Netherlands - 67% (Monash survey 62%); their professional medical 
associations changing their stance - 58% (Monash survey 52%); a change of law to permit active 
voluntary euthanasia - 68.7% (Monash survey 60%); and whether they would be willing to practice 
active voluntary euthanasia if it were made legal - 51 % (Monash survey 41 % ) . These differences can 
perhaps be explained by the fact that doctors in the United States, and particularly in California, ha~e 
359 Ibid. . 
360 Ibid. See also the results of a study co-ordinated by the Center for Health Ethics and Policy Graduate 
School of Public Affairs, University of Colorado at Denver, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-
Sustaining Treatment (1988). This survey involved a questionnaire sent to all doctors in Colorado, of 
which a total of 2,218 responded. Though dealing primarily with passive euthanasia, the survey 
revealed that 60% of doctors responding to the survey had attended patients for whom they believed 
active voluntary euthanasia would be justifiable if it were legal, and of those who had encountered such 
patients, 58.9% indicated that they would have personally been willing to administer a lethal drug if 
such measures were allowed by law. See the report, 15-16. 
361 Responses for the Hemlock and Monash surveys were as follows; 16.5% sole reason (Monash survey 
5%); 23% primary reason (Monash survey 15%); 40% part of the reason (Monash survey 45%); 20% 
not at all the reason (Monash survey 35% ). 
362 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). For discussion, see chapter II, 62-63, 74. 
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had greater exposure to the problem of euthanasia and the poSsibility of reform in this area than have 
their Victorian counterparts. One only has to have regard to the enactment of 'living will' legislation 
in many American states, commencing with the Californian Natural Death Act in 1976, various 
landmark 'right to die' cases,363 and the ballot initiative to introduce legislation in California to 
permit active voluntary euthanasia, which was well underway at the time this survey was 
conducted, 364 to understand why the doctors in the Californian survey were perhaps better informed 
on the subject and more willing to embrace change in this area 
Also in 1988, but some months after the release of the results of the Hemlock survey in California, 
the findings were published of a survey of doctors undertaken by the San Francisco Medical Society. 
The aim of this survey was to gauge the attitudes to active voluntary euthanasia of members of the 
San Francisco Medical Society in the light of reform initiatives being proposed in the State of 
California for the legalisation of active voluntary physician-assisted euthanasia.365 The survey 
covered some 1,743 San Francisco doctors, 676 of which responded (a total response rate of 38.8%). 
The results obtained in this survey are generally consistent with the earlier Hemlock survey and 
surveys undertaken in other jurisdictions, including Australia. The overwhelming majority of the 
doctors surveyed supported the view that patients should have the option of requesting active 
euthanasia when faced with incurable terminal illness: 70% in favour, with only 23% against.366 
Another of the questions was directed at ascertaining members' views as to the doctors' role with 
regard to active euthanasia. Respondents were asked: 'If you do feel that legalisation of active 
euthanasia would be appropriate do you think that physicians should be the ones to carry out such 
requests?' More than half (54%) were of the view that if legal, active voluntary euthanasia should be 
carried out by physicians, while 26% disagreed.367 There appears, however, to have been considerable 
uncertainty with regard to this issue, with 11 % unsure and 9% giving no answer to this question. 368 
On the question of preparedness to perform active voluntary euthanasia if it were made legal, 45% of 
the respondents indicated that they would, 35% said no.369 Once again, there was a relatively high 
rate of respondents undecided on this issue - 18% were unsure and 2% gave no answer.370 
The survey conducted by the San Francisco Medical Society is significant. It represents the first 
survey of its kind undertaken by a professional medical association in any of the jurisdictions under 
consideration. Not only was an anonymous opinion survey of members undertaken, but the results of 
the survey were made public, even though one suspects that the Board of the San Francisco Medical 
Society may have been a little surprised, not to say disappointed, by the results obtained. This course 
363 For example, Bartling v Superior Court 163 Cal. App. 3d 186 (1984) and Bouvia v Superior Court 225 
Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) See chapter Il, 54-55. 
364 For discussion, see chapter Vll, 339-341. 
365 S. Heilig, 'The S.F.M.S. Euthanasia Survey: Results and Analyses' (1988) San Francisco Med. (May) 
24-6, 34. 
366 Id 24. Seven percent of respondents were unsure and 1 % did not answer this question. 
367 Ibid. 
368 Ibid. 
369 Id. 25. 
370 Ibid. 
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of events can only be seen as evidence of a growing willingness within the medical profession to 
obtain an informed view on the subject and possibly re-evaluate its traditional opposition to the 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 371 
It is interesting to compare the results from these recent surveys with the findings of earlier surveys 
conducted in the United States. On the basis of a number of studies conducted in the United States in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, between approximately 10%-30% of the doctors surveyed were in 
favour of active euthanasia.372 Against this background, the more recent surveys, indicating quite 
significant support for active voluntary euthanasia, are of particular relevance. Whilst caution must be 
exercised in attempting to compare the results of these different surveys, the more recent results appear 
to reflect growing support amongst the medical profession for active voluntary euthanasia. This 
development is consistent with the increase in support for active voluntary euthanasia reflected in 
public opinion polls in the United States. 
Whilst the survey evidence is probably the clearest indication of attitudes to active voluntary 
euthanasia amongst doctors in the United States, there have been a number of other noteworthy 
developments which reflect growing acceptance within the medical profession of active voluntary 
euthanasia. A striking development which clearly signals change in this area is the increased level of 
informed debate on the subject of active voluntary euthanasia. It is a subject which is now openly 
being discussed amongst the medical profession and frequently features in the pages of the medical 
journals. More and more doctors, many of whom are well-known and respected, have publicly declared 
their willingness to re-examine the appropriateness of the current prohibitions on active voluntary 
euthanasia and assisted suicide.373 
Illustrative of this trend has been the emerging consensus amongst a group of eminent doctors 
regarding care of the dying. This came about through the initiative of the Society for the Right to Die 
(now called Choice in Dying374) which had sponsored a number of conferences for a select group of 
doctors in the United States from diverse professional and institutional backgrounds, with the object 
of establishing guidelines in the care of dying patients.375 The deliberations and conclusions of the 
panel of doctors have subsequently been published in a series of special articles in the New England 
371 Prior to the survey, the San Francisco Medical Society did not have an official position on the subject 
of active voluntary euthanasia and on the basis of the survey results, the society decided not to take any 
such position, deferring to the individual and personal convictions of each member physician: 
(Written communication with the Director of Public Health and Education, San Francisco Medical 
Society, May 1992). 
372 See above, n. 349. 
373 See, for example, M. Angell, 'Euthanasia' (1988) 319 New Eng.J.Med. 1348; S. Wanzer, 'Maintaining 
Control in Terminal Illness: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia' (1990) 6 Humane Med. 186; C. Cassel 
and D. Meier, ,'Morals and Moralism in the Debate Over Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide' (1990) 323 
New Eng.J.Med. 750; T. Quill, C. Cassel and D. Meier, 'Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-
Assisted Suicide' (1992) 327 New Eng.J.Med. 1380; H. Brody, 'Assisted Death - A Compassionate 
Response to Medical Failure' (1992) 327 New Eng.J.Med. 1384. 
374 See above, 250. 
375 See above, 249-250. 
285 
Journal of Medicine316 and have attracted widespread pubiicity as a result of the eminence of the 
doctors involved as well as of the journal in which their views were published. At the second of these 
conferences, a group of twelve doctors considered the doctors' response to the dying patient who is 
rational and desires suicide or euthanasia. In the publication which followed tacit approval was given 
to physician-assisted suicide, with ten of the twelve doctors supporting the view that it is not 
immoral for a doctor to assist in the rational suicide of a terminally ill patient.377 And whilst active 
voluntary euthanasia was not openly advocated, the matter was dealt with in a sympathetic and even-
handed manner, with the group refraining from outright condemnation of the practice.378 Although 
euthanasia opponents have sought to undermine the relevance of these conferences, and the resulting 
publications,379 these developments are of obvious significance. Not only have they attracted 
widespread publicity, but they have undoubtedly been influential in promoting understanding and 
acceptance within the medical profession of physician-assisted suicide and even active voluntary 
euthanasia. 
Another noteworthy development was the publication of an article in the prestigious American 
Medical Association Journal, in which a doctor admitted to having taken active steps to hasten the 
death of a patient dying of cancer. The article, entitled 'It's Over Debbie•,380 which appeared in the 
January 8 (1988) issue of the journal, briefly recounted the experience of a resident doctor who was 
called up in the middle of the night to attend to Debbie, a twenty year old female patient, dying of 
ovarian cancer. Her only words to the doctor were 'let's get this over with' to which the doctor 
responded by administering 20 m.g. of morphine intravenously. The doctor recollected how Debbie's 
breathing slowed, became irregular, and then ceased within a few minutes. The article, and its 
anonymous presentation in the journal, without editorial comment, stimulated substantial reaction 
from the medical professional, as well as the public, the media and legal authorities. The weight of 
opinion was against the resident's actions, with criticism even extending to the editors of the journal 
for publishing the article.381 In a subsequent editorial, the editor, George Lundberg, defending his 
decision to publish the manuscript, stated that the article proceeded through the normal peer review 
process, and after some editorial debate, the decision was taken to publish the article in order to 
provoke responsible debate within the medical profession and the public about active voluntary 
euthanasia in the United States.382 According to Lundberg, by publishing 'It's Over Debbie', the 
376 S. Wanzer.et al, 'The Physician's Responsibility to the Hopelessly Ill Patient' (1984) 310 New 
Eng.J.Med. 955; S. Wanzer et al, The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A 
Second Look' (1989) 320 New Eng.J.Med. 844. 
377 Id. 847-848. 
378 Id. 848-849. 
379 For example, alleging bias in the selection of doctors in the group, and the fact that they were 
sponsored by the Right to Die Society which is a pro-euthanasia organisation. 
380 (1988) 259 J.A.M.A. 272. 
381 See the letters to the editor arising from this publication; (1988) Vol. 259 No. 1. J.A.M.A. 272; 
(1988) Vol. 259 No. 2 J.A.M.A 2094-2098. For coverage of this development, as well as a nur_nber of 
other developments contributing to the changing climate for reform in the United States, see N. 
Newman, 'Euthanasia: Orchestrating "The Last Syllable of .... Time"' (1991) 53 U.Pitt.LRev. 153, 153-
164. 
382 Note, "'It's Over, Debbie" and the Euthanasia Debate' (1988) 259 J.A.M.A 2142. 
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Journal demonstrated its belief that the ethics of.euthanasia 1imst be debated anew.383 Although the 
publication of this article and the actions of the resident described therein have attracted much criticism 
both from within and outside the medical profession, even from proponents of euthanasia,384 it 
nevertheless marks a significant development within the medical profession in the United States. The 
fact that the item was published in the prestigious journal of the American Medical Association and 
the subsequent defence of that decision by the editor, clearly demonstrate an open-minded attitude to 
the issue active voluntary euthanasia and represents acknowledgment of the need to openly debate the 
issue. Whatever else this publication may have achieved, it certainly succeeded in its aim of 
promoting debate within the medical profession and the public about active voluntary euthanasia in 
the United States. 
Debate on the subject of active voluntary euthanasia has also been stimulated as a result of a number 
of widely publicised cases of doctor-assisted suicide. The first of these cases involved Dr Jack 
Kevorkian and his so called 'suicide machine' which he has used to assist the suicide of a number of 
patients.385 Following the first incident, involving a patient who was suffering from Alzheimer's 
disease, Dr Kevorkian was charged with murder.386 This charge was subsequently dismissed on the 
grounds that there was no proof that he had carried out and planned the patient's death.387 From the 
outset, Dr Kevorkian has been very public in his advocacy of physician-assisted suicide, and has 
succeeded in attracting much publicity to the voluntary euthanasia cause. The reaction to Dr 
Kevorkian's conduct from the medical profession in the United States has been somewhat mixed: 
amongst some vocal opposition,388 he also received considerable support.389 Dr Kevorkian has since 
assisted a number of other patients suffering severe illnesses to commit suicide by providing suicide 
devices.390 Two further murder charges have been brought against Dr Kevorkian but these charges 
were dismissed on the grounds that he had not actually activated the devices which had caused the 
deaths so as to constitute homicide as distinct from assisted suicide which is not, at present, an 
offence in the State of Michigan.391 Dr Kevorkian still faces possible murder charges in respect of a 
number of further deaths which were brought about with the assistance of his suicide devices.392 
383 G. Lundberg, 'Debate Over the Ethics of Euthanasia' (1988) 259 J.A.M.A. 2143. 
384 It has, for example, been argued that the actions of the doctor in this case were completely 
inappropriate because he knew virtually nothing of the patient's condition or circumstances and had 
acted impulsively on the basis of an ambiguous request. 
385 See chapter N, n. 78. 
386 Assisting suicide is not an offence in the State of Michigan. 
387 People v Kevorkian (unreported) N.Y. Times 14 Dec. 1990. For discussion, see Newman, 161-164. 
388 See, for example, R. Weir, 'The Morality of Physician-Assisted Suicide' (1992) 20 Law, Med. & Health 
Care 116, 119-120. 
389 The Mercury 12 Jan. 1991 which reports that the New York weekly Medical Tribune asked doctors to 
comment upon the actions of Dr Kevorkian: of the 250 that did so, 45% expressed approval of what 
Kevorkian had done. Further, in some of the letters received by the Medical Tribune doctors indicated 
that they had personally been involved in such activities. Another survey of doctors in the wake of the 
Kevorkian case was done by American Press in July 1990 in which an opinion poll was sent to 100 
doctors: 30% of the doctors polled said that the actions of Dr Kevorkian in assisting in the suicide of a 
patient should be a legal act; Note, 'Polls, Polls and More Polls' (1990)° 17 World Right-to-Die 
Newsletter 1. 
390 The Australian 23 July 1992. 
391 Ibid. 
392 The Australian 23 July 1992; the Mercury 29 September 1992. 
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However, in view of the outcome of the preceding cases, it is unlikely that a conviction for murder 
would succeed. These cases, and the controversy surrounding Dr Kevorkian and his suicide devices, 
have certainly prompted debate within the medical profession regarding physician-assisted suicide and 
active voluntary euthanasia. 
Another case of physician-assisted suicide which, in comparison with the incidents involving Dr 
Kevorkian, have attracted overwhelmingly favourable publicity was that involving Dr Timothy Quill. 
As noted in an earlier chapter, this case came to light as a result of an admission by Dr Quill, 
published in the New England Journal of Medicine.393 Dr Quill escaped liability on charges of 
assisting suicide as a result of the grand jury's refusal to indict He later explained that his purpose 
behind publishing the account was to provoke greater public discussion of the treatment of terminally 
ill patients. 394 His confession was welcomed by many doctors and ethicists as helping to remove 
taboos preventing doctors from discussing how they have helped their patients to die, and paving the 
way for a reassessment of the doctors' role.395 
Significantly, there has recently been some indication of a willingness to possibly review the 
American Medical Association's official opposition to active voluntary euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide in the future. In a recent report, the American Medical Association's Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs noted the increasing support for the proposition that physicians should be 
allowed to deliberately end a patient's life upon the patient's request 396 Whilst reiterating its position 
that physicians must not perform active voluntary euthanasia or participate in assisted suicide, the 
council recommended that a more careful examination of the issue is necessary.397 In particular, it 
observed that there is currently little data in the United States regarding the number of requests for 
active euthanasia or assisted suicide, the concerns behind the requests, the types and degree of 
intolerable and unrelievable suffering, or the number of requests that have been granted by health care 
providers. 398 The council suggested that before active voluntary euthanasia can be considered a 
legitimate medical treatment in the United States, the needs behind the demand for physician provided 
euthanasia must be examined more thoroughly and addressed more effectively.399 The report 
concluded with a recommendation that the societal risks of involving physicians in medical 
interventions to cause patients' deaths is too great to condone active voluntary euthanasia or 
physician-assisted suicide at this time.400 This report is significant in so far that it demonstrates the 
preparedness of the American Medical Association to further investigate the issue and possibly re-
393 T. Quill, 'Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualised Decision Making' (1991) 324 New Eng.J.Med. 
691. See further, chapter IV, 120-125. 
394 New York Times 27 July 1991. 
395 For an illustration of the favourable reaction to the actions of Dr Quill, see N. Jecker, 'Giving Death a 
Hand: When the Dying and the Doctor Stand in a Special Relationship' (1991) 39 J.Am. Geriatrics 
Society 831. 
396 American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Decisions Near the End of Life 
(1991) 245. 
397 Id. 254. 
398 Id. 251. 
399 Ibid. 
400 Id. 254. 
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evaluate its stance with regard to active voluntary euthanasia' and physician-assisted suicide at some 
later stage. 
International Developments: The Appleton International Conference 
Another significant development which has given recognition and qualified support to active voluntary 
euthanasia ha& been the Appleton International Conference. This development began in 1987 with an 
international working conference for practising clinicians regarding decisions to withhold or withdraw 
treatment.401 Participants ~ere drawn internationally from nearly a dozen countries and their 
deliberations led to the preparation of model guidelines with regard to forgoing treatment. 402 A 
further conference was held in 1991 to continue the development of internationally recognised 
guidelines with regard to forgoing life-prolonging medical treatment. At this conference consideration 
was, inter alia, given to requests for intervention intended to terminate life (active voluntary 
euthanasia). Although there was by no means unanimity on the issue, the following guidelines were 
suggested concerning requests for active euthanasia: 
Patients having decision-making capacity who are severely and 
irremediably suffering from an incurable disease sometimes ask for 
assistance in dying. Such requests for active termination of life by a 
medical act which directly and intentionally causes death may be morally 
justifiable and should be given serious consideration. Doctors have an 
obligation to try to provide treatment and care that will result in a 
peaceful, dignified, and humane death with minimal suffering. There is a 
particular obligation upon the doctor confronted with a request for 
euthanasia or other assistance in dying to undertake a scrupulously careful 
enquiry into the circumstances of the request to see if alternative courses of 
action might be helpful in removing or alleviating the cause or causes that 
led to the request .... 
It is recognised that participation in doctor-assisted dying for those patients 
who persist in their wish to die in spite of all measures to reduce their 
suffering will reflect different cultural and societal norms in individual 
countries. Whether statutory legalisation of the international termination 
of life by doctors is desirable is the subject of continuing international 
debate.403 
These carefully worded guidelines which gain international exposure are clearly intended to convey a 
degree of acceptance for active voluntary euthanasia In so doing, they reflect the enormous changes 
that have occurred with regard to this subject, and in their own right, marking a significant milestone 
in the history of active voluntary euthanasia. 
401 J. Stanley, 'The Appleton International Conference: Developing Guidelines for Decisions to Forgo 
Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment' (1992) 18 J.Med. Ethics 3. 
402 These guidelines were published' as 'The Appleton Consensus: Suggested International Guidelines for 
Decisions to Forgo Medical Treatment' in the Journal of the Danish Medical Association (1989). 
403 Stanley, 6-7. Note the dissent to this guideline by 5 of the 24 participants. 
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Changes Within the Medical Profession: An Evaluation 
From the foregoing review of developments within the medical profession in Australia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States with regard to the issue of active voluntary euthanasia, it is readily 
apparent that despite the official opposition of professional medical organisations, there is growing 
evidence of a changed outlook on the subject on the part of many doctors. It is more difficult to state 
with any certainty the reasons behind this change. A number of tentative suggestions can, however, 
be made which reinforce the important interrelationship between the changing attitude of the medical 
profession on the issue and changes in public opinion generally. Amongst possible reasons behind 
this clear shift in medical opinion is the increasingly open attitude in the community to death and 
dying. Although active voluntary euthanasia remains a crime, much of the taboo formerly surrounding 
the subject has disappeared and doctors are, therefore, increasingly willing to present their views on 
the subject. Doctors, as members of the community, can be taken to reflect, at least to some extent, 
the attitudes of the wider population which are unequivocally moving towards acceptance of active 
voluntary euthanasia. Moreover, as the evidence of public support for active volm.1tary euthanasia 
mounts, more and more doctors would be likely to acknowledge this development and respond to it, 
regardless of what their own personal views on the subject may be. This is particularly the case in 
view of the declining influence of medical paternalism and the growing recognition of the importance 
of patient autonomy and self-determination. 
In the light of the overwhelming evidence of growing acceptance within the medical profession for 
active voluntary euthanasia, there is a strong case to suggest that if the professional medical 
associations are to remain relevant and representative of the views of their members, they must 
urgently re-examine their traditional opposition to the practice. Moreover, if such a review is to be 
effective and responsive to the needs of the medical profession as a whole, it is essential that a 
genuine effort is made to gauge the views of members of the profession. Indeed, as suggested 
earlier,404 it was primarily for this reason that the recent review undertaken by the B.M.A., whilst 
undoubtedly a development of major significance, ultimately failed to address the real issues in this 
area. 
It has also been shown that apart from survey evidence of doctors' attitudes to active voluntary 
euthanasia, in all the jurisdictions under consideration there have been quite a number of other more 
general developments within the medical profession which have contributed to the process of reform. 
Widespread acceptance of passive euthanasia, changing attitudes to death and dying, the development 
of hospice and palliative care, and increased debate within the medical profession and the community 
generally on the subject of assisted dying are just some of the developments which have contributed to 
a growing understanding and acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia. The extent of this change, also 
from an international perspective, is evident from the deliberations of the Appleton International 
404 For criticiam of the report, see above, 276-278. 
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Conference which has led to the development of guidelines for medical practitioners concerning 
requests for active euthanasia. 
Copclusiop 
The object of this chapter has been to outline the key features in the changing climate for reform of 
the law with regard to active voluntary euthanasia Evidence from opinion poll results has shown that 
a large majority in Australia and the other common law jurisdictions under consideration support the 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. The degree of community support is reflected in the 
expansion of the voluntary euthanasia movement, with the establishment and growth of voluntary 
euthanasia societies in all jurisdictions. Intermeshed with these developments, there has been a 
significant shift of opinion from within the medical profession towards acceptance of active voluntary 
euthanasia, although the implications of this shift are yet to be fully recognised by the official 
medical organisations. The analysis in this chapter evidences a clear trend towards greater acceptance of 
active voluntary euthanasia. In some jurisdictions, this development dates back a number of 
decades, 405 whilst in others it is of relatively more recent origin. However, in all jurisdictions, there 
are indications that the trend .has been gathering momentum in recent years, with ever increasing 
demands for changes to the present law. In the chapter which follows, consideration will be given to 
the measures which have todate resulted from this changing climate for reform. 
405 See above, 243-244 and 247-248 for discussion of the history of the voluntary euthanasia movement 
in the United Kingdom and the United States 
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CHAPTER VII 
REFORM DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA AND OTHER COMMON LAW 
JURISDICTIONS 
Introductjon 
The foregoing chapter has concentrated on the changing climate for reform within the medical 
profession and the community generally on the issue of active voluntary euthanasia. documenting the 
growing evidence of acceptance of the practice and support for its legalisation. Specific attention will 
now be given to the governmental response to these changes in the form of law reform commission 
and parliamentary inquiries. Consideration will also be given to legislative efforts, primarily initiated 
by the voluntary euthanasia societies, to introduce laws permitting active voluntary euthanasia. 
Although todate, these legislative efforts have been unsuccessful, there has been considerable reform 
activity in this area, particularly in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Australia 
There have been a number of inquiries conducted in Australia in recent years which have touched on 
the issue of legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. but the majority of these inquiries have not 
directly dealt with this issue. The relevant Australian inquiries have essentially taken two forms -
either comprising part of a broader revision of ~e criminal law in the course of which some attention 
has been given to whether there is a need to change the law with regard to mercy killing, 1 or inquiries 
directed at the issue of patients' rights with regard to medical treatment, dealing with what is 
essentially passive euthanasia 
Criminal Law Inquiries 
Whilst there have been a number of criminal law inquiries in Australian jurisdictions which have 
indirectly touched on the issue of active voluntary euthanasia, their focus has generally been mercy 
killings in the family context As a result, these foquiries have been of limited relevance to the issue 
1 See the Introduction to this thesis, 4 for a definition of 'mercy killing' where it is explained that this 
term is usually used in the context of compassionate killings involving family or friends as distinct 
from medically administered active voluntary euthanasia. 
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of active voluntary euthanasia as understood for the purposes of this thesis; i.e. active voluntary 
euthanasiit performed by doctors in the medical context: 
In 1974, the Law Reform Commission of Victoria, as part of its reference with respect to the law of 
murder, examined the issue of mercy killing. 2 In particular, consideration was given to whether mercy 
killing, in the sense of 'an intentional killing, the motive of which is to spare the victim a 
continuance of severe suffering', should be removed from the definition of murder and reduced to the 
lesser offence of manslaughter. This proposal was rejected, and it was recommended that mercy killing 
should continue to be classed as murder. 3 The Victorian Law Reform Commissioner was of the view 
that it would be unwise to change the law in this area because it would be likely to increase the 
number of people who inappropriately take upon themselves the responsibility of killing. 
Furthermore, it was pointed out that in many instances, the motive for the killing would be to relieve 
the killer from a burden and that it was thought undesirable to place temptation in the way of persons 
who carry such burdens to kill for their own relief and then to seek to evade full responsibility by 
asserting that their motive was to relieve suffering. The commissioner also made reference to the 
evidentiary difficulties involved in such cases, particularly in establishing the motive of the offender, 
in circumstances where the killer would usually be the only person able to give an account of what 
had occurred. It is clear from the nature of these objections that attention was primarily directed at 
mercy killings occurring in the family context: objections based for example, upon the self-interest of 
the killer or of a similar nature are not as relevant in the context of active euthanasia performed by a 
doctor at the request of a patient and subject to appropriate safeguards. 
A similar approach was taken some years later in South Australia, when the Criminal Law and Penal 
Methods Reform Committee in its 1977 Report, The Substantive Criminal Law, recommended 
against the introduction of a separate offen~ of mercy killing.4 Specific consideration was given to a 
proposal which had earlier been put forward by the English Criminal Law Revision Committee,5 that 
an offence of mercy killing be created to cover circumstances of intentional killing through motives of 
compassion. However, the South Australian Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee 
rejected any attempt to deviate from the criminal law's traditional concern with intention. The 
committee was of the opinion that the problem of euthanasia cannot be solved by introducing a new 
concept under which the law takes notice of the motives of the killer to reduce what would be murder 
or manslaughter to a lesser crime. According to the committee, the only option was to either retain 
the existing law which treats such cases of intentional killing as murder or manslaughter, or to create 
some defined exceptions to the class of victims· in respect of whom a charge of murder or 






Law Reform Commissioner of Victoria, Report No. 1, Law of Murder (1974) 20. 
Id. 23. 
South Australian Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee, Fourth Report, The Substantive 
Criminal Law (1977) 57-58. 
Criminal Law Revision Committee, Working Paper on Offences Against the Person (1976) paras. 79-
87. 
South Australian Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee, The Substantive Criminal Law, 
58. 
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instances of active voluntary euthanasia performed by doctois, it was not the subject of any detailed 
consideration in the committee's report. 
Significantly, it is to be noted that although neither the Victorian nor South Australian reform bodies 
recommended any change to the law, they both acknowledged that lenient treatment of mercy killers 
would be appropriate.7 
The subject once again came under review in 1984 by the Victorian Law Reform Commission in the 
Working Paper, Murder: Mental Element and Punishment.8 However, the scope of this inquiry was 
specifically confined to the 'relatively rare instances of mercy killing by family and friends', and it was 
recognised that different issues are involved in cases of active voluntary euthanasia performed in the 
medical context. It was suggested that the subject of euthanasia could be reviewed by a committee 
drawn from a number of disciplines, which would engage in widespread consultation to assess the 
legal, medical, social and ethical implications of the practice.9 Notwithstanding the valuable 
suggestions made in the working paper, the issues raised therein have not been taken up in the 
subsequent reports on homicide released by the Victorian Law Reform Commission.10 
Whilst it is undoubtedly of some significance that the issue of mercy killing has been considered in 
these inquiries, indicating, as it does, recognition of a problem in this area and the possible need for 
reform, these inquiries are of fairly limited relevance to the more specific issue of legalisation of 
active voluntary euthanasia performed in the medical context. This is in part because the inquiries 
have invariably embraced broader criminal law issues, and as a result, the mercy killing issue has 
never received more than incidental attention. More importantly, however, because of the significant 
differences which exist between mercy killing and the concept of medically administered active 
voluntary euthanasia, objections raised or recommendations made with regard to the issue of mercy 
killing cannot be taken to exhaustively deal with all issues which may arise with regard to active 
voluntary euthanasia performed in the medical context 
Dying with Dignity, Natural Death, and Passive Euthanasia 
Apart from the inquiries into the criminal law, the other major legal development has been the 




Law Reform Commissioner of Victoria, Law of Murder, 20; South Australian Criminal Law and Penal 
Methods Reform Committee, The Substantive Criminal Law, 58. The South Australian report even went 
so far as to suggest that in some cases it may be appropriate to release such a person on parole 
immediately after sentence. 
Law Reform Commissioner of Victoria, Working Paper No. 8, Murder: Mental Element and Punishment 
(1984). 
Id. 30. 
10 But see Law Reform Commission of Victoria, Report No. 1, The !Aw of Homicide in Victoria (1985) 
where brief reference was made to cases of compassionate killing to demonstrate the inappropriateness 
of a mandatory life sentence. Recommendations were made that the sentence for murder be maximum 
life imprisonment in place of the mandatory life imprisonment, and these recommendations were 
subsequently implemented in the Crimes Amendment Act 1986 (Vic.). 
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rights and medical treatment for the dying.11 Parliamentary ~r law reform commission inquiries into 
these issues have been conducted in the States of South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, 
with. further developments mooted in a number of other jurisdictions.12 However, the terms of 
reference for these inquiries, whilst encompassing topics which cover passive euthanasia, have not 
included the issue of active voluntary euthanasia, either by design or as a result of the way in which 
they have been interpreted.13 These inquiries have nevertheless been significant in promoting public 
debate on the issue of euthanasia generally and have been instrumental in the introduction of 
legislation in a number of these jurisdictions which has some bearing on the issue of passive 
euthanasia. 
South Australia 
South Australia was the first Australian jurisdiction to move towards reform in this area, with the 
introduction by the Honourable Frank Blevins M.L.C., of the Natural Death Bill in early 1980, by 
way of a Private Member's Bill. The object of the Bill, which was to a large extent based on natural 
death legislation introduced in the United States, was to provide statutory means for a 'person to make 
a direction that extraordinary measures will not be taken to prolong life, in circumstances where death 
is imminent from a terminal disease.14 Under the legislation, the direction would ensure that a 
patient's right to refuse treatment would apply in circumstances where the patient was no longer able 
to communicate his or her wishes. This would be achieved by giving statutory recognition to an 
individual's advance declaration (frequently referred to as a 'living will') directing the withholding of 
life-sustaining measures in the event of terminal illness or injury. In April 1980, the Bill was referred 
by the South Australian Legislative Council to a Select Committee for inquiry and report. The Select 
Committee released its report later that year.15 The substance of the Bill was unanimously endorsed 
by the committee subject to a number of recommended changes.16 An amended Natural Death Bill 
was subsequently introduced and was enacted in 1983. 
Natural Death Act 1983 (S,A,) 
The Natural Death Act 1983 (S.A.) provides that a person of sound mind and over eighteen years of 
age who desires not to be subjected to 'extraordinary measures' 17 in the event of his or her suffering 
11 Note also the National Health and Medical Research Council Discussion Paper on the Ethics of 
Limiting Life-Sustaining Treatment (1988) prepared by the Ethics in Clinical Practice Advisory Panel 
with the aim of widening community discussion in this area. 
12 In 1985 the Commonwealth Law Reform Commission recommended review of the laws in the 
Australian Capital Territory in relation to suicide and euthanasia; Law Reform Commission of 
Australia, First Report, Community Law Refonnfor the Australian Capital Territory (1985) 10-11, 36. 
13 Todate, the only exception has been the South Australian Select Committee Inquiry on the Law and 
Practice Relating to Death and Dying; see discussion below, 297-301. 
14 Second Reading Speech, S.A. Par!. Deb. (L.C.), Vol. 1, 1982-83, 23 March (1983) 550-551. 
15 South Australian Select Committee of the Legislative Council, Report on the Natural Death Bill of 
1980 (1980). 
16 The Select Committee of the Legislative Council recommended, inter alia, inclusion in the legislation 
of a statement to make it quite clear that natural death is the sole substance of the legislation and that 
no measure which accelerates or causes death is to be condoned. 
17 Defined in s. 3 to mean 'medical or surgical measures that prolong life, or are intended to prolong life, 
by supplanting or maintaining the operation of bodily functions that are temporarily or permanently 
incapable of independent operation.' 
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from a 'terminal illness•,18 may make a direction in the p~escribed form and witnessed by two 
witnesses.19 Once duly executed, the directive remains effective indefinitely and provides evidence of a 
person's wishes at a time when they are no longer possessed of decision-making capacity.20 The Act 
provides that the medical practitioner who is treating the patient is under a duty to act in accordance 
with the direction unless be or she bas reason to believe that the patient has revoked, or intended to 
revoke, the direction or that at the time of giving the direction, the patient was not capable of 
understanding the nature and consequences of the direction.21 However, the legislation provides no 
sanction for the failure of the medical practitioner to comply with a patient's direction. 22 
The legislation specifically preserves the common law right of a patient to refuse medical 
treatment. 23 The Act also provides that nothing in the Act authorises an act that causes or accelerates 
death as distinct from an act that permits the dying process to take its natural course. 24 This 
provision was included on the recommendation of the Select Committee, which had felt that it was 
necessary to make it clear that the legislation in no way promotes active euthanasia. 25 The Act also 
contains a provision regarding causation, providing that for the purposes of the law of South 
Australia, the non-application or withdrawal of extraordinary measures from a person suffering from a 
terminal illness does not constitute a cause of death.26 This provision clearly protects a doctor from 
any liability for withholding or withdrawing extraordinary measures from a terminal patient, and is in 
fact framed in such general terms that it applies regardless of whether the patient has made a direction 
under the legislation.27 
It is perhaps not surprising that South Australia should have been the first Australian State to 
introduce such legislation in view of its history of progressive legislative reform. During its passage 
through parliament28 the legislation was subject to vigorous debate and had attracted considerable 
18 Defined in s. 3 to mean 'any illness, injury or degeneration of mental or physical faculties (a) such that 
death would, if extraordinary measures were not undertaken, be imminent; and (b) from which there is 
no reasonable prospect of a temporary or permanent recovery, even if extraordinary measures were 
undertaken.' 
19 Sections 4(1) and (2). Although the wording of s. 4(1) would appear to suggest that a direction must be 
made before the diagnosis of a terminal condition, in 1985, the Minister responsible for the 
legislation, the Honourable Frank Blevins M.L.C., was of the view that a person may make a direction 
under the legislation at any time; D. Lanham and B. Fehlberg, 'Living Wills and the Right to Die with 
Dignity' (1991) 18 Melbourne U.L.Rev. 329, 338. 
20 For materials dealing with the interpretation of the Natural Death Act 1983 (S.A.) see, for example, 
Lanham and Fehlberg; P. Bravender-Coyle, 'South Australia's Natural Death Legislation' (1984) 2 
Lawyer 18-19; C. Thomson, 'Natural Death Legislation: Some Issues' (1981) M.J.A. 451. 
21 Section 4(3). 
22 For criticism of this position see Lanham and Fehlberg, 346-347. 
23 Section 5(1). 
24 Section 7(2). 
25 See above, n. 16. 
26 Section 6. 
27 Thomson, 452. For further discussion regarding the scope of this provision, see Lanham and Fehlberg, 
348-349. 
28 S.A. Parl. Deb. (L.C.), Vol. 1, 1982-83, 30 March (1983) 743-746, 20 April (1983) 895-896; Vol. 2, 
1982-83, 4 May (1983) 1110-1111; S.A. Parl. Deb. (H. A.), Vol. 2, 1982-83, 4 May (1983) 1167-
1168; Vol. 1, 1983-84, 14 Sep. (1983) 845, 19 Oct. (1983) 1190-1191; Vol. 2, 1983-84, 9 Nov. 
(1983) 1575-1578, 30 Nov. (1983) 2143-2144. 
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interest from a number of community groups and organisati~>ns. 29 Although some members of the 
medical profession were of the view that prevailing medical practice with regard to the treatment of 
terminally ill patients was generally satisfactory and that such legislation was therefore 
unnecessary, 30 there appears to have been no major opposition to the legislation either from the 
medical profession or community groups. 
Since its enactment, the Act has attracted criticism on a number of grounds.31 Attention has been 
drawn to the ambiguities in the legislation and the lack of clarity in the terminology used. The 
legislation has also been criticised for its circumscribed operation, giving effect to a patient's directive 
only in circumstances where a patient is suffering from a 'terminal illness' and then, only allowing a 
patient to reject 'extraordinary measures•.32 However, as a result of the saving clause ins. 5(1) the 
Act clearly does not in any way derogate from the patients' common law right to refuse medical 
treatment. A more fundamental criticism of the declarations provided for under the legislation is that 
they involve a refusal of treatment in a wide range of unforeseeable circumstances.33 Thus, critics 
argue, the decision to refuse treatment is inevitably uniformed and consequently invalid. 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the real significance of this legislation is its operation in 
circumstances where the patient lose competence to make decisions regarding his or her medical 
treatment. The advance declaration procedure provided for under the legislati~n allows a patient, while 
fully conscious and in full control of his or her mental faculties, to give his or her doctor clear 
directions against prolonging the dying process which will continue to apply even though the patient 
may become comatosed or otherwise loose the capacity to consent to or reject treatment. To this 
extent, the legislation clarifies the situation which exists at common law. 34 However, as noted 
above, the operation of the legislation is circumscribed by the fact that a declaration is only effective 
in the event of a terminal condition and only applies in relation to extraordinary measures.35 
The legislation is also significant in the protection that it provides to medical practitioners. Although 
patients clearly have the right at common law to refuse any form of treatment, and doctors are legally 
obliged to comply with a patient's request, a great deal of uncertainty exists within the medical 
profession regarding the legality of passive euthanasia, particularly with regard to the withdrawal of 
29 See the South Australian Select Committee of the Legislative Council, Report on the Natural Death Bill 
of 1980 for reference to the community groups and organisations that had made submissions to the 
Select Committee. 
30 J. Gilligan and J. Linn, 'Natural Death Legislation' (1980) M.J.A. 473. 
31 For a critical evaluation of the living will technique adopted under the Natural Death Act 1983 (S.A.) 
see Lanham and Fehlberg, 337-349. 
32 Lanham and Fehlberg, 337, 342-345. 
3 3 For analysis of this criticism, see, for example, the Parliament of Victoria Social Development 
Committee, Second and Final Report, Inquiry into Options for Dying with D,ignity (1987) 50 (hereafter 
referred to as Victorian Social Development Committee Report) and the Law Reform Commission of 
Western Australian, Project No. 84, Report, Medical Treatment for the Dying (1991) 12-14 (hereafter 
referred to as the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Report). 
34 For discussion of the common law position, see chapter II, n. 55. 
3 5 See above, 295. 
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artificial life-support measures.36 The effect of the legislation 'is to provide legal protection to medical 
practitioners who withhold or withdraw 'extraordinary measures' from a patient even in circumstances 
where the patient has not made a direction.37 This goes some considerable way in addressing the 
problem of doctors over-treating patients in order to protect themselves from the risk of liability. The 
legislation also plays an important educative role, in helping to raise awareness amongst health care 
personnel and the public generally about the right of a patient to refuse treatment 
The operation of the legislation and in particular, the extent of its use in practice, is more difficult to 
gauge. A prescribed government form for the making of a directive under the legislation is available to 
the public free of charge from the South Australian State Information Office and the State Health 
Commission. Although not entirely satisfied with the legislation, the South Australian Voluntary 
Euthanasia Society also assists in disseminating information about the Act and the benefits of 
executing a directive or 'living wm•.38 Whilst community awareness and understanding of the 
legislation has undoubtedly grown since it was first introduced, there have been continuing reports of 
widespread ignorance amongst the public, and even the medical profession, regarding the existence and 
operation of the legislation.39 Of particular concern is the mistaken view apparently held by some 
doctors that if a patient has not made a direction under the Act, then the patient must submit to 
medical treatment 40 
South Australian Select Committee on the Law and Practice Relatin~ to Death and 
In December 1990, the Member for Coles, opposition back bencher, the Honourable Jennifer 
Cashmore M.H.A. put forward a proposal for the setting up of a committee to inquire into options for 
dying with dignity.41 This proposal was adopted and in December 1990, the South Australian House 
of Assembly appointed a Select Committee qn the Law and Practice relating to Death and Dying. The 
terms of reference for this committee are, inter alia, to examine: 
36 For example, Victorian Social Development Committee Report, 43-48; Law Reform Commission of 
Western Australia Report, 4. 
37 Section 6(1). Negligence is expressly excluded from this protection; see s. 6(2). 
38 The South Australian Voluntary Euthanasia Society (S.A.V.E.S.) had produced a brochure explaining 
the provisions of the Natural Death Act 1983 (S.A.) and providing guidelines for the placement of a 
Notice of Direction. In addition, the society's newsletters frequently contain information regarding 
living wills. 
39 See, for example, the concerns raised by S.A.V.E.S.; Note, 'The Natural Death Act' (1986) Vol. 3 No. 4 
S.A. V.E.S.Bull. 5; Note, 'Legal Perspectives' (1987) Vol. 4 No. 2 S.A. V.E.S.Bull. 1, 2. These 
concerns were acknowledged by the Honourable Jennifer Cashmore M.H.A., in connection with the 
establishment of the South Australian Select Committee on the Law and Practice Relating to Death and 
Dying (S.A. Parl. Deb. (H.A.), Vol. 2, 1990-91, 6 Dec. (1990) 2453-2455) and have since been borne 
out by the findings of the Select Committee; see Interim Report of the Select Committee of the House 
of Assembly on the Law and Practice Relating to Death and Dying (1991) Appendix D, 2 where, in a 
survey of community opinion, only one person in five was able to say that the South Australian 
Natural Death Act 1983 enabled them to make a living will. See also the Second Interim Report of the 
Select Committee of the House of Assembly on the law and Practice Relating to Death and Dying 
(1992) Appendix E which reported on the views and experiences of general practitioners with regard to 
the care of the terminally ill, including their knowledge of and approach to the Natural Death Act 1983. 
The findings were that despite the Act being proclaimed some eight years ago, there is still a 
substantial proportion of general practitioners who are unaware of the provisions of the Act, or who do 
not make use of it; Appendix E, 9-10. 
40 Note, 'Legal Perspectives' (1987) Vol. 4 No. 2 S.A. V.E.S.Bull. 1, 2. 
41 S.A. Parl. Deb. (H.A.), Vol. 2, 1990-91, 6 Dec. (1990) 2453. 
-the extent to which the health services and the present law provide adequate 
options for dying with dignity; 
-whether there is sufficient public and professional awareness of the Natural 
Death Act and if not what measures should be taken to overcome any 
deficiency; and 
-to what extent if any, community attitudes towards death and dying may be 
changing and to what extent if any the law relating to dying needs to be 
clarified or amended.42 
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These terms of reference, particularly the part directing inquiry into whether 'the law relating to dying 
needs to be clarified or amended,' are broad enough to include the issue of active voluntary euthanasia 
and have in fact been interpreted by the committee so as to encompass this issue.43 In October 1991, 
the committee released an interim report44 in which it identified amongst the key issues emerging 
from the inquiry, the view of some people in the community that active voluntary euthanasia should 
be decriminalised and become an accepted part of medical practice. 45 Other key issues noted by the 
committee included: the need for the right to refuse treatment to be well understood; the need for 
greater awareness, education and availability of palliative care; the need for legal provision enabling 
people to appoint an agent to make decisions about medical treatment on their behalf if patients 
themselves become unable to do so; and the need to repeal the Natural Death Act and replace it with 
more appropriate and relevant legislation. 46 
In its second interim report, released in May 1992,47 the committee recommended against any change 
to the law to provide the option of medical assistance in dying.48 In rejecting the arguments which 
had been advanced by the South Australian Voluntary Euthanasia Society in support of the case for 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, the committee expressed the view that the fact that some 
patients and doctors may resort to illegal means of ending life is not in itself sufficient justification 
for legalising the practice.49 The committee also rejected the notion that there is no moral distinction 
between letting someone die and bringing about that person's death. 50 According to the committee, 
society has placed significant moral and legal weight on intention and the committee recommended 
that this distinction should be maintained in the law.51 Reference was made to evidence put before the 
42 S.A. Parl. Deb. (H.A.), Vol. 3, 1990-91, 13 Dec. (1990) 2746. 
43 S.A. Parl. Deb. (H.A.), Vol. 2, 1990-91, 6 Dec. (1990) 2455 where the Member for Coles, the 
Honourable Jennifer Cashmore, although personally opposed to the concept of active voluntary 
euthanasia, forcefully argued against exclusion of the issue from the committee's terms of reference. 
44 South Australian Select Committee of the House of Assembly on the Law and Practice Relating to Death 
and Dying, Interim Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly on the Law and Practice 
Relating to Death and Dying (1991). 
45 Id. 3. 
46 Id. 2-3. 
4 7 South Australian Select Committee of the House of Assembly on the Law and Practice Relating to Death 
and Dying, Second Interim Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly on the Law and 
Practice Relating to Death and Dying (1992). 





committee regarding the growth of the voluntary euthanasi~ movement, results of public opinion 
polls, medical opinion polls and published articles in support of legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia However, the committee stated that these materials did not persuade it that parliament 
should legislate in this area, since 'there is a significant difference between the expression of personal 
support for legalising voluntary euthanasia and acceptance of responsibility for provision in law of 
this power. •52 The committee also noted that 
The fact that there is no precedent in the world for legalised voluntary euthanasia, 
despite popular pressure in many countries, is evidence of reluctance by even the 
most radical legislators to adopt a course of action which could have far-reaching 
and unforeseen consequences.53 
Whilst acknowledging the need to relieve the suffering of patients, the committee was of the view that 
this was not a goal which should be achieved by means of medically assisted death. The committee 
expressed the belief that if the recommendations made in its report were adopted there would be 
significant relief of suffering, as well as enhancement of individual dignity, greater comfort for 
families, and improved development of professional skills.54 
The greater part of the committee's report was devoted to the other issues which had been identified in 
the committee's first interim report.55 After examining the operation of the Natural Death Act 1983 
(S.A.), the committee found that although the objectives of the legislation were well supported, there 
was little understanding, or indeed, knowledge of its provisions.56 It also noted the practical 
difficulties in the operation of the legislation.57 The committee therefore recommended that the Act 
should be replaced by more appropriate legislation, but that any existing certificates executed under the 
Act should continue to have full force and effect notwithstanding the Act's repeal.58 A copy of the 
proposed legislation, entitled the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Bill 1992, is 
included in an Appendix to the report.59 In framing alternative legislation, the committee was of the 
view that it was necessary to clarify the law with regard to the patient's right to refuse treatment and 
recommended that this t1ght be established by statute. The committee also recommended that 
legislative provision be made for a medical power of attorney which would come into effect on the 
legal incapacity of the donor.60 Any person over the age of 16 years would be legally able to execute 
a medical power of attorney. The committee recommended that the power of attorney could be given 
either in general terms or subject to specific conditions, thereby allowing a person to provide 
expressly for the withdrawal or retention of extraordinary measures to prolong life or require the 
52 Ibid. 
53 Id. 52. 
54 Ibid. 
55 See above, 298. 
5 6 Id. 3. 
51 Id. 3-4 and see above, 296. 
5 8 Id. 4. See also Appendix G of the Report, Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Bill 1992. 
59 Id. Appendix G. 
60 Id. 5. 
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refusal of specific forms of treattnent which the person considered inappropriate. 61 The medical agent 
should be empowered to grant or withhold consent on behalf of the donor for any medical procedure to 
which the patient could give or withhold consent with the exception that the medical agent may not 
refuse normal palliative care. 62 The committee was of the view that whilst a patient may refuse such 
care for any reason, including a desire to hasten death, such refusal required a level of self-
determination which the committee believed could only be exercised by individuals acting 
consciously, in all the circumstances, on their own behaif.63 
The committee also addressed the issue of the legal liability of the medical profession. It recommended 
that a medical practitioner, or person acting under medical direction, who acts in accordance with the 
instructions of a patient or his or her agent to withdraw or withhold treatment, should not incur any 
civil or criminal liability as a result.64 It was further recommended that the legislation provide that 
the provision of palliative care reasonably administered without negligence and with informed consent 
to a terminally ill patient will not attract criminal or civil liability even if it has the effect of 
shortening life. 65 A novel aspect of the committee's deliberations concerned the use of 'do not 
resuscitate' orders. Recognising the problems in the operation of these orders, which in practice are 
frequently made without information about the patient's wishes, the committee recommended that this 
approach be replaced with the adoption of 'good palliative care' orders.66 These orders are to be based 
on consultation with the patient, the family and hospital staff and are intended to be a positive 
statement of good palliative care directed at patient comfort. 67 Recommendations were also made 
regarding the appropriate provision of palliative care and the need for professional education in this 
area68 
Although rejecting the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, the committee's report is 
_significant in that it did at least openly address the issue and acknowledged the growing demand for 
legalisation of the practice. It could be argued that there might have been more complete canvassing of 
the arguments in support of legalisation, in particular the need for upholding patient self-
de~rmination. Essentially, the reasons given for rejecting any change in this area reflect conservative 
views about the implication8 of legalisation and concern about untested consequences. Unfortunately, 
the current Netherlands' experience.where active voluntary euthanasia has for some time been practiced 
by the medical profession with relative openness, was not studied in depth by the committee, though 
the committee did note concerns which have been expressed about the cumulative impact on that 
61 Ibid. 
62 Id. 6. The committee recommended that 'palliative care' should be defined in the Act as measures 
directed primarily at maintaining or improving the comfort of a patient who is, or would otherwise be, 
in pain or distress. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Id. 1. 
65 Id. 8-9. See also Appendix G of the Report, Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Bill 
1992, clauses 9 and 10. 
66 Id. 9-11. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Id. 15-27. 
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society of medically assisted death.69 Since the Netherlands is the only jurisdiction where active 
voluntary euthanasia is practiced by the medical profession with some degree of official acceptance, 
any serious and comprehensive analysis of the issue of legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 
would require a detailed examination of the position in that jurisdiction.70 
Leaving aside the issue of active voluntary euthanasia, the report is to be welcomed for its 
recommendations for the repeal of the Natural Death Act 1983 (S.A.) and its replacement with wider 
and more appropriate legislation. In November 1992, the committee released its final report which 
continues the broad thrust of these recommendations. 71 
Victoria 
In December 1980, the Refusal of Medical Treatment Bill was introduced into the Victorian 
Parliament by the Honourable Rod Mackenzie M.L.C. as a Private Member's Bill.72 This Bill which 
was along similar lines to the South Australian natural death legislation, was subsequently amended 
and reintroduced in September 1981; however, debate on the Bill was adjourned and the Bill was never 
proceeded with. In August 1982, following a change of government, the Minister for Health referred 
the matter to the Health Advisory Council for consideration with the request that the council comment 
and report not only on the earlier Bill, but on the wider questions relating to the proposed legislation. 
In July 1983, the Health Advisory Council released its report, recommending in principle the 
introduction of refusal of treatment legislation in Victoria and making specific suggestions for 
amendment to the proposed Bm.73 The proposed legislation had attracted considerable criticism from 
a number of quarters and no further action was taken by the Victorian Government in relation to this 
issue until 1985. 
Parliament of Victoria Social DeyelOJllDent Committee Inguirv. Q>tions for Dying with 
Dignity 
In 1985, the all-party Parliament of Victoria Social Development Committee was given a reference to 
inquire into a number of issues related to the treatment of dying patients. Th~ committee's terms of 
reference were potentially far-reaching, including consideration of: 
-whether it is desirable and practicable for the Government to take legislative or 
other action establishing a right to die; 
-the fundamental question as to whether, and under what circumstances, if any a 
person should have a right to die; 
69 Id. 52. 
7 O See chapter VIII. 
71 South Australian Select Committee of the House of Assembly on the Law and Practice Relating to Death 
and Dying, Final Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly.on the Law and Practice 
Relating to Death and Dying (1992). 
72 Information received from private correspondence with the Honourable Rod Mackenzie, M.L.C., March 
1991. 
73 Victorian Health Advisory Council, Report to the Minister of Health, The Right to Refuse Medical 
Treatment Bill (1983). ' 
-the right of an individual to direct that in certain circumstances he or she be 
allowed to die or assisted in dying and the.form which such a direction should 
take; 
-the right of an individual who has not and is incapable of giving such a 
direction, to be allowed to die, or assisted in dying; and 
-the protection for medical, nursing and other professionals who allow an 
individual to die, or to assist an individual in dying.74 
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The committee's first report took the form of a discussion paper reflecting a range of views on options 
for dying with dignity which was published at the same time that the committee invited public 
submissions, with the aim of assisting individuals or groups who wished to participate in the 
committee's inquiry. 75 After an extensive period of public consultation, 76 the committee released its 
second and final report in 1987.77 Although the inquiry was limited to the Victorian jurisdiction, the 
final report of the Social Development Committee is of much wider significance, being one of the 
most extensive and comprehensive reviews of its kind ever to be conducted in Australia. 
The committee produced no less than 31 recommendations for the consideration of the Parliament of 
Victoria on a range of matters connected with the inquiry. One of the committee's central deliberations 
was whether it is desirable and practicable for the government to take legislative or other action 
establishing a right to die. Although the committee noted general support for the concept of a right to 
die with dignity,78 it found little consensus about what the 'right to die' meant in practice. The 
evidence before the committee revealed widespread disagreement as to the meaning of the right to die: 
whether, for example, the right to die was synonymous with the right of a patient to refuse treatment 
or whether it was a euphemism for euthanasia and mercy killing. Due to both the conceptual and 
practical difficulties relating to the notion, the committee concluded that it is neither desirable nor 
practicable to legislate or take other action to establish a right to die.79 Specific consideration was 
given by the committee to the issue of active voluntary euthanasia including analysis of the results of 
an opinion poll conducted by the Morgan Research Centre in the State of Victoria which had been 
presented as evidence to the inquiry by the Voluntary Euthanasia Society of Victoria.so Despite 
public opinion polls indicating support for legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, as well as 
many submissions and letters to the committee requesting that active voluntary euthanasia be 
legalised, the committee concluded that legislation to cover active voluntary euthanasia was not 
appropriate in Victoria 81 
7 4 Victorian Social Development Committee Report, (xi). 
75 Parliament of Victoria Social Development Committee, First Report on Inquiry into the Options for 
Dying with Dignity (1986) 7. 
76 Some 1,400 submissions were received by the Committee (see Victorian Social Development 
Committee Report, Appendix A), numerous public hearings were held (see Victorian Social 
Development Committee Report, Appendix B) and the Committee made many visits to hospitals and 
hospices (see Victorian Social Development Committee Report, Appendix C). 
77 Parliament of Victoria Social Development Committee, Second and Final Report on the Inquiry into 
the Options for Dying with Dignity (1987). 
78 Id. 138. 
79 Id. 139. 
80 Id. 128-135. 
81 Id. 140. 
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The committee did, however, recommend legislative action clarifying and protecting the existing 
common law right to refuse medical treatment by the enactment of legislation to establish an offence 
of medical trespass.82 This offence would be established when a medical practitioner carries out or 
continues with any procedure or treatment which a competent and informed patient has freely refused. 
The committee was of the view that such legislative action was necessary to combat widespread 
ignorance and confusion in the community and amongst many medical practitioners, regarding the 
right of a patient to refuse medical treatment 83 With regard to the issue of medical treatment for 
incompetent patients, the committee acknowledged the many difficulties in this area and emphasised 
the value of promoting the enduring power of attorney as a way of enabling people to indicate who is 
to be responsible for medical decisions on their behalf should they become incompetent in the 
future.84 
As a corollary to giving statutory force to the patient's right to refuse treatment, the committee 
believed it necessary to clarify the legal liability of medical practitioners who withhold or withdraw 
medical treatment or life-support systems. It was accordingly recommended that the legislation 
encompass protection from criminal and civil liability on the part of a medical practitioner who acts 
in good faith and in accordance with the expressed wishes of the fully informed, competent patient 
who refuses medical treabnent or procedures. 85 It was further recommended that the non-application of 
medical treatment does not in itself constitute the cause of death, where a medical practitioner is acting 
in good faith to avoid committing the offence of medical trespass.86 
A number of the committee's other terms of reference, directing inquiry, inter alia, into the right of an 
individual to be 'assisted in dying', were interpreted by the committee as not encompassing 
euthanasia. 87 Although arguably broad enough to permit consideration of active voluntary euthanasia 
as a form of assistance in dying, these particular terms of reference were read down by the committee 
so as to exclude consideration of active voluntary euthanasia. This represented a fairly significant 
limitation on the scope of the committee's inquiry, virtually foreclosing serious consideration of the 
issue. Although the question of active voluntary euthanasia had admittedly been given some 
consideration in the context of the committee's inquiry regarding a 'right to die', the inherent 
vagueness of that concept inevitably led to rejection of any proposal to legislate in favour of active 
voluntary euthanasia 
The report of the Social Development Committee was generally welcomed by medical and church 
groups, particularly for its recommendation that no legislative action to be taken to establish a right 
82 Id. 140-141. 
83 Id. 99, 101-104. 
84 Id. (viii) (Recommendation No. 21), 193-199. 
85 Id. 140-141. 
86 Id. 143. 
87 Id. 155-156. 
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to die.88 Opposition to the committee's recommendations c~e principally from right to life groups, 
which alleged that the inquiry and subsequent report were pro-euthanasia 89 
The first government initiative in response to the committee's report was the Medical Treatment Bill 
1987 (Vic.) which was introduced into parliament in October 1987. The Bill sought to give statutory 
force to the common law right of a patient to refuse treatment by setting out a refusal of treatment 
certificate procedure. In order to provide some means for the enforcement of this right, the Bill 
proposed the enactment of the offence of medical trespass to apply in circumstances where a doctor 
undertakes treatment after a refusal of treatment certificate has been signed by the patient. The Bill 
also sought to provide legal protection to medical practitioners acting in accordance with a patient's 
refusal of treatment certificate. Further, the Bill made provision for an individual to appoint an agent 
to make decisions about medical treatment, in the event that the individual became incompetent. This 
latter provision had come about as a result of doubts raised after the committee's report had been tabled 
in parliament, as to whether the existing enduring power of attorney mechanism (introduced into 
Victorian legislation by amendments to the Instrument Act 1958 (Vic.) in 1981) was able to be used 
to give an agent authority in respect of health care matters.90 Because of these doubts, and in 
accordance with the general spirit of the committee's report,91 it was decided to include a provision for 
an enduring power of attorney in the legislation. Following the introduction of the Bill in October 
1987, some amendments were made of a clarifying or technical nature and the Bill was renamed the 
Medical Treatment Bill (No 2) 1988.92 
Whilst there was widespread community support for the Bill, even amongst church groups, 93 the 
proposed legislation provoked a stormy response from right to life organisations. The President of 
Right to Life Victoria, Margaret Tighe, claimed that the Bill promoted passive euthanasia and stated 
that it would therefore be vigorously opposed by her organisation.94 The Australian Medical 
Association (A.M.A.) was also opposed to the introduction of legislation, particularly the creation of 
an offence of medical trespass, claiming that the changes were an unnecessary intrusion into the 
doctor-patient relationship.95 
It had originally been anticipated that the Bill would receive support from the opposition party since it 
was largely based on the recommendations of the all-party Parliamentary Committee which the 
opposition had endorsed. However, in April 1988, the shadow Attorney-General, Mr Chamberlain, 
88 The Age 1May1987. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Vic. Par!. Deb. (L.C.), Vol. 389, 28 Oct. (1987) 1029. 
91 See Victorian Social Development Committee Report, (viii), Recommendation No. 21. and discussion 
at 193-199. 
92 Vic. Par!. Deb. (L.C.), Vol. 390, 23 March (1988) 332-336. 
93 The legislation received support from the Roman Catholic and Anglican Archbishops of Melbourne; 
see the Sun 21 March 1988; the Advocate 24 March 1988; the Age 7 April 1988. 
94 Note, 'Medical Treatment Act' (1988) Vol. 7 No. 4 Bioethics News 1, 2. 
95 The Australian 13 Oct. 1987; the Herald 14 Oct. 1987; the Age 14 Oct. 1987. Opposition also came 
from individual doctors; see, for example, the advertisement placed in the Age 3 May 1988 opposing 
the Medical Treatment Bill and signed by 63 doctors. 
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announced that the Bill was 'fraught with uncertainties and dallgers and would not be supported by the 
opposition•.96 Particular concern was expressed about the operation of the enduring power of attorney 
provisions which had been included in the legislation, although they had not been part of the 
recommendations of the Social Development Committee.97 The Liberal Party's decision to oppose 
the legislation quickly met with condemnation and prompted a number of community leaders, led by 
the Vice-Chancellor of Melbourne University, Professor Penington, to urge opposition members to 
cast a conscience vote and support the legislation rather than reject it for political reasons.98 It was 
claimed that the Liberal party had succumbed to pressure from right to life groups and was greatly 
misreading the community mood with regard to the legislation.99 
The legislation was only saved from defeat when a senior liberal member of parliament, the 
Honourable Alan Hunt M.L.C., defied his party and abstained from voting against the Bm.100 This 
meant that the Bill could proceed to the crucial committee stage, allowing opportunity for 
consideration and debate on the merits of the Bill. However, in the committee debate, Mr Hunt voted 
with his party to reject the clause which would have allowed patients to appoint an agent to refuse 
treatment on their behalf if they become incompetent.101 The Bill was subsequently passed after the 
controversial provision had been deleted. The agency provision was in fact one of the few innovations 
under the legislation, and the failure of this initiative came as a great disappointment to proponents of 
the legislation. The then Victorian Attorney-General responded to the Liberal aboutface by announcing 
that the form of the legislation passed by parliament was not acceptable to the government, and. that 
while the government intended to proclaim those parts of the original Bill which had been passed, it 
would move to reintroduce those provisions deleted by the opposition.102 
Medical Treatment Act 1988 <Yic,) 
The Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic.), which came into operation on the lst of September 1988, 
clarifies the law relating to the right of patients to refuse medical treatment by establishing a 
procedure whereby a patient can, by certificate, clearly indicate a decision to refuse medical 
treatment.103 'Palliative care•l04 is specially excluded from the operation of the legislation.105 The 
96 The Age 14 April 1988; Vic. Parl. Deb. (L.C.), Vol. 390, 19 April (1988) 682-703. 
97 Ibid. 
98 The Australian 16-17 April 1988. 
99 The Age 20 April 1988. 
100 The Sydney Morning Herald 6 May 1988. See also Vic. Parl. Deb. (L.C.), Vol. 391, 3 May (1988) 
1041. 
101 Vic. Parl. Deb. (L.C.), Vol. 391, 5 May (1988) 1272-1281, 1298. 
102 Note, 'Dying with Dignity' (1988) 14 C'wlth. Law Bull. 1504. 
103 Note also s. 1 which outlines the purposes of the legislation. For analysis of the legislation, see D. 
Lanham, 'The Right to Choose to Die with Dignity' (1990) 14 Crim.L.J. 401, 424-430. Note also K. 
Andrews, 'The Medical Treatment Act' (1989) 150 M.J.A. 31. 
104 Defined in s. 3 to include (a) the provision of reasonable medical procedures for the relief of pain, 
suffering and discomfort; or (b) the reasonable provision of food and water. 
105 Section 4(2). This provision was the product of an amendment made to the original Medical Treatment 
Bill 1987 in response to concern from representatives from the Catholic Church; the Advocate 31 
March 1988. 
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patient's common law right to refuse treatment is preserved 6y virtue of s. 4(1) which provides that 
the Act does not affect any right of a person under any other law to refuse medical treatment.106 
A central feature of the Act is the refusal of treatment certificate, the procedure for which is set out in 
s. 5. Section 5(1) provides that: 
If a medical practitioner and another person are each satisfied-
(a) that the patienl has clearly expressed or indicated a decision-
(i) to refuse medical treatment generally, or 
(ii) to refuse medical treatment of a particular kind-
for a current condition; and 
(b) that the patient's decision is made voluntarily and without inducement and 
compulsion; and 
(c) that the patient has been infonned about his or her condition to an extent which is 
reasonably sufficient to enable the patient to make a decision about whether or 
not to refuse medical treatment generally or of particular kind (as the case 
requires) for that condition and that the patient has appeared to understand that 
infonnation and 
( d) that the patient is of sound mind and has attained the age of 18 years-
the medical practitioner and the other person may together witness a refusal of treatment 
certificate. 
In order to be effective, a refusal of treatment certificate must be in the form of Schedule 1.107 The 
terms 'medical practitioner', 'medical treatment' and 'refusal of treatment certificate' are defined under 
the legislation.108 It is clear from the wording of s. 5(1)(a) that a patient can only refuse medical 
treatment for a current condition. In this regard, the legislation differs from the situation under the 
present South Australian legislation. As a certificate under the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic.) 
must relate to a current condition, it cannot be used as a living will to refuse treatment generally in 
advance of the onset of illness or disease.109 However, in other respects, the Medical Treatment Act 
1988 (Vic.) is broader than the South Australian Natural Death Act 1983 in that its operation is not 
limited to terminal patients. Under the Victorian legislation, patients can refuse any medical treatment 
(with the exception of palliative care), whereas under the South Australian legislation, only 
extraordinary measures can be refused in the event of terminal illness.110 
Under the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic.) a refusal of treatment certificate can be cancelled by the 
patientl 11 and will automatically cease to apply if the medical condition of the person has changed to 
106 The patient's right to refuse palliative care at common law is therefore preserved. 
107 Section 5(2). 
108 Section 3. 
109 Andrews, 32. . 
110 As outlined above, recommendations have been made by the South Australian Select Committee on the 
Law and Practice Relating to Death and Dying for the repeal and replacement of the South Australian 
Natural Death Act 1983. See above, 299. 
l l l Sections 7(1)&(2). For Notice of Cancellation, see also Schedule 1 as amended by the Medical 
Treatment (Enduring Power of Attorney) Act 1990 (Vic.). Prior to the Medical Treatment (Enduring 
307 
such an extent that the condition in relation to which tlie certificate was given is no longer 
current.112 
Section 6 of the Act seeks to give statutory force to the refusal of treatment certificate by creating the 
offence of medical trespass. That section provides that a medical practitioner must not, knowing that a 
refusal of treatment certificate applies to a person, undertake or continue to undertake any medical 
treatment to which the certificate applies, being treatment for the condition in relation to which the 
treatment certificate was given.113 In this respect, the legislation goes beyond the Natural Death Act 
1983 (S.A.),-or for that matter the newly proposed Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care 
Bill 1992 (S.A.), which provide no sanction for the failure of a medical practitioner to comply with a 
patient's directive. 
The right of a patient to refuse treatment under the legislation is reinforced by s. 9 which confers 
protection on medical practitioners who act in accordance with a patient's refusal of treatment 
certificate. The section provides that a medical practitioner or a person acting under the direction of a 
medical practitioner who, in good faith and in reliance on a refusal of treatment certificate, refuses to 
perform or continue medical treatment which he or she believes on reasonable grounds has been 
refused in accordance with this Act is not-
(a) guilty of misconduct or infamous conduct in a professional respect; or 
(b) guilty of an offence; or 
(c) liable in any civil proceedings-
because of the failure to perform or continue that treatment.114 
Thus, medical practitioners who, in good faith, act in accordance with a patient's refusal of treatment 
certificate are clearly protected from professional, criminal and civil liability. 
While the introduction of the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic.) was undoubtedly significant, 
clarifying and reinforcing the right of a patient who has decision-making capacity to refuse medical 
treatment, its major shortcoming was the absence of a mechanism providing for decision-making in 
the event of supervening incompetence. As noted earlier, the original Medical Treatment Bill 1981 
(Vic.) had provided for the issue of supervening incompetence by allowing for the appointment of an 
agent to make decisions about medical treatment, but the opposition had forced the deletion of these 
crucial provisions from the Bm.115 
Power of Attorney) Act 1990 (Vic.), the Medical Treatment Act 1988) (Vic.) also allowed for the 
modification of a refusal of treatment certificate. 
l l 2 Section 7(3). 
113 Section 6 as amended by the Medical Treatment (Enduring Power of Attorney) Act 1990 (Vic.) 
(consequential amendment only). 
114 Ibid. 
115 See above, 305. 
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Medjcal Treatment fEnilurin~ Power qfAUQmey!,Act 1990 <Vic.) 
In 1990, significant amendments were made to the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic.) with the 
enactment of the Medical Treatment (Enduring Power of Attorney) Act 1990 (Vic.) dealing with 
decision-making on behalf of incompetent patients. 116 This legislation had its origins in the agency 
provisions of the initial Medical Treatment Bill, but these earlier proposals had undergone substantial 
revision in order to incorporate appropriate safeguards against abuse of authority. The Medical 
Treatment (Enduring Power of Attorney) Bill 1989 (Vic.) was first introduced into the Victorian 
Parliament in May 1989 and was eventually passed in April 1990. It received support from all parties 
in the Victorian Parliament, but members of the Liberal Party and the National Party were allowed a 
conscience vote.117 
The Medical Treatment (Enduring Power of Attorney) Act 1990 (Vic.) complements the Medical 
Treatment Act 1988 (Vic.) by conferring upon incompetent patients the right to refuse medical 
treatment This is achieved by extending the scope of the legislation so that in circumstances where 
the patient becomes incompetent, decisions to refuse medical treatment can be made on behalf of the 
patient either by an agent appointed under an Enduring Power of Attorney (Medical Treatment) or by a 
guardian appointed under the Guardianship and Administration Board Act 1986 (Vic.). 118 
The key feature of the legislation is that, by way of amendment to the Medical Treatment Act 1988 
(Vic.), it provides a procedure whereby a person can appoint an agent to make decisions on his or her 
behalf in the event that he or she becomes incompetent.119 The Act provides that the appointment of 
an agent shall be by way of enduring power of attorney (medical treatment) in accordance with 
Schedule 2 of the legislation and takes effect if and only if the person giving the power becomes 
incompetent.120 However, once the person becomes incompetent, the decision-making power of the 
agent operates in much the same way as when a competent patient refuses treatment: a medical 
practitioner and an independent witness must be satisfied that the agent has been informed about the 
nature of the patient's current condition and that the agent understands that information. 121 In order to 
protect against potential abuse, the legislation contains a number of additional preconditions which 
must be satisfied before an agent or guardian can complete a refusal of treatment certificate on behalf 
of an incompetent patient. These are contained in the news. 5B(2) which provides that an agent or 
116 For analysis of this legislation, see D. Lanham and S. Woodford, 'Refusal by Agents of Life-Sustaining 
Medical Treatment' (1992) 18 Melbourne U.LRev. 6S9. 
117 The legislation was passed 6S votes to 16 after members of the Liberal Party and the National Party 
were allowed a conscience vote; Note, 'Medical Treatment Enduring Power of Attorney Act' (1990) Vol. 
9 No. 4 Bioethics News 1. 
118 See Medical Treatment (Enduring Power of Attorney) Bill 1989 (Vic.) Explanatory Memorandum. 
119 See news. SA inserted into the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic.) In addition to the agency situation, a 
decision about medical treatment of a person may be made in accordance with the legislation if the 
person is a represented person and an appropriate order has been made under the Guardianship and 
Administration Board Act 1986 (Vic.) providing for decisions about medical treatment by the person's 
guardian; sees. SA(l)(b). 
A further amendment has recently been made to the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic.) by the 
enactment of the Medical Treatment (Agents) Act 1992 (Vic.) which enables a person to appoint an 
alternate agent to make decisions about the medical treatment of the person if the person becomes 
incompetent and the agent is unable or unavailable to act. 
120 Section SA(2)(b). 
121 Section SB. 
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guardian may only refuse medical treatment on behalf of a patient if: (a) the medical treatment would 
cause unreasonable distress to the patient; or, (b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the 
patie.nt, if competent, and after giving serious consideration to his or her health and wellbeing, would 
consider that the medical treatment is unwarranted. As a further safeguard against the risk of abuse, s. 
SC enables the Guardianship and Administration Board, on the application of the Public Advocate, or 
a person who has a special interest in the affairs of the donor of the power, to suspend or revoke an 
enduring power of attorney (medical treatment) in the interests of the donor of the power. 
Another amendment to the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic.), of general application, is the insertion 
of new s SF which provides that a person forfeits any interest they may have under a will, instrument 
or intestacy of another person, in circumstances where they have procured or obtained the execution of 
a certificate under the Act by that other person by deception, fraud, misstatement or undue influence. 
Further, in order to eliminate any suggestion that the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic.), as amended, 
will legitimise medical homicide or facilitate 'euthanasia by neglect', the Act specifically provides, 
both in its statement of purposes, as well as in the substantive provisions, that the Act does not affect 
the operation of the Crimes Act 19S8 (Vic.) with regard to assisting suicide122 or homicide.123 
The Medical Treatment (Enduring Power of Attorney) Act 1990 (Vic.) effects an important extension 
to the law in Victoria by amending the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic.) so as to provide a 
mechanism whereby a person who is competent can appoint an agent by way of enduring power of 
attorney to make medical decisions on his or her behalf in the event of supervening incompetence. 
The legislation thereby addresses an issue which has been the subject of considerable legal uncertainty 
and community concern.124 Significantly, this is also one of the key. issues which is now being 
addressed in South Australia where it has been recommended that legislation be introduced to replace 
the Natural Death Act 1983 (S.A.) to provide for the appointment of a medical power of attorney.125 
Although there have been some outspoken critics of the legislative developments which have taken 
place in Victoria through the enactment of the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic.) and its subsequent 
amendment by the Medical Treatment (Enduring Power of Attorney) Act 1990 (Vic.),126 the 
legislation has generally been well received. It has been hailed by some commentators as an important 
piece of refonn, the full benefits of which are yet to be realised once more people become appraised of 
their rights under the legislation. 127 In order to ensure smooth implementation of the legislation, the 
Victorian Government established an Implementation Committee under the auspices of the Public 
122 For discussion see D. Mendelson, 'The Medical Treatment (Enduring Power of Attorney) Act and 
Assisted Suicide: The Legal Position in Victoria' (1992) Vol. 12 No. 1 Bioethics News 34. 
123 See s. 1 setting out the purposes of the Act, also s. 6, amending s. 4(2) of the Medical Treatment Act 
1988 (Vic.). 
124 See chapter II, n. 55. 
125 See discussion above, 299-300. 
126 For example, K. Clarke, 'The Medical Treatment Act 1988: Safeguarding Patient Rights or Risking 
Patient Welfare?' (1989) 63 Law Inst.I. 473. 
127 For commentators in support of the legislation see, for example, Lanham, 'The Right to Choose to Die 
with Dignity'; G.P. Smith, 'Re-Thinking Euthanasia and Death with Dignity: A Transnational 
Challenge' (1990) 12 Adel.L.Rev. 480, 481-482. 
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Advocate. This committee, comprising representatives of hospitals, leading professions and 
community representatives, has initiated an education program within the health professions and the 
community generally, including preparation of explanatory notes providing guidance to the Act, 
administrative guidelines for hospitals, copies of documents required under the Act and a pamphlet for 
the public. 
Australian Capital Territory 
Apart from Victoria, the only other jurisdiction to have introduced legislation which provides for the 
appointment of an agent to make medical treatment decisions on behalf of the principal in the event of 
the principal's incapacity is the Australian Capital Territory. 128 Pursuant to the recommendations of 
the Australian Law Reform Commission, 129 the Powers of Attorney Act of 1956 (A.C.T.) was 
amended by the Powers of Attorney Amendment Act 1989 (A.C.T.) inter alia, to permit a person to 
confer upon an agent, by way of enduring power of attorney, the power to consent to medical 
treatment. The legislation is, however, couched in fairly limited terms, enabling the agent to consent 
on behalf of the donor to medical treatment which is necessary for the well-being of the donor, 130 or 
the donation of a body part, blood or tissue of the donor to another person in accordance with the 
Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (A.C.T.), 131 while the donor is incapacitated.132 The exact 
ambit of this provision is somewhat uncertain. Since the legislation refers only to the power to 
consent to medical treatment on behalf of the donor and is silent on the issue of refusal of medical 
treatment, on a strict interpretation of the legislation it could be argued that it does not extend to the 
refusal of medical treatment. A more flexible interpretation, on the other hand, would hold that the 
power to consent to medical treatment necessarily includes the power also to reject treatment on behalf 
of the donor .133 On the assumption that the legislation does extend to the refusal of medical 
treatment on behalf of the donor, as in Victoria, this introduces an important extension to the law, 
enabling a person to appoint another to make health care decisions on his or her behalf in the event 
that he or she loses decision-making capacity. 
Northern Territory 
Todate, the Northern Territory is the only other Australian jurisdiction to have introduced legislation 
in this area with the enactment of the Natural Death Act 1988 (N.T.). In August 1988 a Bill closely 
modelled on the South Australian Natural Death Act 1983 was introduced into the Northern Territory 
Parliament. Drafts of the legislation had been circulated to church representatives, community groups 
128 The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia has recommended that Western Australia introduce 
legislation providing for an enduring health care power of attorney; see below, 312. Although 
enduring power of attorney legislation now exists in all Australian jurisdictions, (R. Creyke, 'Enduring 
Powers of Attorney: Cinderella Story of the 80's' (1991) 21 W.Aust.L.Rev. 122.) it would appear not to 
extend to the area of medical treatment in the absence of specific provision to this effect. 
129 Community Law Reform for the Australian Capital Territory, Third Report, Enduring Powers of 
Attorney (1987) 25-26. 
130 Section 13(l)(b)(i). 
131 Section 13(1)(b)(ii). 
132 Section 13(2)(a). 
133 Support for this view could be drawn from the fact that discussion in the area of 'informed consent' is 
understood to refer to the right of a patient to consent to and also to refuse medical treatment. 
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and the medical profession by the Northern Territory Attdmey-General, but no objections were 
received. 134 The Bill was subsequently enacted with apparent ease, introducing into the Northern 
Territory a statutory mechanism based on the South Australian model pursuant to which a competent 
person can give directions against the artificial prolongation of the dying process through the use of 
'extraordinary measures' in the event of 'terminal illness' which are to apply in the event that he or she 
becomes incompetent.135 Given the similarity between this Act and the South Australian Natural 
Death Act 1983 upon which it is based, the comments made earlier in relation to the latter act are also 
relevant here.136 It is, in all the circumstances, somewhat ironic that the South Australian legislative 
model was adopted in the Northern Territory not that long before its repeal was recommended in South 
Australia.137 
Western Australia 
In response to concerns about legal uncertainties involved in the treatment of the terminally and 
incurably ill, the Western Australian Law Reform Commission was asked to consider and report on 
the civil and criminal law relating to medical treatment for the dying. The commission's terms of 
reference were: 
To review the criminal and civil law so far as it relates to the obligations to 
provide medical or life supporting treatment to persons suffering conditions 
which are terminal or recovery from which is unlikely and, in particular, to 
consider whether medical practitioners or others should be permitted or required 
to act upon directions by such persons against artificial prolongation of 
life.138 
In June 1988, the commission issued a discussion paper and invited public comment on the matters 
raised therein.139 Comments were received from a large number of individuals and organisations. The 
commission's report was released in February 1991. It is clear from the commission's terms of 
reference, that the scope of the inquiry was limited to the issue of withholding or withdrawing 
treatment from dying patients. Thus, as the commission noted in the introduction to the report, the 
reference does not cover active euthanasia in the sense of the application of a procedure or treatment 
with the deliberate intention to terminate life.140 
134 N.T. Parl. Deb. (L.A.), Vol. 27, 11 Oct. (1988) 87. 
135 Natural Death Act 1988 (N.T.). 
136 See above, 295-297. One material difference between the Natural Death Act 1988 (N.T.) and the Natural 
Death Act 1983 (S.A.) is in the scope of s. 6 dealing with cause of death. Under the Northern Territory 
legislation, the non-application or withdrawal of extraordinary measures from a person suffering from 
a terminal illness does not constitute a cause of death where the non-application or withdrawal was as a 
result of and in accordance with a direction made under the legislation. The South Australian provision 
is much wider, containing a blanket statement to the effect that the non-application or withdrawal of 
extraordinary measures from a person suffering from a terminal illness does not constitute a cause of 
death and there is no requirement that the non-application of withdrawal of treatment was done pursuant 
to a direction from the patient under the legislation. For further discussion, see chapter I, 27. 
137 See above, 299. 
138 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Project No. 84, Discussion Paper, Medical Treatment 
for the Dying (1988) 5 (hereafter referred to as the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia 
Discussion Paper.) 
139 Ibid. 
140 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Report, 2. 
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One of the principal issues before the commission concerned the legal uncertainty within the medical 
profession regarding the legality of withholding or withdrawing life-support, even at the request of a 
competent patient, in the light of the legal duties imposed by the Criminal Code 1913 (W.A.).141 
The commission was of the view that although doctors' fears of prosecution are more apparent than 
real, a strong case can nevertheless be made out for the enactment of legislation in Western Australia 
to clarify the rights of patients, along similar lines to that introduced in Victoria by virtue of the 
Medical Treatment Act 1988.142 The commission thought that this was necessary to allay the 
concern and uncertainty amongst many members of the medical profession regarding the legality of 
their actions which may inhibit doctors from providing the most appropriate medical care.143 The 
basic principle underlying the conimission's deliberations was the patient's right of self-
determination.144 Whilst acknowledging that the common law already gives proper recognition to the 
principle that a person has the right not to be treated without consent, the commission recommended 
that adult patients should be able to complete a refusal of treatment certificate as a means of providing 
proof of a refusal of treatment 145 Drawing upon the Victorian model, it was recommended that the 
offence of medical trespass be created to apply in circumstances where a doctor who, knowing that a 
refusal of treatment certificate has been executed, undertakes or continues to undertake any medical 
treatment to which the certificate applies. Further, it was recommended that doctors acting in good 
faith in reliance on a refusal of treatment certificate should be protected from civil or criminal liability 
for failing to provide or continue treatment.146 
The other principal issue addressed by the commission was the need to provide a means by which 
persons can make provision for their future medical treatment in the event that they become 
incompetent and are unable to make these decisions for themselves.147 The legislative approach 
favoured by the commission was that adopted in Victoria pursuant to the Medical Treatment (Enduring 
Power of Attorney) Act 1990 which allow~ a person to execute an enduring power of attorney, 
appointing an agent to make treatment decisions on his or her behalf should he or she become unable 
to do so. The commission accordingly recommended that similar legislation be introduced in Western 
Australia.148 
It should be noted that notwithstanding the fairly narrow terms of reference, the commission's 
recommendations with regard to these matters are not limited to 'persons suffering conditions which 
are terminal or recovery from which is unlikely' and are in fact capable of applying to all kinds of 
patients. 149 
141 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Discussion Paper 6, 12-17; Law Reform Commission of 
Western Australia Report, 3-7. 
142 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Report, 8-9. 
143 Id. 8. 
144 Id. 9. 
145 Id. 9, 21-22. 
146 Id. 24. 
147 Id. 10-20. 
148 Id. 15-20. 
l49 Id. 32. 
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Another area of concern addressed by the commission was the issue of pain control care given to 
terminally ill patients which may have the effect of accelerating the patient's death. ISO The 
commission was of the view that as the existing law is uncertain and is capable of leading to 
inhumane treatment of terminally ill patients, it ought to be amended. ISI The commission 
recommended that doctors should not be criminally or civilly liable for administering drugs or other 
treatment for the purpose of controlling or eliminating pain and suffering, even if the drugs or other 
treatment incidentally shorten the patient's life, provided that the consent of the patient (or the 
patient's agent or guardian if the patient is not competent) is obtained and the administration of the 
drug or treatment is reasonable in all the circumstances. IS 2 At the time of writing, the 
recommendations made by the commission had not been implemented. 
Tasmania 
In Tasmania, repeated efforts have been made by the Honourable Dr Bob Brown, Independent M.H.A., 
to introduce natural death legislation by way of a Private Member's Bill. A Bill, in identical terms to 
the South Australian Natural Death Act 1983, was first introduced into the Tasmanian Parliament in 
' 
1985 with the aim of providing for and giving legal effect to directions against artificial prolongation 
of the dying process. IS3 Dr Brown claimed to have received widespread community support for the 
legislation, evidenced by a 1985 Tasmanian public opinion poll which indicated that more than 80% 
of the Tasmanian public were in favour of the legislation. IS4 However, following the Second 
Reading Speech, the then Liberal government successfully sought a 12 month adjournment of the 
debate, ostensibly to allow adequate time for full consideration of all the issues. ISS Opposition to the 
Bill came principally from right to life groups. IS6 The AM.A. (Tas. Branch), whilst not opposing 
the legislation outright, expressed doubts about whether the legislation was necessary. 
When the Bill was reintroduced in 1986, it was opposed by the government on the grounds that there 
was no legal definition of death in Tasmania. Although a statutory definition of death was 
I50 Id. 25-27. 
I51 Id. 26. 
152 Id. 26-27. See also the recommendations of the Queensland Criminal Code Review Committee in its 
Interim Report, First Interim Report of the Criminal Code Review Committee (1991). Clause 69 
provides that a person is not criminally responsible if he or she gives such palliative care as is 
reasonable in the circumstances, for the control or elimination of a person's pain and suffering even if 
such care shortens that person's life, unless the patient refuses such care. This recommendation was 
based on the recommendations of the Law Reform Commission of Canada in its 1987 revision of the 
Canadian Criminal Code; see below, 345-347. The South Australian Select Committee of the House of 
Assembly on the Law and Practice Relating to Death and Dying has made similar recommendations; see 
above, 300. 
I53 Natural Death Bill I98S (Tas.). See Second Reading Speech, Tas. Parl. Deb. (H.A.), Vol. Vll, 2I March 
(I985) 552-553. 
I54 See Tasmanian Opinion Polls, 23 Feb. I98S. Respondents were asked: 'Do you support legislation 
giving the right to die? That is, giving the individual of sound mind the right to choose whether 
extraordinary measures are taken to preserve his/her life?' Of the respondents, 80.9% answered yes, 
13.1 % answered no and 6.1 % were undecided. 
155 Tas. Parl. Deb. (H.A.), Vol. VII, 21 March (1985) SS2-557; 28 March (1985) 797-801. 
156 Tasmanian Right to Life Association, Right to Life Australia .. 
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subsequently enacted, 157 the government continued to oppos~ the legislation.158 A proposal, moved 
by the then Labor opposition in November 1987, to establish a Select Committee to inquire into and 
report upon the need for such legislation also failed to gain the necessary support in the 
parliament.159 
The Natural Death Bill was reintroduced by Dr Brown in April 1990, but was subsequently withdrawn 
and replaced with the Medical Treatment and Natural Death Bill 1990 based upon the Victorian 
Medical Treatment Act 1988.160 The extensions which have subsequently been made to the Victorian 
legislation, by virtue of the enactment of the Medical Treatment (Enduring Power of Attorney) Act 
1990 (Vic.), were not contained in this Bill. The shift in the proposed legislation from the South 
Australian to the Victorian model represents a significant change in direction from what is essentially 
living will legislation to legislation which, although in some respects of broader application, 161 
simply confirms and supports the existing right of a patient to refuse medical treatment through the 
refusal of treatment certificate procedure and the creation of the offence of medical trespass. In the 
absence of the enduring power of attorney provisions, this Bill did not address the situation of patients 
who wish to make provision for their future medical treatment in the event that they lose decision-
making capacity. 
As a result of support for the legislation from the then Labor government, the Private Member's Bill 
was passed by the House of Assembly in December 1990. It was, however, defeated in the Legislative 
Council in July 1991.162 Dr Brown has since reintroduced this legislation.163 
New South Wales 
In recent years, consideration has been given in New South Wales to the introduction of legislation to 
give legal effect to directions against artificial prolongation of the dying process. These developments 
were largely precipitated by concern in that jurisdiction regarding the legal liability of doctors for 
withholding or withdrawing treatment from patients. The issue of legal liability had arisen in the 
context of the development of guidelines and protocols by a number of Sydney hospitals to assist 
medical staff on the issue of withdrawing life-support or withholding life-saving treatment from 
seriously ill patients, and, in particular, with regard to the legality of implementing a 'not-for-
resuscitation' policy in respect of certain patients.164 The matter was brought to the attention of the 
157 Hwnan Tissue Amendment Act 1987 (Tas.), amending the Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas.). 
158 When first introduced, the Labor opposition had supported the Bill in principle but called for further 
public debate. However, the Labor opposition subsequently joined with the government to oppose the 
Bill. 
159 Tas. Parl. Deb. (H.A.), Vol. IX, 26 Nov. (1987) 5371-5373; 10 Dec. (1987) 5619-5623. 
160 See Dr Brown, Second Reading Speech, Tas. Parl. Deb. (H.A.), Vol. XII, 22 Nov. (1990) 5300-5302 
where he explains that there was preference from some quarters for the Victorian legislative model over 
the South Australian legislation. 
161 See above, 306. 
162 Tas. Parl. Deb. (L.C.), Vol. XIlI, 15 July (1991) 1856-1876. 
163 Medical Treatment and Natural Death Bill 1992. 
164 The Eastern Sydney Area Health Service had obtained legal advice regarding the implementation of a 
'not-for-resuscitation' (N.F.R.) policy. This advice, which was subsequently made public, indicated that 
non-action pursuant to a N.F.R. notation could lead to serious criminal liability. 
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Minister for Health, the Honourable Peter Collins M.P; who referred the matter to the Crown 
Solicitor for legal advice. The advice received from the Crown Solicitor was to the effect that where 
life-saving treatment is withheld or withdrawn from a patient, serious issues of criminal liability arise 
on the part of any health service and individuals involved in the care and treatment of patients.165 
This advice prompted calls for the introduction of legislation in New South Wales that would provide 
protection to medical practitioners from legal liability for the withholding or withdrawing of medical 
treatment. In 1990, a discussion paper was prepared and circulated by the New South Wales 
Government, in which a proposal was put forward for the introduction of legislation based upon the 
South Australian Natural Death Act 1983.166 The issue of active voluntary euthanasia was quite 
specifically excluded from consideration in the discussion paper.167 
The proposed legislation attracted criticism on the grounds that it did not adequately address the very 
problem that it attempted to solve, namely the legal liability of medical practitioners in circumstances 
where treatment is withheld or withdrawn.168 As some critics pointed out, if legislation in the form 
proposed were introduced in New South Wales, doctors would only have the benefit of statutory 
protection in circumstances where the patient had executed an advance directive indicating that artificial 
life-support be withheld or withdrawn in the event of terminal illness, and it would not cover the 
majority of situations in ordinary medical practice.169 Thus, it was argued, if there is a real and 
justifiable concern about the legal liability of doctors, more comprehensive legislation ought to be 
introduced.170 The proposal mooted in the New South Wales Health Department discussion paper bas 
also been criticised on the grounds that it does not give sufficient attention to patients' rights and the 
need to protect the right of all patients to refuse medical treatment 171 Indeed, a striking feature of the 
165 A copy of the Crown Solicitor's advice is included in the New South Wales Health Department, 
Discussion Puper Proposed Legislation to Give Legal Effect en Directions Agamst Artificial 
Prolongalion of the Dying Process (1990) Appendix. In the opinion of the Crown Solicitor, even the 
consent of a patient to the withholding of medical treatment would not be a good defence. For a 
contrary view, see chapter II, 70-81. _ 
166 New South Wales Health Department, Discussion Paper, Proposed Legislation to Give Legal Effect to 
Directions Against Artificial Prolongalion of the Dying Process (1990). 
167 Id. l, 2. 
168 For example, the Sydney Sunday Telegraph 16 June 1991 and private correspondence with a number of 
doctors in New South Wales who had spoken out against the legislation. 
169 Ibid. It should be noted, however, that the South Australian legislation on which the New South Wales 
proposal was based, is in fact broader than the New South Wales proposal, in that the immunity 
conferred upon doctors with regard to the non-application or withdrawal of artificial life-support 
measures from a person suffering from a terminal illness applies regardless of whether or not the 
patient had executed a living will; compare s. 6(1) of the Nalural Dealh Act 1983 (S.A.) and clause 5 of 
the legislation which was proposed for New South Wales. 
170 See A.M.A., N.S.W. Branch Council Resolution, 29 Jan. (1991) where the Council resolved as follows; 
i) The N.S.W. Branch Council believes that there is a need for legislation to protect medical 
practitioners who do not revive terminally ill patients. 
ii) That the Government enact an amendment to the Medical Practitioners Act. Such an amendment 
should be along the lines that, where a medical practitioner, in good faith, and in accordance with 
normal medical practice, withholds or withdraws treatment from a person in circumstances where death 
is imminent, in spite of the proposed treatment and where the treatment will secure only a burdensome 
prolongation of life, such medical practitioner will not be guilty of professional misconduct or 
negligence. 
However, notwithstanding the threat of legal liability, some doctors in New South Wales believe that 
it is a mistake to introduce any legislation in this area; e.g. J. Graham, (letter) (1991) 337 Lancet 370-
371. 
171 See, for example, the N.S.W. Voluntary Euthanasia Society submission to the Legal Service Branch of 
the N.S.W. Department of Health on the Discussion Paper, 18 Jan. (1991). 
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developments in New South Wales is that they appear to have come about almost entirely as a result 
of concern about the potential legal liability of health care professionals rather than a general concern 
to enhance the rights of individual patients with regard to their medical treatment as has been the case 
in most other jurisdictions.172 As a result, there have been calls in New South Wales for legislation 
based on the Victorian model, 173 or alternatively, a combination of the South Australian and 
Victorian legislation.174 However, even the broader Victorian legislation does not comprehensively 
cover the legal position of doctors, so if this is in fact the principal objective for legislation in New 
South Wales, a new legislative model will have to be developed. 
As a result of the perceived drawbacks in the legislation proposed for New South Wales, the New 
South Wales branch of the A.M.A. made its concerns known to the Minister and a forum was 
organised in conjunction with the New South Wales Department of Health in June 1991 to deal with 
the matter. This forum highlighted concerns about th~ form of the government's legislative proposal 
and as a result, plans to introduce legislation in New South Wales based upon the South Australian 
model have been shelved.175 In order to address some of the uncertainties and concerns which had 
been raised in this area, the New South Wales Department of Health is in the process of developing 
clinical guidelines for the treatment of dying patients. Consideration is also being given to the 
introduction of some mechanism to allow for the appointment of an agent or guardian to make 
decisions on behalf of a formerly competent patient.176 
Proposals for Active Voluntary Euthanasia 
Although the subject of euthanasia has been avoided by most political parties, forthright support for 
active voluntary euthanasia has come from the A.C.T. branch of the Australian Labor Party. At its 
annual branch conference held in June 1991, the A.C.T. branch adopted the concept of active 
voluntary euthanasia as party policy. The policy states that under certain conditions: 
If a patient who has been counselled consistently requests assistance to die and 
two doctors are of the view that there is little or no prospect of substantial 
improvement of the patient's condition, then it should not be an offence for a 
doctor to assist the patient to die.177 
172 Clearly, however, concern about the potential legal liability of health care professionals can in turn 
impact on the welfare of patients if doctors are reluctant to withhold or withdraw medical treatment 
because they fear prosecution, even though such withdrawing or withholding would be regarded as 
humane and appropriate medical practice. 
173 For some time, the Opposition health spokesman, Dr Andrew Refshauge M.P, has been pressing for 
legislation to allow the terminally ill to die with dignity and has in fact been considering introducing a 
Private Member's Bill based upon the Victorian legislation; Press Release, 14 Aug. 1990. 
174 N.S.W. Voluntary Euthanasia Society submission to the Legal Servic~ Branch of the N.S.W. 
Department of Health on the Discussion Paper, 18 Jan. (1991). 
175 The Sydney Morning Herald 26 July 1991. 
176 Verbal communication with Caroline Marsh, Legal Branch, N.S.W. Health Department, 6 May 1992. 
177 The Canberra Times, 16 June 1991. 
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The Honourable Terry Connolly M.L.A., the A.C.T. Attorney-General and spokesman for the party's 
legal policy committee, is reported to have said that the A.C.T. Labor government will move to 
implement the policy but not immediately and not without community consultation. He expressed the 
view that it would be appropriate to set up an Assembly Committee to examine the matter and to 
consult with the community .178 
The adoption of this policy by the A.C.T. branch of the Australian Labor Party represents quite a 
milestone in the history of active voluntary euthanasia in Australia, being the first time that a 
political party has officially endorsed its legalisation. There has already been some opposition to the 
proposal; 179 however, this is to be expected given the controversial nature of the subject. It remains 
to be seen whether the A.C.T. branch will persevere with this policy and whether it will be successful 
in securing its implementation. 
Evaluation of Australian Reform Developments 
Apart from a number of inquiries which have touched on the issue of mercy killing from a criminal 
law perspective, and which are only of incidental relevance to the subject of active voluntary 
euthanasia, governmental and legislative reform developments in Australia have generally been limited 
to the area of passive euthanasia.180 The thrust of these reforms has been to endorse the patient's 
common law right to refuse treatment resulting in the introduction of legislation in some Australian 
jurisdictions, enabling individuals to make advance declarations regarding medical treatment or appoint 
an agent to make treatment decisions on their behalf in the event that they lose decision-making 
capacity. In addition to clarifying the common law position, which has at best been murky in 
circumstances where a formerly competent p~tient loses decision-making capacity, these developments 
have also played an important educative role in drawing attention to patients' rights and raising the 
level of public debate and consciousness about these issues. 
In comparison with the United Kingdom and the United States, where legislative efforts have 
frequently been made to introduce legislation to permit active voluntary euthanasia, 181 there has, 
todate, been very little serious legislative activity in Australia aimed at introducing such legislation. 
Whilst the voluntary euthanasia societies in Australia have as their long term objective the 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, they have generally steered a more conservative and 
178 Ibid. 
179 The Canberra Times, 17 June 1991. 
180 Note also the position in New Zealand as a result of the enactment of the Bill of Rights Act 1990, s. 11 
of which provides that everyone has the right to refuse to undergo medical treatment. The Act is, 
however, limited in operation by virtue of s. 3 which states that the Act only applies to acts done by 
the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the government of New Zealand (s. 3(a)); or by any 
person or body in the performance of any public function, power or duty conferred or imposed on that 
person or body pursuant to law (s. 3(b)). It has been suggested that the spirit of the Act will have a 
wider operation and that other legislative enactments (e.g. the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961 must now 
be interpreted in the light of this Act; see H. Souness, 'Dying Voices' (unpublished Honours thesis, 
Law Library, Victoria University of Wellington 1991) 20-21. 
181 See below, 318-321 and 324-326, 339-345. 
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pragmatic course towards reform than their counterparts in th~ United Kingdom or the United States, 
presently concentrating their efforts on improving understanding and acceptance of active voluntary 
euthanasia. It is only in fairly recent times that work has been underway towards the preparation of 
draft legislation aimed at decriminalising aiding and abetting suicide and towards the legalisation of 
active voluntary euthanasia 182 
Brief consideration will now be given to some of the more important reform developments in the 
other common law jurisdictions under consideration, including legislative efforts to introduce laws 
permitting active voluntary euthanasia and government initiated law reform commission and 
parliamentary inquiries touching on the issue. 
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom has a long history of reform efforts to introduce legislation for the legalisation 
of active voluntary euthanasia due to the early development of the voluntary euthanasia movement in 
that country. The Voluntary Euthanasia Society in London was the first such society to be established 
in the common law world and has, since its inception in 1935, actively pursued the introduction of 
active voluntary euthanasia legislation. Quite a number of Bills have been prepared and introduced into 
parliament but todate these reform efforts have been unsuccessful. Apart from these legislative 
activities which have been largely initiated by the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, there have also been 
a number of governmental mquiries in the United Kingdom which have considered the issue of mercy 
killing as well as recent reform initiatives undertaken by the Centre for Law and Medical Ethics and 
the Institute of Medical Ethics. 
Legislative Developments 
In 1936, a Bill, known as the Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill which was promoted by the 
newly established British Voluntary Euthanasia Society, was introduced into the House of Lords by 
Lord Ponsonby. Under this Bill, in order to be eligible for active voluntary euthanasia, a patient had 
to be over 21 years of age, suffering from an incurable and fatal illness, and was required to sign a 
form in the presence of two witnesses asking to be put to death. Before a patient's request for active 
euthanasia would be approved, a complicated legal procedure would have to be complied with, 
including investigation of the case by a 'euthanasia referee' and a hearing before a special court.183 If 
the necessary conditions were satisfied, a license would be issued permitting active voluntary 
182 See chapter VI, 241-242. 
183 The Euthanasia Society, A Plan for Voluntary Euthanasia (Revised ed., 1962) 10; J. Gould and Lord 
Craigmyle, (eds.) Your Death Warrant? (1971) 29-30; R. Russel, Freedom to Die (Revised ed., 1977) 
68-70. 
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euthanasia to be administered by a doctor in the presence of an official witness.184 The Bill was given 
a first reading, but was rejected by the House of Lords on the second reading by a vote of 35 to 14.185 
It was subsequently acknowledged by the Voluntary Euthanasia Society that the cumbersome 
safeguards included in the Bill had largely been responsible for its defeat, with opponents of the 
legislation having objected that it would bring too much formality into the sickroom.186 
Under the guidance of Professor Glanville Williams, a notable supporter of active voluntary 
euthanasia, 187 new legislation was developed during the 19(J()s for the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia which provided for a much simplified procedure with a minimum of formality.188 The 
revised Bill authorised a doctor to administer active euthanasia to a consenting patient thought on 
reasonable grounds to be suffering from an 'irremediable condition', 189 and who had, not less than 30 
days previously, signed a declaration requesting the achninistration of active euthanasia. In addition to 
streamlining the procedure for the administration of active voluntary euthanasia, the Bill contained a 
number of other significant changes from the earlier legislation. One such change was the substitution 
of the requirement of an 'irremediable' condition for the requirement of a 'fatal' condition which had 
been contained in the earlier legislation, thereby considerably extending the range of cases to which 
active voluntary euthanasia would become applicable. Another important new feature of the proposed 
legislation was that it allowed for an advance declaration, enabling persons to request in advance the 
administration of active euthanasia in the event of their suffering from an irremediable condition at 
some future date.190 The Bill also sought to provide protection to doctors and nurses, who in good 
faith, administered active voluntary euthanasia in accordance with the legislation.191 In 1969 Lord 
Raglan introduced into the House of Lords the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill modelled along these lines 
(with minor modifications). However, the Bill was rejected on the second reading by a vote of 61 to 
4Q.192 Although the Bill was defeated, the vote in the House reflected a substantial increase in 
support since the 1936 Bill. Moreover, many of those who voted against the 1969 Bill indicated that 
they supported it in principle, but objected to some of the specific details of the legislation.193 
184 T. Helme, 'The Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill (1936) Revisited' (1991) 17 J.Med. Ethics 25, 
25. 
185 For detailed consideration of the parliamentary debates, see Gould and Craigmyle, 38-44. 
186 See G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (1956) 298; Euthanasia Society, A Plan for 
Voluntary Euthanasia, 10. 
187 See, for example, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 302 where he sets out his suggestions for 
reform; and 'Voluntary Euthanasia - The Next Step', an address delivered by Professor Williams on the 
occasion of the 1955 Annual General Meeting of the Euthanasia Society. 
188 The Euthanasia Society, A Plan for Voluntary Euthanasia. 
189 'Irremediable condition' was defined in clause 1 of the Bill to mean 'a serious physical illness or 
impairment reasonably thought in the patient's case to be incurable and expected to cause him severe 
distress or render him incapable of rational existence.' 
190 See the Preamble of the Bill, as well as the substantive provisions. For discussion see Gould and 
Craigmyle, 30-37; H. Trowell, The Unfinished Debate on Euthanasia (1973) 17-18. 
191 Clause 5. The 1936 Bill did, implicitly at least, create an immunity for doctors; see clause 1. 
192 For reference to the parliamentary debates, see Gould and Craigmyle, 49-63. See also Note, 'Euthanasia 
Legislation' (1969) M.J.A. 987. 
193 Trowell, 18; Gould and Craigmyle, 49-63. For example, the Bill was criticised on the grounds of poor 
drafting, vague definition of terms and procedural difficulties. 
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The society's campaign for the legalisation of active voluntarf euthanasia has continued to the present 
time. In the early 1980s a new draft Bill was prepared194 and representations were made to members 
of parliament with the aim of gauging support for the proposed Iegislation.195 In 1989, Mr Roland 
Boyes M.P. tabled an early day motion on behalf of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, in the 
following terms: 
That the House notes the results of the National Opinion Poll survey of May 
1989 showing 75 % in favour of the choice of medical help to die toward the 
end of life; notes that Holland has already made such a choice available to its 
citizens; and believes that it should also be available to the people of this 
country .196 
Quite a number of members of parliament indicated their support, by signing the early day 
motion.197 Another early day motion in favour of active voluntary euthanasia was tabled in January 
1990 and later that year, Mr Roland Boyes introduced a Voluntary Euthanasia Bill into the House of 
Commons under the 'ten minute rule•.198 The Bill was, however, defeated by 101 votes to 35.199 
The society is presently campaigning to have a Private Member's Bill introduced into the 
parliament.200 This is dependent on persuading one of the society's M.P. supporters to agree to 
introduce such legislation, and then for that member to be drawn in the ballot in the House of 
Commons allowing that member the opportunity of introducing a Private Member's Bill. 
Hopes for securing the passage of legislation have increased since the establishment in 1991 of an all-
party parliamentary group for voluntary euthanasia on the initiative of Lady NicoJ.201 The group is 
chaired by the medical peer, Lord Winstanley, the Liberal Democrat spokesman on health. 202 The 
parliamentary group claims the support of 150 M.P.s and peers. Supporters of the group are drawn 
from both houses and the main political parties. About 70 supporters attended the inaugural meeting 
which was held in July 1991. A steering committee has been formed and an exploratory Bill may 
follow. As a preliminary step, the group, working in conjunction with the voluntary euthanasia 
society, is promoting draft legislation providing for the legal recognition of advance directives.203 
194 Voluntary Euthanasia Bill, Provisional Draft 1983. A copy of this Bill is contained in A. Downing and 
B. Smoker, Voluntary Euthanasia (1986) 284-287. 
195 See chapter VI, n. 98. 
196 Note, 'MP Calls for Legalised Euthanasia' (1989) 37 V.E.S. Newsletter 1. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Note, 'Voluntary Euthanasia' (1990) 40 V.E.S. Newsletter 10-12. The ten minute rule provides an 
opportunity for a backbencher member of parliament to raise an issue. If a Bill is successful at this 
stage, it simply means that the person putting forward the Bill has the opportunity for the Bill to be 
printed. There is, however, no chance of it directly becoming legislation through the ten minute rule 
procedure. 
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201 Note, 'All Party Parliamentary Group' (1991) 43 V.E.S. Newsletter 9. 
202 Note, 'Euthanasia: New Issue for Conscience' (1991) 303 B.M.J. 1422. 




There have been a number of government initiated and other official inquiries in the United Kingdom 
which have touched upon the issue of euthanasia. As in Australia, these have generally focussed on 
the question of family mercy killings as distinct from medically administered active voluntary 
euthanasia. The deliberations and conclusions of these inquiries are therefore only of limited relevance 
in determining the appropriateness of legalising active voluntary euthanasia administered by a doctor. 
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 
The Gower Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-1953) gave consideration to whether 
mercy killing should be taken out of the category of murder. 204 It was noted by the commission, that 
notwithstanding the mandatory death sentence for murder existing at the time, mercy killing was one 
class of case in which it was established practice for the Home Office to recommend the commutation 
of the sentence of death. Although the commission was clearly sympathetic to the proposal to treat 
mercy killing cases as a special category, it reluctantly came to the conclusion that it could not 
exempt mercy killing from the law of murder and that such cases should continue to be dealt with by 
way of discretion to mitigate the sentence of death, s~ch as that exercised by the Secretary of State 
through the prerogative of mercy. 205 This decision was primarily based upon the practical difficulties 
in giving effect to such a proposal, particularly having regard to evidentiary difficulties if the offence 
of mercy killing were to be defined in terms of motive of the offender, and the problem of defining a 
category which would not be open to abuse. 206 
It must be noted, however, that the commission was dealing with the case of mercy killings occurring 
in the family context, and did not specifically consider the more limited question of legalising active 
voluntary euthanasia administered by a doctor. Since doctors are independent third parties, unlikely to 
have any vested interest in the death of a patient, the objections raised by the commission, regarding 
motive of the offender and risk of abuse, arguably do not apply to active voluntary euthanasia 
administered in the medical context. 
Criminal Law Revision Committee 
Although the mandatory death penalty was abolished in 1965, all cases of murder in the United 
Kingdom, including mercy killing cases, are subject to mandatory life imprisonment. In 1976, the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee in its Working Paper on Offences Against the Person201 
tentatively suggested that a new offence of mercy killing should be created to cover cases of unlawful 
killing of incurable patients from motives of compassion but not necessarily at the patient's request or 
204 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1953) Cmnd. Papers, 8932, par~. 177-180. 
205 Id. para. 180. 
206 Id. para. 179. 
207 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Working Paper on Offences Against the Person (1976) paras. 79-
87. 
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with the patient's consent. 208 A maximum penalty of two years imprisonment was suggested as the 
appropriate penalty applying in such cases, leaving open to judges the possibility of passing a non-
custodial sentence. The committee made it clear that it was not suggesting legalisation of mercy 
killing but was simply seeking to deal with a handful of tragic killings for which a mandatory life 
sentence was inappropriate. However, the committee's proposal for the creation of a mercy killing 
offence met with substantial opposition, 209 and in its final report the committee llllanimously decided 
to withdraw the proposaI.210 
House of Lords Select Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment 
In 1989 a Select Committee of the Hou·se of Lords was established on murder and life imprisonment. 
Under the committee's temis of reference it was, inter alia, required to consider the scope and definition 
of the crime of murder. The Voluntary Euthanasia Society presented a submission to the Select 
Committee where it suggested the creation of a special defence for cases of mercy killing.211 
However, after considering this proposal, the committee recommended that there be no change in the 
current law.212 
Apart from these criminal law inquiries which have considered the issue of mercy killing, there have 
been a number of other significant developments in the United Kingdom. 
Living Will, Working Party Report 
Under the auspices of Age Concern and the Centre for Medical Law and Ethics, a multi-disciplinary 
working party was set up to examine the medical, ethical and legal issues with regard to advance 
directives for health care. The report of the working party,213 released in 1988, proceeds on the basis 
of maximising respect for the liberty of individuals and autonomous decision-making. Whilst the 
report concludes that some improvement t~ the status quo is required,214 it is somewhat more 
cautious in prescribing the precise steps which should be taken.215 With the aim of promoting debate 
on the issue, the report canvasses the range of options available and summarises the principal 
arguments for and against each option. The report goes on to recommend either the introduction of 
living wills on a non-statutory basis or alternatively, a combination of living wills and durable 
208 The committee suggested that the offence would apply to a person who, from compassion, unlawfully 
kills another, where the accused with reasonable cause, believed that the victim was (1) permanently 
subject to great bodily pain or suffering or (2) permanently helpless from bodily and mental 
incapacity, or (3) subject to rapid and incurable bodily or mental degeneration. 
209 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fourteenth Report, Offences Against the Person (1980) Cmnd. 
7844, para. 115. 
210 For criticism of the committee's decision to withdraw its proposal for the creation of an offence of 
mercy killing, see R. Leng, 'Mercy Killing and the CLRC' (1982) 132 New L.J. 76. 
211 See the submission from the Voluntary Euthanasia Society to the Select Committee on Murder and Life 
Imprisonment (1989). 
212 Note, 'Voluntary Euthanasia' (1990) 40 V.E.S. Newsletter 10, 11. 
213 Age Concern Institute of Gerontology and Centre of Medical Law and Ethics, Working Party Report, 
Living Will (1988). 
214 Id. 86. 
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powers of attorney on a statutory basis, but stresses the need for further public and political debate in 
this area before any final decision can be made.216 
Whilst this reform initiative deals with living wills and does not deal directly with the issue of active 
voluntary euthanasia, the report is significant for its strong recognition of the importance of respect 
for individual liberty and autonomy, and for its efforts to clarify and protect the rights of formerly 
competent patients. The report has received widespread support and commendation from those 
concerned with the issues it addresses. Public debate on these issues has been further stimulated by the 
recent efforts of the all party parliamentary group on euthanasia to introduce legislation giving legal 
recognition to advance directives.217 
Institute of Medical Ethics Working Party on the Ethics of Prolonging 
Life and Assisting Death 
An important development on the subject of active voluntary euthanasia has been the work of the 
Institute of Medical Ethics Working Party on the Ethics of Prolonging Life and Assisting Death. In 
response to frequent calls for review, the Institute of Medical Ethics set up a multi-disciplinary 
working party to investigate and report on the ethics of prolonging life and assisting death. The 
individuals invited to serve on the working party were drawn from a number of disciplines, and were 
chosen with the intention of representing a broad spectrum of ethical viewpoints on the subject In 
September 1990, the working party released a discussion paper, published in the Lancet, 218 in which 
it examined in what circumstances, if any, a doctor is ethically justified in assisting death.219 After 
considering some of the commonly raised objections to assisting death, and the moral debate as to 
whether there is any difference between killing and letting die, the working party suggested that in 
circumstances where a patient is suffering from a terminal illness, where distressing symptoms cannot 
be relieved and the patient asks to have his or her life ended, the balance of the moral argument shifts 
towards asking why death should not be assisted; the greater the unrelieved pain and distress, the more 
ethical is a doctor's decision to assist death if the patient desires it The majority of the working party 
concluded that 
A doctor, acting in good conscience, is ethically justified in assisting death if 
the need to relieve intense and unceasing pain or distress caused by an 
incurable illness greatly outweighs the benefit to the patient of further 
prolonging his life ... Assistance of death, however is not justified until the 
doctor and the clinical team are sure that the patient's pain and distress cannot 
be relieved by any other means-pharmacological, surgical, psychological, or 
social.220 
216 Id. 77-85. 
217 See above, 320. For general discussion regarding the likelihood anc,l desirability of introducing living 
will legislation in the United Kingdom, see D. Greaves, 'The Future Prospects For Living Wills' (1989) 
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218 Institute of Medical Ethics, Working Party on the Ethics of Prolonging Life and Assisting Death, 
'Assisted Death' (1990) 336 Lancet 610. 
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The discussion paper of the working party, amHn particular, its endorsement of assisted death in 
certain circumstances, is clearly a development of enormous significance. It represents an unequivocal 
rejection of the position of the B.M.A. working party in its 1988 report221 and is likely to be the 
focus for ongoing debate in this area in the United Kingdom. 222 
United States 
The United States also has a long history of reform efforts to introduce legislation for the legalisation 
of active voluntary euthanasia. The earliest Bill dates back to 1906 and since that time, particularly in 
the period between 1936 and the' late 1950s, quite a number of voluntary euthanasia Bills have been 
prepared and introduced into various State legislatures, although they have invariably been 
unsuccessful. There has, however, been significant legislative activity in the United States with regard 
to passive euthanasia through the enactment of living will legislation in the majority of American 
States. Efforts are now again being made in a number of States for more far-rea:ching reforms 
encompassing a form of active voluntary euthanasia. The organisation Americans Against Human 
Suffering has been campaigning for the introduction of legislation permitting physician aid-in-dying 
in a number of States through the voter initiative mechanism. In a number of other States, which do 
not have this voter initiated referendum process, voluntary euthanasia legislation has been introduced 
as Private Members' Bills. 
Apart from legislative developments, another significant development to have taken place in the 
United States in recent years was the President's Commission inquiry into decisions to forgo life-
sustaining treatment. 
Early Legislative Developments 
The first voluntary euthanasia Bill to have been introduced in the United States, and for that matter, in 
any English speaking country in the world, was the Bill for the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia for certain incurable sufferers introduced in the legislature of Ohio in 1906 as a Private 
Member's Bm.223 Under the proposed legislation, an adult of sound mind, who had been fatally hurt 
or was so ill that recovery was impossible, or who was suffering from extreme physical pain without 
hope of recovery, could express to his or her doctor the wish to die. Provided that three further doctors 
agreed that the case was hopeless, they were empowered to make arrangements to put the person out 
221 See chapter VI, 274-276. 
222 The work of the working party is continuing in this area. A further paper has been published (Institute 
of Medical Ethics, Working Party on the Ethics of Prolonging Life and Assisting Death, 'Withdrawal of 
Life-Support From Patients in a Persistent Vegetative State' (1991) 337 Lancet 96) and others are 
underway with regard to advance directives, clinical decisions about resuscitation and issues relating to 
neonates and young children; written communication with Dr K. Boyd, Research Director, Institute of 
Medical Ethics, October 1992. 
223 Russel, 60-61. 
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of pain and suffering with as little discomfort as possible. Although proceeding to a first reading, the 
Bill was defeated by a vote of 79 to 23.224 
In February 1937, a euthanasia Bill largely modelled on the 1936 British Bill was introduced into the 
Nebraska State legislature by Senator Comstock, and sponsored by Dr Philbrick, a retired doctor.225 
The Nebraska Bill differed from the British Bill in two important respects: first. by allowing an 
application to be made on behalf of a minor or incompetent adult. who was suffering from an 
incurable or fatal disease; and second, by providing that active euthanasia could be performed even 
where the illness was not terminal. 226 The Bill was referred to a committee and was postponed 
indefinitely, having never been submitted to a vote.227 There was also an unsuccessful attempt to 
introduce a similar Bill into the New York legislature but without the provisions with regard to 
minors and incompetent adults. 228 
By 1938, the Euthanasia Society of America was established and for many years was the driving force 
behind efforts to secure legislative reform with regard to active voluntary euthanasia. In response to 
growing indications of community support for active voluntary euthanasia by the mid 1940s, the 
Euthanasia Society of America began a campaign in New York to secure the legalisation of active 
voluntary euthanasia In 1947 a euthanasia Bill was presented to the New York Legislature. This Bill, 
also based on the 1936 British Bill, provided that any person of sound mind, over 21 years of age and 
suffering from severe physical pain caused by disease for which there is no known remedy, could, by 
written petition, apply to have active euthanasia administered. As under the 1936 British Bill, a 
complicated legal procedure was involved, pursuant to which a commission was to be appointed by 
the court to investigate the patient's request. Subject to a favourable report from the commission, the 
court would grant the patient's petition permitting the administration of active euthanasia. 229 
However, the Bill met with opposition and by the end of 1949 had still not been introduced into the 
New York legislature.230 In 1952, a further attempt was made to get the New York State legislature 
to consider this legislation231 but the Bill once again failed to reach the legislature notwithstanding 
evidence of wide support for the proposal from doctors, the clergy and the community .232 
In the decades which followed, further unsuccessful attempts were made to pass active voluntary 
euthanasia legislation in a number of American jurisdictions. In 1950, a Bill was proposed for the 
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State of Connecticut and was introduced with some modiflcations, into the Connecticut General 
Assembly in 1959 at the initiative of the State chapter of the Euthanasia Society.233 This Bill, 
which was, essentially, couched in the same terms as the New York Bm,234 was also defeated. In the 
light of these set backs, the Euthanasia Society of America decided that further legislative efforts 
would be fruitless and resolved to shift its campaign for reform towards educational activities. 235 The 
Bills which were subsequently introduced into the legislatures of a number of American States were 
initiated independently of the activities of the Euthanasia Society and were substantially similar to the 
1969 Voluntary Euthanasia Bill proposed in the United Kingdom. In 1969, the Health and Welfare 
Committee of the Idaho House of Representatives introduced a voluntary euthanasia Bill to legalise 
the painless inducement of death at the request of a patient suffering from an irremediable 
condition.236 Notwithstanding quite detailed safeguards built into the legislation, it failed to pass. 
The next attempt at legislative reform was in Oregon in 1973 when a voluntary euthanasia Bill was 
introduced by a group of Senators into the Oregon leg~slature.237 However, this Bill was tabled after 
a single hearing. 238 In the same year a Bill to legalise active voluntary euthanasia was introduced into 
the Montana State legislature239 but this Bill was also defeated. 240 
Living Will Legislation 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s legislative efforts in the United States were increasingly concerned 
with the protection of patients' 'right to die with dignity' and by 1975, living will legislation had been 
introduced in some 15 States.241 This shift in legislative attention from active to passive euthanasia 
must be understood against a growing concern in the community with respect of the excesses of 
modem medical technology as well as concern amongst health care professionals regarding their 
potential legal liability for withholding or withdrawing medical treatment. Moreover, since the late 
1960s, the voluntary euthanasia societies in the United States had been paving the way for reform in 
this area. 242 
The first State to introduce living will legislation was California, with the enactment of the Natural 
Death Act in 1976. Introduced by Assembly man Barry Keene, the Californian Natural Death Act 
1976 provides a mechanism enabling competent adults to execute a written directive or living will to 
the effect that they do not wish to be provided with artificial means of prolonging life in the event 
233 Russel 133-135. 
234 One difference was that the Connecticut Bill provided for an advance declaration of the patient's request; 
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that they have a terminal illness and are no longer able to express their wishes about their medical 
care. 243 This legislation was premised on the fundamental right of patients to control the decisions 
relating to their own medical care, in circumstances where they are no longer competent to make their 
wishes known, including the decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in the 
event of a terminal condition. The Californian Natural Death Act 1976 was, however, very much the 
product of political compromise: opposition from religious and pro-life groups forced significant 
amendments to the original Bill, resulting in substantial limitations on the scope and operation of the 
legislation. 244 
Since the introduction of the Natural Death Act in California in 1976, the majority of American 
States have passed similar legislation. 245 The pace of reform has been somewhat uneven, however, 
with an acceleration of legislative activity in the years 1985 and 1986, exceeding any other period in 
the history of living will legislation.246 In quite a number of jurisdictions, significant amendments 
have been made to the legislation, and in some instances the original Act has been entirely replaced by 
new legislation.247 As a result of the general autonomy of State legislatures and the piecemeal 
implementation of living will legislation in the United States, considerable diversity exists in the 
legislative provision that has been made in the various jurisdictions, and this is reflected in the variety 
of titles under which these Acts have been introduced. 248 
Notwithstanding the diversity of the existing legislation certain features common to most 
jurisdictions can be identified. Essentially, the object of such legislation is to give legal recognition 
to living wills in circumstances where the patient no longer has decision-making capacity. In 
furtherance of this objective, the statutes establish a procedure enabling an adult who has decision-
making capacity to execute a directive that medical treatment be withheld or withdrawn in the event 
that he or she becomes terminally ill. 249 .Thus, the statutes relate only to the withholding or 
withdrawing of treatment or what is in effect passive euthanasia and the only reference to active 
euthanasia in some of the statutes is for the purpose of specifically excluding it from the operation of 
243 For detailed analysis of the Californian Natural Death Act, see, for example, E. Flannery, 'Statutory 
Recognition of the Right to Die: The California Natural Death Act' (1977) 57 B.U.L.Rev. 148; W. 
Winslade, 'Thoughts on Technology and Death: An Appraisal of California's Natural Death Act' (1976-
77) 76 De Paul LRev. 717. 
244 M. Lerner, 'State Natural Death Acts: Illusory Protection of Individuals' Life-Sustaining Treatment 
Decisions' (1992) 29 Harv.J. on Leg is. 175, 187. For further discussion of the influence of pro-life 
forces on living will legislation in the United States, see below, 331. 
245 For reference to living will legislation in the United States see Choice in Dying, 'Right-to Die Case and 
Statutory Citations State-by-State Listing' Nov. 1991. See also G. Gelfand, 'Living Will Statutes: The 
First Decade' (1987) Wis.LRev. 737, 739 where he lists in chronological order the 38 States and the 
District of Columbia which had, as of 1987, enacted such legislation. 
246 Society for the Right to Die, Handbook of Living Wills (1987) 5. 
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Medical Treatment Decision Act 1985; Delaware Death with Dignity Act 1982; Florida Life-Prolonging 
Procedure Act 1981; Georgia Living Wills Act 1984; Louisiana Life-Sustaining Procedures Act 1984; 
Missouri Life Support Declarations Act 1985; New Mexico Right to Die Act 1977; Oregon Rights with 
Respect to Terminal Illness Act 1977. 
249 Some statutes are broader in scope,_allowing a declaration to be made on behalf of an incompetent adult 
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the legislation.250 Further, the patient's directive only com~s into operation after the patient loses 
decision-making capacity: whilst the patient still has the capacity to make decisions regarding his or 
her health care, the doctor must ascertain the patient's current wishes with regard to medical treabnent. 
All of the statutes require certain fonnalities for the execution of living wills although the details of 
the fonnalities vary significantly as between jurisdictions. 251 In most States, the threshold standard 
in order for the patient's directive to be operative depends on the existence of a 'terminal illness,' 
however, statutes differ in their definition of this requirement. 252 For example, the statutes in quite a 
number of jurisdictions specify that the patient's condition must be such that death will occur shortly 
whether or not life-supporting treabllents are administered.253 In some States, the statutes also refer 
to the timing of death for the purposes of defining a tenninally ill patient, for example, by requiring 
thaf death must be 'imminent' or that it will occur within a 'short time•.254 
All living will legislation contains some limitations on the types of treabnents which may be 
withheld or withdrawn pursuant to the advance direction of a patient. For example, some statutes 
specifically provide that a directive only applies in respect of 'life-sustaining procedures;•255 others 
refer to 'artificial' or 'mechanical' treabnents or 'extraordinary measures•;256 and the majority of living 
will statutes specifically exempt nutrition, hydration, comfort care and treabnent for the alleviation of 
pain from the range of treabnents that may be withheld or withdrawn. 257 
An important feature of all living will legislation is that it confers immunity upon health 
professionals from civil and criminal liability if they withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures 
in accordance with the patient's directive.258 The majority of statutes do not impose upon doctors a 
duty to comply with the patient's directive. Where a doctor is unwilling to comply with a patient's 
directive, most living will statutes require the doctor to transfer the patient to another doctor. 259 
However, only a few statutes actually contain penalties for the doctor's failure to comply with the 
patient's directive or to take steps to ensure that another doctor does so, and under most of those Acts, 
the doctor's failure to give effect to a patient's directive is simply treated as unprofessional conduct and 
is not an offence under the legislation. 260 
250 Gelfand, 748. 
251 Under most living will statutes, the declaration must be in writing, it must be witnessed, and the 
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Under the majority of statutes, a directive will remain in' force indefinitely unless specifically 
revoked.26l All living will statutes provide procedures for the revocation of a directive, with the 
majority of statutes adopting fairly liberal revocation provisions. The statutes generally provide for 
revocation, either formally by the execution of an instrument expressing an intent to revoke, or by a 
physical act or verbal expression of the declarant or individual acting on his or her behalf, 
communicated to the doctor. Many of the statutes permit revocation of a directive regardless of the 
mental state or competency of the declarant, in order to ensure that under no circumstances, a directive 
is carried out against the present wishes of the patient. 
Specified Limits on the Scope of Living Will Statues 
The living will legislation in most States contain penalties with regard to causing a person's life to be 
terminated against his or her wm262 and causing a person to be kept alive against his or her will by, 
for example, forging a revocation or destroying a declaration.263 
The legislation in some States provides that actions in accordance with the Act do·not constitute 
suicide or aided suicide and quite a few statutes specifically state that nothing in the statute condones, 
authorises or approves mercy killing or euthanasia. 264 
Another limitation on the operation of living will legislation in many jurisdictions arises in 
circumstances where the declarant is pregnant at the time when she is diagnosed as terminally ill. In 
most States, the statute provides that a directive shall have no force or effect during pregnancy. 
However, a minority of States have adopted a more liberal course, by restricting the operation of the 
living will only in circumstances where the fetus could develop to the point of live birth.265 
In order to protect the position of patients who have not executed a living will, most living will 
statutes provide that the failure of a patient to execute a living will creates no presumption as to the 
wishes of the patient regarding the use, withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining medical 
treatment. 266 A further provision contained in most living will statutes is that the rights created 
under the legislation do not displace or effect any judicially created rights and procedures. Thus, the 
common law right of patients to refuse treabnent is specifically preserved. As a result, interesting 
questions arise as to the legal status of an advance directive which falls outside the terms of living 
will legislation. The interrelationship between, on the one hand, a patient's common law and 
constitutional right to refuse treabnent, and living will legislation on the other, was to some extent 
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department 
261 Gelfand, 765. 
262 Id. 175. 
263 Id. 116-7. In a number of States, additional crimes and penalties have been created, for example, to 
cover improper attempts to cause death or keep persons alive which do not succeed, or coercing a 
patient to sign a declaration. 
264 Id. 785-86. 
265 Id. 778-780. 
266 Id. 783 787. 
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of Health. 261 One of the conclusions which can be drawn from that decision is that the patient's right 
to refuse medical treatment may be exercised through a living will or other advance directive whether 
or not the State has enacted legislation permitting the use of such instruments. Moreover, provided 
the patient's directions in a living will or other advance directive clearly evidence the patient's wishes 
regarding the withdrawal of treatment, those directions will be valid, notwithstanding that living will 
legislation purports to limit the directions that a patient may give, for example, by excluding artificial 
nutrition and hydration, or by requiring that a patient be in a terminal condition. 268 
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 
Notwithstanding certain features common to most living will Acts, as noted earlier, considerable 
diversity exists in the provision which has been made in the various jurisdictions.269 In response to 
growing concern regarding the lack of uniformity of living will legislation in the United States, in 
1983 the conference of commissioners on uniform State laws commenced work on uniform living 
will legislation. The object of this initiative was to develop an Act which is simple and effective in 
its operation and which, through uniformity of scope and procedure, would ensure the effectiveness of 
a declaration in States other than the State in which it was executed.270 The end product of this work, 
the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, was approved and recommended for enactment in 
1985.271 The Act has drawn upon existing legislation in order to avoid further complexity and to 
permit its effective operation in the light of prior enactments. The Act's basic structure and substance 
are therefore similar to that found in most existing legislation. Where necessary, departures have been 
made from the existing statutes in an attempt to simplify procedures, improve drafting and clarify 
language. 272 However, contrary to the hopes of the Conference of Commissioners, the response to 
the Act has not been overwhelming. A number of States which have introduced living will 
legislation, or amended existing legislation since the promulgation of the Uniform Rights of the 
Terminally Ill Act have substantially adopted the Act.273 It has been suggested that the many 
legislatures which already have living will legislation are unlikely to see much advantage in amending 
their legislation to bring it into conformity with the model Act.274 The remaining States which have 
not enacted living will legislation are generally those where the opposition to such legislation has 
been the greatest, so in order to be adopted, the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act will have to 
overcome the residual objection to such legislation in these States.275 
267 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). For analysis of this aspect of the decision, see D. Orentlicher, 'The Right to 
Die After Cruzan' (1990) 264 J.A.M.A. 2444, 2445. 
268 Orentlicher, 2445; F. Rouse, 'Advance Directives: Where Are We Heading After Cruzan?' (1990) 18 
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269 See above, 327. 
270 Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, Prefatory Note. 
271 For a review of the history of this legislation, see M. Chapman, 'The Uniform Rights of the Terminally 
Ill Act: Too Little, Too Late? (1989) 42 Kansas L.Rev. 319. 
272 Uniform Rights of the Terminally Rl Act, Prefatory Note. 
273 See Chapman, 374-377; W. Leschensky, 'Constitutional Protection of the "Refusal-of-Treatment": 
Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health,' 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990)' (1991) 14 Harv.J.L. & 
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Terminally Ill Act: A Critical Analysis' (1986) 6 /ssues Law & Med. 441. 
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Critical Analysis of the Living Will Legislation in the United States 
It must be acknowledged that the living will legislation introduced in the United States does address a 
very important need by providing a mechanism whereby instructions about health care decisions 
prepared whilst the patient has decision-making capacity remain in effect after the patient loses that 
capacity. Thus, in circumstances where the legislation applies, (and indications are that only a 
minority of patients in the United States have prepared a living wm276) the patient's self-
determination is upheld, the family is spared making difficult decisions about the withholding or 
withdrawing of treatment on behalf of the patient. and the need for costly litigation can generally be 
avoided. 277 There are, however, a number problems with the current legislation. 278 
One of the major criticisms of the living will legislation in the United States is that it is excessively 
narrow in scope, resulting in many categories of patients being excluded from its operation.279 
Indeed, it has been pointed out that the situation in the landmark case of Karen Quinlan, which did 
much to highlight the medical-legal problems associated with incompetent patients would not in fact 
be covered by the legislation.280 The limited operation of the legislation is a product of a 
combination of factors but is primarily attributable to the requirement of a 'terminal illness' before the 
legislation can take effect and the fact that only treatment in the nature of 'artificial life-support' can be 
refused. 281 The effect of these limitations is that the legislation will only be of assistance in a narrow 
range of cases and many categories of patients, arguably most in need of legislative assistance in 
having their wishes respected, are excluded from its operation.282 Pressure from right to life groups 
and other interest groups led to the inclusion of this and other limitations283 which have arguably 
weakened the objectives of the legislation. 
Living will legislation in the United States has also been criticised for the many ambiguities and 
uncertainties in the terminology and operation of the legislation. 284 In some instances, there is no 
definition of key terms, or even where defined, the definitions do not necessarily clarify the situation. 
276 See below, n. 316. 
277 For recognition of some of the benefits of legally recognised advance directives, see K. Davidson et al, 
'Physicians' Attitudes on Advance Directives' (1989) 262 J.A.M.A. 2415. 
278 For criticism of the living will legislation see, for example, Lerner, 'State Natural Death Acts: Illusory 
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legislation is too permissive; for discussion see J. Moskop, 'Advance Directives in Medicine: 
Choosing Among the Alternatives' in C. Hackler, R. Moseley and D. Vawter, (eds.) Advance Directives 
in Medicine (1989) 9, 11-12. 
280 R. Veatch, 'Death and Dying: The Legislative Options' (1977) 7 Hastings Center R. 5, 6; L. Heintz, 
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281 Heintz, 83-86; Gelfand, 740-747, 750-753. 
282 For example, most living will legislation would not apply to a formerly competent patient, now 
comatosed whose condition is not terminal and where death is not imminent. See Heintz, 84-85; G. 
Annas and L. Glantz, 'The Right of Elderly Patients to Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment' (1986) 64 
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Furthermore, the legislation in some States is fraught with Hiogicalities and internal inconsistencies 
which threaten to undermine the object of the legisfation. For example, under some living will 
statutes there is a requirement that the patient's death must be imminent, i.e. that the patient will die 
soon, whether or not life-sustaining procedures are used.285 This requirement, if taken literally, 
nullifies the whole purpose of living will statutes in enabling an individual to secure a 'natural' 
death. 286 Another illustration of the contradictions inherent in the legislation is to be found in the 
general statutory statement in most living will legislation to the effect that nothing in the legislation 
condones or permits any type of euthanasia. However, the circumstances to which the legislation 
applies clearly come within the meaning of passive euthanasia as that phrase is now generally 
understood, and the Acts specifically provide that the legislation does not displace judicially created 
rights and procedures; rights and procedures which may in fact endorse the right of a patient to seek 
passive euthanasia. 287 
A very real concern which has been raised with regard to the operation of the living will legislation in 
the United States is that notwithstanding the good intentions of the framers of the legislation in 
seeking to promote patients' rights, the legislation may in fact be having the opposite effect of 
eroding the common law right to refuse treatment. As noted earlier, most of the Acts contain a 
specific provision to the effect that failure to execute a living will creates no presumption as to the 
wishes of the patient and further, that the statutorily created rights are not intended to impair or 
supersede any pre-existing common law rights.288 In this light, the legislation can be seen as simply 
offering an alternative mechanism for exercising patient rights, and thereby hopefully avoiding the 
need for litigation which the enforcement of common law rights in the United States has frequently 
entailed. Despite these specific provisions aimed at limiting the operation of the legislation, the 
concern has been raised that some doctors may, for fear of liability, be reluctant to withhold or 
withdraw artificial life-support in the event qf terminal illness in the absence of a written directive 
under the legislation.289 The obvious concern is that if such legislation is viewed, albeit mistakenly, 
by health care providers as the exclusive means for making and implementing a decision to forgo 
treatment, some dyiilg patients may be subject to treatment that is neither desired nor beneficial.290 
Further, there is the additional danger that people will infer that a patient who has not executed a 
directive in accordance with the legislation, does not desire life-sustaining treatment to be ended under 
any circumstances, when in fact the failure to execute a directive may be because of ignorance of its 
existence, inattention to its significance, or for one of a number of other reasons.291 It has been 
suggested that the statement in the legislation that it does not affect common law rights does not in 
285 Gelfand, 740. 
286 /d. 742. 
287 Id. 785-786. 
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itself correct the difficulty.292 Consequently, there is conce1in that in practice, the legislation may 
restrict, rather than promote, the patient's ability to have their wishes about life-sustaining treatment 
respected. And whilst it could well be argued that any tendency on the part of the medical profession 
to continue treatment in the absence of a directive may be an unwarranted response to the situation, it 
is nevertheless a matter of real concern if this is in fact occurring. 
A further criticism which has been made of living will legislation in the United States is that most of 
the statutes confer protection upon doctors from liability without imposing any legal obligation to 
comply with the patient's directive.293 As one commentator has observed, to offer such a large degree 
of immunity in this sensitive area without imposing sanctions to protect the individual's right to have 
his or her wishes respected is both one-sided and unjustified.294 
Another, more general objection which has been raised against living will legislation is that it 
attempts to address in advance medical problems not yet in existence. Since it is impossible for a 
person to contemplate every possible treatment choice and provide instructions in respect of that 
choice, directions under a living will to withhold life-sustaining treatment are inevitably made in 
abstract terms at a time when the person could not be fully informed about the circumstances and 
consequences of that decision.295 Further problems resulting from the advance nature of living wills 
is their inherent lack of specificity, which can in turn result in difficulties in interpretation. 296 
It should be noted that many of the foregoing criticisms and concerns apply equally to the Uniform 
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, although this was largely as a result of limitations which were 
imposed on the drafting committee by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws.297 Consequently, the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act put forward as a 'model act', 
carries forward most of the problems with regard to the scope and operation of living will 
legislation.298 It must, however, be acknowledged that the Uniform Act does represent an 
improvement on existing living will legislation and has managed to overcome many of the 
ambiguities and internal inconsistencies in the earlier legislation.299 
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Notwithstanding the problems of living will legislation, it does, in some limited circumstances, 
operate to uphold the advance directions of a formerly competent patient. Moreover, one should not 
overlook the educative effect of the reform process which has been underway in the United States since 
the 1970s. The legislative approval of the patient's right to refuse treatment has had the practical effect 
of informing patients about their rights and reassuring doctors about the legality of their actions. 
Thus, perhaps the greatest value of such legislation is the impetus that it provides for discussions 
between patients, doctors and families about decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment300 as well as 
the symbolic significance of enacting legislation which seeks to give effect to the patient's self-
determination and the right to die a natural death.301 
Other Mechanisms for Preserving Patient Autonomy 
Partly in an attempt to secure alternatives to living will legislation, a number of other mechanisms 
for preserving patient autonomy have been developed in the United States in recen"t years. These 
include provision for the appointment of a proxy decision-maker and the introduction of durable health 
care powers of attomey.302 
Appointment of a Proxy Decision-Maker 
One possible mechanism for persons to exercise autonomy in health care decisions is by appointing a 
family member, friend or other person as a 'proxy' or 'agent' to act on their behalf in the event of 
supervening incompetence.3°3 The main advantages of this mechanism is that the patient can select 
in advance a person who has knowledge of his or her treatment preferences and whom can be trusted to 
follow them. Moreover, unlike living will directions which are necessarily made in advance without 
full knowledge of the circumstances, appointment of a proxy ensures that the person who makes the 
decision is cognisant of the facts and circumstances and is in a position to make an informed decision. 
In a number of States, the living will legislation itself includes a provision for the appointment of a 
health care proxy.304 However, because the proxy's authority extends no further than the patient's 
authority, if the living will statute limits the kinds of directions that the patient may give, then the 
authority of a proxy appointed in accordance with the provisions a State's living will statute may be 
limited in the same way.305 
300 Note also the President's Commission Report, 145; B. Towers, 'The Impact of the California Natural 
Death Act' (1978) 4 J.Med. Ethics 96, 98. 
301 Winslade, 736. 
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Durable Powers of Attorney 
One form of proxy decision-making which has been developed in the United States has been the 
durable health care power of attorney. Legislation providing for general durable powers of attorney 
exist in all American States which, unlike ordinary powers of attorney, remain in effect in the event 
that the principal becomes legally incapacitated. 306 Although this legislation is potentially broad 
enough to permit the agent to make medical treatment decisions for the principal, there has been some 
doubt as to whether general durable powers of attorney can be used for this purpose, particularly since 
this was not envisaged when this legislation was introduced.307 Moreover, concern has been 
expressed regarding the lack of appropriate procedural safeguards in the legislation if it were to be used 
for this purpose.3°8 In an attempt to overcome these uncertainties, further legislation has been 
introduced in quite a number of American jurisdictions specifically dealing with durable powers of 
attorney for health care and containing procedural safeguards for the protection of both the principal 
and the agent.309 Pursuant to this legislation the principal can give specific instructions or authority 
to the agent to act in all health care decisions for the principal. 
Durable health care powers of attorney offer a number advantages over living wills. 310 To begin 
with, their operation is considerably wider, in that they are not restricted to cases of terminal illness 
where death is imminent and can generally be used to delegate authority for health care decisions in all 
cases of patient incompetence. 311 Furthermore, the durable health care power of attorney is a much 
more flexible instrument, allowing the individual to determine the extent to which he or she will 
delegate decision-making to their appointed attorney. The delegation may be a broad one, permitting 
the agent to make any medical decision that the principal could have made if legally competent.312 
Alternatively, the principal may wish to delegate only limited decision-making power and may even 
include in the delegation of power specific directions for treatment decisions.313 The main advantage 
is that unlike a living will which is a fixed instrument, durable health care powers of attorney enable a 
patient to provide specific instructions in many circumstances, but at the same time can be 
306 For a brief outline of the introduction of such legislation in the United States, see Annas and Glantz, 
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' sufficiently broad to talce account of unforeseeable contingencies by conferring upon the agent general 
decision-making authority in unanticipated circumstances.314 Because the agent has clear authority to 
act on behalf of the principal, the use of durable powers of attorney would be likely to reduce the need 
or tendency to seek judicial intervention.315 
The Patient Self-Determination Act 1990 
Although legislation now exists in most American States for some type of advance directive, surveys 
indicate that only a relatively small proportion of Americans have availed themselves of this 
legislation and executed an advance directive.316 As a result, written advance directives still play only 
an occasional role in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from incapacitated 
patients and in the majority of cases decisions are made without the benefit of the patient's views. 317 
Federal legislation has recently been introduced in the United States in an attempt to increase patients' 
involvement in decision-making about their medical treatment in the event that they become 
incompetent The Patient Self-Determination Act was passed by Congress in October 1990 and is the 
first piece of federal legislation to address end of life decision-making in the United States. Under the 
legislation, which commenced operation in December 1991, all hospitals, hospices, nursing homes 
and other health care provision organisations must inform patients upon their admission about their 
right to refuse treatment and prepare 'advance directives' under applicable State law as well as provide 
information about the facility's own internal policies governing patients' rights. The Act defines an 
'advance directive' as a written instruction, such as a living will or durable power of attorney for health 
care, recognised under State law ... and relating to the provision of such care when the individual is 
incapacitated. 
More particularly, the Act requires that all health care facilities receiving federal funding (Medicare or 
Medicaid) to: 
-maintain written policies on refusal of care and advance directives; 
-give this written information to adults at the time of admission as hospital 
inpatients or as residents of a skilled nursing facility, before coming under the 
care of a home health agency or hospice, or upon enrolment in a health 
maintenance organisation; 
-note in patient records whether an advance directive has been made; 
-ensure compliance with advance directives consistent with State law; 
-provide both staff and community education on advance directives.318 
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The Act has considerable bite in that failure to comply with the legislation will result in the loss of 
federal funding. It is anticipated that this legislation will dramatically increase awareness of patients' 
rights to control their medical treatment, including the right to prepare an advance directive. It will 
also help to ensure that existing directives are available to doctors at the time medical decisions are 
being made and that they are complied with.319 The Patient Self-Determination Act thus represents 
an important initiative towards promotion and recognition of patients' rights to refuse treatment in the 
United States. 
Government Inquiries 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioural Research 
As a natural outgrowth of the President's Commission's earlier work on informed consent, 320 the 
definition of death and access to health care, though not actually part of its original mandate, a study 
was undertaken in 1981 with regard to decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment.321 Following two 
years of public hearings and discussions, the commission released its report, Deciding to Forgo Life-
Sustaining Treatment in 1983. Although the commission was primarily concerned with the ethical, 
medical and legal issues with regard to the withholding or withdrawing of treatment, 322 the report 
does make some comments on the subject of active voluntary euthanasia. The commission was of the 
view that it would not be appropriate to legalise active voluntary euthanasia. Whilst recognising the 
artificiality of some of the distinctions which are made in the health care context, in particular, the 
distinction between acts and omissions,323 the commission came to the conclusion that the legal 
prohibition of active killing should be sustained.324 It expressed the view that: 
Weakening the legal prohibition to allow a deliberate taking of life in extreme 
circumstances would risk allowing wholly unjustified taking of life in less 
extreme circumstances. Such a risk would be warranted only if there were 
substantial evidence of serious harms to be relieved by a weakened protection of 
life, which the Commission does not find to be the case.325 
In examining the implications of its conclusion, the commission acknowledged that one serious 
consequence of maintaining the legal prohibition against killing of terminally ill patients could be the 
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320 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural 
Research, Making Health Care Decisions 1982. 
321 President's Commission Report, 9-11. 
322 The commission made numerous recommendations aimed at upholding the right of an individual to 
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prolongation of suffering.326 However, in the opinion of the commission, this possibility was 
insufficiently weighty to justify a change in legal policy: 
In the final stages of some diseases, such as cancer, patients may undergo 
unbearable suffering that only ends with death. Some have claimed that 
sometimes the only way to improve such patients' lot is to actively and 
intentionally end their lives. If such steps are forbidden, physicians and family 
might be forced to deny these patients the relief they seek and to prolong their 
agony pointlessly. 
If this were a common consequence of a policy prohibiting all active termination 
of human life, it should force a reevaluation of maintaining the prohibition. 
Rarely however, does such suffering persist when there is adequate use of pain 
relieving drugs and procedures.327 
The commission also recognised that policies prohibiting direct killing may conflict with the 
important value of patient self-determination: 
This conflict will arise when deliberate actions intended to cause death have been 
freely chosen by an informed and competent patient as the necessary or preferred 
means of carrying out his or her wishes, but the patient is unable to kill him or 
herself unaided, or others prevent the patient from doing so. The frequency with 
which this conflict occurs is not known, although it is probably rare. The 
Commission finds this limitation on individual self-determination to be an 
acceptable cost of securing the general protection of human life afforded by the 
prohibition of direct killing.328 
And in an earlier part of the commission's report, where consideration was given to the possible 
liability of doctors under the criminal law, the commission stated that: 
Since neither wrongful shortening of life by physicians nor the failure to give 
appropriate medical treatment for fear of the criminal law appears to be prevalent, 
society seems to be well served by retaining its criminal prohibition on killing, 
as interpreted and applied by reasonable members of the community in the form 
of prosecutors, judges and jurors. 329 
First, it should be noted that the commission's report was primarily concerned with the issue of 
forgoing life-sustaining treatment, so the commission's comments on the issue of legalising active 
voluntary euthanasia were simply incidental to its principal inquiry. It is therefore not unreasonable to 
suggest that the issue of active voluntary euthanasia may not have received as full and detailed 
consideration as it would deserve and further that the commission is unlikely to have had before it all 
the relevant evidence and information to make a fully informed decision on this difficult issue. The 
commission's report is nevertheless significant in that it is one of the few government inquiries in the 
common law jurisdictions under consideration to have given serious consideration to the issue of 
legalising active voluntary euthanasia performed in the medical context. 
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Central to the commission's rejection of active voluntary euthanasia is the concern that its 
legalisation would result in abuse and erosion of proper respect for human life. However, there is 
remarkably little argument or evidence of any kind to substantiate this assertion which in tum casts 
doubt on the commission's findings.330 
The approach adopted by the commission does not purport to comment on the morality of active 
voluntary euthanasia. Rather, it seeks to ascertain whether there is sufficient justification to warrant 
some modification of the present criminal law prohibition on active termination of life within the 
medical context, and on this issue the commission was clearly of the view that there was insufficient 
evidence to justify a change of the law. The commission's determination on this issue raises certain 
matters which have earlier been considered in the preceding chapters331 and no attempt will be made 
here to retrace that ground. Suffice it to say that the commission's conclusion on this issue was by no 
means the only conclusion that could have been reached. 
Notwithstanding the commission's rejection of any change to the law, the willingness of the 
commission to accept the possible need to re-evaluate the present prohibition is of itself significant, 
reflecting recognition that the law's prohibition of direct killing is not finite or absolute and may 
require adaptation to meet changing circumstances. Further, it should be noted that since the 
commission released its report in 1983, there have been significant developments with regard to the 
issue of active voluntary euthanasia332 which would arguably justify a different conclusion today. 
Legislative Developments with Regard to Active Voluntary Euthanasia 
Humane and Dignified Death Act 1988 
In recent years attempts have been made in a number of States, to introduce 'physician aid-in-dying' 
legislation through the voter initiated referendum process. The first State to be targeted for reform was 
California because of its reputation as the bellwether State for many social reforms. The Humane and 
Dignified Death Act 1988333 sought, by amendment to the Californian Constitution, to extend the 
right of privacy to include the right of the terminally ill to physician-assisted aid-in-dying; (i.e. active 
voluntary euthanasia performed by a physician.) More particularly, the object of the legislation was to 
confer on all competent, terminally ill adults the right to request and receive voluntary, humane and 
dignified physician aid-in-dying under carefully defined circumstances.334 In order to achieve this 
objective, the Act sought to build on the existing law by enlarging the Californian Natural Death Act 
1976 and including a durable power of attorney of health care within the legislation. 
330 E. Winkler, 'Forgoing Treatment: Killing vs. Letting Die and the Issue of Non-Feeding' in J. Thornton 
and E. Winkler, Ethics and Aging (1988) 155, 162. 
331 See chapter IV and V. 
332 See chapter VI. 
333 Although widely referred to as an 'Act,' this legislation was never enacted. 
334 For analysis of the legislation see R. Risley, Death with Dignity (1989) 47; D. Clarke, 'Physician 
Assisted Aid in Dying: A California Proposal' (1988) 2 Euthanasia Rev. 207. 
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In order to come within the scope of the proposed legislation, a competent adult would have to sign a 
directive in the presence of two disinterested witnesses.335 Before signing the directive, the patient 
would be required to inform his or her family and indicate that he or she has considered the family's 
opinion though the patient would retain the right of final decision provided he or she remained 
competent.336 In the directive, a patient would be required to specify that it was his or her wish that 
his or her life not to be prolonged artificially or that his or her life be ended with the help of a 
physician on request. The patient would also be required to designate an agent to make health care 
decisions on his or her behalf in the event that he or she becomes incompetent, and must specifically 
stipulate whether the agent bas the power to request physician aid-in-dying on his or her behalf.337 
Once duly executed, a directive would remain in effect for a period of seven years, but could be revoked 
at any time.338 A number of conditions would have to be met before a physician would legally be 
able to comply with a patient's directive.339 First, there would have to be a validly executed directive 
presently in force. Second, two physicians would have to certify that the patient's condition was 
'terminal'. 340 Third, if the patient became incompetent after being certified tenµinally ill, the patient's 
agent could request physician aid-in-dying on behalf of the patient but the decision would have to be 
reviewed by a three person ethics committee.341 In this way, the proposed Act sought to make 
provision for physician aid-in-dying for patients who are no longer competent to make their own 
decisions. 
The Humane and Dignified Death Act 1988 also proposed protection for physicians and other health 
care workers from civil, criminal and administrative liability when complying with the patient's 
directive in accordance with the legislation.342 The legislation additionally provided that the failure of 
a physician to effectuate the directive would not give rise to liability. However, the wilful refusal by a 
physician to transfer the patient to a physician who would comply with the directive would constitute 
unprofessional conduct.343 Further, the Act provided that nothing in the legislation should be 
construed to condone, authorise or approve mercy killing or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act 
to end life except as provided for under the legislation.344 
Whilst clearly following the format of the earlier living will legislation, the proposed Humane and 
Dignified Death Act 1988 represented a significant departure from any existing legislation in seeking 
335 For reference to the Hwnane and Dignified Death Act 1988 see R. Risley and M. White, 'Humane and 
Dignified Death Initiative for 1988' (1986) 1 Euthanasia Rev. 226-237. 
336 See the terms of the directive where this is recited. 
337 Risley and White, 233. 
338 /cl. 229. 
339 Risley, Death with Dignity, 48. 
340 'Terminal condition' was defined under the legislation as one which, regardless of application of life-
sustaining procedures, is incurable and, within reasonable medical judgment, will lead to death within 
six months. 
341 Risley and White, 228-229. 
342 Id. 230. 
343 Id. 230-231. 
344 Id. 232-233. 
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to permit physician aid-in-dying (active euthanasia), subject tb certain conditions and safeguards. The 
scope of the proposed legislation was potentially quite broad, petmitting physician aid-in-dying at the 
request of a competent patient as well as providing a mechanism for the patient to appoint an agent to 
request aid-in-dying on his or her behalf in the event that he or she becomes incompetent. The 
Californian initiative drew considerable opposition from right-to-life and medical groups, including 
the Californian Medical Association, primarily on the grounds that legalisation of physician aid-in-
dying would be too open to abuse to be justifiable. The initial attempt to introduce this legislation in 
California in 1988 was unsuccessful, due to a failure to collect the required number of signatures 
within the speeified time frame to qualify the initiative for the ballot.345 
Initiative 119, Washington 1991 
The next State targeted for the introduction of legislation petmitting physician aid-in-dying was 
Washington where the 'Death with Dignity Initiative' (also known as Initiative 119) was mounted. In 
May 1990, campaigners began to gather signatures in support of the petition for the introduction of 
legislation permitting physician aid-in-dying. Under Washington State law, a minimum of 150, 001 
signatures must be collected in order to qualify an initiative for the referendum process. However, this 
number was far exceeded and a total of 223, OOO signatures was in fact collected, qualifying the 
initiative for the November 1991 ballot.346 
The legislative proposal under Initiative 119 was similar to the Humane and Dignified Death Act 
1988 which had been proposed in Califomia.347 In order to qualify for physician aid-in-dying, a 
person would need to be examined by two physicians. one of whom must be the attending physician. 
Both physicians would have to certify that the patient's condition was 'tetminal' .348 Further, the 
patient would need to indicate in writing a request for 'aid-in-dying•349 at the time such a medical 
procedure was desired and the request would need to be witnessed by two disinterested persons. Thus, 
the Washington initiative was clearly confined to competent patients requesting aid-in-dying on their 
own behalf. In this respect, this proposal was substantially narrower than the earlier Californian 
proposal. 
345 This was later put down to a lack of funding and inexperience; see A. Parachini, The California Humane 
and Dignified Death Initiative' (1989) 19 Hastings Center R. 10, 11. 
346 See the promotional literature published by Washington Citizens for Death with Dignity, 'Political 
History and Background of Initiative 119'. 
347 The full title to this legislation was An Act Relating to the Natural Death Act and Amending RCW 
70.122.010, 70.122.020, 70.122.030, 70.122.040, 70.122.050, 70.122.060, 70.122.070, 
70.122.080, 70.122.090, 70.122.100, and 70.122.900. There were, in fact, two distinct components 
to Initiative 119; the aid-in-dying proposal which is discussed here and a proposal to extend the 
Washington Natural Death Act 1979 by clarifying that artificially administered nutrition and hydration 
is a life-sustaining procedure which may be withdrawn and extending the definition of 'terminal 
condition' to include irreversible coma and persistent vegetative state. 
348 As under the earlier Californian proposal, 'terminal condition' was defined as an incurable or 
irreversible condition which in the opinion of the physicians, exercising reasonable medical 
judgment, will result in death within six months. 
349 'Aid-in-dying' was defined under the legislation to mean 'aid in the form of a medical service, provided 
in person by a physician, that will end the life of a conscious and mentally competent qualified patient 
in a dignified, painless and humane manner, when requested voluntarily by the patient through a 
written directive in accordance with this chapter at the time the medical service is to be provided.' 
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The proposed legislation also provided that a directive could be revoked at any time and that no 
physician who provides aid-in-dying to a qualified patient in accordance with the provisions of the 
legislation shall be subject to prosecution or be guilty of any criminal act or unprofessional conduct. 
As under the Californian proposal, no health care facility or physician would be required to administer 
aid-in-dying. However, if the physician or facility was unwilling to do so, they would be required to 
transfer the patient to another health care facility and/or physician who would be willing to carry out 
the patient's request 
Proponents for Initiative 119 presented a sophisticated campaign and were supported by a variety of 
professional groups including clergy, lawyers, doctors, nurses, social workers and hospice 
workers.350 However, as with the earlier campaign in California, considerable opposition was 
encountered particularly from right-to-life groups and Roman Catholic Church leaders. In the build-up 
to the November ballot, these forces financed an aggressive television campaign against the initiative. 
The initiative was also opposed by the Washington State Medical Association.351 Public opinion 
polls taken prior to the ballot suggested that the initiative would be successful. However, in a State-
wide referendum held on the 5th of November 1991, the initiative was defeated by a narrow margin. 
Of some 1.3 million voters (apparently the biggest recorded turnout for a State referendum in 
Washington), 54% voted against with 46% in favour.352 
For many the defeat of the initiative came as a surprise, particularly in the light of opinion poll 
results gathered over recent years which indicate majority support for active voluntary euthanasia A 
number of factors can be advanced which may help to explain the referendum result. 353 There is no 
doubt that the opposition's campaign against the initiative took its toll in the electorate.354 There 
was also some adverse publicity arising from the suicide of Anne Wickett, the former wife of Derek 
Humphry, the then Executive Director of the. Hemlock Society and one of the key supporters of the 
legislation.355 There may have also been some public backlash to the activities of Jack Kevorkian 
and his 'suicide machine' which were again before the public in the period shortly prior to the 
November ballot.356 More fundamentally, some of those in the community who in principle support 
active voluntary euthanasia may not have been satisfied with the particular form of the proposal. 357 
350 For example, Washington Citizens for Death with Dignity; the Interfaith Clergy for Yes on Initiative 
119; Lawyers for~ on Initiative 119; Nurses for~ on Initiative 119; and Physicians for~ on 
Initiative 119. 
351 In a random survey of its membership, 51 % of the 2,000 respondents voted to oppose the initiative, 
with 49% in support. In the light of this close poll result, the association did not initially campaign 
against the initiative. However, following a House of Delegates vote against the measure and with 
support from the American Medical Association, it embarked, quite late in the piece, on a campaign 
against the legislation; Am.Med. News 18 Nov. (1991). 
352 N.Y. Times 7 Nov. 1991. 
353 R. Carson, 'Washington's I-119' (1992) Hastings Center R. 7. 
354 Note, 'Fear Campaign Beat the Washington Initiative' (1992) 46 Hemlock Q. 5. The Washington State 
Attorney-General has since filed suit against the 119 Vote No! Committee, alleging that the committee 
made false claims in a pamphlet circulated about a week before the election; Hemlock News July-August 
1992. 
355 Note, 'Washington State Euthanasia Moves Fails' (1992) Vol. 11 No. 2 Bioethics News 4-5. 
356 Ibid. 
357 There were, for example, complaints that the legislative proposal was loosely worded and lacked a 
precise regulatory mechanism for the practice of physician aid-in-dying. 
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Notwithstanding its defeat, Initiative 119 was an historic development, being the first time ever that 
voters have had the opportunity to pass electoral judgment on the subject of active voluntary 
euthanasia. The initiative was also significant for the widespread support it received from a variety of 
professional groups. It must also be emphasised that although it was ultimately unsuccessful, it was 
supported by a substantial minority and the final result was very close indeed. 
Death with Dignity Act 1992 
The campaign to introduce physician aid-in-dying legislation in the United States has continued. In 
California a coalition has been formed between Hemlock chapters in that State, and the organisation 
Americans Against Human Suffering (California Coalition for Death with Dignity), 358 to campaign 
for the introduction of physician aid-in-dying legislation. The legislation, a slightly modified version 
of the earlier Humane and Dignified Death Act 1988 (renamed the Death with Dignity Act359) was 
sufficiently supported to qualify it for the ballot.360 The proposal, known as Proposition 161, was 
narrowly defeated in the November 1992 ballot by 54% to 46% - exactly the same margin as for the 
Washington Initiative 119.361 
The Californian initiative differed from the Washington proposal in a number of respects. One 
additional requirement under the Californian proposal was that the request for aid-in-dying had to be an 
'enduring request•.362 It also bad provision for psychological counselling and record keeping and 
required that the family must be informed of the patient's intent.363 As under the earlier Californian 
proposal, the legislation provided for the appointment of a health care attorney who can make 
decisions on behalf of the patient in the event that the patient becomes incompetent, including a 
request for aid-in-dying. In this respect the legislation was broader than the Washington proposal. 
Private Members' Bills 
In addition to these developments based on the citizen initiated referendum process, active voluntary 
euthanasia legislation bas also been introduced in a number of American States. During 1992, Bills 
were introduced in the legislatures of New Hampshire, Maine and Iowa. The New Hampshire Bm364 
358 For details regarding the 'California Coalition for Death with Dignity' (comprised of Hemlock chapters 
in that State and Americans Against Human Suffering) and the proposed legislation see Note, 'Three 
States Move to Legalize Physician Aid-in-Dying' (1989) 36 Hemlock Q. 1. Plans are also underway for 
the introduction of a similar initiative in Oregon in 1994; Medical Tribune 28 Nov. 1991. 
359 See Risley, Death with Dignity, Appendix A for reference to the proposed legislation and Appendix B 
for analysis of the legislation. 
360 Note, 'California Campaign Off to a Good Start' (1992) 46 Hemlock Q. 1. A minimum of 600,000 
signatures had to be gathered before the end of March 1992. The 'death with dignity' proposal received 
considerable support from a number of quarters, including the State Bar of California's House of 
Delegates which adopted an amended version of the legislation at the recommendation of the Beverly 
Hill Bar Association; J. Podgers, 'Matters of Life and Death: Debate Grows Over Euthanasia' (1992) 78 
A.B.A.J. 60, 61. 




364 An Act Relative to Death with Dignity for Certain Persons Suffering Terminal Illness 1992. 
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allows a mentally competent person who is 18 years of age or older and who has been diagnosed as 
having a terminal condition365 to request that his attending physician, after consultation with a 
second physician competent in the appropriate category of expertise, prescribe medication which will 
enable the patient to control the time, place and manner of his or her death. The Bill does not require 
any physician, health care personnel or health care facility to participate in the request, but does 
require a good faith effort to transfer a patient to another physician or facility. Under this Bill, the 
request is witnessed and signed in essentially the same manner as a living will. The Bill requires a 
review by an ethics committee or similar body of a health care facility before the patient's request is 
honoured. This Bill was referred for Interim Study by the House Judiciary Committee. Public hearings 
and work sessions were held in September 1992, and at the time of writing, a determination was yet 
to be made whether the Bill has sufficient merit to be redrafted and introduced for the 1993 
parliamentary session. 
The Bill introduced in the Maine legislature366 seeks to amend the living will legislation in that 
State to allow for a medically assisted death in certain limited circumstances. The' Bill allows a 
person, who is at least 18 years of age, and who has been diagnosed with a terminal condition, to 
request a medically assisted death. Two consulting physicians must independently certify the 
individual's condition before a medically assisted death may proceed. If both consulting physicians 
certify that the individual has an incurable and irreversible condition, the individual's attending 
physician, any other physician and any health care facility are authorised to assist the individual with a 
medically assisted death. 
Finally, the Iowa Bm367 provides for the execution of a declaration by qualified patients368 which 
allows the provision for assistance-in-dying to the declarant. The Bill stipulates requirements for a 
valid declaration, including a requirement that two people must witness the execution of the 
declaration, that two physicians must attest to the condition of the declarant as terminal, 369 and that 
the declaration will not be effectuated unless the declarant is conscious and competent at the time that 
assistance-in-dying is to be provided 
The introduction of these three Bills heralds a new era in the campaign for the introduction of 
legislation permitting active voluntary euthanasia in the United States. The Bills proposed in Maine 
and Iowa provide for medically assisted death along similar lines to the legislation which has been 
proposed in Washington and California under the citizen initiated referendum process. The New 
365 'Terminal condition' is defined in the legislation to mean an incurable and irreversible condition, the 
end stage of a disease for which there is no known treatment which will alter its course to death, and 
which, in the opinion of the attending physician and a second physician competent in that disease 
category, both of whom shall have personally examined the patient, will result in death. 
366 An Act Regarding the Tenninally Ill 1992. 
367 An Act Relating to the Provision of Assistance-in-Dying, and Providing Penalties 1992. 
368 'Qualified patient' is defined as a patient who has been diagnosed to be in a terminal condition by two 
physicians. 
369 'Terminal condition' is defined as an incurable or irreversible condition that, without the administration 
of life-sustaining procedures, will, in the opinion of two physicians having examined the patient and 
exercising reasonable medical judgment, result in the death of the patient within six months. 
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Hampshire Bill is somewhat more circumscribed, dealing orlly with physician-assisted suicide. The 
legislative scheme in all three jurisdictions includes an immunity for physicians who act upon a 
patient's request in accordance with the legislation. 
Canada 
There have also been significant developments in Canada in the past ten years. The Canadian Law 
Reform commission has specifically addressed the issue of active voluntary euthanasia and there have 
been law reform inquiries as well as legislative developments in a number of Canadian Provinces with 
regard to both active and passive euthanasia. 
Law Reform Commission of Canada 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada has undertaken extensive work in the area of medical law 
and ethics, in connection with its Protection of Life Project.370 In 1982, the commission published a 
working paper Euthanasia, Aid~ng Suicide and the Cessation of Treatment to address what it saw as a 
real interest and need in this area.371 Three basic questions were asked by the commission: (1) should 
active euthanasia be legalised, or at least decriminalised?; (2) should aiding suicide be decriminalised?; 
and (3) should the Canadian Criminal Code be revised to define the legal parameters of the refusal and 
cessation of treatment?372 The formulation of the questions in these terms is in itself significant, in 
that the issue of medically administered voluntary euthanasia373 was directly considered by the 
commission. This is in contrast to the government and law reform commission inquiries into the 
criminal law undertaken in Australia and the United Kingdom which have focussed attention on the 
more general question of mercy killing.374 The working paper released by the commission set out 
some preliminary proposals with regard to the matters under consideration, which were largely 
incorporated in the commission's 1983 report.375 
370 In 1976, a special study group was established called the Protection of Life Project, which has over the 
years, examined various topics including abortion, sterilisation, criteria for determining death and 
consent to medical treatment. 
371 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper No. 28, Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and the 
Cessation of Treatment (1982) Foreword. (hereafter referred to as the Law Reform Commission of 
Canada, Euthanasia Working Paper). 
372 Id. 32, 43. 
373 The definition used by the commission was 'the act of ending the life of a person from compassionate 
motives, when he is already terminally ill or when his suffering has become unbearable'; Law Reform 
Commission of Canada, Report No. 20, Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and the Cessation of Treatment 
(1983) (hereafter referred to as the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Euthanasia Report.) 17. 
374 The issue of mercy killing has also been the subject of earlier consideration by the Canadian Law 
Reform Commission; see Canadian Law Reform Commission Working Paper No. 33, Homicide (1984) 
where it was proposed that mercy killing should be taken out of the category of first-degree murder. For 
discussion, see B. Sneidman, 'Why Not a Limited Defence? A Comment on the Proposals of the Law 
Reform Commission of Canada on Mercy Killing' (1985) 15 Man.L.J. 85. 
375 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Euthanasia Report. 
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The issues of active euthanasia and aiding suicide were dealt with quite summarily by the 
commission. 376 The commission recommended against legalising or decriminalising active voluntary 
euthanasia in any form and was in favour of continuing to treat it as culpable homicide. The reasons 
for this view were stated in the report: 
The legalization of euthanasia is unacceptable to the Commission because it 
would indirectly condone murder, because it would be open to serious abuses, 
and because it appears to be morally unacceptable to the majority of the 
Canadian people. The Commission believes that there are better answers to 
the problems posed by the sufferings of the terminally ill. The development 
of palliative care and the search for effective pain control methods constitutes 
a far more positive response to the problem than euthanasia on demand. To 
allow euthanasia to be legalized, directly or indirectly, would be to open the 
door to abuses and hence indirectly weaken respect for human life.377 
With regard to the more general question of mercy killing, the commission recommended that mercy 
killings should not be made an offence separate from homicide and that there be no formal provision 
for special modes of sentencing for this type of killing other than what is already provided for 
homicide.378 The commission further recommended against decriminalising aiding suicide for much 
the same reasons that it did not favour the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia.379 
The bulk of the commission's report dealt with the third area, concerning the cessation and refusal of 
treatment.380 After considering living will legislation adopted in California and some other American 
States, the commission rejected this legislative approach on the grounds that it would risk the reversal 
of the already established rule that there should be no duty to initiate or maintain treatment when it is 
useless to do so.381 The commission did, however, believe it necessary to introduce amendments to 
the Criminal Code giving formal and explicit recognition to the right of a competent patient to refuse 
treatment of any kind and at the same time, conferring appropriate protection upon medical personnel 
involved in the withholding and cessation of treatment and the administration of palliative care. 
In order to address concerns amongst members of the medical profession that the cessation of 
treatment may be grounds for civil and criminal liability, it was recommended by the commission that 
the Criminal Code be amended to make it clear that it is lawful for a doctor to comply with the 
expressed wishes of patients regarding the course of their treatment and also to discontinue treatment 
which has become therapeutically useless and is not in the best interests of the patient..382 However, 
the commission decided against the creation of a new criminal offence for doctors who treat patients 
against their wishes.383 
376 Id. 17-21. 
377 Id. 18. See also the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Euthanasia Working Paper for consideration of 
the arguments for and against legalisation; 44-48. 
378 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Euthanasia Report, 18-20. 
379 Id. 20-21. 
380 Id. 22-28. 
381 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Euthanasia Working Paper, 69; the Law Reform Commission of 
Canada, Euthanasia Report, 23-28. 
382 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Euthanasia Report, 32. 
383 Id. 22. 
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Legal concerns had also been raised before the commission, regarding the administration of drugs in 
palliative care which may shorten the patient's life expectancy. In particular, there was concern that 
certain provisions of the Criminal Code may prevent a doctor from undertaking or continuing 
necessary palliative care, because the dosage for effective pain relief may hasten the death of the 
patient.384 It was accordingly recommended that it be specified in the Criminal Code that a doctor 
cannot be held criminally liable merely for undertaking or continuing the administration of palliative 
care in order to eliminate or reduce the suffering of an individual for the sole reason that such care or 
measures are likely to shorten the life expectancy of the patient 385 
The commission's report met with a mixed reaction. It has generally been welcomed for its efforts to 
clarify the legal status of initiating and ending life-supporting medical treatment and the 
administration of palliative care.386 The report has, however, been subject to criticism for its 
treatment of the euthanasia issue.387 It is certainly true that the report merely recites the well 
established arguments for and against active voluntary euthanasia including concerns about the risk of 
abuse, without really advancing the debate or providing any evidence to substantiate such claims. 
More fundamentally, however, in its forthright rejection of any change to the law with regard to active 
voluntary euthanasia, and in particular, in the assertion that legalisation ef active voluntary euthanasia 
'appears to be morally unacceptable to the majority of the Canadian people,' the report ignores 
important evidence of growing public opinion in Canada in favour of legalisation of medically 
administered active voluntary euthanasia.388 Furthermore, it could be argued that the commission, in 
rejecting any change, has underestimated the significance of the existing discrepancy between law and 
practice in this area, and the problems resulting from this discrepancy.389 
In 1987, the Law Reform Commission of ClJilada. in its report Recodifying Criminal Law - Revised 
and Enlarged Edition, made recommendations for the implementation of its earlier proposals with 
regard to the withholding or withdrawing of treatment or the administration of palliative care.390 At 
the time of writing these recommendations had not been implemented. 
384 Id. 35. 
385 Id. 22-23. The Canadian Law Reform Commission subsequently reiterated these recommendations in its 
Report, Some Aspects of Medical Treatment and the Criminal Law (1986). 
386 For example, J. Baudouin, 'Cessation of Treatment and Suicide: A Proposal for Reform' (1982) 3 Health 
Law in Canada 12; W. Curran, 'Quality of Life and Treatment Decisions: The Canadian Law Reform 
Commission Report' (1984) 310 New Eng J.Med. 297; Note, 'Treatment Decisions and the Third 
Alternative' (1984) 32 J.Am. Geriatrics Society 483. 
387 For example, R. Samek, 'Euthanasia and Law Reform' (1984) 17 Ottawa L.Rev. 86; L. Schiffer, 
'Euthanasia and the Criminal Law' (1985) 42 U. Toronto Fac.L.Rev. 91. 
388 See chapter VI, 235-236. 
389 For example, the omission relies upon the internal regulating mechanisms to offset the apparent 
harshness of the law as an argument in favour of retaining the existing prohibition when this is in fact 
one of the strongest arguments for change. See also Schiffer, 108. 
390 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report No. 31, Revised and Enlarged Edition of Report 30, 
Recodifying Criminal Law (1987). See draft s. 6(2) (no person is criminally liable for an omission to 
provide or continue medical treatment that is therapeutically useless or medical treatment for which 
consent is expressly refused or withdrawn) and drafts. 42 (to the effect that the Code provisions with 
regard to homicide and suicide do not apply in respect of the administration of palliative care that is 
appropriate in the circumstances to control or eliminate the pain and suffering of a person regardless of 
whether or not the palliative care reduces the life expectancy of that person, unless that person refuses 
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Apart from the work of the Canadian Law Reform Commission, there have been a number of other 
interesting developments in recent years relevant to the issue of euthanasia. One noteworthy 
development has been the increasing interest and activity in Canada with regard to advance directives 
and durable powers of attorney for health care. In 1990, the Manitoba Law Reform Commission 
commenced an inquiry into self-determination in health care. The aim of this inquiry was to determine 
whether the law should be reformed to permit the creation of a mechanism which would give legal 
effect to the wishes of a formerly competent patient and if so, to determine the musl appropriate 
mechanism for giving effect to health care decisions.391 In its report released in June 1991, the 
commission recommended that the law should be reformed so as to give legally binding effect to the 
previously expressed wishes of a person who lacks the capacity to make decisions about medical 
treatment. 392 The commission proposed that the law should recognise a new document to be called 
the health care directive in which an individual can set out his or her wishes for future medical 
treatment and/or name another person to make health care decision on his or her behalf. At the time of 
writing steps were underway for the legislative implementation of these recommendations. Similar 
reviews have been undertaken in other Canadian jurisdictions. 393 
In a number of Provinces, legislation has already been passed validating the durable power of attorney 
for health care394 and legislation is currently being considered in a number of other Provinces. For 
example, in Ontario, there has been considerable legislative activity. In 1991, a number of Private 
Members' Bills were introduced which had the support of the three political parties.395 They were, 
however, superseded by more comprehensive legislation introduced by the New Democratic Party 
government in May 1991.396 This legislation, comprised of two separate Bills397 providing for 
durable health care power of attorney and living wills respectively, passed second reading and was 
referred to the Justice Committee for public input398 Following extensive public hearings the Bills 
are again before the Ontario legislature and it is expected that this legislation will be enacted. 399 
At the federal level, attempts have been made to amend the criminal law regarding the care of 
terminally ill patients. In May 1991, Robert Wenman introduced in federal Parliament a Private 
to consent to that care.) For a discussion of this latter recommendation, see D. Caswell, 'Rejecting 
Criminal Liability for Life-Shortening Palliative Care' (1990) 6 J.Contemp. Health Law & Pol'y. 138. 
391 Manitoba Law Reform Com.mission, Discussion Paper on Advance Directives and Durable Powers of 
Attorney for Health Care (1990). 
392 Manitoba Law Reform Com.mission, Report, Self-Determination in Health Care (Living Wills and 
Health Care Proxies) (1991). 
393 See, for example, the Law Reform Com.mission of Saskatchewan, Proposals for an Advance Health Care 
Directives Act (1991); the British Columbia Royal Com.mission on Health Care and Costs, Report, 
Closer To Home (1991); Law Reform Commission of Newfoundland, Discussion Paper on Advance 
Health Care Directives and Attorneys for Health Care (1992). 
394 For example, Nova Scotia and Quebec (following amendments to the Quebec Civil Code.) 
395 Note, 'President's Corner' (1991) Vol. 8 No. 3. Dying with Dignity Newsletter 2. 
396 Jbid. 
397 Bill 108; An Act to Provide for the Making of Decisions on Behalf of Adults Concerning the 
Management of their Property and Concerning their Personal Care, and Bill 109; An Act Respecting 
Consent to Medical Treatment. 
398 Note, 'President's Corner' (1991) Vol. 9 No. 1. Dying with Dignity Newsletter 2. 
399 Ibid. 
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Member's Bill which sought to give effect to the recommendations of the Canadian Law Reform 
Commission in its Report Euthanasia, Aiding Suiciile and Cessation of Treatment. 400 However, this 
Bill was not supported by the government and lapsed in committee.401 The failure of this piece of 
legislation was widely attributed to it having been introduced as a Private Member's Bill. 
Physician-Assisted Suicide and Active Voluntary Euthanasia 
Apart from these initiatives which deal principally with providing mechanisms for decision-making 
for competent patients in the event of future incompetence, growing interest has focused on physician-
assisted suicide and active voluntary euthanasia. In 1991, the British Columbia Royal Commission 
on Health Care released a report which proposed an amendment to the Criminal Code that would 
exempt health care workers from criminal liability for assisting the suicide of a terminally ill 
patients. 402 The issue of active voluntary euthanasia was also considered and although a number of 
the commissioners believed that health care workers should be protected from criminal 'charges if they 
assisted terminally ill patients in ending their lives, a consensus could not be reached and no 
recommendations were made.403 This report is significant, being the first Canadian report where 
physician-assisted suicide is unequivocally endorsed and where there is some qualified support from 
some commissioners for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. 
In other developments, steps have been taken in one Canadian Province for the legalisation of active 
voluntary euthanasia. In 1991, a Private Member's Bill for the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia was introduced into the Ottawa House of Commons by Chris Axworthy.404 Under the 
terms of the proposed legislation, a person suffering from an irremediable condition could make 
application (on a specific form, witnessed by two people who are not related to the applicant) and 
accompanied by a medical certificate signed by the attending physician. This document would then be 
presented to a 'referee' appointed by the Attorney-General, and a decision would have to be made 
within five days of receipt: If the application were to be approved, a euthanasia certificate would be 
issued with a copy to the patient's doctor. Only qualified medical practitioners would be authorised to 
administer active euthanasia under the legislation and they would be protected from criminal liability, 
provided the administration of active euthanasia was performed with reasonable skill and care. The Bill 
also sought to clarify the law with regard to the administration of pain-killing treatment which may 
have the effect of hastening death and the issue of withholding or withdrawing of treatment at the 
patient's request or in circumstances where the treatment is therapeutically useless.405 Although the 
Bill was generally welcomed by proponents of active voluntary euthanasia. the terms of the Bill and 
400 Bill C-203; An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Terminally Ill Persons) 1991. For discussion of the 
original recommendations, see above, 345-347. 
401 Note, 'President's Comer' (1992) Vol. 9 No. 2 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 2, 4. 
402 British Columbia Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs, Closer To Home C-183. 
403 Ibid. 
404 Euthanasia and Cessation of Treatment Act 1991; see Note, 'Euthanasia Legislation' (1991) Vol. 8 No. 
3 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 1-2. 
405 Explanatory Note. See also discussion in Note, 'Euthanasia Legislation'. 
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in particular the proposal for a euthanasia referee did not attract much support.406 This Bill was 
defeated in the House of Commons.407 
International Developments 
Although this thesis has principally focused on the Australian position, with attention also being 
given to a number of other common law jurisdictions, a number of developments at the international 
level also merit brief consideration in the light of their broader implications. 
Until recently, the issue of euthanasia, and in particular the issue of active voluntary euthanasia, had 
received little attention at the international leve1.408 There have, however, been a number of recent 
developments of some significance including preliminary consideration of the issue of active 
voluntary euthanasia by a committee of the Council of Europe and attempts to introduce legislation in 
support of active voluntary euthanasia in the European Parliament 
Council of Europe 
In 1987, the issue of active voluntary euthanasia was raised before the Council of Europe by the 
Netherlands government. The Netherlands government was at the time considering the introduction of 
legislation dealing with active voluntary euthanasia and had sought advice on the subject from the 
Council of Europe. 409 The matter was referred to a working party of the Ad Hoe Committee of 
Experts on Progress in Biomedical Science of the Council of Europe (C.A.H.B.I.). Questionnaires on 
euthanasia, prepared by the secretariat in collaboration with experts from the Netherlands were sent to 
all member States as well as those non-member States that have observer status with the C.A.H.B.I. 
Under its terms of reference, the working party was instructed to examine the replies received to this 
questionnaire and to prepare a draft opinion on euthanasia. In particular, the working party was 
requested to give an opinion of the feasibility and the desirability of undertaking a study of the legal, 
human rights, ethical and medical problems relating to euthanasia 
On the basis of the opinion provided by the working party, the C.A.H.B.I. reached the conclusion that 
whilst it would be possible to undertake a study on problems relating to active euthanasia, (which it 
defined as a deliberate act to end the life of a severely suffering patient at his or her request) such a 
406 Note, 'Forum Draws Good Crowd' (1992) Vol. 9 No. 1 Dying with Dignity Newsletter 3. 
407 Ibid. 
408 In 1976, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recommended the establishment of 
national commissions of inquiry to lay down ethical rules for the treatment of persons approaching the 
end of life and which would consider, inter alia, the situation which may confront members of the 
medical profession, such as legal sanctions whether civil or penal, when they have refrained from 
effecting artificial measures to prolong the death process in the case of terminal patients whose lives 
cannot be saved by present day medicine, or have taken positive measures whose primary intention 
was to relieve suffering in patients and which could have a subsidiary effect on the process of dying. 
Recommendation 779 (1976). For discussion see D. Costello, 'The Terminally Ill - The Law's 
Concerns' (1986) 21 fr. Jurist 35. 
409 For further discussion, see chapter VIII, 377. 
351 
study was not appropriate or timely.410 A report was subsequently ·submitted by the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe to the 16th Conference of European Ministers of Justice relating to 
the work of the C.A.H.B.I. With regard to the problems relating to active voluntary euthanasia, it was 
reported that in December 1987, the C.A.H.B.I. adopted an opinion for the Committee of Ministers 
on the feasibility and the desirability of undertaking a study on the legal, human rights, ethical and 
medical problems relating to euthanasia (in particular 'giving death on request') and that, in this very 
detailed opinion, the conclusion was reached that such a study, even if it is feasible, is not 
desirable. 411 
European Parliament 
In 1989, a Dutch member of the European Parliament, Mrs Van Hemeldonck, proposed a resolution 
on the care of the terminally ill. The matter was referred to committee and a report ensued dealing with 
the treatment of terminally ill patients. The report, authored by Leon Schwartzenberg, Professor of 
Medicine and world renowned cancer specialist, contains a clause supporting active voluntary 
euthanasia. 412 That clause provides: 
In the absence of any curative treatment, and following the failure of palliative 
care correctly provided at both a psychological and medical level, each time a 
fully conscious patient insistently and repeatedly requests an end to an 
existence which bas for him been robbed of all dignity and each time a team 
of doctors created for that purpose establishes the impossibility of providing 
further specific care, the request should be satisfied without thereby involving 
any breach of respect for human life.413 
The Schwartzenberg report, as it bas become known, was narrowly adopted by the European 
Parliament's Environment, Public Health and Consumers Committee in June 1991, but has not yet 
been debated in plenary sitting .. 414 Debate in the European Parliament on the report was originally 
scheduled to take place later in 1991 but bas been postponed on a number occasions. If the parliament 
adopts the resolution, active voluntary euthanasia will have received substantial European support.415 
However, the resolution will have no legal effect unless members of the European Parliament can 
persuade the European Commission to draft legislation which, if approved by the Council of 
Ministers, would be binding on member States.416 
410 Council of Europe, Ad Hoe Committee of Experts on Progress in Biomedical Science (C.A.H.B.I.), 
Draft Opinion on the Legal, Human Rights, Ethical and Medical Problems Relating to Euthanasia Oct. 
(1987). 
411 Report submitted by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to the 16th Conference of European 
Ministers of Justice relating to the work of the C.A.H.B.I. 
412 Note, 'Euthanasia and the European Parliament' (1991) 43 V.E.S. Newsletter 1. 
413 Extract from the motion for a resolution on care of the terminally ill. See Note, 'European Support for 
Euthanasia?' (1991) 69 Bull.Med. Ethics 25, 26. 
414 Written communication with the principal administrator of the Directorate General for Research of the 
European Parliament, Oct. 1992. 
41 5 Id. 25. 
416 Note, 'Euthanasia and the European Parliament' (1991) 43 V.E.S. Newsletter 1. 
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Conclusjop 
The foregoing analysis of reform developments with regard to active voluntary euthanasia in Australia 
and other common law jurisdictions under consideration reveals significant progress in recent years. 
An important indication of this development is the position taken by the Scottish Institute of M~cal 
Ethics working party in its 1990 discussion paper in which it unequivocally endorsed the practice of 
assisted death in some limited circumstances. The subject of active voluntary euthanasia has been 
considered by the South Australian Select Committee on the law relating to death and dying. It has 
also been considered by the President's Commission in the United Stated and the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada. Although these bodies rejected any change to the law, their analysis of the 
issue has undoubtedly been an important development. The recent report of the British Columbia 
Royal Commission on Health Care is also of interest, for its endorsement of doctor-assisted suicide 
and the indications of support from a number of commissioners for a change to the law with regard to 
active voluntary euthanasia. The issue of active voluntary euthanasia bas also indirectly received 
attention as a result of a number of criminal law inquiries dealing with the issue of mercy killing and 
law reform commission and parliamentary inquiries dealing with patients' rights and the subject of 
death and dying. 
Although, todate, legislative enactments have been confined to the right of patients' to refuse 
treatment and to prepare an advance directive, they have nevertheless drawn attention to the issue of 
active voluntary euthanasia, and they evidence a willingness to respond to a growing demand for 
greater control over the manner of our dying. Specific steps have also been taken towards securing 
legislative reform with regard to active voluntary euthanasia. This bas been the case particularly in the 
United Kingdom, initially through the efforts of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, and now supported 
independently by an all-party parliamentary group on voluntary euthanasia. There have also been a 
number of important developments in the United States. The citizen initiated referendum process bas 
been invoked in a number of States in an attempt to secure the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia (or 'physician aid-in-dying' as it is often referred to in that jurisdiction.) In addition, there 
have been a number of Private Members' Bills seeking the legalisation of physician assisted suicide or 
active voluntary euthanasia. In sum, as a result of a variety of interrelated developments, Australia and 
the other jurisdictions under consideration appear now to be increasingly receptive to the legalisation 
of active voluntary euthanasia and this development is reflected in the interest that the subject of 
voluntary euthanasia bas received internationally. 
What has, however, been lacking in most considerations of the issue of active voluntary euthanasia 
has been a detailed analysis of the position in the Netherlands, where, for some time now, active 
voluntary euthanasia has been practiced relatively openly by the medical profession. This omission 
has tended to undermine the categorical rejection of active voluntary euthanasia by a number of law 
reform commission bodies and agencies on the grounds that they have based their conclusions on 
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supposition, for example, about feared consequences of legalisation, and have failed to take into 
account the available evidence. In the chapter which follows, the position in the Netherlands will be 





The country which has come closest to the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia is the 
Netherlands. Although active voluntary euthanasia is still illegal in that country, it is now practised 
quite openly by the medical profession and there are very few prosecutions of doctors involved in the 
practice. Developments in the Netherlands have naturally attracted interest in Australia and other 
countries where there is growing pressure for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. The 
Dutch position is often cited by proponents for active voluntary euthanasia as a model of social 
reform which demonstrates the benefits of sanctioned active voluntary euthanasia and which ought to 
be followed in other countries. I The object of this chapter is to examine the legal position and 
practice of active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands. 
There is no doubt at all that the Netherlands offers a unique opportunity to those interested in the 
legalisation of active .voluntary euthanasia to assess the effects of State sanctioned active voluntary 
euthanasia upon the law, medicine, health care and social policy.2 In essence, the practice of active 
voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands constitutes a social experiment3 which is open to analysis 
and may provide important lessons in any f~ture attempts to legalise active voluntary euthanasia in 
other countries. 
There has, for some time, been some difficulty in obtaining reliable information about the practice of 
euthanasia in the Netherlands, not the least of which has been the language barrier and the lack of 
scholarly literature on the Dutch position available in English. In more recent years, however, as 
interest in the Netherlands has heightened, attempts have been made to rectify this situation and there 





For example, H. Kuhse, 'Voluntary Euthanasia in th~ Netherlands' (1987) 147 M.J.A. 394. 
B. Bostrom, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Model for the United States?' (1989) 4 Issues Law & 
Med. 461, 470; J. Keown, 'The Law and Practice of Euthanasia in the Netherlands' (1992) 108 Law 
Q.Rev. 51, 77. 
Bostrom, 470. 
See, for example, the journal Issues in Law and Medicine which dedicated an entire issue to reporting 
the facts on the practice of active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands; 'Euthanasia in the 
Netherlands' (1988) 3 Issues Law & Med. 361 and the recent issue in the Hastings Center Report Vol. 
22 March-April (1992). For Dutch commentators, see, for example, H. Rigter, E. Borst-Eilers and H. 
Leenen, 'Euthanasia Across the North Sea' (1988) 297 B.M.J. 1593; B. Sluyters, 'Euthanasia in the 
Netherlands' (1989) 57 Medico-Legal J. 34; J. Gevers, 'Legal Developments Concerning Active 
Euthanasia on Request in the Netherlands' (1987) 1 Bioethics 156; H. Leenen, 'Supreme Court's 
Decisions on Euthanasia in the Netherlands' (1986) 5 Med. & Law 349; H. Leenen, 'Dying with 
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items have been written by Dutch scholars and have subsequently been translated into English. There 
has also recently been a major government commissioned inquiry into medical decisions affecting the 
end of life which has produced the most comprehensive information todate about the practice of 
euthanasia in the Netherlands. 
The Legal Posjtjon in the Netherlands 
The present legal position in the Netherlands with regard to active voluntary euthanasia is very 
complex. Contrary to popular belief, active voluntary euthanasia has not actually been legalised and 
doctors engaging in the practice do so in violation of the Dutch Penal Code 1886.5 In practice, 
however, they are not prosecuted, provided that they can show that their actions in performing 
voluntary euthanasia were in accordance with certain guidelines which have been developed by the 
courts.6 Thus, through a combination of jurisprudential developments and prosecution policy, a 
situation has been reached where there is de facto conditional legal tolerance of active voluntary 
euthanasia in the Netherlands. 
The official definition of euthanasia in the Netherlands is the deliberate termination of an individual's 
life by another, at that individual's request, 7 and this definition is now widely accepted in that 
country. This definition is not only linked with the concept of self-determination but also with the 
legal definition of euthanasia in the Dutch Penal Code 1886. 8 Specifically excluded from the 
definition of euthanasia are: the withholding or withdrawing of treatment which is medically 
pointless; the administration of necessary pain-relieving drugs which may shorten life; and the 
withholding or withdrawing of treatment at the patient's request.9 It follows from the Dutch definition 
of euthanasia that it necessarily refers to voluntary euthanasia (indeed the Dutch regard the notion of 
non-voluntary or involuntary euthanasia a contradiction in terms) and it involves active steps in the 
termination of life. However, in the interests of consistency with other chapters of this thesis, the 






Dignity: Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in the Netherlands' (1989) 8 Med. & Law 517; H. 
Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands' (1987) 8 
Health Policy 197; H. Roscam Abbing, 'Dying with Dignity, and Euthanasia: A View from the 
Netherlands' (1988) 4 Journal of Palliative Care 70; M. de Wachter, 'Active Euthanasia in the 
Netherlands' (1989) 262 J.A.M.A. 3316. · 
See Article 293. See also Rigter, Borst-Eilers and Leenen, 1593. 
Rigter, Borst-Eilers and Leenen, 1593. 
State Commission on Euthanasia, The Hague, (1985). See also Royal Dutch Medical Association, 
Central Committee, Vision on Euthanasia (1986) (hereafter referred to as the Royal Dutch Medical 
Association, Vision on Euthanasia). For commentators in support, see also H. Leenen, 'Euthanasia in 
the Netherlands' in P. Byrne, (ed.) Medicine, Medical Ethics and the Value of Life (1990) 1, 2-4; E. 
Borst-Eilers, 'The Status of Physician-Administered Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands', paper 
presented at the Second International Conference on Health Law and Ethics, London, 16-21 July (1989) 
2. 
H. Leenen, 'Legal Aspects of Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and Terminating the Medical Treatment 
of Incompetent Patients' in Royal Dutch Medical Association, Euthanasia in the Netherlands (1991) 2 
(hereafter referred to as the Royal Dutch Medical Association, Euthanasia in the Netherlands). 
Royal Dutch Medical Association, Vision on Euthanasia, 4-5. In so defining euthanasia, the Royal 
Dutch Medical Association has rejected the notion of 'passive' euthanasia. 
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The Dutch Penal Code 
The starting point for analysis of the legal position in the Netherlands with regard to active voluntary 
euthanasia is Article 293 of the Dutch Penal Code 1886. It provides that 
A person who talces the life of another at that other person's express and serious 
request is punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of 12 years or by a 
fine.10 
Article 293 of the Dutch Penal Code is the Article most frequently applicable in cases of active 
voluntary euthanasia.11 It was introduced in 1886 to leave no doubt that the killing of a person is 
unlawful even if that person requests death.12 The inclusion of Article 293 also serves to decrease the 
maximum term of imprisonment from life-long imprisonment as provided for murder13 to 12 years 
by virtue of the request of the victim. The rationale behind this diminished punishment is the fact that 
murder violates the life of a particular person whereas killing on request is a violation of the respect 
which is due to human life in general even though the personal right to life is not violated.14 
Another relevant provision of the Dutch Penal Code 1886 is Article 40 which contains a defence of 
force majeure or 'necessity'. It provides that a person committing an offence under force majeure is not 
criminally liable.15 In the medical context, Article 40 has given rise to a particular defence known as 
noodtoestand or 'emergency' in which the defendant faces an irreconcilable conflict of duties.16 The 
recognition of the noodtoestand defence has played a central role in the development of Dutch 
jurisprudence with regard to euthanasia and has ultimately provided a means by which doctors in the 
Netherlands can perform active voluntary euthanasia without incurring criminal liability 
notwithstanding the prohibition in Article 293. 
Jurisprudential Developments 
Although active voluntary euthanasia is a punishable offence under Article 293 of the Dutch Penal 
Code 1886, the Dutch courts, l 7 through a series of decisions, have developed certain exceptions to 
10 Keown, 51-52. 
11 Note also Article 294 dealing with assisted suicide which provides: A person who intentionally incites 
another to commit suicide, assists in the suicide of another, or procures the means to commit suicide is 
punishable, where death ensues, by imprisonment for up to three years or by a fine. See Keown, 52. 
12 Sluyters, 35. 
13 See Article 289. 
14 See M. Driesse et al, 'Euthanasia and the Law in the Netherlands' (1988) 4 Issues I.Aw & Med. 385, 387, 
referring to the Explanatory Memorandum for the Dutch Penal Code and H.J. Schmidt, Geschiedenis 
van het Wetboek van Stafrecht (History of the Penal Code of 1881), Vol II, 440. 
15 Sluyters, 37. 
16 See further discussion below, 361-367. 
1 7 Comprising the District Courts, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 
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this prohibition by defining guidelines for the practice of active voluntary euthanasia. If these 
guidelines are observed, doctors will not incur liability. Essentially, the position is that a doctor can 
be acquitted, or, if found guilty, released with minimal punishment, and generally will not even be 
prosecuted, if the act of voluntary euthanasia took place in circumstances creating a conflict of duties 
for the doctor which constituted a higher necessity. These guidelines, initially developed by the 
courts, have subsequently been sanctioned by the Dutch medical profession, through prosecution 
guidelines, government commission statements and hospital protocols. 
The first reported case of a Dutch doctor being prosecuted for having administered active voluntary 
euthanasia came before the Leeuwarden District Court in 1973.18 This case involved a doctor, Dr 
Geertruida Posbna, who was prosecuted for ending the life of her mother. Dr Posbna's mother had 
suffered a cerebral haemorrhage, was partially paralysed, had trouble speaking, and was deaf. She had 
unsuccessfully tried to commit suicide and had repeatedly expressed the wish to die.19 In response to 
her mother's request, Dr Postma killed her mother by injecting her with a fatal dose of morphine. Dr 
Postma readily admitted what she had done and said that her only regret was that she had not acted 
earlier. 20 At the time of the trial, quite a number of doctors had signed an open letter to the Dutch 
Minister of Justice stating that they had committed the same offence at least once.21 Dr Posbna was 
convicted for contravention of Article 293 of the Dutch Penal Code 1886 but, because of her purity of 
motives, was only sentenced to a symbolic and conditional punishment.22 The Leeuwarden Court did, 
however, indicate that active voluntary euthanasia would have been acceptable if it were performed in 
circumstances where the patient is incurably ill, experiencing unbearable suffering, and requests the 
termination of his or her life and provided that the termination is performed by the doctor treating the 
patient or in consultation with him or her. 23 
Whilst there have been some differences in the interpretation of this case, 24 the decision attracted 
widespread interest and public debate on the subject of active voluntary euthanasia and was soon hailed 
18 The Postma Case, Nederlands Jurisprudentie, 1973, No. 183, District Court of Leeuwarden, 21 February 
1973. See Note, 'Euthanasia Case Leeuwarden - 1973' (1988) 3 Issues Law & Med. 439. It should be 
noted that in 1952 the Utrecht Court convicted a doctor who had killed his severely suffering brother. 
However, the Leeuwarden case is generally cited as the first euthanasia case in the Netherlands, because 
the court in the earlier Utrecht decision did not consider issues relevant to the acceptability of 
euthanasia; Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands,' 
200 n. 7. 
19 D. Humphry and A. Wickett, The Right to Die (1987) 180-181. 
20 L. Kennedy, Euthanasia (1990) 33. 
21 Kuhse, 'Voluntary Euthanasia in the Netherl~ds,' 94. 
22 She was given a suspended sentence of one week in gaol and one year probation. See Note, 'Euthanasia 
Case Leeuwarden - 1973', 442; Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments 
in the Netherlands,' 200. 
23 See Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands,' 200; 
Note, 'Euthanasia Case Leeuwarden - 1973,' 439-440. 
24 There was some discussion in this case regarding the medical practice of manipulating medications in 
order to alleviate the unbearable suffering of an incurably ill patient, even if that course of action would 
shorten the patient's life. Whilst accepting the prevailing medical standard as a guide, the court held 
that Dr Postma had deviated from that standard by bypassing the course of alleviation and opting 
instead for immediate termination of her mother's life; Note, 'Euthanasia Case Leeuwarden - 1973'. 
Against this background, some commentators have raised doubts as to the scope of the decision; 
whether it merely permitted the hastening of death as a side effect of relieving pain or whether it was in 
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as a legal precedent for the performance of active voluntary euthanasia a8 an exception to Article 293 
of the Penal Code 1886.25 During Dr Posbna's trial, the people in her village had banded together in 
a show of support and shortly after the passing of sentence, the first Dutch Voluntary Euthanasia 
Society was formed (the Nederlandse Vereniging Voor Euthanasie).26 The aim of this society was to 
bring about changes to Article 293 of the Dutch Penal Code 1886 so as to expressly permit active 
voluntary euthanasia performed by a doctor. At the same time, another organisation, the Foundation 
for Voluntary Euthanasia (Stichting Vrjwillige Euthanasie) was formed under the leadership of lawyer 
Dr van Till.27 Unlike the pressure group tactics of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, the foundation 
was a 'think tank' of academics who tried to find a way to make a 'good death' accessible for those 
who really needed it, but without endangering those who were undecided or unwilling to die. This 
group was not convinced that the Penal Code 1886 should be changed and believed that jurisprudence 
could adequately deal with the problem. The foundation sought to promote public discussion on the 
subject and released a number of publications which 'Yere later used by the courts in the development 
of guidelines for the practice of active voluntary euthanasia.28 During this time opinion polls 
conducted in the Netherlands showed growing support for the practice.29 
Another important development which took place in 1973 in the wake of the Leeuwarden Court 
decision was the release of a provisional statement on active voluntary euthanasia by the Royal Dutch 
Medical Association.30 In this statement, the Royal Dutch Medical Association softened its earlier 
opposition to active voluntary euthanasia31 and expressed the somewhat tentative view that 
Legally euthanasia should remain a crime, but that if a physician, after having 
considered all the aspects of the case, shortens the life of a patient who is 
incurably ill and in the process of dying, the court will have to judge whether 
there was a conflict of duties which could justify the act of the physician.32 
This statement contributed to the opening of wide public debate on active voluntary euthanasia in the 
Netherlands and was the beginning of,significant interaction on the subject between the courts and the 
Royal Dutch Medical Association.33 The notion of 'conflict of duties' referred to in the association's 
statement came to be the basis for the defence accepted by the courts for the performance of active 
voluntary euthanasia. 
fact intended to provide guidelines under which a doctor could avoid punishment under Article 293. For 
discussion see Driesse et al, 654-656; Bostrom, 474. 
25 I. van der Sluis, 'The Practice of Euthanasia in the Netherlands' (1989) 4 Issues Law & Med. 455, 458. 
26 Humphry and Wickett, 181. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Verbal communication with Dr van Till, November 1991. 
29 Leenen, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 1-2. 
30 Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst (J(.N.M.G.). 
31 See, for example, the Royal Dutch Medical Association 1959 booklet, Medical Ethics in which active 
euthanasia and assisted suicide are strongly rejected and strong emphasis is placed on the doctor's duty 
to preserve life as long as possible. 
32 Royal Dutch Medical Association, Provisional Statement on Euthanasia (1973). 
33 De Wachter, 3317. 
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Following the Leeuwarden Court decision, several other cases were brought before the lower courts in 
the Netherlands, including a case of assisted suicide which was brought before the Rotterdam Criminal 
Court in 1981.34 Although this case involved a lay person35 and was therefore distinguishable from 
the earlier Leeuwarden Court decision, the Rotterdam Criminal Court took the opportunity to lay 
down specific guidelines under which the practice of active voluntary euthanasia would not be a 
punishable offence. These guidelines represented a synthesis of earlier legal developments as well as 
reflecting developments within the medical profession and contributions made by the voluntary 
euthanasia organisations with regard to the public debate on the permissibility of active voluntary 
euthanasia 36 In order for a doctor to escape liability: 
(i) There must be physical or mental suffering which the sufferer finds unbearable; 
(ii) The suffering and the desire to die must be lasting (i.e. not temporary); 
(iii) The decision to die must be the voluntary decision of an informed patient; 
(iv) The patient must have a correct and clear understanding of his or her condition 
and of other possibilities (the results of this and that treatment and of no 
treatment); he or she must be capable of weighing those options and must 
have done so; 
(v) There is no other reasonable (i.e. acceptable for the patient) solution to 
improve the situation; 
(vi) The (time and manner of) death will not cause avoidable misery to others (i.e. 
the next of kin should be informed beforehand); 
(vii) The decision to give aid-in-dying is only open to medical doctors and should 
not be a one-person decision. Consulting another professional (medical doctor, 
psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker, according to the circumstances of the 
case) is obligatory; 
(viii) A medical doctor who is familiar with the relevant circumstances of the case 
must be involved in the decision al}d the prescription of the correct drugs; and 
(ix) The decision process and the actual aid must be done with the utmost care.37 
These conditions, sometimes referred to as the Leeuwarden and Rotterdam criteria,38 also became the 
basis upon which decisions whether to prosecute were made.39 The Public Prosecutor's Office in the 
Netherlands has the discretion not to proceed with a criminal case if it is considered to be in the public 
interest not to do so.40 Following the decision of the Rotterdam Criminal Court, the Public 
Prosecutor's Office, in consultation with the Ministry of Justice, decided upon central co-ordination of 
cases of active voluntary euthanasia. Prosecution policy was adopted in conformity with the 
34 lst December 1981. See Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the 
Netherlands,' 200. 
35 In this case, a woman was convicted and sentenced to six months conditional confinement for having 
provided the means and assisted in the suicide of an old lady who believed she had cancer. 
36 Written communication with Dr van Till, 1990. 
37 Humphry and Wickett, 186-187. 
3 8 Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands,' 200. 
39 Ibid. 
40 E. Sutorius, 'How Euthanasia was Legalised in Holland,' paper delivered in Arnhem, the Netherlands 
(1985) 10. 
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guidelines established in the cases. A committee consisting of the country's five Chief Prosecutors 
(each of whom is attached to one of the five regional Courts of Appeal41) was formed to centrally 
review all euthanasia cases brought to the attention of the public prosecutor, and guidelines were 
issued by the government that no cases of medically administered active voluntary euthanasia were to 
be prosecuted before they had been examined by the committee and approved for prosecution. 42 
However, even after the development of these guidelines by the courts and the decision of the 
prosecution to bring their policy into conformity with those guidelines, considerable uncertainty 
remained. There was no guarantee that a doctor who performed active voluntary euthanasia in 
accordance with the guidelines would not be prosecuted. Moreover, doubt remained whether decisions 
taken by the lower courts to accept active voluntary euthanasia under certain conditions, 
notwithstanding the prohibition in Article 293, would be upheld in the higher courts. 43 
The Alkmaar Case 198444 
The Alkmaar case was the first case to be brought before the Dutch Supreme Court and thus became a 
test-case for the permissibility of active voluntary euthanasia performed in accordance with the criteria 
laid down in the earlier decisions. This case also presented the opportunity for the Court of Appeal 
and the Supreme Court to consider and authoritatively pronounce upon various defences which had 
been advanced in the lower courts since the 1970s on behalf of doctors who had been prosecuted for 
the performance of active voluntary euthanasia.45 
A number of different defences have been put forward. One such defence is the 'medical exception' to 
the effect that a doctor who acts with due care and within generally accepted medical standards should 
not be convicted under Article 293 of the Penal Code 1886.46 According to a number of jurists who 
have vigorously put forward this viewpoint, active voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide should be 
considered a normal part of the services which doctors provide to their patients.47 Another defence, 
also based on the interpretation of Article 293, is that the prohibition contained in this Article was 
not intended by the framers of the Code to cover the act of a physician in ending life.48 
A further defence which has been advanced is based on the argument that although the terms of a 
certain legal provision may prohibit a certain act, that act may not violate the spirit of the legal 
provision.49 This defence is also sometimes expressed in terms of 'absence of material illegality'. The 
origins of this defence date back to a 1933 case in which it was held that a clear legal prohibition 
41 C. Gomez, Regulating Death (1991) 60. 
42 Sluyters, 41. 
43 See, for example, the concern expressed by the Royal Dutch Medical Association; de Wachter, 3318. 
See also Leenen, 'Supreme Court's Decisions on Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 349. 
44 Alkmaar Case, Nederlands Jurisprudentie 1985, No.106, Supreme Court, 27 Nov. 1984. 
45 Sluyters, 36-38. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Verbal communication with Professor Leenen and Dr Sutorius, November/December 1991. 
49 Sluyters, 37. 
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against subjecting healthy cattle to infectious disease did not apply to a veterinary surgeon because the 
infection caused was aimed at improving and not injuring the health of the animals.so 
Another defence which has been put forward by defence attorneys and in Dutch legal literature is the 
defence of force majeure or necessity which derives from Article 40 of the Penal Code 1886. In the 
context of medically administered active voluntary euthanasia this has taken the form of the 
noodtoestand defence which is essentially based upon an irreconcilable conflict of duties. According to 
this defence, the duty of a doctor to abide by the law and to respect the life of the patient may be 
outweighed by the doctor's other duty to help a patient who is suffering unbearably and for whom, to 
end this suffering, there is no alternative but death.51 
The facts of the Alkmaar case were that the defendant, Dr Schoonheim, had given a series of lethal 
injections to his patient, a 95 year old woman, Maria Barendregt, who was seriously ill and who had 
no prospect of improvement. Some years earlier, the patient had discussed her deteriorating condition 
with her doctor and had signed an advance declaration stating that she requested active euthanasia if she 
were to be in such a condition that no recovery to a reasonable and dignified state of life was to be 
expected. At age 94 she fractured her hip, suffered hearing and vision loss, and at times was unable to 
speak or articulate. The weekend before her death, her condition deteriorated considerably. She was 
unable to drink or eat and became unconscious. She regained consciousness some days later and 
declared that she did not want to live through a similar experience. The defendant subsequently 
discussed the matter with his assistant doctor and with the patient's son, both of whom approved of 
performing active voluntary euthanasia upon the patient. After a final conversation with the patient 
later that week, in which she again declared her wish to die, the doctor decided to meet her request 
because, according to his judgement, every day that she lived would be a heavy burden for her with 
unbearable suffering.52 Dr Schoonheim then wrote on the death certificate 'unnatural death' and 
informed the police of his actions. 
At first instance, before the Alkmaar District Court, the doctor was acquitted on the grounds of 
absence of material illegality. 53 The court found that although he had contravened the terms of Article 
293 of the Penal Code 1886, his conduct, judged from a legal point of view, could not be termed 
undesirable. The court's acceptance of this defence was, to a large extent, based upon its willingness 
to recognise the principle of self-determination. The court stated that the principle of self-
determination has been so generally accepted that it should prevail in an active voluntary euthanasia 
situation where the aid of a doctor is necessary to terminate life in a way worthy of a human being 
and without violence.54 The court found that Dr Schoonheim had acted with the greatest possible 
care, giving serious consideration to the persistent suffering of his patient before taking the decision 
SO Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Gevers, 159. 
53 H. Scholten, 'Justification of Active Euthanasia' (1986) 5 Med. & Law 169. 
54 Sluyters, 37; Scholten, 170. 
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to perfonn active voluntary euthanasia. It was held that since he had satisfied the highest standards of 
conscientiousness, his actions were not legally undesirable and therefore not materially illegal under 
Article 293. This was the first time that a lower court had actually acquitted a doctor who had 
perfonned active voluntary euthanasia. 55 
The prosecution appealed to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. The Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
overturned the decision, rejecting outright the doctrine of absence of material illegality.56 The court 
held that while the doctor's actions might have been desirable, especially in tenns of the patient's 
right to self-detennination, such actions were still illegal, and the doctor was therefore still 
accountable under Article 293.57 The defence counsel had, inter alia, relied on the notion of 
noodtoestand or emergency. This was presented on the grounds that the doctor had been faced with 
conflicting duties, and that after carefully weighing the conflicting duties and interests, in conformity 
with the standards of medical ethics and expertise, he had made a decision which was objectively 
justified.58 However, the Court of Appeal rejected this argument.59 The court was also critical of the 
fact that the doctor had relied solely on approval from the patient's son and the assistant doctor. In the 
opinion of the Court of Appeal, these two people were not sufficiently objective and independent. 60 
Thus, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal found the doctor guilty. However, no punishment was 
imposed on the grounds that although it was doubtful that Dr Schoonheim had acted out of necessity, 
it was nonetheless evident that he had acted with integrity and due caution. 61 
The doctor appealed to the Dutch Supreme Court, the highest legal forum in the Netherlands. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's analysis as to the absence of material illegality62 but 
held that the court had wrongly rejected the defence counsel's plea that a conflict of duties caused the 
doctor to act under force majeure in an emergency situation (i.e. the noodtoestand defence).63 The 
Supreme Court ruled that the a doctor's duty to abide by the law and to respect the life of the patient 
'may be outweighed by his other duty to help a patient who is suffering unbearably, who depends 
upon him and for whom, to end his suffering, there is no alternative but death'.64 The Supreme Court 
found that the Court of Appeal had failed to adequately investigate whether, according to respousible 
medical judgment, tested by norms of medical ethics, force majeure existed in this case as the doctor 
55 Humphry and Wickett, 187. 
56 H. Feber, 'De Wederwaardigheden van Artikel 293 van het Wetboek van Strafrecht Vanaf 1981 Tot 
Heden' ('The Vicissitudes of Article 293 of the Penal Code to the Present') in G. van der Wal, (ed.) 
Euthanasie Knelpunten in ein Discussie (Euthanasia: Bottlenecks in a Discussion) 54-81 (1987), 
reviewed in Abstracts, (1988) 3 Issues Law & Med. 455, 456-457. 
57 D. Wainey, 'Active Voluntary Euthanasia: The Ultimate Act of Care for the Dying' (1989) 37 
Clev.St.L.Rev. 645, 658. 
58 Sutorius, 6. 
5 9 Scholten, 170. 
60 Ibid. 
6 l Feber, 456. 
62 Wainey, 658. 
63 E. Sutorius, 'A Mild Death for Paragraph 293 of the Netherlands Criminal Code?,' paper delivered in 
Amhem, the Netherlands (1985). 
64 D. Brahams, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands' (1990) 58 Medico-Legal J. 98 
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had claimed.65 According to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal could for instance have attached 
importance to: 
-whether, and if so to what extent, according to professional medical judgment, 
increasing disfigurement of the patient's personality and/or increasing 
deterioration of her already unbearable suffering were to be expected; 
-whether, also taking into account the possibility of new serious relapses, it was 
to be expected that soon she would no longer be in a position to die with dignity; 
-whether, and if so to what extent, there had been ways to alleviate her 
suffering. 66 
Because the Amsterdam Court of Appeal had not adequately investigated the conflict of duties for the 
doctor, its decision was reversed and the case was referred to the Court of Appeal of the Hague for 
final determination, with instructions to review the questions which had not been addressed in the 
lower court.67 The Hague Court of Appeal upheld the reasoning of the Supreme Court and acquitted 
the doctor. The court found that although there was no medical consensus as to the permissibility of 
active voluntary euthanasia, the doctor's actions were '.justified according to reasonable medical 
insight'. 68 In reaching this decision, the court had relied heavily on the opinion of the Royal Dutch 
Medical Association with regard to active voluntary euthanasia which had been specifically sought for 
the purposes of this case. 69 
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Alkmaar case, and its endorsement by the Hague Court of 
Appeal, was a significant development in securing the legal acceptability of active euthanasia on 
request in the Netherlands.7° It effectively upheld the noodtoestand defence which recognises that a 
doctor may be faced with conflicting duties: the duty to uphold the law of the land which prohibits the 
taking of life, and the duty to act in the best interests of the patient. Since doctors cannot always 
simultaneously satisfy both duties, they cannot be held criminally responsible when they do what 
their professional duty demands, namely putting the patient's interests first.71 Although decisions of 
the Supreme Court only relate to the particular case before the court, in practice, its rulings have a 
strong influence on the lower courts. By accepting the appeal to force majeure in the sense of 
65 Leenen, 'Supreme Court's Decisions on Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 350. 
6 6 Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands,' 200. 
67 Id. 201. The Supreme Court only has jurisdiction on matters of law. Where it finds that the lower court 
had not remained within the law, it refers the decision to one of the Courts of Appeal to review the case, 
having regard to all the facts and circumstances~ Sutorius, 'How Euthanasia was Legalised in Holland', 
7. 
68 Feher, 462. (Emphasis in the original). The only point of departure from th~ decision of the Supreme 
Court was the change from 'responsible medical insight' to 'reasonable medical insight'. See also 
Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands,' 201. 
69 Gomez, 37-38. 
70 For example, Leenen, 'Supreme Court's Decisions on Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 350. 
71 H. Kuhse, 'Sanctity of Life and the Role of the Nurse' (1988) 18 Aust. Nurses J. 10, 11. 
364 
conflicting duties, the Supreme Court made an opening for acquittal (or other lenient treatment) in 
individuai cases of doctors administering active voluntaiy euthanasia under certain conditions.72 
A significant aspect of the Supreme Court's decision was its reliance upon medical standards in 
determining the validity of a plea based upon a conflict of duties. According to the Supreme Court, 
the primary judgement as to the permissibility of active voluntary euthanasia rests with the medical 
profession. 73 The court specifically ruled that in deciding whether, on the basis of the facts of the 
case, the doctor should not be held liable because of the 'emergency' he or she faced, the court should 
take into consideration 'scientific medical views and medical ethical norms.•74 It could therefore be 
argued that, to a limited extent at least, the Supreme Court has accepted the medical exception 
defence.75 This is not to say, however, that the question of the permissibility of active voluntary 
euthanasia is solely a medical concern: whilst the view of the medical profession as to the 
permissibility of active voluntary euthanasia in any particular case is, in the judgment of the Supreme 
Court, clearly relevant, where there is any doubt, a plea based upon conflicting duties must ultimately 
be determined by reference to legal standards, as assessed by the courts.76 
Although the decision of the Supreme Court has been widely welcomed, having paved the way for the 
legal acceptability of active euthanasia performed at the patient's request, it has been criticised for its 
reference to medical ethics.77 It has been argued that active voluntary euthanasia is not purely a 
medical act, subject only to medical ethics, and that in any event, no norms exist within the medical 
profession as to the permissibility of the practice.78 A better view of the decision is that the Supreme 
Court has not entirely delegated the decision as to the permissibility of active voluntary euthanasia to 
the medical profession, but rather will refer to medical standards, in so far as they exist, in 
determining the validity of a defence plea based upon a conflict of duties. 
Some consideration should also be given to the role of the principle of self-determination in the 
Alkmaar case. In this, as in earlier cases, the principal focus of the court has been on the position of 
the defendant doctor, and the issue of patient autonomy has only been dealt with indirectly. Although 
the principle of self-determination was not a specific basis of the Supreme Court's decision in the 
Alkmaar case, it does clearly play an important role in that the performance of active voluntary 
72 Leenen, 'Legal Aspects of Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and Terminating the Medical Treatment of 
Incompetent Patients,' 5. It is, however, possible that the court finds that the defendant had committed 
some other offence; e.g. falsification of the death certificate. 
73 Sutorius, 'How Euthanasia was Legalised in Holland?' 12; Sluyters, 38. 
74 Sluyters, 38. The relevance of medical considerations is also apparent from the Supreme Court's 
finding that the Court of Appeal had erred in not investigating 'whether, according to responsible 
medical judgment, tested by norms of medical ethics, force majeure existed in this case' and from the 
specific matters which the Supreme Court identified as being relevant for consideration and which it 
directed the Hague Court of Appeal to take into account. See above, 363. 
15 For explanation, see above, 360. See also Sluyters, 38; Sutorius, 'How Euthanasia was Legalised in 
Holland,' 14. 
16 Sutorius, 'How Euthanasia was Legalised in Holland,' 12. 
77 Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands,' 201; Feber, 
458. 
78 Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands,' 201. See 
also Bostrom, 483. 
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euthanasia is conditional on the express and earnest request of the patient.79 The importance of 
patient self-determination is also evident from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the criterion of 
'dying with dignity•80 as being dependent on the patient's own life perspective. 81 The principle of 
self-determination is, however, tempered by other considerations and certainly does not entitle a 
patient to demand the performance of active voluntary euthanasia in all circumstances. In light of the 
Alkmaar case, the permissibility of the doctor's act depends on the existence of a true 'emergency' 
situation and is therefore limited to exceptional circumstances.82 
It should also be noted that whilst upholding the existence of the noodtoestand defence in cases of 
active voluntary euthanasia, the Supreme Court did n~t specify the necessary criteria for the 
performance of lawful euthanasia. This can, to a large extent, be explained by the fact that the role of 
the Supreme Court is to adjudicate on the law, and any consideration of factual issues must be referred 
back to another court. 83 One can, however, interpret the Supreme Court's decision as giving at least 
tacit recognition to the guidelines for the performance of active voluntary euthanasia developed by the 
lower courts in earlier cases. 84 
Since the landmark Alkmaar case, and its unequivocal acceptance of the noodtoestand or emergency 
defence, a number of further cases involving doctors performing active voluntary euthanasia have 
come before the Dutch courts. 85 These cases have confirmed the existence of the noodtoestand defence 
and have examined the application of this defence in different factual circumstances. 
In 1985, two cases of active voluntary euthanasia were decided by the lower courts in Rotterdam and 
the Hague.86 In both cases, the courts accepted the argument based upon the noodtoestand or 
emergency defence; that the doctor had made a decision which could objectively be regarded as justified 
in light of the conflicting duties and interests which the doctor faced.87 The case before the Hague 
Court involved the prosecution of Dr Pieter Admiraal, a leading practitioner of active voluntary 
euthanasia in the Netherlands. The patient in this case was a 34 year old woman suffering from 
79 J. Gevers, 'Euthanasia or Assisted Suicide and the Non-Terminally Ill', in 0. Aycke and M. Smook, 
(eds.) Right to Self-Determination (1990) 65, 66. 
80 This was amongst the relevant considerations which could have been considered by the Court of 
Appeal, see above, 363. 
81 Feber, 463. 
82 Gevers, 'Euthanasia or Assisted Suicide and the Non-Terminally Ill', 67. 
83 Verbal communication with Professor Leenen, December 1991. 
84 Ibid. 
85 For a discussion of these cases, see Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: 
Developments in the Netherlands,' 202; Leenen, 'Dying with Dignity: Developments in the Field of 
Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 521-523. There have also been a number of cases brought before the 
medical disciplinary courts. 
86 Gevers, 'Legal Developments Concerning Active Euthanasia on Request in the Netherlands,' 160. 
87 Note, however, that in the Rotterdam case, the doctor was found guilty of completing a false death 
certificate. In a number of cases the courts have held that where a patient dies following the 
administration of active voluntary euthanasia, one cannot say that death occurred as a result of natural 
causes. The doctor is therefore required to enter a declaration of non-natural death. A doctor cannot rely 
on the plea of necessity or professional secrecy to escape liability for falsification of a death 
certificate: B. Bostrom and W. Lagerwey, 'Court of the Hague (Penal Chamber) April 2 1987' (1988) 3 
Issues Law & Med. 451. 
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multiple sclerosis. The patient had been experiencing physical and mental suffering and bad repeatedly 
requested assistance to die. Dr Admiraal bad complied with the patient's request in accordance with the 
guidelines laid down by the courts. The Hague Court dismissed the case against Dr Admiraal, 8 8 
thereby confirming the proposition which bad been first accepted in the 1973 Leeuwarden case that the 
patient need not be in the terminal phase in order for a doctor to be able to rely on the noodtoestand 
defence.89 
There bas also been a recent prosecution against a psychiatrist who bad assisted one of bis patients to 
commit suicide. The Rotterdam Court accepted that unbearable psychic suffering of a patient could be 
the basis for the application of the noodtoestand defence.90 
In a number of other cases the doctors were convicted because it bad not been established beyond 
reasonable doubt that the patient had requested active euthanasia.91 There have also been a number of 
cases involving nurses and nursing assistants who have terminated the lives of patients.92 The courts 
have held that nurses and nursing assistants cannot invoke the defence of noodtoestand or emergency 
because they are not entitled to undertake acts which may endanger the life of a patient. Arguments 
based upon pressures of psychic stress have been rejected on the grounds that nurses should be able to 
cope with stressful conditions. 
Evaluation of Dutch Case Law Developments 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that quite an extraordinary situation exists in the Netherlands: 
notwithstanding the seemingly absolute prohibition of active voluntary euthanasia in Article 293 of 
the Penal Code 1886, in certain circumstances of unbearable suffering of a patient, active voluntary 
euthanasia may be performed by a doctor with the acquiescence of the law. A major step in this 
development was the acceptance by the Supreme Court in the Alkmaar case that noodtoestand (or 
emergency) could be a defence in a prosecution for active voluntary euthanasia. Apart from this 
landmark decision, other cases have also contributed in setting criteria to be followed by doctors when 
administering active voluntary eutbanasia.93 In addition to the need for a true emergency situation 
(noodtoestand), certain minimum requirements have emerged from the cases: the voluntariness of the 
patient's request; the requirement that the patient must suffer unbearably (physically or mentally); that 
8 8 Feber, 465. 
89 A. Vervoorn, 'Voluntary Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Recent Developments' (1987) 6 Bioethics 
News 19, 24; Wainey, 662 n. 150. 
90 24 January 1992. (Written communication with Professor Leenen, July 1992.) 
91 Gevers, 'Legal Developments Concerning Active Euthanasia on Request in the Netherlands,' 160; 
Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands,' 202; 
Leenen, 'Dying With Dignity: Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 521-522. 
92 Leenen, 'Dying with Dignity: Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 522. 
93 See also Leenen, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 1. 
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there must be no other way to relieve the patient's suffering; that only a doctor may perform active 
voluntary euthanasia; and that in doing so, he or she must consult with another doctor.94 
Significantly, the guidelines which have been developed by the Dutch courts regarding the 
circumstances under which the performance of active voluntary euthanasia is tolerated (sometimes also 
referred to as the 'carefulness requirements'), have subsequently been affirmed and extended by the 
Royal Dutch Medical Association, the State Commission on Euthanasia and the prosecution 
authorities. 95 
Position of the Royal Dutch Medical Association 
In 1984, the Central Committee of the Royal Dutch Medical Association issued a report outlining its 
official standpoint on active euthanasia, revising the association's provisional view formulated in 
1973.96 The need for publishing a statement of its views at this time had in part been precipitated by 
a request from the State Commission on Euthanasia, so that the commission could incorporate the 
association's views in its own work.97 The association's 1984 statement reflected the significant 
social and legal developments which had taken place in the Netherlands since the release of its 
provisional statement in 1973.98 The object of the 1984 report was not to argue the permissibility of 
active voluntary euthanasia, but rather, on the assumption that it was already being performed, to 
provide guidance as to the appropriate conditions under which it is performed and to draw attention to 
the legal uncertainty which existed at that time with regard to the practice of active voluntary 
euthanasia, both for doctors and patients. 99 
The conditions for the performance of active voluntary euthanasia recommended by the Royal Dutch 
Medical Association Central Committee followed quite closely the guidelines laid down in the court 
decisions. A strong recommendation made by the association was that the practice of active voluntary 
euthanasia must be confined exclusively to the doctor/patient relationship.100 This was not only 
94 Leenen, 'Dying with Dignity: Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in the Netherlands', 523. 
Leenen notes (n. 16) that the Supreme Court and a lower court left open whether, under certain 
conditions, not consulting another doctor would automatically result in conviction. It appears that the 
failure to consult a colleague would not necessarily prevent a doctor from bringing a successful plea of 
noodtoestand. 
Although most of the cases have included consultation as one of the key requirements there is still no 
consensus as to the precise content of this requirement, (e.g. whether a doctor must consult with a 
doctor independent of the consulting doctor and the patient) and what form that consultation should 
take (e.g. whether the doctor who is consulted must see the patient in person.) (Verbal communication 
with Professor Leenen, Dr Sutorius, Dr Gevers and Chief Prosecutor Jitta, November/December 1991.) 
95 Rigter, Borst-Eilers and Leenen, 1594. 
96 Royal Dutch Medical Association, Central Committee, Vision on Euthanasia (English translation and 
adaption of an article first published in Dutch in the Royal Dutch Medical Association official 
magazine, August 1984.) See above, 358 for reference to the 1973 statement. 
97 Royal Dutch Medical Association, Vision on Euthanasia, 3. For discussion of the State Committee on 
Euthanasia see below, 372-374. 
9 8 Gevers, 'Legal Developments Concerning Active Euthanasia on Request in the Netherlands,' 158. 
99 Royal Dutch Medical Association, Vision on Euthanasia, 3. 
lOO Id. 7. 
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because the practice requires medical and pharmacological expertise, but also because only doctors 
were in a position to give a diagnosis and prognosis of the patient's condition. Moreover, doctors are 
accountable for their conduct under the medical code of ethics and can be brought before a disciplinary 
court in the event that they breach the rules. It was accordingly recommended that the medical 
profession has an obligation to come up with a socially acceptable approach for the practice of active 
voluntary euthanasia It was further recommended that the practice of active euthanasia at the patient's 
request by a doctor must be completely voluntary.101 A doctor who is opposed to the practice is, 
however, required to enable the patient to come into contact with another doctor who is willing to 
assist, but without necessarily breaking off his or her own relationship with the patient. 102 In view 
of the irrevocable and exceptional character of active voluntary euthanasia, doctors who are willing to 
perform the practice will have to meet a number of conditions and active voluntary euthanasia should 
only be performed as a last resort. Taking into account jurisprudential developments in the 
Netherlands with regard to the administration of activ~ voluntary euthanasia, it was recommended that 
doctors will have to meet the following requirements with regard to the exercise of due care: 
(i) that the request for euthanasia is entirely voluntary; 
(ii) that it is a well considered request; 
(iii) without indicating any particular time span, that the request for euthanasia is a 
durable wish; 
(iv) that the patient is experiencing unacceptable suffering, be it suffering due to 
pain, whether or not based on a perceivable physical condition or suffering due 
to a physical condition or physical disintegration without pain; and 
(v) consultation with a colleague with experience in the field.103 
The central committee was of the view that one should not ascribe an overriding importance to 
whether or not the patient is in the dying phase. This represented a change from the associations' 
provisional view formulated in 1973, 104 reflecting case law developments in which the courts have 
not insisted on this being a requirement. According to the central committee, the key question is 
whether a situation has been reached in which the patient voluntarily expresses a wish for death in a 
well-founded way and the doctor acknowledges the patient's unacceptable suffering, and that the 
suffering may be considered prospectless.105 It was, however, recommended that there should be a 
stipulation to the effect that active voluntary euthanasia be performed in a manner that is medically 
and pharmacologically justified.106 
101 /d. 7-8. 
102 ld. 8. 
103 Id. 8-11. For analysis of these criteria see Gomez, 40-42. 
104 See above, 358. 
105 Royal Dutch Medical Association, Vision on Euthanasia, 12. 
106 Id. 16. 
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In the interests of a balanced decision-making process, the central committee was of the view that 
consultation within professional medical circles is indispensable. 107 It recommended that in addition 
to informal consultation within the doctor's own team, there should be a more formal evaluation 
procedure to judge the merits of the request for active euthanasia by way of a committee of medical 
examiners consisting, for example, of a number of doctors to be appointed regionally by the Royal 
Dutch Medical Association.108 
With regard to the reporting procedure after active voluntary euthanasia has been performed, the central 
committee acknowledged that it is not unusual for doctors to record cases of active voluntary 
euthanasia as 'natural deaths' in order to protect the next of kin and/or to protect themselves from the 
unpleasant consequences attached to legal proceedings, even if no punishment is ultimately 
imposed.109 The committee was of the view that this practice was inappropriate, simply obscuring 
the tension which exists between the strict legal position as reflected in Article 293 of the Penal Code 
1886 and the practice of active voluntary euthanasia. Moreover, it has the consequence that the actual 
practice with regard to active voluntary euthanasia is absolutely unverifiable. It was accordingly 
recommended that doctors exercise due openness in reporting the cause of death. By the same token, 
however, it was thought th~t a doctor who complies with the conditions for the exercise of due care in 
the performance of active voluntary e~thanasia may reasonably expect not to be prosecuted. In order to 
unequivocally achieve this end, greater clarity was called for and the committee recommended a 
modification of the legislation on the disposal of the dead as well as clear arrangements being made 
between the Ministry of Justice and the Royal Dutch Medical Association with regard to prosecution 
policy concerning the performance of active voluntary euthanasia by doctors until such time that 
legislation is introduced.110 
Whilst the central committee had expressed ~ts concern about the legal uncertainty concerning active 
voluntary euthanasia both for doctors and patients, and had strongly urged that this uncertainty be 
eliminated as soon as possible, 111 the association refrained from saying whether the introduction of 
legislation was the appropriate solution.112 What was important was that there should be legal 
security for doctors and patients, whether this was achieved through explicit guidelines for prosecution 
developed by jurisprudence or by legislation.113 
Since the release of the 1984 revised statement on active voluntary euthanasia by the Royal Dutch 
Medical Association, the association has been involved in a number of other initiatives. In 1987, the 
107 Id. 11, 12-13. 
108 The specifics of this recommendation were not in the English translation of the central committee's 
vision, but appear in various other summaries and accounts, see, for example, Sutorius, 'How 
Euthanasia was Legalised in Holland,' 15. 
109 Royal Dutch Medical Association, Vision on Euthanasia, 14. 
110 Id. 15. 
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112 Gevers, 'Legal Developments Concerning Active Euthanasia on Request in the Netherlands,' 159. 
113 M.G. van Berkestijn, 'The Royal Dutch Medical Association and the Practice of Euthanasia and Assisted 
Suicide,' in Royal Dutch Medical Association, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 6. 
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Royal Dutch Medical Association and the Dutch nurses' union issued a joint paper which laid down 
practical guidelines for health care professionals participating in the active voluntary euthanasia 
decision.114 As with the association's 1984 statement on active voluntary euthanasia, this joint paper 
does not attempt to evaluate the permissibility of active voluntary euthanasia, but rather, to provide 
practical guidelines with regard to the respective tasks, competences and responsibilities of both 
doctors and nurses with regard to the performance of active voluntary euthanasia. These guidelines are 
intended not only to protect the legal position of doctors and nurses but also to protect the legal rights 
and interests of patients by sanctioning only voluntary euthanasia and requiring documentation of the 
decision-making process.115 
It is made clear under the guidelines that the decision-making process for active voluntary euthanasia 
occurs under the final responsibility of a doctor. The doctor must satisfy him or herself of the 
voluntariness of the patient's request, that it is a well considered and persistent request, and that the 
patient is experiencing unacceptable suffering. Furthermore, the doctor must consult with at least one 
colleague about the request of the patient.116 The guidelines also recognise the central role of nurses 
in the care of patients and that in some cases, the request for active euthanasia may initially be made 
to the nursing staff.1 17 The guidelines emphasise the need for open dialogue between doctors and 
nurses and for joint participation in the decision-making process.118 However, the guidelines 
recommend that the ultimate decision of whether or not to proceed with active voluntary euthanasia 
must be taken by the doctor.119 With regard to the performance of active voluntary euthanasia, the 
guidelines recognise that only doctors have the protection of the law and that a nurse who 
independently engages in active voluntary euthanasia, even if she observes the procedure for 
appropriate medical care, would almost certainly be prosecuted._120 It was accordingly recommended 
that the act of euthanasia be performed by the doctor alone. However, where this is not possible, 
(where, for example, a procedure is chosen at the request of the patient, involving a number of 
activities which the doctor cannot carry out alone) the doctor can ask a nursing or caring attendant 
who was involved in the decision-making process to co-operate in the procedure.121 If the nursing or 
caring attendant is convinced that all the criteria of appropriate medical care have been met and, in 
accordance with his or her conscience, agrees to co-operate, a written agreement must be entered into 
between the doctor and nurse/caring attendant with regard to the carrying out of the procedure, 
specifying who performs which action and when.122 The joint guidelines also stress the desirability 
114 For an English translation of the guidelines, see Note, 'Guidelines for Euthanasia' (1988) 3 Issues Law 
& Med. 429. 
115 Wainey, 664. 
116 'Guidelines for Euthanasia,' 431-433. 
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of developing procedural agreements for each work organisation with regard to the carrying out of 
active voluntary euthanasia.123 
Consideration has so far focused on the position of the Royal Dutch Medical Association and the 
main Dutch nursing organisation with regard to the practice of active voluntary euthanasia In order to 
present a complete picture, it should also be noted that there is some opposition to the practice of 
active voluntary euthanasia from within the Dutch medical profession. There are a number of medical 
organisations including the Nederlands Artsenverbond (Dutch League of Physicians) and the Pro Life 
Doctors which are officially opposed to the practice. Some Dutch doctors are also members of the 
World Federation of Doctors who Respect Human Life, an intem~tional organisation which is 
actively campaigning against the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands.124 
There are also many doctors who, although not in principle opposed to active voluntary euthanasia, 
refuse to practice it while it is still illegal.125 Significantly though, the endorsement of active 
voluntary euthanasia by the Royal Dutch Medical Association in its 1984 statement resulted in very 
few cancellations of membership. Of a total of 30,000 Dutch doctors, 25,000 are members of the 
Royal Dutch Medical Association. This provides some grounds for suggesting that the vast majority 
of Dutch doctors are not opposed to active voluntary euthanasia, provided it is confined to the strict 
conditions that have been advocated by the central committee of the Royal Dutch Medical 
Association. 126 
Institutional Policies and Procedures 
As the practice of active voluntary euthanasia remains punishable, individual doctors, hospitals and 
health care institutions have attempted to protect themselves by following policies that will prevent a 
prosecution from being initiated. To this end, many hospitals and nursing homes have developed their 
own institutional guidelines and prescribed their own procedures for the practice of active voluntary 
euthanasia.127 It is estimated that 80% of all institutions of the health services have a euthanasia 
protocol or directive.128 Almost all of them leave some room for active voluntary euthanasia, 
usually under very strict conditions and review, and they also compel the doctor to report the 
occurrence of active voluntary euthanasia. 129 Information is readily available to doctors in the 
Netherlands regarding how to perform active euthanasia.130 
123 Ibid. 
124 News Exchange of the World FederaJion of Doctors who Respect Human Life 'Euthanasia in Holland' 
Part I No. 97, October 1987 and Part II No. 99, April 1988. 
125 Kennedy, 38. 
126 Van Berkestijn, 8. 
127 De Wachter, 3318-3319. 
128 Van Berkestijn, 9. 
129 Ibid. 
130 See, for example, the publication by P. Admiraal, Justifiable Euthanasia (1980). Dr Pieter Admiraal, an 
anaesthesiologist practising for many years at the Delft General Hospital, was the first Dutch doctor to 
speak openly about his involvement with active voluntary euthanasia. Dr Admiraal has been a high 
profile campaigner for the acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia both within his own country and 
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The Netherlands State Commission on Euthanasia 131 
In response to calls for reform, a State Commission on Euthanasia was established in 1982 by Royal 
Decree. The role of this commission was to advise the government concerning its future policy with 
regard to active voluntary euthanasia and of rendering assistance in self-killing, in particular with 
respect to legislation and the application of the law. The commission comprised 15 members: 7 
lawyers, 3 doctors, 2 psychiatrists, 1 nurse and 2 theologians. 132 The report of the commission was 
released in August 1985 and its recommendations were set out in the form of a proposal for the 
amendment of the Dutch Penal Code 1886. By a majority of 13 to 2, the commission recommended 
that the present prohibition in the Penal Code 1886 should be revised so as to allow doctors to 
practise active voluntary euthanasia under conditions similar to those developed by the courts.133 The 
commission was of the view that the intentional killing of another person at the latter's explicit and 
earnest request should remain punishable under Article 293 of the Penal Code 1886, but that an 
exception should be incorporated into the law for a doctor who does so with regard to a patient who is 
in an untenable situation without any acceptable prospects for change, and provided the act is carried 
out within the framework of careful medical practice.134 It was recommended that assistance to 
suicide should be regarded within the same circumstances and on the same conditions as active 
voluntary euthanasia.135 The commission went on to elaborate the minimum requirements for careful 
medical practice, including that: 
a) the patient has been informed of his or her particular circumstances; 
b) the doctor has satisfied him or herself that the patient has made his or her 
request for life to be terminated after careful consideration and voluntarily abides 
by that decision; 
c) the doctor has decided that terminating life on the basis of his or her findings 
would be justified, because he or she has reached the conclusion together with 
the patient, that there is no other acceptable solution to the patient's untenable 
situation; and 
d) the requirement of consultation with another medical practitioner nominated by 
the Minister of Welfare, Public Health and Culture.136 
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In order to underline the importance of the request of the patient, the commission recommended the 
introduction of a new provision to the effect that a person who intentionally terminates the life of 
another person on account of serious physical or mental illnesses or disorders suffered by that person, 
if the latter is incapable of expressing his or her will, will be guilty of an offence.137 
The commission was of the opinion that a decision to terminate life should be implemented by a 
doctor and cannot be delegated to a third party, for example, a member of the family or nursing 
staff.138 In order to demonstrate the importance of the requirement that a doctor must consult another 
doctor before terminating the life of a patient (included amongst the commission's criteria for careful 
medical practice), the commission recommended the introduction of a separate punitive sanction to 
cover any case where the doctor omits to take this step.139 The commission also recommended the 
inclusion in any new legislation of a 'conscience clause' to the effect that no medical worker should be 
obliged to participate in the active termination of life of a patient.140 The commission also set out 
procedures with regard to body disposal and for the notification of the prosecution by a doctor 
following the termination of the life of a patient.141 It was recommended that body disposal 
procedures should be designed in such a way as to permit retrospective verification of the way in 
which the decision to terminate life was taken. 142. The commission recommended that the doctor in 
charge personally notify the public prosecutor that he or she had terminated the patient's life or 
assisted the patient to take his or her own life.143 Such notification should be accompanied by a 
statement of the way in which the criteria proposed for the Penal Code 1886 had been taken into 
account.144 The public prosecutor should also be sent a declaration setting out the findings of the 
doctor consulted by the doctor in charge.145 It was also recommended that the doctor in charge must 
notify the occurrence of active voluntary euthanasia on the cause of death form.146 Further, it was 
recommended that the deliberate failure to fulfil the statutory requirement to furnish particulars with 
regard to death, or the provision of incorrect particulars in cases where life has been terminated, should 
be made a separate offence.147 
137 See Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands,' 204; 
Report of the Netherlands State Commission on Euthanasia, 172. The commission did, however, 
express the view that the intentional termination of the life of a person unable to express his or her 
will should not be an offence provided that this is performed by a doctor in the context of careful 
medical procedure in respect of a patient who, according to the current state of medical knowledge, has 
irreversibly lost consciousness, and provided also that treatment has been suspended as pointless; 
Report of the Netherlands State Commission on Euthanasia, 168. This proposal was not included in the 
legislative reforms recommended by the commission. 
138 Report of the Netherlands State Commission on Euthanasia, 168. 
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The commission also considered the status of written requests for the termination of life. It considered 
that a written request of this kind must be treated as an indication of the patient's wishes but should 
only carry authority when the patient is no longer able to make bis or her will known.148 As long as 
a patient is still competent, only bis or her verbal expression of intent is relevant and the written 
instructions can be revoked or amended at any time.149 
In its report, the commission deemed it essential for parliament to make plain its position on active 
voluntary euthanasia. ISO The commission was particularly concerned that the issue could become 
politicised, and to this end, urged that a free vote be allowed on the question in which members of 
parliament could vote according to their own conscience.151 The commission was also concerned 
about the widespread uncertainty regarding the scope of Article 293 of the Penal Code 1886 in relation 
to active voluntary euthanasia.152 In the commission's view, the development of relevant case law 
would take so long that it would be many years before the exact definition emerges of what is and 
what is not an offence.153 Nor, in the commission's view, does the modification of prosecution 
policy in accordance with case law developments, provide the necessary clarity and certainty.154 
Two members of the commission could not agree to the regulation of active voluntary euthanasia in 
the law and presented their objections in a minority report rejecting any change or modification to the 
present prohibition on killing on request.155 The objections raised by the dissenters included the fear 
that if the Netherlands proceeded with the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, it could result in 
the isolation of the Netherlands from the international community, particularly through the possible 
contravention of Article 2 of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.156 The other main objections were based on the concept of human 
dignity and on 'slippery slope' arguments.157 
The report of the State Commission gave rise to an extensive, and often emotional debate in medical 
and legal journals and in the mass media.158 It also precipitated critical discussion as to the need for 
legislation with regard to active voluntary euthanasia and if so, what form that legislation should 
take. 
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Leejslatiye Deyelopments 
Even prior to the release of the State Commission's report, a draft Bill for the legalisation of active 
voluntary euthanasia was introduced into the lower house of parliament by one of the smaller non-
denominational political parties - D66. The Wessel-Tuinstra Bill (named after the member of 
parliament who introduced it) proposed the amendment of Article 293 of the Penal Code 1886 so as to 
legalise active voluntary euthanasia administered by a doctor in accordance with specified carefulness 
requirements.159 It also made provision for the legal recognition of a patient's prior written request 
(in effect, an advance directive) as evidence of a patient's request for active euthanasia in circumstances 
where the patient is no longer competent. This Bill became the focal point for debate on the subject 
of active voluntary euthanasia both within and outside the government, but no action was taken on 
the Bill pending the report of the State Commission on Euthanasia. After the commission's report 
was published, the Bill was revised in accordance with the commission's recommendations.160 
Although the revised Bill had the support of a small majority in the parliament, it was opposed by 
the Christian Democrats who were in office together with the Conservative Party which supported the 
proposed legislation.161 This presented a political problem for the coalition government which the 
government attempted to solve by introducing its own, more restrictive, draft Bill in January 
1986.162 In addition to the usual carefulness requirements, the government Bill contained an 
additional requirement that 'according to accepted medical understanding there is concrete expectation 
of death as a consequence of the illness or affliction and further medical treatment would serve no 
reasonable purpose' .163 However, in a rather unusual step by the government, the draft Bill was 
introduced without being given the formal status of a proposed law. In a covering letter accompanying 
the Bill, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, said that the 
government would prefer not to amend the law at this stage and would rather allow case law to 
develop in this area. It was indicated that in the event that the lower house was to take the view that it 
was desirable to enact legislation, the Ministers indicated that the specimen Bill would be revised and 
put to the State Council for its opinion.164 At this point the Royal Dutch Medical Association, 
which was opposed to the government's 'draft Bill' on the grounds that it would create more 
uncertainties, 165 came down firmly in favour of legislative reform in accordance with jurisprudential 
159 Second Chamber of the States-General, Session 1985-1986, 18 331, No. 38. 
160 For an English translation of the revised Bill, see Vervoom, 21-23. 
161 Leenen, 'Dying with Dignity: Development in the Field of Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 524. 
162 Jbid. 
163 Vervoom, 23. This is even more restrictive than case law developments in the Netherlands which have 
upheld the practice of active voluntary euthanasia in appropriate circumstances notwithstanding that 
the patient was not terminally ill. This Bill was also more restrictive with regard to the need to involve 
close relatives in the decision-making process and with regard to the performance of active euthanasia 
upon minors; Vervoom, 24. It did, however, make provision for the legal recognition of an advance 
directive as evidence of a patient's request for active euthanasia. 
l64 Driesse et al, 395. 
165 For a detailed critique of the Government's draft Bill from the perspective of the medical profession see 
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Criterion 'Terminal Phase' Things Are Getting Out of Hand' in Royal Dutch Medical Association, 
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developments and the association's own viewpoint.166 Parliamentary debate on both Bills took place 
in March 1986 during which the Conservative Party, as a result of pressure from the Christian 
Democrats, withdrew its support for the proposed legislation.167 Following the parliamentary debate, 
both proposals were submitted to the State Council for its opinion. In the meantime, an election was 
held and the Conservative Party and the Christian Democrats coalition was restored to government. 
During the formation of the Cabinet, both parties agreed that the issue of active voluntary euthanasia 
must not lead to a breakdown of the coalition and that they would abide by the future advice of the 
State Councit.168 
In July 1986, the State Council released its advice to the government. The State Council 
recommended against the immediate introduction of legislation and suggested that the body of case 
law be allowed to develop further before any legislative action was taken.169 However, in view of the 
ongoing public debate on the subject and the earlier legislative proposal which was still pending in 
parliament, this recommendation was unacceptable to the government.170 The government sought 
advice from the General Health Council 171 and a compromise position was subsequently reached 
which differed from the recommendations of both the State Commission on Euthanasia and the State 
Council. The government's position, published in January 1987, recommended retention of the 
existing prohibition on active voluntary euthanasia, but that doctors could invoke force mo.jeure 
(necessity) when certain requirements for careful medical practice and administrative rules were met 
which would be set out in the Act regulating the practice of medicine.172 These carefulness 
requirements were essentially to follow the proposal of the State Committee on Euthanasia.173 This 
compromise reflected the position of the Christian Democrats that active voluntary euthanasia remain 
punishable, and at the same time, at the behest of the Conservatives, incorporating in the law the 
criteria for careful medical practice to be followed by a doctor performing active voluntary 
euthanasia.174 This proposal was, however, subject to criticism on the grounds that it was a half-way 
measure, lacking legal coherence, and disregarding the opinion of the majority of the population 
which is in favour of immunity for a doctor who administers active voluntary euthanasia in 
accordance with the rules.175 One prominent Dutch legal commentator, Professor Leenen, has 
suggested that the main problem with this compromise was that there was no connection between the 
proposed section of the Medical Practice Act 1865 and the Penal Code 1886; as a consequence, doctors 
166 Van Berkestijn, 'The Royal Dutch Medical Association and the Practice of Euthanasia and Assisted 
Suicide,' 7. 
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Concerning Carefulness Requirements in the Performance of Euthanasia (1987). 
172 Medical Practice Act (Wet Uitoefening Geneeskunst) 1865. See Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to 
Suicide and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands,' 205. 
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who have performed active voluntary euthanasia and have followed the rules of careful medical practice 
remain punishable and can only invoke force majeure, to be assessed on a case by case basis by the 
prosecution and the courts.176 
During the course of 1987, the Dutch government commenced consultation within the framework of 
the Council of Europe in order to test the attitudes of other countries to the issue of active voluntary 
euthanasia 177 In particular, it sought an opinion of the feasibility and desirability of the Council of 
Europe undertaking a study of the legal, human rights, ethical and medical problems relating to 
euthanasia This was done in order to avoid the possibility that the Netherlands might end up in an 
internationally isolated position as a result of its stance with respect to active voluntary euthanasia. 
However, the Council of Europe Working Party which was required to consider this matter178 reached 
the conclusion that such a study, even if feasible, was not desirable.179 
Notwithstanding this negative response from the Council of Europe, the government's compromise 
proposal led to the introduction of draft legislation in December 1987. Under this legislative proposal, 
Article 293 of the Penal Code 1886 was to remain unchanged except for a decrease of the maximum 
term of imprisonment from 12 years to 4 and 1/2 years.1 80 Under separate legislation,181 an 
amendment was proposed to the effect that 'without prejudice to his or her responsibility under the 
Penal Code 1886, a medical doctor who wishes to follow the explicit serious wish of a patient to 
terminate the life of that patient should abide by a number of requirements of careful medical 
behaviour.' Those requirements, largely based on the recommendations of the State Commission, 
were also set out in the proposed legislation.182 
The critical feature of this proposal was that doctors would remain punishable for performing active 
voluntary euthanasia. In any particular case it would be left to the prosecution, and ultimately the 
courts, to decide whether the doctor had complied with the statutory requirements and if so, whether 
this would lead to the successful invocation of the force majeure defence.183 Thus, it would simply 
give statutory effect to the current position in the Netherlands where de facto recognition of active 
voluntary euthanasia has been achieved through jurisprudential developments and prosecution policy. 
Debate on both this legislative proposal and the earlier Wessel-Tuinstra Bill proposing the 
176 Leenen, 'Dying with Dignity: Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 524; 
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legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, was due to proceed in April 1989 but did not take place 
because in the spring of 1989 the coalition government fen.184 
The new coalition government of Christian Democrats and Socialists was unable to reach agreement 
with regard to active voluntary euthanasia legislation. It was decided to postpone a decision until more 
reliable information was available about the practice of active voluntary euthanasia in the 
Netherlands.185 In order to obtain this information, a committee was set up in February 1990 under 
the Chairmanship of Professor Remmelink, Procurator-General of the Dutch Supreme Court, to 
conduct a nation-wide survey amongst doctors.186 In the meantime, both draft Bills remained pending 
in parliament.187 
The Remmelink Report 
Background to the Report 
Prior to the release of the results of the Remmelink Committee inquiry, which for the first time 
involved a 'comprehensive nation-wide survey, no precise figures have been available regarding the 
extent to which active voluntary euthanasia is being performed in the Netherlands.188 This lack of 
accurate information has largely been attributable to the fact that many doctors are still reluctant to 
report cases of active voluntary euthanasia to the police as a result of fear of investigation and 
prosecution and/or the desire to protect the family of the deceased from this type of investigation. 
After the death of a patient, the treating doctor may only issue a death certificate in cases of natural 
death.189 Active voluntary euthanasia is not considered to be a natural death, and therefore a doctor 
cannot by law issue a death certificate. Indications were, however, that in the majority of cases of 
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active voluntary euthanasia, doctors were falsifying the death certificate and entering the death as one 
by naturafcauses. 
As the practice of active voluntary euthanasia was gaining acceptance by the courts, a reporting 
procedure was established whereby a doctor who had performed active voluntary euthanasia was 
required to telephone the police to advise that he or she had done so.190 Before a burial or cremation 
could proceed, permission had to be obtained from the prosecuting authorities.191 Upon the reporting 
of a case of active voluntary euthanasia, the municipal coroner would come to view the body and a 
police detective would come to interview the doctor. Both the municipal coroner and the police 
detective would then report to the public prosecutor. If it appeared that everything had been done in 
accordance with the guidelines, the prosecution would give permission to hand over the body to the 
relatives for burial. In circumstances where the doctor had acted properly and fully recorded in writing 
all the details of the case, this whole procedure would usually not take more than a couple of hours 
from the time of the reported death and the release of the body to the family. If, however, there was 
some reason to believe that all the criteria had not been complied with, a further investigation would 
be ordered by the public prosecutor, and the doctor would have to wait for some months before he or 
she would know whether a prosecution would result.192 Whilst this procedure was widely used, there 
was still no uniformity amongst the country's prosecutors, with the practice in some Dutch Provinces 
at variance with others. Of particular concern to the medical profession were instances of intrusive 
police investigation of active voluntary euthanasia cases and the inappropriate questioning of relatives 
of the deceased. 
The courts have, on a number of occasions, confirmed the importance of accurate reporting of non-
natural deaths by active voluntary euthanasia and have punished doctors for the falsification of death 
certificates.193 Following the Royal Dutch .Medical Association's direction to members to comply 
with the legal reporting requirements, l94 many more cases of active voluntary euthanasia were 
reported.195 Nevertheless, it was evident that many cases of active voluntary euthanasia still went 
undetected with doctors continuing to falsify death certificates in order to conceal active voluntary 
euthanasia as the cause of death.196 As a result of this widespread underreporting, it has been 
impossible to accurately gauge the extent of the practice of active voluntary euthanasia in the 
Netherlands by reference to the official figures held by the police and prosecuting authorities. 
Estimates have varied from 2,000 to 10,000 cases per year out of a total population of 14 million and 
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an annual total of approximately 130,000 deaths.197 Some estimates have even been higher (mostly 
made by opponents of active voluntary euthanasia) and it has been suggested that the figure may be as 
high as 20,Q00.198 
As noted above, the Remmelink Committee was established by the government in order to obtain 
more precise information on the occurrence of active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands.199 In 
framing the committee's terms of ref~rence, it was decided to take the opportunity to investigate more 
widely medical decisions concerning the end of life. The committee's brlef was to report on 'the state 
of affairs regarding the practice of commission or omission by a doctor leading to a patient's death, 
whether or not at the latter's explicit or serious request.'200 The aims of the study were: to produce 
reliable estimates of the incidence of active voluntary euthanasia and other medical decisions 
concerning the end of life; to describe the characteristics of patients, doctors, and situations involved; 
to assess how far doctors are acquainted with the criteria for acceptable euthanasia; and to determine 
under wliich conditions doctors would be willing to report a death by euthanasia as such.201 Under 
the terms of reference, the role of the committee was simply to provide empirical data and not to give 
an opinion on the moral or legal permissibility of active voluntary euthanasia. 
After some negotiation, this study was conducted with the full support and co-operation of the Royal 
Dutch Medical Association. 202 One of the conditions laid down by the association for its support for 
members' participation in the survey was for the formal adoption by the prosecuting authorities of 
guidelines for the reporting and investigation of cases of active voluntary euthanasia. Following 
negotiations between the Royal Dutch Medical Association and the coalition government, agreement 
was reached that the revised procedures would be formally adopted and would form the basis for the 
reporting and investigation of all cases of active voluntary euthanasia. The new protocol was 
197 De Wachter, 3316; Gevers, 'Legal Developments Concerning Active Euthanasia on Request in the 
Netherlands,' 161 referring to estimates that there are 5,000-8,000 cases each year. 
198 For example, R. Fenigsen, 'A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia' (1989) 19 Hastings Center R. 22 where 
he notes that figures as high as 18,000 or 20,000 have been mentioned. See also P. Schepens, 
'Euthanasia, Our Own Future?' (1987) 97 News Exchange of the World Federation of Doctor Who 
Respect Human Life 5, 6, citing K. Gunning, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands' (1987) 96 News Exchange 
of the World Federation of Doctor Who Respect Human Life 8 and C. Dessaur and C. Rutenfrans, Mag de 
Dokter Doden? (Is the Physician Allowed to Kill?) Querido Edition, Amsterdam (1986). For a general 
discussion regarding the prevalence of active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands see Gomez, 48-
56. 
199 See above, 378. 
200 Note, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands' (1990) 300 B.M.J. 1093. For a report of the first results of this 
nation-wide survey, see van der Maas, et al. For the full Report (in Dutch) see P. van der Maas, J. van 
Delden and L. Pijnenborg, Medische Beslissingen Rond het Levenseinde. Het Onderzaek Voor de 
Commissie Onderzoek Medische Praktijk Inzake Euthanasie (1991). At the time of the completion of 
this thesis, an English translation of this report had just become available; P. van der Maas, J. van 
Delden and L. Pijnenborg, Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life: An 
Investigation Performed Upon Request of the Commission of Inquiry into the Medical Practice 
Concerning Euthanasia Health Policy Monographs, Volume 2 (1992). 
201 Van der Maas et al, 669. This article, which reports on the first results of this nation-wide survey, only 
addresses the first and second of these goals. 
202 See van Berkestijn, 'The Royal Dutch Medical Association and the Practice of Euthanasia and Assisted 
Suicide,' 4 where he notes that initially the central committee of the Royal Dutch Medical Association 
refused to participate in the inquiry because it feared that it would be used to push a political decision. 
However, since the association has always promoted openness in the practice of active voluntary 
euthanasia, the central committee agreed to an inquiry under stringent conditions pertaining mainly to 
the confidentiality of the data and the dependability of the inquiry. 
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introduced in November 1990 under the direction of the Minister of Justice. Under the new protocol, 
doctors are required to notify the coroner of all cases of active voluntary euthanasia 203 This aspect of 
the new protocol represents a significant change from the former procedures whereby the doctor would 
advise the police or the public prosecutor. This new procedure is apparently much preferred by the 
Dutch medical profession since it involves reporting to a medical colleague rather than to the legal 
authorities.2o4 Once notified, the coroner then investigates the matter and is required to prepare a 
report to the public prosecutor which is to include the coroner's assessment of whether the guidelines 
for the performance of active voluntary euthanasia have been adhered to. The matter is then referred to 
the public prosecutor. By virtue of the direction from the Minister of Justice, prosecutors are no 
longer to ask the police to investigate euthanasia cases unless there is some reason to suspect that 
there has not been compliance with the criteria. The new protocol also contains agreement that in 
circumstances where police investigation is necessary, the police are to exercise discretion in 
conducting their investigations.205 If, on the basis of the doctor's report and the advice from the 
coroner, (and where appropriate, consultation with the Inspector of Health) the prosecutor is satisfied 
that all requirements have been met, permission is given for the patient's body to be released to the 
family for burial. The doctor is then advised by the prosecutor that the case will be referred to the 
committee of Chief Prosecutors for final determination. Almost invariably, the decision taken by the 
prosecutor is endorsed by the committee of Chief Prosecutors and no charges are laid against the 
doctor.206 
Report Findings 
The Remmelink inquiry is, todate, the most comprehensive study to have been conducted with regard 
to the extent of the practice of active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands.207 Under the auspices 
of the Remmelink Committee, the study was conducted by a team of researchers from the Department 
of Public Health and Social Medicine, at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, headed by Professor van der 
Maas, with the co-operation of the Dutch Central Statistical Office. Three separate studies were 
undertaken as part of this survey: (i) detailed interviews with a sample of 405 doctors (comprised of 
general practitioners, nursing home doctors and clinical specialists); (ii) mailing of questionnaires to 
the doctors of a sample of 7,000 deceased persons; and (iii) a prospective study in which doctors 
interviewed in study (i) (referred to above) gave information concerning deaths in their practice in the 
six month period following the interview. 208 An important feature of this survey was the 
203 The information required is gathered by the completion of a standard form check-list. 
204 Most coroners in the Netherlands are medically trained with a background in forensic medicine. 
205 For example, by using non-marked police cars, avoiding police uniforms, and refraining from 
interviewing the relatives of the deceased unless absolutely necessary. 
206 For example, in 1990, 454 cases were reported and officially investigated but no prosecutions were 
commenced. In 1991, 590 cases were reported and only one case was prosecuted. (Verbal 
communication with Chief Prosecutor Jitta, November 1991.) For brief discussion of this prosecution, 
see above, 366. 
207 Note also the survey of Dutch general practitioners conducted by van de Wal et al, below, 386-387. 
208 Van der Maas, et al, 669. 
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confidentiality of the inquiry, so that participating doctors could be expected to provide full 
information without fear of repercussions.209 In addition, the Minister of Justice guaranteed legal 
immunity in respect of all information collected in the three studies.210 
Significantly, the three studies yielded similar estimates ofincidence.211 According to these studies, 
there were 2,300 cases of active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands in 1990 amounting to 1.8% 
of all deaths.212 Assisted suicide (i.e. where a doctor intentionally prescribes or supplies lethal drugs 
but the patient administers them) occurred in almost 400 cases (0.3% of all deaths). 213 At interview, 
doctors were asked if they had ever practised active voluntary euthanasia or assisted a suicide at the 
request of a patient. Fifty-four cent confirmed that they had, and 24% had done so at least once during 
the previous 24 months. DoCtors working in general practice performed active voluntary euthanasia 
most frequently (62% had performed active voluntary euthanasia, and 28% had done so during the 
previous 24 months.) Forty-four per cent of clinical specialists had previously performed active 
voluntary euthanasia, and 20% had done so in the previous 24 months. There was a relative low 
incidence of active voluntary euthanasia amongst nursing home doctors (only 12% had previously 
performed active voluntary euthanasia, and 6% had done so in the previous 24 months.)214 
A significant proportion of the doctors interviewed (34%) said that they had never practised active 
voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide but could conceive of situations in which they would be 
prepared to do so.215 The remaining 12% said that they could not conceive of any such situations but 
more than half of those (8%) indicated that they would be prepared to refer patients requesting active 
euthanasia or assistance in suicide to another doctor with a more permissive attitude.216 From this 
data, the researchers conclude, that a large majority of doctors in the Netherlands see active voluntary 
euthanasia as an accepted element of medical practice llllder certain circumstances. 217 
The study also found that in the Netherlands, over 25,000 patients per year seek an assurance from 
their doctors that they will be given assistance in form of active voluntary euthanasia if their suffering 
becomes unbearable.21 8 Each year, there are approximately 9,000 explicit requests for active 
, euthanasia or assisted suicide of which less than one third are agreed to.219 The fact that many 
209 This was a precondition for the co-operation of the Royal Dutch Medical Association. Above, n. 380. 
210 Van der Maas, et al, 670. Included in the data are figures regarding the withholding or withdrawing of 
treatment but analysis of these results is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
211 Id. 671. 
212 Van der Maas, et al, 673. 








requests are not acted upon can, at least in part, be explained on the basis that in many cases doctors 
can offer alternatives which render active voluntary euthanasia unnecessary.220 
Significantly, many of the doctors who had practised active voluntary euthanasia indicated that they 
would be reluctant to do so again, other than in exceptional circumstances; i.e. in cases of unbearable 
suffering where there are no alternatives.221 Many of the respondents indicated that an emotional 
bond between doctor and patient is required for the administration of active voluntary euthanasia. The 
researchers conclude that this may be one reason why active voluntary euthanasia was more common 
in general practice where doctor and patient have often known each other for years and the doctor has 
shared part of the patient's suffering. 222 
Compliance with the Guidelines 
Whilst the study found that there was a high degree o~ knowledge of the guidelines for the practice of 
active voluntary euthanasia on the part of doctors,223 doctors' compliance with these guidelines was 
variable. Requests for active voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, in cases where this request was 
fulfilled, were explicit and persistent requests and, in the view of the attending doctor, were hardly ever 
made under pressure from others. 224 On the basis of data obtained from interviews with doctors, in 
96% of instances of active voluntary euthana'iia and a'isisted suicide, the doctor stated that the patient's 
request was explicit and persistent. In 94% of cases, the request had been made repeatedly and in 99% 
of cases, the doctor felt sure that the request had not been made under pressure from others. In all 
cases, the doctors were convinced that the patient had sufficient insight and knowledge of the course of 
disease to make an informed decision. 225 In most cases, (84%) there had been consultation with a 
colleague before the decision to perform active voluntary euthanasia had been acted upon, and in 
nearly all cases the decision had been discussed with relatives. 226 In the great majority ~f cases, 
(79%) there was no alternative treatment available, or if available, the patient had refused that 
treatment (17% ).227 Doctors were less compliant with the requirement of documenting cases of active 
voluntary euthanasia by the preparation of a written report ( 60% ). 228 Even fewer (28%) were prepared 
to notify the authorities of their actions.229 However, even during the course of the prospective study 
220 Id. 672, 673. Other possible explanations include a change of mind by the patient, cases where the 
patient died before the request could be implemented, and cases where the doctor is not satisfied that the 
criteria for active voluntary euthanasia (e.g. voluntariness or unbearable suffering) are made out. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
223 P. van der Maas, J. van Delden and L. Pijnenborg, 'Euthanasie en Andere Medische Beslissingen Rond 
Het Leenseinde in Nederland. II. Zorgvuldigheid en Melding' (1991) 135 Ned Tijdschr Geneeskd 2082, 
2083. 
224 Id. 672. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Verbal communication with the principal researcher, Professor van der Maas," December 1991. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Verbal communication with Professor van der Maas, December 1991, referring to the full report (in 
Dutch) at 38. In 1990 only 454 of the estimated 2,300 deaths by active euthanasia were reported. 
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in which doctors were required to give information concerning every death in their practice over'a six 
month perlod, there was a notable increase in the incide'nce of reporting. 230 
Pursuant to the Remmelink Committee's terms of reference, the study also sought to ascertain the 
incidence of cases where' a doctors assists in the termination of life other than at the explicit and 
persistent request of the patient The study found that in 0.8% of cases (accounting for approximately 
1,000 deaths per year), drugs were administered with the explicit intention to shorten the patient's life 
without an explicit and persistent request from the patient.231 However, in more than half of these 
cases, this possibility had already been discussed with the patient, or the patient had expressed in a 
previous phase of the disease a wish for active voluntary euthanasia if his or her suffering became 
unbearable. 232 In other cases, possibly with a few exceptions, the patients were near to death and 
clearly suffering grievously, yet verbal contact had become impossible. The decision to hasten death 
was then nearly always taken after consultation with the family, nurses or one or more colleagues. In 
most cases, according to the doctors, the amount of time by which life had been shortened was a few 
hours or days only.233 In the report of the Remmelink Committee accompanying the research 
findings these cases were described as 'providing assistance to the dying'. 234 According to the 
committee, the justification of such acts was that the suffering of the patient had become unbearable, 
and that according to strict medical norms, the life of the patient must be considered over, with death 
soon likely to occur, regardless of medical intervention.235 
The study also examined cases where dosages of pain-relieving drugs were administered with the 
potential effect of shortening the patient's life. This category accounted for 17.5% of all deaths. The 
study found that in 6% of cases where pain medication was administered with possible lethal effect, 
(2% of total deaths) the drugs were administered with the express purpose of accelerating the death of 
the patient. 236 In about 40% of such cases, the decision to increase dosages and the possibility that 
this might hasten the end of life, had been discussed with the patient.237 In cases where it had not, 
such discussion had usually been impossible because the patient was incompetent (73% of cases).238 
Whilst there are clearly some similarities between this category and cases of active euthanasia, the 
doctors involved felt there was a material difference. Certainly in terms of methods used239 and the 
230 An increase in the range of 30-35% was recorded in the study by van der Maas et al. 
231 Van der Maas, et al, 671, 672. 
23 2 Ibid. In a small proportion of cases, (approximately 1 % ) patients had previously made a written 
declaration indicating their desire for active voluntary euthanasia in the event that their suffering 
became unbearable. Verbal communication with Professor van der Maas, December 1991, referring to 
the full report (in Dutch) at 34-35. 
233 Van der Maas, et al, 672. 
234 H. ten Have and J. Welle, 'Euthanasia: Normal Medical Practice?' (1992) 22 March/April Hastings 
Center R. 34, 35. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Van der Maas, et al, 672. In 15.5% of the total deaths, pain-relieving drugs were administered partly 
with the purpose of accelerating the end of life. 
237 Van der Maas, et al, 672. 
238 Ibid. 
239 The administration of active voluntary euthanasia usually involves curare or insulin whereas morphine 
and opiades are administered for pain relief. 
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certainty and proximity of death following the administration of those drugs, the two categories can 
be differentiated. 240 
In the report accompanying the research findings, the Remmelink Committee recommended that in 
relation to the consultation requirement, in order to get an independent medical judgment, the general 
practitioner who is considering the administration of active voluntary euthanasia should consult a 
specialist (preferably one who is already in attendance) and vice versa. This was thought to be an 
important element in ensuring the quality of the decision-making process. The committee also 
expressed the view that all doctors must strictly observe the requirements for scrupulous care in cases 
of active voluntary euthanasia. with particular emphasis being placed on the requirement of a written 
report. It was felt that this would enhance the decision-making process and would enable doctors to 
demonstrate their willingness to justify their conduct It was also recommended that the new protocol 
for reporting cases of active voluntary euthanasia, introduced in November 1990, should also apply to 
cases of active termination of life by a doctor without an explicit request from the patient.241 
Evaluation of the Remmelink Committee's Findings 
The study conducted by van der Maas et al, under the auspices of the Remmelink Committee, is 
widely regarded as being a reliable and credible investigation. It was the first nation-wide study to be 
undertaken on the subject and involved a large number of respondents. Due to the support of the 
Royal Dutch Medical Association, there was a high participation rate amongst members of the 
medical profession. 242 Moreover, because of the anonymity and legal immunity assured to doctors 
participating in the study, there is good reason to believe that the respondent doctors were answering 
truthfully. As a result, there is widespread acceptance of the research findings as accurately reflecting 
medical practice in the Netherlands. Whilst the release of the Remmelink Report has eliminated much 
of the speculation with regard to the extent of the practice of active voluntary euthanasia in the 
Netherlands, some Dutch commentators believe that it has also raised many new questions. 243 
Although the findings of the research group are not in dispute, differences exist in the interpretation of 
the results. 244 The report has generally been received in the Netherlands as demonstrating that active 
vohmtary euthanasia is a well controlled and workable medical practice and that the incidence of this 
240 Verbal communication with Professor van der Maas and Dr van Delden, November/December 1991. 
241 See the full report (in Dutch) 37-38. The committee was, however, of the view that this was not 
necessary in cases where there is already an irreversible failure of vital functions. 
242 Verbal communication with Dr Dillmann, staff member - ethical affairs, Royal Dutch Medical 
Association, November 1991. 
243 Verbal communication with Dr de Wachter, November 1991. 
244 There has been particular conflict with regard to the 1,000 cases of termination without an explicit and 
persistent request and the cases where pain-relieving drugs were administered with the express purpose 
of hastening death. Whilst many commentators and persons interviewed by the writer in the 
Netherlands have expressed satisfaction with the research findings in the belief that active voluntary 
euthanasia is an exceptional and controlled practice others have suggested that the findings present 
cause for alarm; e.g. R. Fenigsen, 'The Report of the Dutch Governmental Committee on Euthanasia' 
(1991) 7 Issues Law & Med. 339; J. Fleming, 'Euthanasia, the Netherlands, and Slippery Slopes' 
Bioethics Research Notes, Occasional Paper No. 1 June 1992. 
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practice is not as extensive as had frequently been alleged. Opponents of active voluntary euthanasia, 
on the other hand, have cited the findings to demonstrate the alarming extent of the practice.245 
Criticism has also been levelled at some aspects of the Remmelink Committee's interpretation of the 
research findings, particularly with regard to the category of patients whose lives were terminated in 
the absence of an explicit and persistent request from the patient. 246 Some commentators are of the 
view that the committee has deliberately glossed over these findings in an attempt to make the results 
of the study politically acceptable.247 
The results of the study by van der Maas et al tend to confirm the results obtained from a number of 
smaller surveys, and in particular, a survey of general practitioners and nursing home doctors 
undertaken by van de Wal et al, Public Health Inspector of the Province of North Holland, under the 
auspices of the Department of Family Medicine and Nursing Home Medicine at the Free University of 
Amsterdam. 248 The study by van de Wal et al was confined to family doctors in the Netherlands and 
was conducted by means of an anonymous questionnaire sent to 1,042 family doctors. The study 
found that Dutch family doctors practice active voluntary euthanasia/assisted suicide about 2,000 
times per annum. It was estimated that Dutch family doctors receive an average of 5,000 requests for 
active voluntary euthanasia/assisted suicide, and that an average of 40% of all requests lead to actual 
administration. Further, the study found that 48% of family doctors in the Netherlands have never 
engaged in these practices. 
The study also sought to gauge the extent to which family doctors in the Netherlands comply with 
the guidelines for the practice of active voluntary euthanasia. The study found that most family 
doctors satisfy the requirements for prudent practice with regard to voluntariness of the patient's 
request;249 that it is a well considered and durable request;250 and the unbearable and pointless nature 
of the patient's suffering. Moreover, in the majority of cases, there were no further treatment options 
available. In those cases where treatment options remained, they offered no prospect of cure, and in 
most cases the patient had refused this further treatment. The study found that there was less 
compliance with the requirements of consultation, documentation and reporting of cases of active 
voluntary euthanasia: 25% of family doctors had not consulted another doctor prior to performing 
active voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide; almost half (48%) of all family doctors had kept no 
written record of their last case of active voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide; and 74% had falsely 
245 For example, K. Gunning, 'Euthanasia' (letter) (1991) 338 Lancet 1010; A. Fergusson et al, 
'Euthanasia' (letter) (1991) 338 Lancet 1010. 
246 For example, ten Have and Welie, 35. 
247 Ibid. 
248 G. van der Wal et al, 'Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: I. How Often Practiced by Family Doctors in the 
Netherlands?' (1992) 9 Fam. Practice 130, and 'Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: II. Do Dutch Family 
Doctors Act Prudently?' (1992) 9 Fam. Practice 135. 
249 This was ascertained by questions as to who had taken the initiative in arranging a discussion with the 
family doctor about active voluntary euthanasia and the reasons for the patient's request. 
250 Whether the request was well considered was ascertained by questions regarding the reasons given for 
the patient's request and the existence or non-existence of other forms of treatment. The durability of 
the request was gauged by reference to the time lapse between the first discussion, the first and last 
explicit request and the actual implementation. 
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issued a certificate testifying to death from natural causes. A positive correlation was found to exist 
between obtaining a second opinion, preparing a written report and not falsifying the death certificate. 
On the basis of the Remmelink inquiry and the earlier study by van der Wal et al, which have yielded 
similar results thereby confirming the accuracy of these surveys, certain conclusions can be drawn 
with regard to the practice of active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands. The results refute the 
assertion that active voluntary euthanasia occurs on an excessive scale in the Netherlands and that it is 
used increasingly as an alternative to good palliative or terminal care. The extent of the practice 
appears to be in the range of 2,300 a year, and is most frequently performed by general practitioners. 
The studies also indicate that doctors are generally reluctant to engage in the practice and that a 
significant proportion of requests for active voluntary euthanasia are refused. The research findings do, 
however, confirm that not all doctors are complying with the stipulated guidelines with regard to the 
practice of active voluntary euthanasia, particularly with regard to the need for consultation, 
documentation and reporting of the practice. 
The study by van de Wal et al also examined the incidence of active euthanasia other than at the 
request of the patient. According to the findings of this study, there are approximately 100 cases per 
year of active euthanasia performed by family doctors in Holland without the explicit and persistent 
request of the patient, and these cases almost invariably involved exceptional circumstances. 251 
Although this survey was confined to family doctors in Holland, the results obtained by van der Wal 
et al with regard to active terminations without request appear to be significantly lower than this 
aspect of the findings of the Remmelink inquiry.252 
Expanding Boundaries? 
The unique developments in the Netherlands have naturally been the focus of interest in Australia and 
other jurisdictions where there is increasing pressure for the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia. As we have seen, one of the major obstacles for change is concern regarding the operation 
in practice of a law which permits active voluntary euthanasia and fear of the 'slippery slope•:253 
There have been claims by a few vocal dissenters that there is already evidence in the Netherlands of 
the adverse consequences of any loosening of the legal prohibition on the practice of active voluntary 
euthanasia. 254 Assertions have been made about the growing incidence of active euthanasia in the 
Netherlands and that the practice has extended to non-voluntary and ev~n involuntary euthanasia, 
overstepping ethical bounds and administrative controls. 255 From this premise, it is inevitably 
251 G. van der Wal et al, 'Actieve Levensbeeindiging Door Huisartsen Zonder Verzoek van der Patient' 
(1991) 34 Huisarts en Wetenschap 523. 
252 See above, 384 where it was estimated that there were approximately 1,000 cases of active 
terminations of life other than at the explicit and persistent request of the patient. 
253 See chapter V, 202-205. 
254 See, for example, Fenigsen, 'A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia,' 22; Bostrom, 467; J. Segers, 'Elderly 
Persons on the Subject of Euthanasia' (1988) 3 Issues Law & Med. 407; Desssaur and Rutenfrans, 399; 
van der Sluis, 455; A. Capron ,'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: American Observations' (1992) 22 
Hastings Center R. 30; D Callahan, 'When Self-Determination Runs Amok' (1992) 22 Hastings Center 
R. 52, 54; Gomez, 127-139. 
255 For example, B. Pollard, 'Medical Aspects of Euthanasia' (1991) 154 M.J.A. 613. 
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argued by opponents of active voluntary euthanasia that the Netherlands would be a very dangerous 
model for other countries to follow.256 In support of these claims, Dutch cases are cited where 
patients were killed without their consent by nurses and/or doctors, but negligible punishment was 
imposed on the offender.257 It is also alleged that there is growing support for non-voluntary 
euthanasia amongst prominent advocates of voluntary euthanasia. 258 and the Dutch community 
generally. 259 
As a result of the 'uncontrollable nature' of euthanasia, especially when it is performed by doctors 
who work alone (for example, family doctors or nursing home doctors), it is claimed that many 
people, particularly elderly nursing home residents, are fearful that they will be subject to non-
voluntary euthanasia.260 It has further been alleged that the acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia 
has resulted in a change of attitude of doctors towards patients who are disabled by illness or accident 
but who do not meet the guidelines for active voluntary euthanasia.261 This change, it is claimed, is 
reflected in decisions regarding withdrawal of treatment from these patients without their knowledge or 
consent as well as pressure being placed on patients by doctors to 'voluntarily' request active 
euthanasia. 262 Claims have also been made that the availability of active voluntary euthanasia has 
hindered the development of hospice and palliative care in the Netherlands, with the result that inferior 
care is available to the terminally ill. In turn, it is argued that patients who are not given appropriate 
pain relief and other care are more likely to be driven to request active voluntary euthanasia.263 
These assertions have, however, been sharply rejected, particularly by members of the Dutch medical 
profession, as being completely unfounded and portraying a misleading picture of the practice of 
active euthanasia in the Netherlands. 264 A number of distinguished Dutch commentators have pointed 
out that the foreign press (including specialist journals) has tended to seize upon the allegations being 
made by a hard core minority opposed to the practice of active voluntary euthanasia and give them 
2561d. 616. 
257 For example, the much publicised killings in the De Terp nursing home where a number of patients had 
allegedly been killed without their knowledge or consent by the head nurse on the doctor's orders. The 
doctor subsequently pleaded guilty and was convicted of three killings. He was sentenced to one year 
imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the Hague reversed the sentence on the grounds that 
the criminal investigators had transgressed their competence by seizing documents which were legally 
privileged. Because the evidenpe had been wrongfully obtained it was inadmissable in court. The doctor 
was however disciplined by the Medical Disciplinary Court of the Hague; Bostrom, 476; van der Sluis, 
463; Fenigsen, 'A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia,' 23; Pollard, 613; Keown, 'The Law and Practice of 
Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 69. 
258 Keown, The Law and Practice of Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 75-76. 
259 Pollard, 615. 
260 Bostrom, 477; Segers, 407; Fenigsen, 'A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia,' 26. 
261 Bostrom, 479-480. 
262 [bid. 
263 Verbal communication with Dr. Willebois, fol"II).er president of the Nederlands Artsenverbond (Dutch 
League of Physicians), November 1991. 
264 See, for example, the reaction to the publication of the article by Fenigsen in the Hastings Centre 
Report, 'A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia'. This led to the adoption of a motion by the General 
Assembly of the Dutch Society of Health Law and its publication in the Hastings Center Report 
claiming that Fenigsen's account was incorrect and misleading, as well as a letter of complaint signed 
by numerous prominent Dutch doctors. See also H. Rigter, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: 
Distinguishing Facts from Fiction' (1989) 19 Hastings Centre R. 31; Leenen 'Dying with Dignity: 
Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 525. 
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disproportionate attention. 265 This has resulted in a very inaccurate and unreliable impression being 
conveyed outside of the Netherlands about the extent arid nature of the practice of active euthanasia in 
that country.266 For some time, the absence of reliable data (at least until the recent Remmelink 
survey) tended to fuel speculative claims and there was no firm basis upon which these claims could 
be refuted. 
However, the data obtained by the Remmelink Committee survey has dispelled claims about the 
growing and uncontrollable nature of the practice of active voluntary euthanasia in the 
Netherlands.267 Results from that survey, and from a number of other inquiries,268 have shown that 
the occurrence of active voluntary euthanasia is in fact much less than had earlier been thought. 
Indeed, some commentators in the Netherlands contend that there is no indication that active 
euthanasia on request is practised more often in the Netherlands than in other countries.269 Rather, 
they suggest that in the Netherlands, a practice which was formerly kept behind closed doors, as is the 
case in many other countries, has now been brought into the open.270 Contrary to claims that once 
doctors become 'killers,' there is the danger that killing comes all too easily, data from the 
Remmelink survey found that doctors who have performed active voluntary euthanasia indicated that 
they would be most reluctant to do so again and would only do so in the face of unbearable suffering 
where there were no other altematives.271 This is supported by other anecdotal evidence which 
suggests that few Dutch doctors seem eager to hasten the deaths of their patients.272 
Critics of the Dutch position contend that the guidelines which supposedly regulate the practice of 
active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands are hopelessly vague and imprecise.273 It is argued that 
the failure of doctors to comply with the guidelines, and in particular, the requirement to report cases 
of active voluntary euthanasia, means that the practice remains unverifiable and uncontrollable.274 In 
support of such assertions, critics draw upon the findings of the Remmelink study that in a 
significant proportion of cases (approximately 1,000 or 0.8% of all deaths), doctors performed acts of 
termination without an explicit and persistent request from the patient This, they argue, demonstrates 
the occurrence of non-voluntary euthanasia. 
265 For example, van Berkestijn, 'The Royal Dutch Medical Association and the Practice of Euthanasia and 
Assisted Suicide,' 8-9; Leenen, 'Legal Aspects of Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and Terminating the 
Medical Treatment of Incompetent Patients,' 1. 
266 Van Berkestijn, 'The Royal Dutch Medical Association and the Practice of Euthanasia and Assisted 
Suicide,' 9. 
267 Professor van der Maas, the principal researcher, has said, in response to questions regarding the 
interpretation of the study, that the data should be interpreted as indicating that on the whole in the 
Netherlands, there is a reliable practice of taking decisions concerning the end of life; see Note, 
'Medical Aid in Dying in the Netherlands' (1992) Vol. 9 No. 3 S.A. V.E.S. Bull. 4. 
268 See discussion above, 386-387 of the study by van der Wal et al. 
269 For example, Leenen, 'Dying with Dignity: Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in the 
Netherlands,' 525. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Van der Maas et al, 673. 
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274 Keown, 'The Law and Practice of Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 67; Gomez, 117-139. 
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To begin with, there is some basis for suggesting that the incidence of active termination of life 
without the patient's request reported in the Remmelink survey may be disproportionately high. 
According to the study by van der Wal et al, of more than 1,000 family doctors in Holland, it was 
found that such cases occur approximately 100 times a year in general practice in the Netherlands. If 
one extrapolates from this figure to the medical profession as a whole, it would still be significantly 
less than the findings of the Remmelink survey. In view of the close correlation between the two 
surveys' with respect to most other matters, this discrepancy does perhaps raise some doubt as to the 
correctness of the findings of the Remmelink survey. However, even if one accepts the results of the 
Remmelink survey as accurately reflecting the incidence of active terminations without the patient's 
explicit and persistent request, there are a number of grounds on which the critics' claims can be 
countered. One point which can be made is that whilst these cases clearly did not strictly comply with 
the guidelines for the performance of active voluntary euthanasia, closer analysis of this category 
reveals that 'non-voluntary euthanasia' is not an appropriate label for the majority of these cases; in 
more than half of these cases the decision was discussed with the patient or the patient had previously 
expressed a wish for active euthanasia in the event that his or her suffering became unbearable.275 In 
most of the remaining cases where there was no consultation with the patient, the patients were near 
to death, suffering grievously and no longer competent. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that 
the incidence of these cases where life is terminated in the absence of an explicit and persistent request 
is the product of the de facto acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands. In contrast 
to cases of active euthanasia, where in the great majority of cases, life is shortened by at least one 
week and in many cases by a period of some months,276 in most of these cases, life had been 
shortened by a few hours or days at the most and the patient had been in a state of extreme 
suffering.277 It is therefore arguable that these cases, which undoubtedly also occur in other 
jurisdictions, are unconnected with developments in the Netherlands with regard to active voluntary 
euthanasia. 
There is also another major ground for the rejection of the critic's reasoning that the figures regarding 
active terminations without the patients' explicit and persistent request is evidence of a 'slippery 
slope'. In order to substantiate a 'slippery slope' argument, it would need to be shown that cases of 
non-voluntary euthanasia occur more frequently now than they did prior to the quasi-legalisation of 
active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the 
275 See also B. Sneide(r)man, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Model for Canada?' (1992) 8 Humane 
Med.104, 111. 
276 Van der Maas et al, 672. 
277 Ibid. This has been confirmed in discussions with the principal researcher, Professor van der Maas, 
December 1991. 
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incidence of such cases is increasing.278 The Remmelink report is the first extensive study of fts kind 
so no such figures are available. 279 
Critics have also seized upon the results with regard to the administration of pain-relieving drugs 
where the drugs were administered with the express purpose of accelerating the death of the 
patient.280 This category of cases (accounting for 6% of cases where pain medication was 
administered with possible lethal effect, and 2% of total deaths) is difficult to interpret.281 It is, 
admittedly, somewhat illogical to say that drugs are administered for pain relief with the explicit 
purpose of hastening death, unless, of course, it is accepted that it was necessary to end the patient's 
life in order to relieve the patient's pain. It has been suggested that this category of cases is a product 
of the continuing illegality of active voluntary euthanasia and the resulting tendency of some doctors 
to conceal their actions.282 The intention in these cases is virtually indistinguishable from that of a 
doctor performing active voluntary euthanasia. Consultation had taken place with the patient in nearly 
half these cases yet the doctors were clearly not willing to openly perform active voluntary 
euthanasia. 
One aspect of the 'slippery slope' argument which has been raised in opposition to active voluntary 
euthanasia generally283 and has surfaced in the debate over the practice of active voluntary euthanasia 
in the Netherlands284 is that acceptance of active voluntary euthanasia will lead to a loss of respect 
for human life. It has, however, been vigorously denied by doctors and commentators in the 
Netherlands that the open practice of active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands has led to a lesser 
respect for human life in that country. 285 Indeed, many doctors have defended the Dutch position and 
argue that to perform active voluntary euthanasia, as limited by the guidelines, is in fact an act of 
respect for that patient as person. 286 
Contrary to the claims of their critics, many of those who are involved in the administration of active 
voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands assert that there have been a number of beneficial outcomes of 
the liberalisation of the law and practice. In addition to providing relief to many patients from an 
existence of subjectively intolerable suffering, it has been suggested that the contemporary debate on 
the subject of active voluntary euthanasia has had positive consequences for patients generally in that 
278 H. Kuhse, 'Voluntary Euthanasia in the Netherlands and Slippery Slopes' (1992) Vol. 11 No. 4 
Bioethics News 1, 4-6. See also Sneide(r)man, 112, 113. By the same token, however, as Kuhse points 
out, the findings of the Remmelink inquiry cannot be used as evidence to categorically refute the 
slippery slope. 
279 Ibid. 
280 For example, Fenigsen, 'The Report of the Dutch Governmental Committee on Euthanasia,' 340-344. 
281 Verbal communication with Professor van der Maas, December 1991. 
282 For example, Dr Admiraal, verbal communication, November 1991. 
283 See chapter V, 205-206. 
284 Bostrom, 467. 
285 Borst-Eilers, 'Facts About the Actual Euthanasia Practice in the Netherlands', 12. 
286 P. Admiraa1, 'Active Voluntary Euthanasia' (1985) New Humanist 23, 24. This view was also expressed 
by Dr Admiraal and other Dutch doctors in interviews with the writer, November/December 1991. 
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is has led to a re-evaluation of the patient's role as an actor in the decision-making process. 287 Others 
see advantages from the practice of active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands in that the subjects 
of death, illness and ageing have lost much of their terror.288 This is, to some extent, borne out by 
the results of the Remmelink survey which found that a large number of patients seek assurance from 
their doctors that active voluntary euthanasia will be available if their suffering becomes 
unbearable.289 The very fact that these assurances are sought and given, even though active voluntary 
euthanasia is only performed in a small proportion of these cases, highlights the importance of the 
availability of active voluntary euthanasia for the patient's peace of mind. For many patients facing 
terminal illness, it is the prospect of uncontrollable suffering and loss of dignity which they fear 
most, and if they can be given an assurance by their doctor that assistance will be available in the 
event that it becomes necessary, it appears that much of this anxiety can be avoided. 
Government's Response to the Remmelink Report 
The release of the Remmelink survey has made it possible for the Dutch government to decide on the 
desirability of legislation from a reasonably informed basis. In April 1992, the government withdrew 
its draft law of 1987 and submitted a new Bill.290 The current legislative proposal seeks to 
implement the recommendations of the Remmelink Committee. It leaves Article 293 of the Penal 
Code 1886 unchanged291 and merely gives effect to the protocol introduced in November 1990 
regarding reporting procedures for doctors performing active voluntary euthanasia. This is to be 
achieved by an amendment to the Act dealing with the disposal of the dead so as to permit the 
promulgation of regulations by the Queen.292 This represents a significant retreat from the earlier 
proposal of the Christian Democrats-Conservatives coalition under which the carefulness requirements 
to be followed by a doctor performing active voluntary euthanasia where actually to be specified in the 
legislation dealing with medical practice. Moreover, the form of the current proposal is also less 
expansive, involving secondary legislation (promulgation of regulations) which will be more readily 
open to amendment than if the change were embodied in an Act of parliament 
In accordance with the recommendations of the Remmelink Committee, the coalition government's 
current proposal also requires that cases of termination of life without the express and explicit request 
of the patient be reported in the same way as cases of active voluntary euthanasia. The expectation of 
the government is that such cases should be investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted. It should 
be noted that such cases would come within the murder provisions of the Penal Code 1886 rather than 
287 H. Bakker-Winnubst, 'The Right to Euthanasia During the Terminal Stage of Life' in Aycke and Smook, 
39, 43. See also P. Admiraal, 'Is There a Place for Euthanasia?' (1991) Vol. 10 No. 4 Bioethics News 
10, 11 where he notes the importance now attached to patient self-determination. 
288 H. Cohen, 'Euthanasia As a Way of Life' in Aycke and Smook, 61. 
289 See above, 382. 
290 J. Gevers, 'Legislation on Euthanasia: Recent Developments in the Netherlands' (1992) 18 J.Med. 
Ethics 138, 140 
291 The earlier proposal for the reduction of penalty is not included in this proposed amendment. 
292 Verbal communication with Professor Leenen, November 1991. 
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Article 293 (dealing with killing on request). Even in the absence of a request for active euthanasia, it 
is possible that the defence of necessity in Article 40 of the Code would apply. 
The current legislative proposal, has however, come in for criticism on a number of grounds. 293 
Many regard the proposal as an inept political compromise. One of the principal criticisms is that it 
is illogical and contradictory to have under one Act a law which unequivocally prohibits active 
voluntary euthanasia (Article 293 of the Penal Code 1886), and at the same time, to contemplate 
amendments to other legislation which appear to condone the practice of active voluntary 
euthanasia. 294 It has also been argued that the implementation of this proposal will, in any event, 
not achieve the desired object of securing full reporting by doctors of cases of active voluntary 
euthanasia since the practice remains a criminal offence under the Penal Code 1886, and there will 
always be a proportion of doctors who are not willing to report in these circumstances. 295 One aspect 
of the proposal which has attracted particular criticism has been the decision to treat cases of 
termination of life without the express and explicit request of the patient in the same way as cases of 
active voluntary euthanasia. 296 Many people are concerned that this blurs the crucial distinction 
between voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia and tends to imply that termination of life other than 
at the express and explicit request of the patient may, in some circumstances, be acceptable.297 The 
views of a number of leading legal commentators in the Netherlands is that cases of this kind are 
exceptional and cannot be legislated for.298 
Arguments for Leg:jslatjye Reform in the Netherlands 
Notwithstanding the significant jurisprudential developments and the general compliance of 
prosecuting authorities in bringing prosecution policy in line with the case law developments, a 
number of problems have been identified with the current position in the Netherlands.299 Foremost 
amongst these problems is the continuing legal uncertainty faced by doctors as a result of the 
inconsistency between law and practice with regard to active voluntary euthanasia 300 At present, 
active voluntary euthanasia is still prohibited under Article 293 of the Penal Code 1886, and doctors 
who engage in the practice are committing a criminal offence. Whilst the courts can, to some extent, 
bridge the gap between legislation and the practice of active voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands, 
293 For critical analysis of the government's proposal, see Gevers, 'Legislation on Euthanasia: Recent 
Developments in the Netherlands.' 
294 I.e. the same argument that was raised against the earlier coalition proposal. A well-known and 
outspoken critic of both proposals is Professor Leenen. (Verbal communication, November 1991.) 
295 Twenty-five per cent of doctors say that they will not report cases of active voluntary euthanasia whilst 
it remains illegal; Verbal communication with Dr Dillmann, staff member - ethical affairs, Royal Dutch 
Medical Association, November 1991. 
296 Verbal communication with Professor Leenen, Dr Sutorius, and Dr Gevers, November/ December 1991. 
297 Ibid. Professor Leenen suggests that this legislative proposal may even be in contravention of Article 
2 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Practices 1953. 
298 Verbal communication with Professor Leenen and Dr Gevers, November/ December 1991. 
299 For detailed consideration of some of these problems, see Leenen, 'Legal Aspects of Euthanasia, 
Assistance to Suicide and Terminating the Medical Treatment of Competent Patients,' 5-6, 11-14. 
300 Ibid. 
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there are inherent limitations in the capacity for case law to provide certainty in this area. Apart from 
certain minimum standards which have been more or· less uniformly applied, there is no absolute 
certainty that all courts would abide by the same criteria which have been developed in the mainstream 
jurisprudence.301 Thus, the possibility always exists that a doctor who has performed active 
voluntary euthanasia in accordance with established guidelines could face conviction and substantial 
punishment under Article 293.302 The co-ordination of prosecution policy in conformity with the 
case law developments and more recently, the introduction of a uniform protocol for the reporting and 
investigation of cases of active voluntary euthanasia has, to a large extent, clarified the situation and 
removed some of the uncertainty. There is now some degree of confidence amongst the medical 
profession that doctors will not be prosecuted if they perform active voluntary euthanasia in 
accordance with the guidelines laid down by the courts and then report their actions as required under 
the new protocol. This is borne out by the significant increase in the number of reports of active 
voluntary euthanasia cases since the introduction of this protocol in November 1990.303 But, despite 
these developments, doctors who perform active voluntary euthanasia are still acting contrary to law 
and must carefully justify their actions in order to escape criminal liability. Their conduct can not be 
excused in advance, but only after reporting and investigation of the matter. Thus, some uncertainty 
inevitably remains and there is clear evidence that some doctors simply will not report cases of active 
voluntary euthanasia whilst the practice remains illegal.304 As a result, many cases of active 
voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands are still performed behind closed doors and there is little 
possibility of fully controlling the practice. In the absence of adequate controlling mechanisms for the 
administration of active voluntary euthanasia, the interests of the patient are at risk. The recent survey 
results have shown that active euthanasia is performed quite frequently, and although in the majority 
of cases, it is performed at the explicit and persistent request of the patient, in a not insignificant 
proportion of cases, lethal drugs are administered without such a request.305 There is, therefore, some 
justification for calls for the introduction of legislation to establish effective control mechanisms and 
to protect against the possibility of patients' lives being terminated without their explicit request 306 
Neither case law nor prosecution policy can provide the necessary clarity, legal uniformity and 
certainty, and it is only through legislation that the patient's right of self-determination can be 
specifically protected. 3o1 On the basis of the foregoing arguments, there is a strong case for 
introducing legislation which, unlike the coalition proposal, actually legalises active voluntary 
301 Leenen, 'Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands,' 202; 
Leenen, 'Dying with Dignity: Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in the Netherlands,' 523. 
302 Leenen, 'Legal Aspects of Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and Terminating the Medical Treatment of 
Competent Patients,' 5-6, 11-14. 
303 An increase in excess of 30% is noted in the Remmelink report; Verbal communication with Dr 
Dillmann, staff member - ethical affairs, Royal Dutch Medical Association, November 1991. 
304 See above, n. 295. 
305 See above, 384 for discussion of the 0.8% of cases in which doctors terminated life without an explicit 
and persistent request, in approximately half of which there was no consultation with the patient. Note 
also the category of cases where pain-relieving drugs were administered with the express purpose of 
hastening the death of the patient. Although this possibility was discussed with the patient in 40% of 
cases, in many cases this was not possible because the patient was incompetent. 
306 For example, Leenen, 'Legal Aspects of Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and Terminating the Medical 
Treatment of Competent Patients,' 11; Roscam Abbing, 73. 
307 Roscam Abbing, 72-3. By virtue of the terms of Article 293 of the Penal Code 1886, case law has very 
much focussed on the position of the doctor, only indirectly referring to the autonomy of the patient. 
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euthanasia performed in accordance with strict safeguards (for example, along the lines of the Wessel-
Tuinstra Bill).308 If active voluntary euthanasia were legalised, with the criteria for its performance 
clearly spelt out in the legislation, the onus would no longer be on doctors to prove their innocence. 
Instead, it would be for the prosecution to prove that the doctor had acted outside the criteria. Whilst it 
would be unrealistic to suppose that the introduction of legislation legalising the practice of active 
voluntary euthanasia would result in full reporting or completely eliminate the risk of inappropriate 
practices, it would certainly be an improvement on the present situation. There is good reason to 
believe that many more doctors would, in these circumstances, be willing to report cases of active 
voluntary euthanasia and subject themselves to legal scrutiny, and the practice would generally be 
more open. 309 
There certainly appears to be considerable support for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 
amongst the Dutch medical profession and the community generally. According to figures obtained in 
the Remmelink survey, 60% of doctors are in favour of the introduction of a statutory immunity 
excluding doctors from the liability of Article 293 of the Penal Code 1886, provided the specified 
criteria are satisfied.310 The Royal Dutch Medical Association is now also actively seeking 
legislation which allows an immunity to doctors. So far as community attitudes are concerned, 
opinion poll evidence suggests that a large majority of the Dutch population favours the introduction 
of legislation permitting active voluntary euthanasia. 311 
However, as some commentators have pointed out, there are also potential difficulties associated with 
the introduction of legislation which legalises active voluntary euthanasia. Gevers, for example, 
points out that there are inevitably limitations with legislation, in that it is impossible to delineate 
precisely the situations in which active voluntary euthanasia should be allowed.312 Consequently, a 
new law cannot add very much to what has already been developed by the courts and will only 
partially reduce legal uncertainty. 313 Some commentators have further argued that there is no 
evidence to suggest that there is less risk of abuse if the criteria are statutory.314 Others who are 
opposed to legislation point out that in a democracy, law on any issue is a compromise solution and 
therefore likely to be unsatisfactory.315 Related to this, is the possibility of difficulties being 
encountered in the interpretation of any new legislation. This concern has led some notable advocates 
308 See above, 375. 
309 Verbal communication with Dr Admiraal, November 1991. Support for this view can be found in the 
fact that 25% of doctors refuse to report cases of active voluntary euthanasia whilst the practice 
remains illegal; see above, n. 295. 
310 Verbal communication with Dr Dillmann, staff member - ethical affairs, Royal Dutch Medical 
Association, November 1991. 
311 In a 1985 survey, 70% of respondents indicated their support for legislation; S. Waller, 'Trends in 
Public Acceptance of Euthanasia Worldwide' (1986) 1 Euthanasia Rev. 33, 41. For detailed analysis of 
public opinion in the Netherlands on the subject of active voluntary euthanasia, see H. Hilhorst, 
'Religion and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Exploring a Diffuse Relationship' (1983) 30 Social 
Compass 491. 
312 Gevers, 'Legal Developments Concerning Active Euthanasia on Request in the Netherlands,' 162. 
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314 Keown, 77. 
315 Dr van Till, verbal communication, November 1991. 
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for active voluntary euthanasia, such as Dr Pieter Admiraal and Dr Herbert Cohen to express 
reservations about the introduction of legislation as the means for solving present difficulties.316 
Why the Netherlands? 
A question which has often been raised is why the Netherlands appears to be at the forefront in the 
practice of active voluntary euthanasia Many explanations have been advanced, some of which relate 
to the unique characteristics of the Netherlands and its people. 
The Netherlands is a small, densely populated country. It has a pluriform society with a tradition of 
religious and moral tolerance. 317 It is a very democratic and permissive society which values freedom 
of thinking and expressing one's views. A variety of opinions exist in Dutch society from strict 
Calvinism and Catholicism to liberal Christianity and Humanism. In a population of 14 million, 
there are more than 380 churches or denominations.318 Whilst Holland is nominally (;:atholic, Dutch 
Catholicism is very democratic and aggressively anti-Vatican.319 A significant proportion of the 
Dutch population claim no religious affiliation. Dutch society as a whole is quite interested in moral 
issues such as active voluntary euthanasia, and the Dutch enjoy open and free discussion on such 
subjects.320 It is also a society where the Views of others are respected. This community tolerance is 
reflected in the opinion poll results with regard to active voluntary euthanasia which show that a great 
majority (87%) of the Dutch population is quite tolerant of others who hold opposite attitudes on the 
subject. 3 21 
Dutch people are also known for their fierce independence, moral integrity and defence of civil 
liberties.322 The independence ofDutcb doctors was demonstrated during the Nazi occupation when, 
despite threats and the withdrawal of their licences, they refused to play any part in the Nazi program 
of sterilisation of and medical experiments upon Jews, gipsies and mental defectives.323 As in other 
countries, there has been ·growing recognition in the Netherlands of the importance of individual 
autonomy and respect for the individuals right of self-determination, and this has directly contributed 
to the contemporary acceptance and practice of active voluntary euthanasia.324 
316 Kennedy, 39-45. 
317 This is, for example, illustrated in the liberal approach taken by the Dutch to prostitution and drug use. 
See also P. Zisser, 'Euthanasia and the Right to Die: Holland and the United States Face the Dilemma' 
(1988) N.Y.L.Sch.J. lnt'l. & Contemporary Law 361, 363. 
318 H. Terborgh-Dupuis, 'The Netherlands: Tolerance and Teaching' (1984) 14 Hastings Center R. 23, 23. 
319 Pence, 139; Humphry and Wickett, 189-190. 
320 Terborgh-Dupuis, 23. 
3 21 Hilhorst, 496. 
322 Pence, 139. 
323 Kennedy, 32; L. Alexander, 'Medical Science Under Dictatorship' (1949) 241 New Eng.J.Med. 39. 
324 See R. Dillmann, 'Euthanasia in a Dutch Perspective,' paper, Royal Dutch Medical Association (1991) 
6-7; Borst-Eilers, 'The Status of Physician-Administered Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands', 7. 
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There are also special features of the Dutch health care system which have played a role in the 
development of active voluntary euthanasia. In the Netherlands, at the centre of the health care system 
is the family doctor, or 'huisarts', who has typically looked after the family for a number of years.325 
Although doctors are esteemed, to many people they are a like a family friend.326 In the context of 
provision of terminal care, much of the care is provided in the patient's home, with the family doctor 
making frequent house-calls to assure the patient of adequate pain control and symptom relief, and 
supported by nurses and other health care providers. Unlike many other Westernised countries where 
the majority of people die in hospitals, most patients in the Netherlands die at home, in their natural 
surroundings.327 The nature of the family doctor's relationship with his or her patients has important 
consequences with regard to the performance of active voluntary euthanasia. It is a relationship 
characterised by close personal contact in which the doctor has a good knowledge of the patient and 
his or her family circumstances, including any family support or pressures that might be relevant in a 
request for active euthanasia.328 A patient's family doctor would therefore be in a very good position 
to assess the voluntariness of the patient's request and other relevant factors in the euthanasia 
determination. Significantly, the Remmelink survey has confirmed that active voluntary euthanasia is 
most frequently practised by general practitioners.329 
In addition to the key role played by the family doctor, it has also been suggested that the situation in 
the Netherlands has come about because of the openness of Dutch doctors; because some doctors were 
prepared to act openly in what they judged to be their patients' best interests and defend their actions 
in the law courts.330 The approach taken by these doctors contrasts markedly with the position in 
other countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States where the practice of 
active euthanasia is largely hidden. In those few cases where a doctor is exposed and faces prosecution, 
technical defences are usually invoked, and the case is generally not defended as a case of active 
voluntary euthanasia. 331 
So far as jurisprudential developments are concerned, coincidence has arguably also played an 
important role.332 When the first case came before the court in Leeuwarden in 1973, the Foundation 
of Voluntary Euthanasia heard of it and furnished the President of the court with a number of 
publications by lawyers, doctors, philosophers and theologians who did not condemn active voluntary 
euthanasia but found it acceptable if necessary as a last resort. Copies of these publications, which 
325 H. Dupuis, 'The Right to a Gentle Death' in Aycke and Smook, 53, 56. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Dillmann, 8. This is to be compared, for example, with the United States where 80% of deaths occur in 
hospitals; see President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioural Research, Deciding to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment (1983) 17-18. 
328 M. Battin, 'Seven Caveats Concerning the Discussion of Euthanasia in Holland' (1990) 34 Perspectives 
in Biology & Med. 73. 
329 Sixty-two per cent of the general practitioners surveyed had performed active euthanasia compared with 
44% of the clinicians and 12% of the nursing home physicians. Twenty-eight per cent of the general 
practitioners had performed active euthanasia within the previous 24 months compared with 20% of the 
clinicians and 6% of the nursing home physicians. For further discussion see above, 382. 
330 South Australian Voluntary Euthanasia Society Fact Sheet No. 4, May 1990. 
331 See chapter IV, 123-127. 
332 Verbal communication with Dr. van Till, January 1991. 
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had appeared in medical journals (and therefore were probably unknown to the legal profession) went 
to the prosecutor and defence in this case. This meant that the first case to consider the issue of active 
voluntary euthanasia was based on academic data which may help to explain the willingness of the 
court to take an accommodating view on the subject. 
Another factor which has played some role in shaping legal outcomes concerns the Dutch legal 
system and the absence of a minimal level of punishment. 333 This has left the courts free to impose 
very lenient sentences in cases where doctors have been brought before the courts for performing 
active voluntary euthanasia 
Eyaluatjon of the Netherlands' Model; Suitability for Export? 
It was suggested from the outset of this chapter that the Netherlands presents itself as a living model 
for other countries to assess the effects of State sanctioned active voluntary euthanasia upon the law, 
medicine, health care and social policy. It is therefore necessary to come to some conclusion about the 
position in the Netherlands and whether it is a model suitable for other countries to follow. 
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that there are some problems with the present situation in 
the Netherlands. However, the problems which exist stem mainly from the fact that the 
administration of active voluntary euthanasia is still a criminal offence under the Penal Code 1886, 
and therefore its practice remains largely invisible and unregulated. It cannot, therefore, be extrapolated 
from the situation in the Netherlands that other countries contemplating the legalisation of active 
voluntary euthanasia through legislation would necessarily face the same difficulties. 
In assessing the current situation in the Netherlands with regard to the practice of active voluntary 
euthanasia, we are greatly assisted by the recent surveys which have been conducted, in particular, the 
nation-wide survey of doctors conducted under the auspices of the Remmelink Committee: This 
survey indicated that the practice of active euthanasia in the Netherlands is in fact significantly less 
than had been previously estimated. Whilst there may be some scope for concern in view of the 0.8% 
of cases in which active steps were taken to terminate life without an explicit and persistent request 
from the patient, claims about the uncontrollable nature of euthanasia and the widespread practice of 
non-voluntary and even involuntary euthanasia have been shown to be unfounded. What the 
Netherlands experience has shown is that active voluntary euthanasia can be practised in accordance 
with the wishes of patients in a caring and humane way which, at the same time, respects the 
sensitivities of doctors.334 By and large, it appears that the contemporary practice of active voluntary 
euthanasia in the Netherlands is serving the interests of patients and there is no evidence of large scale 
333 Verbal communication with Chief Prosecutor Jitta, November 1991. 
334 M. Pabst Battin, 'Holland and Home: On the Exportability of Dutch Euthanasia Practices' in Aycke and 
Smook, 124, 124. 
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abuses or extensions of the practice. Thus, it makes the option of an earlier death a reality for the 
. . 
small minority of patients that seek it, without causing any apparent harm or damage to society. 
Even if the conclusion is reached that the contemporary practice of active voluntary euthanasia in the 
Netherlands is working satisfactorily, consideration must be given to the implications of the 
Netherlands situation for other countries, and the 'exportability of Dutch euthanasia practices•.335 In 
particular, care must be taken that a practice, operating satisfactorily in one country is not 
unthinkingly adopted in another, where, for a variety of reasons, it may operate quite differently. 
Some attention has already been given to special features of Dutch society which may have 
contributed to the development of active voluntary euthanasia in that country. For the purposes of the 
present inquiry, consideration needs to be given to those aspects of the contemporary practice of active 
voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands and Dutch society in general which may limit the 
applicability of the Dutch experience. 
First, consideration must be given to a number of features of the Dutch health care system which 
appear to facilitate the performance of active voluntary euthanasia free from coercion or abuse. A 
significant feature of Dutch health care is the comprehensive scheme of national health insurance.336 
The coverage of this insurance is in all cases substantial, including basic care as well costly high 
technology care.337 This is to be contrasted with the situation in some countries, such as the United 
States, where there is, at present, no national health care system or scheme of national health care 
insurance, and where a large number of people have no insurance at all or are substantially 
underinsured.338 Since the Netherlands has a health care system available to every citizen, there are 
not the same financial pressures on patients as there may be in some countries for the performance of 
active voluntary euthanasia 339 
Another observation which has been made by commentators, from both within and outside the 
Netherlands, is that the medical establishment in the Netherlands as a rule is not commercially 
inclined340 and there are certainly no financial or other incentives for hospitals or doctors to terminate 
the lives of their patients.341 Moreover, many have spoken of the integrity of the Dutch medical 
profession. 342 
335 Id. 124-136. 
336 Battin, 'Seven Caveats Concerning the Discussion of Euthanasia in Holland', 76; Sneide(r)man, 108-
109. 
337 Dillmann, 8. 
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Yet another special feature of the position in the Netherlands is that, as noted earlier,343 that country 
. -
has a strongly developed system of general practice, with additional nursing care and other forms of 
care provided to the patient at home.344 The majority of patients die at home under the care of their 
family doctor. For those who are admitted to hospital or nursing homes, the Dutch pride themselves 
on uniformly high quality care with sufficient knowledge and skill in pain treabnent and palliative 
care.345 Thus, a request for active euthanasia cannot be seen as an indication that inadequate care has 
been provided. 346 
It has been suggested that these elements of Dutch health care are important in that they constitute the 
social background for the practice of active voluntary euthanasia which is free from restraint and 
coercion.347 Whilst there are obviously difficulties in attempting to draw conclusions from the Dutch 
experience which may be applicable in other countries, consideration of these features suggests that 
the Dutch situation in not completely unique. In Australia, we have a national scheme of health 
insurance which ensures that health care is available to all. We too can boast high standards of 
medical care, with ever increasing knowledge and skill in pain treabnent and palliative care. We also 
have a well established system of general practice, and there is no doubt about the overall integrity of 
our medical profession. 
It should be noted that there are also a number of distinguishing features between the position in the 
Netherlands and other countries, such as Australia The legal system in the Netherlands has its roots 
in Roman law and is, in the main, a civil-law orientated system.348 This contrasts with the situation 
in common law jurisdictions, such as Australia, which are derived from Anglo-Saxon law. However, 
as in Australia, Dutch judges are appointed for life349 and their independence is constitutionally 
guaranteed.350 There also appears to be some differences with regard to the role of the prosecuting 
authorities. In the Netherlands, there is considerable prosecutorial discretion, more so than in 
Australia or comparable jurisdictions.351 Moreover, the prosecution in the Netherlands appears to 
occupy more of a policy-making role than is evident in other countries, and this is illustrated by the 
development of prosecution policy with regard to active voluntary euthanasia.352 Indeed, it would be 
very difficult for other countries such as Australia to emulate the current position in the Netherlands, 
where cases of active voluntary euthanasia coming to the attention of the authorities are not 
prosecuted even though they are in breach of the criminal law. 
343 See above, 397. 
344 Dillmann, 8; Pabst Battin, 'Holland and Home: On the Exportability of Dutch Euthanasia Practices,' 
126; Sneide(r)man, 109. 
345 Dillmann, 8. 
346 Admiraal, 'Is there a Place for Euthanasia?' 15-16. 
34 7 Dillmann, 8. 
348 Sutorius, 'How Euthanasia was Legalised in Holland', 9. 
349 Compare this, for example, with the situation in the United States where the judges are typically 
subject to public re-election; Pabst Battin, 'Holland and Home: On the Exportability of Dutch 
Euthanasia Practices,' 127. 
350 Sutorius, 'How Euthanasia was Legalised in Holland,' 9. 
351 /d. 10, Pabst Battin, 'Holland and Home: On the Exportability of Dutch Euthanasia Practices,' 127. For 
discussion of Dutch prosecution policy see above, 359-360. 
352 Pabst Battin, 'Holland and Home: On the Exportability of Dutch Euthanasia Practices,' 127. 
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Conclusion 
The object of this chapter has been to examine the legal position and practice of active voluntary 
euthanasia in the Netherlands with a view to assessing the suitability of this model for adoption in 
Australia and other common law jurisdictions. The position which has been reached in the 
Netherlands with regard to active voluntary euthanasia is the product of a complex interplay which has 
taken place over the past two decades between the courts, prosecution policy and medical practice. 
Whilst it would be impossible to replicate this particular development elsewhere, valuable insight can 
be gained from examining the Dutch practice of active voluntary euthanasia which has at least gained 
de facto legal recognition. This in tum may be the basis for other countries such as Australia to 
introduce legislation providing some scope for the lawful administration of active voluntary 
euthanasia by doctors in carefully defined circumstances. 
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CHAPTER IX 
OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
Introductjop 
In earlier chapters, it has been suggested that there are various problems with the present law which 
call for a reassessment of the present legal prohibition of active voluntary euthanasia 1 Consideration 
must now be given to possible legal responses to these difficulties to determine whether legislative 
reform is called for, and if so, what form it should talce. Ove~ the years quite a number of reform 
options have been advanced. The object of this chapter is to examine the various possible models for 
change and their respective merits and shortcomings, with a view to ascertaining the most appropriate 
model for reform. 
Before embarking on consideration of possible options for reform, consideration needs to be given to 
one suggestion which has been made, but which does not in fact represent an option for change, 
namely that the most appropriate solution is to do nothing at all. This was, for example, the approach 
favoured by the Canadian Law Reform Commission in its review of the law with regard to active 
voluntary euthanasia. 2 The commission was of the view that the present criminal law prohibition of 
active voluntary euthanasia should be retained, but that the strictness of the law should continue to be 
ameliorated in individual cases through the internal mechanisms of the criminal justice system. This 
approach is said to have the advantage of recognising the appropriateness of active voluntary 
euthanasia in individual cases, yet avoiding the dangers and difficulties in drafting legislation to more 
formally accommodate the practice.3 However, as outlined in the earlier chapter dealing with the 
position in practice, this approach is subject to enormous problems.4 It inevitably produces 
uncertainty and does not adequately protect the position of either doctors or their patients. Moreover, 
toleration of the discrepancies which presently exist between the law on the books and the law in 
practice tends to lead to disrespect for the law. Some change to the present criminal law prohibition of 





See, in particular, chapter IV. 
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper No. 28, Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and the 
Cessation of Treatment (1982) 51-52 (hereafter referred to as the Law Reform Commission of Canada, 
Euthanasia Working Paper); Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report No. 20, Euthanasia, Aiding 
Suicide and the Cessation of Treatment (1983) 19-20 (hereafter referred to as the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada, Euthanasia Report). See also H. Trowell, The Unfinished Debate on Euthanasia 
(1973) 143-144. 
A. Browne, 'Assisted Suicide and Active Voluntary Euthanasia' (1989) 11 Can.J.L.Juris. 35, 50. 
See chapter IV, 146-150. 
403 
Looking at the situation realistically, if there is going to be any change to the present law dealing 
with active voluntary euthanasia, it will have to be achieved through legislative action. Possibilities 
certainly exist for non-legislative solutions,5 and the situation in the Netherlands demonstrates that 
change can be achieved through the courts. 6 However, in Australia and other jurisdictions under 
consideration, there is practically speaking, little scope for the courts to bring about reform 1 and there 
are arguments to suggest that the legislature is, in any event, the more appropriate forum to bring 
about change in this area. 8 
Before going on to consider specific options for legislative reform, brief consideration must be given 
to the claims of some commentators that legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia would be contrary 
to international human rights instruments to which Australia is a party.9 Essentially the argument 
takes the form that the introduction of legislation would be contrary to Article 6 (para. 1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights .1976 which provides that 'every human being 
has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his life.' However, as was argued in an earlier chapter, 10 the right to life must be capable of being 
waivedll and legislation permitting a doctor to administer active voluntary euthanasia would therefore 
not be an infringement of the individual's right to life. Thus, there is nothing in international human 
rights instruments which would prevent the introduction of legislation permitting active voluntary 
euthanasia 
Reform Options 
It should be noted from the outset that the various reform options which have been advanced fall into 
two distinct categories: those which deal generally with 'mercy killings;•12 and those which are 






For example, the suggestion of Professor Glanville Williams in his text The Sanctity of Life and the 
Criminal Law (1958) 284 that active voluntary euthanasia may in extreme circumstances be justified 
under the general doctrine of necessity. See also P. Mackinnon, 'Euthanasia and Homicide' (1983-84) 
Crim.L.Q. 483, 504-505; A. Rall, 'The Doctor's Dilemma: Relieve Suffering or Prolong Life?' (1977) 
94 S. African L.J. 40, 46-48. 
See chapter Vill, 356-367. Although Australian law provides for a defence of necessity it is highly 
unlikely that the judiciary would accept the defence in a case of active voluntary euthanasia. The courts 
would be inclined to take the view that such a momentous change in the law should come from the 
parliament. See also B. Sneide(r)man, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Model for Canada?' (1992) 8 
Humane Med. 104, 106. 
The opportunity for modification of the criminal law by the courts is even more circumscribed in those 
Australian jurisdictions where the criminal law is dealt with under a Criminal Code; see chapter I, n. 3. 
D. Richards, 'Constitutional Privacy, the Right to Die and the Meaning of Life: A Moral Analysis' 
(1981) 22 Wm. & Mary LRev. 327, 418. See also In re Farrel 529 A.2d 404, 407-408 (1987) per 
Garibaldi J. for arguments regarding the advantages of legislative, as distinct from judicial, guidelines 
in matters of this nature. 
See, for example, the view of the European Association of Centres of Medical Ethics regarding the 
resolution in favour of active voluntary euthanasia before the Europe~ Parliament; see Note, 
'Euthanasia Vote Deferred' (1991) 70 Bull.Med. Ethics 6. Note also the minority view of the Dutch State 
Commission on Euthanasia; see chapter Vill, 374. 
10 See chapter V, 200-201. 
11 See chapter V, 200. 
12 For a definition of mercy killing, see the Introduction to this thesis, 4. 
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Recognition of this distinction is important because it has implications with regard to the content and 
potential application of the respective proposals. Consideration will initially be given to options for 
reform falling within the first category dealing generally with mercy killing. 
Mercy Killing 
One possible direction for change would be to establish lesser penalties for mercy killing. This could 
be achieved in a number of ways including: 1) the creation of a separate offence for compassionate 
murder; 2) the introduction of a sentenCing discretion allowing for the reduction, or even setting aside, 
of penalties in cases of homicide prompted by compassionate motives; or 3) the creation of a new 
defence which would reduce the offence from murder to manslaughter. 
The first two proposals are similar to the position in a number of European countries, where the 
actor's motive is a critical factor in determining culpability.13 For example, in both Switzerland and 
Germany, compassionate killing does not come within the classification of murder but rather 
'manslayer' .14 Moreover, in determining the appropriate punishment, the courts are required to take 
into account the defendant's motive which may justify a reduction in sentence.15 In circumstances 
where the killing took place at the victim's request, it falls within a separate category of 'homicide 
upon request' which attracts a lesser penalty than murder.1 6 These factors, either singly or in 
combination, operate to provide considerable leniency in the treatment of mercy killers in these 
jurisdictions.17 
Consideration will now be given to the three possible options set out above. 
The Creation of a Separate Offence for Compassionate Murder 
As noted above, one possible option for change which has been suggested is to make some provision 
for compassionate murder or mercy killing by the creation of a separate offence with a lower penalty 
than for murder.18 This would enable the courts to take into account the motive of the defendant in 
determining liability. A proposal along these lines has been supported by a number of commentators 
13 For an excellent discussion of the position under the German and Swiss Penal Codes, see H. Silving, 
'Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law' (1954) 103 U.Pa.L.Rev. 350, 360-368. See also M. 
Sayid, 'Euthanasia: A Comparison of the Criminal Laws of Germany, Switzerland and the United States' 
(1983) 6 B.C.lnt'l. & Comp.L.Rev. 533. 
14 See Articles 211 and 212 of the German Penal Code and Article 63 of the Swiss Penal Code. For 
commentary, see Sayid, 550-552; Silving, 364-366. 
15 See Article 213 of the German Penal Code and Article 64 of the Swiss Penal Code. See also discussion 
by Sayid, 551-553; Silving, 366-367. 
16 See Article 216 of the German Penal Code and Article 114 of the Swiss Penal Code respectively. See 
also discussion by Sayid, 553-555; Silving, 378-386. It is to be noted that the Penal Code of Uruguay 
of 1933 provides for total exculpation where a homicide is motivated by compassion and performed 
upon the victim's own request; see Silving, 368-369. 
1 7 See also Silving, 363. 
18 There is also the alternative possibility of creating a specific offence of killing on request as is the case 
in Switzerland and Germany. 
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and agencies19 and has the advantage that the offender is charged with a specific offence other than 
murder and is liable to a lesser punishment 20 Concern has, however, been raised about using motive 
as a criterion for liability.21 Whilst there are obviously difficulties involved in making motive an 
element of the offence, primarily with regard to proof, they are not insurmountable.22 
Sentencing Discretion 
An alternative possibility would be to retain the existing legal prohibition but to allow the courts a 
discretion in sentencing to take into account the defendant's compassionate motive either to reduce or 
completely set aside penalties.23 Questions arise as to the appropriate scope of such a sentencing 
discretion; whether it be confined to cases of compassionate killing or whether it should it take the 
form of a more general sentencing discretion applicable in all cases of homicide.24 Whichever form 
the sentencing discretion were to take, this proposal would provide some formal mechanism for the 
lenient punishment of persons who take life for compassionate motives. However, some unease has 
been expressed about this proposal on the grounds that, as with the aforementioned option, the court 
would be required to ascertain the defendant's motive.25 Moreover, even if only a light punishment 
were imposed, the offender would still experience the stigma of a murder conviction. 26 
A Defence Reducing Murder to Manslaughter 
Another possible option for reform is to allow mercy killing to be a partial defence to murder. 27 The 
onus would rest upon the defendant to adduce evidence in support of the defence and if established, the 
defendant would be convicted of manslaughter rather than murder. 
Some commentators have favoured one or more of the foregoing solutions on the grounds that they 
represent an appropriate compromise, acknowledging that cases of mercy killing are generally 
19 For example, D. Meyers, The Human Body and the Law (1970) 155; J. Castel, 'Nature and Effects of 
Consent with Respect to the Right to Life and the Right to Physical and Mental Integrity in the 
Medical Field: Criminal and Private Law Aspects' (1978) 16 AltaL.Rev. 293, 323; F. Maher, 
'Euthanasia' (1985) 59 Law Jnst.J. 445, 447. A proposal for the creation of a separate offence was put 
forward by the English Criminal Law Revision Committee in its working paper on Offences Against 
the Person but the committee resiled from this position in its final report; see chapter VII, 322. A 
similar proposal was considered by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment; see chapter VII, 
321. 
20 Law Reform Commissioner Victoria, Working Paper No. 8, Murder: Mental Element and Punishment 
(1984) 27 (hereafter referred to as the Victorian Law Reform Commissioner, Working Paper). 
21 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Euthanasia Working Paper, 48-49. (For criticism of the 
commission's reasoning see Browne, 52.) See also the Victorian Law Reform Commissioner, Working 
Paper, 27; and the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1953) Cmnd. Papers, 8932, para. 179. 
22 For further discussion see the Victorian Law Reform Commissioner, Working Paper, 27. 
23 For consideration of this option, see the Victorian Law Reform Commissioner, Working Paper, 26-27; 
and the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Euthanasia Working Paper, 49-51. 
24 See, for example, the suggestion of J. Sander, 'Euthanasia: None Dare Call it Murder' (1969) 60 
J.Crim.L, Criminology & Police Science 351, 358. In a number of jurisdictions consideration has 
been given to whether the penalty for murder should be at the discretion of the court. Todate, this has 
been rejected in the United Kingdom, but in a number of Australian jurisdictions, the mandatory life 
sentence for murder has been abolished; see chapter IV, n. 140. 
25 See, for example, the discussion in the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Euthanasia Working Paper, 
50-51. 
26 Victorian Law Reform Commissioner, Working Paper, 27. 
27 For consideration of this option see the Victorian Law Reform Commissioner, Working Paper, 27-28. 
See also B. Sneidman, 'Why not a Limited Defence? A Comment on the Proposals of the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada on Mercy Killing' (1985) 15 Man.L.J. 85, 94-96. 
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considered less reprehensible than ordinary acts of homicide and therefore deserving of special 
treatment. yet not going so far as to formally endorse mercy killing by legalisation. 28 Whilst the 
implementation of any of these reforms would arguably be an improvement on the present 
unsatisfactory situation, these proposals are not the appropriate solution to the particular difficulties 
in the area of medically administered active voluntary euthanasia. The main objection to all of the 
foregoing proposals in the context of medically administered active voluntary euthanasia is that 
doctors remain at risk of criminal liability if they engage in the practice.29 It may, admittedly, be a 
liability for some lesser offence than murder, or the penalty may be nominal, depending on which 
proposal is implemented and the form in which it is introduced. The fact remains, however, that 
doctors who perform active euthanasia at the patient's request would still potentially be exposed to 
criminal liability. One must bear in mind that these particular proposals were not intended to deal 
specifically with the issue of active voluntary euthanasia in the medical context but rather were 
directed generally at compassionate or mercy killings which may arise in a whole range of 
circumstances. 30 This accounts for the limited nature of these proposals, seeking simply to diminish 
the liability of the defendant, rather than providing a complete immunity from liability: 
Mercy Killing as a Complete Defence? 
A number of commentators have gone further and suggested stronger measures in the form of a 
complete defence to a charge of murder in circumstances where the defendant has acted out of 
compassionate motives. Rachels, for example, has suggested that a plea of mercy killing be 
acceptable as a defence against a charge of homicide in much the same way that a plea of self-defence 
is acceptable.31 Accordingly, someone charged with homicide could plead mercy killing - if it could 
be shown that the victim while competent requested death - and that the victim was suffering from a 
painful and terminal illness, the defendant would be acquitted.32 The onus would be on the mercy 
killer to present clear and convincing evidence that the patient was competent, terminally ill and 
voluntarily chose to die. 
Although this proposal has the advantage of offering a doctor (and any other mercy killer) the 
possibility of a complete acquittal, it still falls short of legalisation. Active voluntary euthanasia 
performed by a doctor would still prima facie be unlawful as murder. It would be up to the doctor to 
raise the defence and a matter for the court to determine whether the defence should be accepted in a 
particular case. This proposal for a mercy killing defence does not. therefore, provide sufficient 
protection either to doctors or their patients with regard to medically administered active voluntary 
euthanasia 
28 Silving, 388; Meyers, 155; Sneidman, 95-96. 
29 J. Wilson, Death by Decision (1975) 165 where he notes that a legal system that only reduces the 
penalty for active voluntary euthanasia is not sufficient to meet the problems of contemporary medical 
practice in terminal cases because it fails to provide adequate guidelines for the difficult life and death 
decisions that must be made in this context. 
30 See chapter IV, 129-146 for reference to some of the mercy killing cases. 
31 J. Rachels, The End of Life (1986) 185. For analysis and support for Rachels' proposal, see W. 
Winslade, 'Guarding the Exit Door: A Plea for Limited Toleration of Euthanasia' (1988) Hous.L.Rev. 
517, 520-523. 
32 Rachels, 185. 
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Another proposal, which goes somewhat further has been put forward by Williams. In contrast to the 
other proposals considered above,33 this particular proposal is specifically confined to active 
voluntary euthanasia administered by a medical practitioner.34 On the basis of this proposal: 
No medical practitioner should be guilty of an offence in respect of an act done 
intentionally to accelerate the death of a patient who is seriously ill, unless it is 
proved that the act was not done in good faith with the consent of the patient and 
for the purpose of saving him from severe pain in an illness believed to be of an 
incurable and fatal character. Under this formula it would be for the physician, if 
charged, to show that the patient was seriously ill, but for the prosecution to 
prove that the physician acted from some motive other than the humanitarian 
one allowed to him by law.35 
This suggested formulation differs from that of Rachels in that it proceeds on the basis that it is 
lawful for a medical practitioner to terminate the life of a seriously ill patient and the onus would be 
on the prosecution to prove that the act was not done in good faith and with the consent of the 
patient. It therefore represents a form of legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 36 This proposal 
also has the advantage that it is specifically confined to medically administered active voluntary 
euthanasia and can consequently address the special needs in that area. Williams' proposal is 
nevertheless open to criticism on the grounds that it contains inadequate safeguards for the practice of 
active voluntary euthanasia. It affords doctors too much discretion in the matter and, as a result, does 
not provide sufficient protection for the patient.37 
The foregoing analysis has shown that proposals for reform which are directed generally at mercy 
killings are not the appropriate solution for the particular difficulties raised by the issue of active 
voluntary euthanasia in the medical context. This is because mercy killing performed by family or 
friends on the one hand, and medically administered active voluntary euthanasia on the other, are quite 
different in nature and raise quite distinct issues. Whilst there is a widespread desire to show leniency 
to mercy killers and avoid the hypocrisy which pervades the present application of the law, few would 
contend that such offenders should completely escape liability. In the medical context, however, where 
a doctor acts bona fide at the request of a patient and performs active euthanasia, there is a case to say 
that a doctor should be protected from incurring criminal liability, provided he or she has acted in 
accordance with acceptable criteria The present problems which confront the law with regard to active 
voluntary euthanasia therefore require specialised attention and the discussion which follows will be 
confined to this area. 
33 - See above, 404-406. 
34 See also H. Brody, 'Assisted Death - A Compassionate Response to Medical Failure' (1992) 327 New 
Eng.J.Med. 1384 where he puts forward a proposal for the creation of a defence to a charge of murder or 
assisted suicide in a genuine case of medically assisted death. 
35 Williams, 303. 
36 See below, 410-425 for further discussion of possible legislative models. 
37 See also Browne, 53. Indeed, Williams himself recognised that this proposal confers on the medical 
practitioner a wide discretion; Williams, 302. In fairness to Williams, however, it must be pointed out 
that this proposal was developed in response to the criticisms of some of the opponents of earlier 
measures for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia which had contained rigorous safeguards 
and procedures. See the Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 1936 (U.K.); chapter VII, 318-319. 
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Significantly, many of the objections which have been raised against the various proposals for change 
with regard to compassionate or mercy killing do not apply with the same force to medically 
administered active voluntary euthanasia. For example, concerns have been raised about the difficulties 
in establishing the real motives behind a killing in circumstances where the killer may have acted out 
of mixed motive; i.e. partly motivated by compassion for the patient but also in part driven by a 
desire to put an end to a difficult family situation or to gain some material benefit from the patient's 
deatb.38 More general concerns have also been raised about the possibility of abuse of any 
liberalisation of the law, with for example, mala fide murders being committed and disguised as 
compassionate murders.39 It would be naive to suggest that legislative reform with regard to 
medically administered active voluntary euthanasia would be completely free of difficulties or risks. 
However, compared with the more general mercy killing scenario, it is reasonable to assume that 
doctors, operating under their professionals codes of.practice, are less likely to have some ulterior 
motive in hastening the death of the patient 
Doctor-Assisted Suicide 
One possibility for reform with specific reference to the medical context is for the legalisation of 
doctor-assisted suicide.40 Such a measure would provide legal protection to a doctor who, at the 
patient's request, provides the patient with the necessary assistance to commit suicide. There is, 
undeniably, a strong similarity between medically administered active voluntary euthanasia and doctor-
assisted suicide, though under the law as it presently stands, the legal outcomes are markedly 
different.41 In canvassing possible options for refonn, one possibility would he for the legalisation of 
doctor-assisted suicide alongside the legalisation of medically administered active voluntary 
euthanasia.42 Indeed, it would be strange if it were lawful for a doctor to take active steps to end a 
patient's life but could not in the same circumstances provide the patient with the means of taking his 
or her own life. The option being considered here, however, presupposes retention of the existing 
38 See, for example, the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Euthanasia Working Paper, 50-51. It should 
be noted, however, that the Canadian Law Reform Commission also raised specific concerns in 
connection with the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia; see the Law Reform Commission of 
Canada, Euthanasia Working Paper, 44-48. 
39 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Euthanasia Working Paper, 51. 
40 This particular option is distinct from proposals for review of the law with regard to assisting suicide 
generally; see, for example, Law Reform Commission of Canada, Euthanasia Working Paper, 52-55, 
and the proposed amendment to the Suicide Act 1961 (Eng.) in England, pursuant to the Suicide Act 
(Amendment) Bill 1985. The object of the Suicide Act (Amendment) Bill, introduced by Lord Jenkins, 
was to make it a defence to any charge relating to counselling, aiding and abetting suicide under the 
Suicide Act that the accused acted on behalf of the person who committed suicide and in so acting 
behaved reasonably, with compassion and in good faith. The Bill was, however, unsuccessful. Note 
also the suggestion for a complete defence in cases of compassionate aiding and abetting suicide; J. 
Harder, 'Mercy Killings - Some Reflections on Beecham's Case' (1988) 52 J. Crim.L. 309. For the 
reasons outlined above, 406, a general provision of the kind suggested in these proposals would not be 
an appropriate solution to the special problems raised in the medical context. 
41 See chapters I and ill. 
42 A law could be framed in such a way that both options would be available to a patient. Alternatively, 
legislation permitting active voluntary euthanasia could be based on the requirement that the patient is 
incapable of suicide and requires assistance to end his or her life. 
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prohibition on medically administered active voluntary euthanasia and envisages doctor-assisted suicide 
as the only legislative measure. 
The possibility of legalisation of doctor-assisted suicide has been advanced by a number of 
commentators and organisations43 and is seen by many as a preferable alternative to any change with 
regard to active voluntary euthanasia. A number of arguments have been put forward in support of this 
method of reform. An obvious advantage is that patients wishing to commit suicide would have the 
benefit of appropriate medical information and assistance in achieving that result. This would reduce 
many of the risks associated with patient suicide; for example, that the patient's diagnosis and 
prognosis are inadequately confirmed-and that the means chosen for suicide will be unreliable or 
inappropriately used or may possibly fall into the wrong hands.44 From a practical point of view, the 
implementation of this proposal of doctor-assisted suicide would require minimal change to existing 
law. All Australian jurisdictions have legislation dealing with assisted suicide which could easily be 
amended to allow for doctor-assisted suicide.45 Achieving legalisation of medically administered active 
voluntary euthanasia would, in comparison, inevitably be more complicated Another advantage which 
is claimed in respect of this particular option is that acceptance of doctor-assisted suicide would at 
least provide some guarantee of the voluntariness of the patient's decision.46 One of the concerns 
often raised with regard to the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia is the difficulty in 
ascertaining truly voluntary consent.47 Where, however, the patient's death is precipitated by the 
patient's own act, (albeit with the doctor's assistance), there is some assurance that the patient 
genuinely desired death. Another consideration which is advanced in support of doctor-assisted suicide 
J.n preference to active voluntary euthanasia is that it minimises third party involvement in the 
patient's death. It is reasoned that where the patient is capable of performing the death inducing act, 
there is no justification for others to do what that patient can do for him or herself. Further, it is 
argued, by minimising the involvement of dqctors one avoids placing the responsibility of killing on 
others, and avoids the possible risk of emotional trauma to the person who brings death.48 Finally, 
proponents of doctor-assisted suicide point out that since this is a far less drastic proposal than the 
43 For an example of such a proposal, see the Bill proposed for the legalisation of physician-assisted 
suicide in New Hampshire, United States; see chapter VII, 343-344. A number of the voluntary 
euthanasia societies in Australia have put forward legislative proposals for the decriminalisation of 
doctor-assisted suicide. See, for example the 'Discussion Paper on Decriminalising Voluntary 
Euthanasia in South Australia', December (1989) published by the South Australian Voluntary 
Euthanasia Society (S.A.V.E.S.). Similar work has been undertaken by the voluntary euthanasia 
societies in Victoria and New South Wales. However, the ultimate aim of these societies is to secure 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. See chapter VI, 240-243. 
The concept of doctor-assisted suicide has also received support from quite a number of commentators: 
see, for example, R. Syme, 'A Patient's Right to a Good Death' (1991) 154 M.J.A. 203; R. Hare, 
'Euthanasia: A Christian View' (1975) 6 Philosophic Exchange 43, 51; H. Smith, 'Termination of Life' 
(1971) B.M.J. 111; R. Crisp, 'A Good Death: Who Best to Bring It? (1987) 1 Bioethics 74, 74-75. 
44 M. Battin, 'Euthanasia: The Way We Do It, The Way They Do It' (1991) 6 Journal of Pain & Symptom 
Management 298, 301. 
45 See, for example, the legislative proposals put forward in the S.A.V.E.S. 'Discussion Paper on 
Decriminalising Voluntary Euthanasia in South Australia.' 
46 Crisp, 75; J. Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (1984) 184; M. Heifetz with C. Mangel, The 
Right to Die (1975) 106. 
47 See chapter V, 207-209. 
48 Crisp, 75. 
410 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, it is likely to enjoy wider acceptability amongst doctors 
and the community generally.49 
There is undeniably some substance to these claims. Indeed, these considerations may well justify a 
cautious approach to the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia and could arguably justify the 
inclusion of a requirement that active voluntary euthanasia only be available in circumstances where 
the patient is physically unable to commit suicide.50 Notwithstanding the advantages of this proposal 
for reform, it is not, on its own, a satisfactory legal response to the present problems with regard to 
medically assisted dying. Whilst the possibility of doctor-assisted suicide may be appropriate and 
adequate in many cases, it does not represent a complete solution to the present difficulties in this 
area. There will always be a proportion of patients who are physically unable to commit suicide.51 
For others, the concept of suicide may for some reason be objectionable, yet they may willingly seek 
active voluntary euthanasia.52 If the legal response was limited to doctor-assisted suicide, these 
categories of individuals would not be provided for.53 
In the event that reform of the law were to take this particular course of allowing doctor-assisted 
suicide, careful consideration would have to be given to the appropriate method of securing such 
reform. In particular, it would be necessary to define the circumstances in which a doctor could 
lawfully assist the suicide of a patient; should a doctor be able to assist suicide only if there is a 
painful and incurable disease or should a doctor be able to assist any sane person who has determined 
to take his or her own life?54 Similar problems of definition would of course also arise with attempts 
to legalise active voluntary euthanasia (and will be considered in more detail in that context), but in 
the area of suicide, special care would need to be taken to ensure that irrational suicide was not 
encouragect.55 
Legalisation of Active Voluntary Euthanasia 
The most far-reaching legislative option for reform would be the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia. Developing an appropriate model for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia will 
inevitably be a difficult and challenging task. That is, however, not a justifiable reason to avoid 
addressing the problems inherent in the present law and practice. It is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to present draft legislation for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia Rather, the aim of this 
thesis is to critically examine various legislative options for the legalisation of active voluntary 
49 Syme, 204. 
50 See, for example, the suggestion of S. Wolhandler, 'Voluntary Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill and the 
Constitutional Right to Privacy' (1983-84) 69 Cornell L.Rev. 363, 382. 
51 L. Schiffer, 'Euthanasia and the Criminal Law' (1985) 42 U. Toronto Fac.LRev. 93, 107. 
52 See also the argument in chapter V, 216. 
53 See also Schiffer, 107 where she argues that this could even be construed as a form of discrlinination 
against incapacitated people. 
54 H. Trowell, 'Suicide and Euthanasia' (1971) B.M.J. 275. 
55 See further chapter ill, 99-100. 
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euthanasia and to make recommendations in more general terms, on appropriate legislative measures 
for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. 
An initial question which must be addressed is the approach which legislative reform should talce. 
There are obviously a whole host of possibilities, ranging from very formal procedures, requiring 
judicial review of all euthanasia decisions56 at one extreme, to a very simple legislative model with a 
minimum of safeguards and formality which vests an enormous discretion in the doctor.57 As noted 
in a previous chapter,58 over the years, quite a number of proposals have been put forward for the 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. Some have actually talcen the form of legislative 
initiatives,59 others have been proposed by commentators in the campaign for legalisation.60 The 
Netherlands model for the practice of active voluntary euthanasia is also an option upon which 
legislation could be based. 61 Although the guidelines for the practice of active voluntary euthanasia in 
the Netherlands have been developed by the courts, as distinct from the legislature, the experience 
which has been gained in that country provides a valuable insight into the appropriate criteria and 
safeguards that legislation permitting active voluntary euthanasia should contain. 
The dilemma inevitably faced in framing legislation for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia 
is striking the appropriate balance between the inclusion of adequate safeguards and procedures for the 
protection of both doctors and patients and, at the same time, avoiding excessive formality and 
bureaucratization of the procedures for active voluntary euthanasia which may ultimately defeat its 
efficient and humane administration. 62 Proposals for legalisation which involve judicial review of the 
patient's request for active euthanasia, or the involvement of a 'euthanasia referee' or other official or 
body,63 seek to provide for a formalised application procedure; the patient seeking active euthanasia 
56 See, for example, the early legislative proposals in the United States, in particular, the 1937 Nebraska 
Bill and the 1938 New York Bill for the legalisation of voluntary active euthanasia. The English 
Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill of 1936, upon which these United States Bills were largely 
based, proposed the use of a euthanasia referee, appointed by the Minister of Health; see chapter VII, 
318. A number of commentators have also proposed a system of judicial review; e.g. J. Fletcher, 
'Morals Medicine and the Law - Symposium: The Issues' (1956) 31 N. Y. U.L.Rev. 1157, 1159-1160 
(see also J. Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, (1979) 187-188); A. Alschuler, 'The Right to Die' (1991) 
141 New LJ. 1637. Note also C. Brandt et al, 'Model Aid-In-Dying Act' (1989) 75 Iowa L.Rev. 125, 
179-187 where the establishment of an 'Aid-in-Dying Board' is proposed. 
57 For example, Williams' proposal in The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 302-309. 
58 See, for example, chapter VII, 318-320 for discussion of the position in the United Kingdom. 
59 See, for example, the English Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 1936 and the Voluntary 
Euthanasia Bill 1969, the Nebraska Bill of 1937 and more recently, the proposed physician aid-in-
dying legislation in the United States. For fuller coverage of these legislative developments, see 
chapter VII. 
60 See, for example Williams' proposal in The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 302-309. Note also 
the model acts which have been suggested by S. Cole and M. Shea, 'Voluntary Euthanasia: A Proposed 
Remedy' (1975) 39 Alb. L Rev. 826; W. Steele and B. Hill, 'A Plea for a Legal Right to Die' (1976) 29 
Okla.L.Rev. 328; Brandt et al, 'Model Aid-In-Dying Act'. 
61 See chapter VIII. 
62 Note Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 298-302 and G. Williams, 'Euthanasia' 
(1970) 63 Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine 659, 666 where he comments on the irony 
that legislation which provided for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia and contained 
stringent safeguards (the 1936 Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill) (U.K.) was criticised on the 
grounds that it would bring too much formality into the sickroom. 
63 For example, T. Helme, 'The Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill (1936) Revisited' (1991) 17 
J.Med. Ethics 25, 27 where he suggests that a system of euthanasia tribunals be introduced. See further, 
T. Helme and N. Padfield, 'Safeguarding Euthanasia' (1992) 142 New LJ. 1335 where this suggestion is 
further developed. Note also the early suggestion made by the Australian Voluntary Euthanasia Society 
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brings an application or petition, together with supporting medical evidence, before the court or 
euthanasia official, and following an investigation of the case, and having regard to the criteria for 
active voluntary euthanasia under the enabling legislation, 64 a determination would be made as to 
whether the patient's request for active euthanasia should be granted. Proponents of this model for 
reform contend that the advantage of such a procedure is that there is an independent investigation of 
the circumstances and an objective determination as to the permissibility of active voluntary 
euthanasia. This, they claim, provides an important opportunity to ascertain the patient's decision-
making capacity, the voluntariness of the patient's request, and other specified preconditions for the 
fulfilment of the euthanasia request.65 However, legislative reform based upon a model of judicial 
review is subject to the criticism that it is a cumbersome procedure which unnecessarily bureaucratizes 
the handling of euthanasia requests.66 There is also the argument that the courts (or similar bodies) 
are, in any event, not a suitable decision-making forum for euthanasia determinations.67 The 
legitimate need to provide safeguards and to protect against abuse can be met without requiring judicial 
participation in the euthanasia procedure.68 There is obviously a need for certain formal procedural 
requirements if active voluntary euthanasia is to be legalised, 69 but these must be kept to a minimum 
if we are to avoid them becoming a barrier to relief. 70 
Consideration must now be given to the appropriate safeguards and criteria for the legalisation of 
active voluntary euthanasia. 
Possible Safeguards for the Legalisation of Active Voluntary 
Euthanasia 
Condition of the Patient 
An initial question which arises is whether it is appropriate to have any reference to the condition of 
the patient as a precondition for eligibility for active voluntary euthanasia. This thesis has focussed 
on the contemporary understanding of euthanasia, i.e. euthanasia in the medical context in 
circumstances where the patient is suffering from some illness or disability, 71 and it is in this atea 
(as it then was) for the use of a euthanasia commissioner. See Note, 'Euthanasia Commissioner' (1974) 
Vol. 1 No. 3 A. V.E.S. Newsletter 5. A number of commentators have also suggested the use of ethics 
committees to review patients' requests and authorise the performance of active voluntary euthanasia; 
e.g. J. Zaremba, 'Death with Dignity: Implementing One's Right to Die' (1987) 64 U.Det.L.Rev. 551, 
572. The ethics committee concept has previously been suggested for determinations with regard to the 
withholding and withdrawing of treatment determinations; e.g. H. Hirsch and R. Donovan, 'The Right 
to Die: Medico-Legal Implications of In re Quinlan' (1976-77) 30 Rutgers L.Rev. 267, 273-276. 
64 See below, 412-425. 
65 Alschuler, 1638. 
66 M. Moore, 'The Case for Voluntary Euthanasia' (1972-1974) 41-42 U.M.K.C.L.Rev. 327, 338; A. 
Levisohn, 'Voluntary Mercy Deaths' (1961) 8 J. Forensic Med. 51, 19. Much also depends on the terms 
of the proposed legislation and whether it gives the relevant court, body or official a discretion to 
authorise active euthanasia; if so, it could be argued to constitute an unjustifiable restriction on the 
patient's capacity to request active euthanasia. 
67 Richards, 418. 
68 Moore, 339. 
69 In this regard, the proposal put by Williams referred to above, 407, confers too much discretion on 
physicians and does not provide adequate safeguards against abuse. 
70 R. Samek, 'Euthanasia and Law Reform' (1984) 17 Ottawa L.Rev. 86, 114. 
71 See the Introduction to this thesis, 3-6. 
j 
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that there are particular problems with law and practice which need to be addressed. On a very liberal 
view of self-determination it could be argued that all patients who have decision-making capacity, 
should be free to seek active euthanasia, regardless of their medical condition. However, if there were 
no requirements at all as to the condition of the person seeking active euthanasia, the spectre would 
be raised of suicide upon request, for whatever reason. The arguments which have been developed in 
this thesis have proceeded on the basis that only in exceptional circumstances is there justification 
for creating an exception to the normal criminal prohibition on the taking of life.72 The 
jusµfication for permitting active voluntary euthanasia is therefore only established in cases where 
the person requesting euthanasia is suffering from some serious condition which he or she finds 
intolerable. Aside from these considerations, there is an additional argument in support of confining 
the class of candidates for active euthanasia in the interests of minimising the potential for abuse and 
mistake. 13 Thus, on the assumption that it is both necessary and appropriate to include some 
reference to the patient's condition in the eligibility criteria for active voluntary euthanasia, 7 4 
consideration will now be given to possible preconditions which could be imposed. 
A number of the legislative proposals have pr~eeded on the basis that the patient must be in a 
'terminal' state before the patient is eligible for active voluntary euthanasia.75 Proposals of this kind 
are fairly limited in their application and would not permit active voluntary euthanasia in respect of 
an incurable and suffering patient who is not expected to die from his or her condition.76 There are 
also problems in the application of this requirement (particularly where terminal illness is defined by 
reference to a specified period of time 77) because of the notorious difficulties in accurately predicting 
a terminal patient's life expectancy. 78 
72 See chapter V, 227-228. 
73 See arowne, 54-55 where he argues that the question of who should be eligible for assisted death cannot 
simply be settled by reference to who has a good reason for death but must also take into account the 
potential for abuse and mistake to which the legislation gives rise. 
74 For an example of a proposal for voluntary euthanasia legislation which deliberately does not contain 
any limitation as to the condition of the patient, see Steele and Hill, 343. 
75 The word 'terminal' is open to a number of possible interpretations; for example, under the 1988 
Californian initiative for physician aid-in-dying, the Humane and Dignified Death Act, 'terminal 
condition' was defined as one which is incurable and with reasonable medical certainty will lead to 
death within six months. A similar definition was contained in the Washington Initiative 119. See 
chapter VIl, n. 348. However, 'terminal' could be more broadly defined to refer to any incurable 
condition, whether or not death is actually impending; see, for example the proposal put forward by 
Cole and Shea, 839 where terminal illness or injury is defined as any illness or injury that is 
reasonably certain to result in the expiration of life, regardless of the use of medical treatment and 
which illness or injury has reached a stage at which painful or debilitating symptoms are imminent. 
Other proposals, including the 1936 Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill in the United Kingdom, 
refer to an 'incurable and fatal disease involving severe pain'. See also Fletcher, 'Morals Medicine and 
the Law - Symposium: The Issues,' 1159. 
76 Indeed, it could be argued that provided pain is· adequately controlled, the terminally ill patient is less 
likely to need active voluntary euthanasia than someone whose equally distressing illness or disability 
is not terminal, since the latter could face many years of suffering; see B. Smpker, 'Remember the Non-
Terminally Ill and Disabled' (1991) 43 V.E.S. Newsletter 10. In the Netherlands, the requirement of a 
terminal illness was rejected in the early stages of the Dutch jurisprudence on the subject; see chapter 
vm. 366. 
77 For example, under the Californian Humane and Dignified Death Act see above, n. 75. 
78 For criticism of the terminal illness requirement, see chapter VIl, 331. 
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An alternative possible criterion which has been advanced in some of the legislative proposals, is that 
the patient's condition must be incurable.79 This is les·s restrictive, since, by definition, the patient 
need not actually be dying, but simply have a condition which cannot be cured. On the basis of this 
requirement, the field of potential candidates for active voluntary euthanasia would be significantly 
expanded. For example, a quadriplegic or a person suffering from some degenerative disorder such as 
multiple sclerosis, Parkinson's or Alzheimer's disease would be potentially eligible for active 
voluntary euthanasia. Incurability as a criterion would be preferable to the requirement of a terminal 
illness because it is less arbitrary and uncertain in its application and leaves greater scope to the 
patient to determine whether active voluntary euthanasia is an appropriate option.so One danger, 
however, of adopting incurability as the criterion, as distinct from a terminal condition, is that it may 
result in requests for active euthanasia by persons whose condition although incurable, is quite trivial. 
This possibility could be countered by an additional requirement that the condition of which the 
patient complains must be objectively serious.81 
Under the Netherlands criteria, the requirement regarding the condition of the patient is even more 
permissive, simply requiring that there must be 'physical or mental suffering which the sufferer finds 
unbearable'. 82 This clearly implies that the patient's suffering stems from a physical or mental 
condition but there is no stipulation as to the nature or seriousness of that condition. Moreover, the 
measure of suffering is to be determined subjectively, by reference to what the patient finds 
unbearable. This formulation has the advantage of conceptual simplicity and avoids the need to 
determine the state of the patient's condition (whether it be 'tetminal' or 'incurable.') It does, however, 
represent an expansion of potentially eligible candidates for active voluntary euthanasia; theoretically, 
any physical or mental condition would suffice, provided that it causes unbearable suffering to the 
patient. Although there is no evidence from the Dutch case law that this criterion causes difficulties 
in practice, it is conceivable that a person wi~ a relatively minor physical condition or impairment, 
such as a skin disorder, seeks active euthanasia on the grounds that that condition causes him or her 
unbearable suffering. It is therefore recommended that in framing legislation for the legalisation of 
active voluntary euthanasia, a somewhat stricter and more objective requirement be imposed with 
regard to establishing the condition of the patient. The Netherlands criterion is, however, useful in 
focussing attention on the patient in determining the degree of suffering for the patient. Because of 
19 See, for example, the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1969 (U.K.) which had substituted the requirement of 
an 'irremediable' condition for the requirement of a 'fatal' condition contained in the 1936 Voluntary 
Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill (U .K.). 'Irremediable' condition was defined under the legislation as a 
serious physical illness or impairment reasonably thought in the patient's case to be incurable and 
expected to cause him severe distress or render him incapable of rationale existence; see chapter VII, 
318-319. Note also H.B. 342 of the Hawaii Legislature (1975) which specified that a patient only need 
be suffering from an incurable physical illness which is causing him severe distress; see Browne 54. 
80 L. Carl, 'The Right to Voluntary Euthanasia' (1988) 10 Whittier L.Rev. 489, 548. This was also the 
view taken by the Institute of Medical Ethics Working Party on the Ethics of Prolonging Life and 
Assisting Death; see chapter VII, 323. 
81 For example, S. O'Brien, 'Facilitating Euthanatic, Rational Suicide: Help Me Go Gentle Into That Good 
Night' (1987) 31 St. Louis U.LJ. 599, 665 where she refers, with approval, to the suggested criteria 
that the 'health of the suicide beneficiary is permanently, implacably and seriously impaired.' 
82 See chapter VIII, 359. There is an additional requirement that 'the suffering and the desire to die must be 
lasting' (see chapter vm, 359) however, this is not tantamount to requiring that the patient's condition 
be incurable. 
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the impossibility of objectively quantifying the degree of suffering that a patient experiences as a 
result of a particular condition, the assessment of this criterion must inevitably be subjectively 
assessed. 
Some proposals for legalisation also refer to the presence of pain as an additional requirement 
alongside other preconditions. 83 There are, however, problems with this requirement. Apart from the 
fact that the presence or extent of pain that a patient is experiencing is impossible to gauge 
objectively, it could be argued that the reference to pain is, in any event, inappropriate. With the 
development of palliative care, the situation has now been reached where most pain can be relieved. 84 
Moreover, experience has shown that the presence of pain is rarely of itself a reason for a patient to 
request active euthanasia. 85 It is therefore recommended that pain not be included as a specific 
criterion. 
A difficult question which arises with regard to eligibility for active voluntary euthanasia concerns 
the status of mental disorders. The more expansive proposals for the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia have extended eligibility to persons suffering from certain organically based mental 
disorders, 86 and it could be argued that this category should be extended even further to include all 
mental illnesses which cause the person severe distress.87 Under the Netherlands criteria for example, 
active voluntary euthanasia is potentially available to all patients who are experiencing 'physical or 
mental suffering which the sufferer finds unbearable•.88 An obvious difficulty when considering 
mentally impaired patients is their capacity to voluntarily request active euthanasia Whilst some 
forms of mental impairment are permanent and would render a patient permanently incompetent, 
there are other mental conditions, such as certain forms of depression and anxiety, from which a 
patient may suffer only intermittently. The question then arises as to whether a patient who suffers 
from some form of irremediable mental impairment, but presently has decision-making capacity, 
should be eligible for active voluntary euthanasia. There appears to be no reason in principle why 
such persons should be excluded, simply because they suffer from a mental, rather than a physical 
condition. Indeed, it has been officially recognised that there is no necessary correspondence between 
mental illness and the presence or absence of decision-making capacity either in fact or in law.89 
83 See, for example, the Bill introduced into the New York State legislature in 1938 which referred to a 
person suffering from 'severe physical pain caused by a disease for which no remedy affording relief or 
recovery is at the time known to medical science'; for discussion, see Wilson, 159. See also the 
proposal put by Fletcher 'Morals Medicine and the Law - Symposium: The Issues,' 1159 where he refers 
to a person suffering from 'an incurably painful and fatal disease.' 
84 See chapter V, 214. 
85 This is the view of Dr. P. Admiraal and the experience of other doctors in the Netherlands; verbal 
communication, Nov./Dec. 1991. 
86 See, for example, the H.B. 137 (1973) and H.B. 256 (1975) of the Montana Legislature and H.B. 143 of 
the Idaho Legislature (1969) which include reference to mental impairment provided that it is founded in 
a condition of 'brain damage or deterioration'; see Browne, 54. 
87 Browne 54. 
88 Author's emphasis. See chapter VII, 366 for reference to a recent case in which the Dutch courts 
accepted the doctor's argument that the mental suffering of a patient could be the basis for the defence of 
noodtoestand. 
89 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural 
Research, Deciding to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment (1983) 123. 
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However, extra care would obviously need to be taken in such cases in ascertaining the patient's 
decision-making capacity and the voluntariness of the patient's request. 
The eligibility criteria for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia should comprise a twofold 
test: first, that the person requesting active euthanasia has a serious and incurable physical or mental 
condition, (to be objectively assessed and documented by medically qualified persons); second, that 
that condition causes suffering intolerable to the patient. An additional requirement which could be 
included is that the suffering cannot be relieved or mitigated by other means. The advantage of this 
requirement would be to ensure that all other options have been explored, including the provision of 
palliative care, thus reinforcing that active voluntary euthanasia should only be available as a last 
resort. However, if we are to avoid undermining the patient's autonomy, this additional requirement 
is only acceptable if it is determined by reference to the patient's wishes; i.e. framed in terms that 
there are no alternatives acceptable to the patient. This is the approach which has been taken under 
the Netherlands criteria.90 The criteria proposed here regarding the condition of the patient could 
readily be embodied in legislation for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia. They are 
sufficiently clear and understandable to provide a workable basis for eligibility. Moreover, there is no 
reason to believe that creating eligibility for active voluntary euthanasia in these circumstances (and 
subject to other criteria being fulfilled) would result in an expansion of categories over time as some 
opponents have alleged.91 
One particular issue warranting consideration is whether pregnant women should be excluded from 
eligibility for active voluntary euthanasia.92 In a number of the proposals for the legalisation of 
active voluntary euthanasia, pregnant women are expressly exempted from eligibility93 and this has 
raised opposition from supporters of the rights of women.94 Significantly, these proposals have 
emanated from the United States where the State is recognised as having a compelling interest in 
preserving the life of the fetus, once the fetus becomes 'viable' .95 In Australia, however, an unborn 
child has no legal rights separate from its mother,96 so there would be no legal impediment to 
permitting a pregnant woman, who in all other respects meets the eligibility criteria. from seeking 
and being given active euthanasia.97 Whether, as a matter of policy, it is appropriate to exclude 
90 See chapter VIII, 359. 
91 See chapter V, 202-205. 
92 For discussion, see, for example, Cole and Shea, 845-847. Note also the position with regard to living 
will legislation; see chapter VII, 329. 
93 For example, under the Humane and Dignified Death Act proposed in California, discussed by R. Risley, 
'What the Humane and Dignified Death Initiative Does' (1986) 1 Euthanasia Rev. 221, 224) and the 
proposal of Cole and Shea, 845-847 where a female who is 20 or more weeks pregnant, and who, with 
reasonable certainty could survive to deliver a child, is excluded from the definition of a 'qualified 
person.' 
94 For a critical discussion of the issues see Carl, 549-550. 
95 Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
96 F and F [1989] F.L.C. 92-031; Attorney-General for the State of Queensland (Ex rel. Kerr) and Anor v T 
(1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 285, 286. 
97 Note, however, the recent English case of Re S (High Court Transcript, October 13 1992) in which a 
pregnant woman, carrying a viable fetus was forced to undergo an emergency caesarean against her 
wishes to save the life of the fetus. For criticism of this decision see D. Morgan, 'Whatever Happened 
to Consent?' (1992) 142 New L.J. 1448. This ruling was influenced by comments made by Lord 
Donaldson M.R. in Re T (Court of Appeal Transcript, July 30 1992) where, whilst upholding the right 
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pregnant women from eligibility is of course a separate matter. In the interests of protecting the 
autonomy of the patient, as well as keeping the legislation as streamlined as possible, it is 
recommended that no such limitation be included in any legislative reform. There would, in any 
event, be significant difficulties in the application of any such requirement.98 
In the context of the earlier discussion regarding medically assisted suicide, the possibility was noted 
of confining the option of active voluntary euthanasia to patients who are physically unable to 
commit suicicte.99 Whilst there may be some advantages attached to such a proposal, on balance, it 
would be an unjustifiable restriction on access to medically administered active voluntary euthanasia. 
As noted earlier, some people may find the concept of suicide objectionable, yet would willingly 
avail themselves of the option of medically administered active euthanasia.100 To require patients 
who seek death to be actively involved in the bringing about of that death does not, in all the 
circumstances, seem warranted. 
Yoluntariness of the Patient's ReQuest 
~ µ~ 
It has been argued in an earlier chapter, that the princip~ justifications for permitting active 
voluntary euthanasia rests upon the notions of consent and self-determination. 101 Ascertaining the 
voluntariness of the patient's request is, therefore, of the utmost importance in the decision to 
administer active voluntary euthanasia. It would accordingly be appropriate for any legislation 
permitting active euthanasia to require clear and convincing evidence that the patient genuinely wants 
active euthanasia and that the patient has made that request free from coercion and pressure from 
others.102 
There are a number of preconditions which are connected with the voluntariness of the patient's 
request.103 First, the patient must have decision-making capacity of a level commensurate with the 
of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment, he left open the question whether it was appropriate 
for a court to intervene in circumstances where the decision of a pregnant woman to refuse medical 
treatment, would effect the life of a viable fetus . For further discussion, see chapter II, 44. 
98 For example, how would the limitation be framed? Would it, as Cole and Shea suggest, be limited to 
circumstances where the woman could with reasonable certainty survive to deliver a live child or would 
it also apply in circumstances where the woman is not expected to survive the normal period of 
gestation? 
99 See above, 410. 
1 OO See above, 410. 
101 See chapter V, in particular, 179-187, 222-228. 
102 It should be noted that some proposals for legalisation of active euthanasia provide for a euthanasia 
decision to be made on behalf of the patient in circumstances where the patient is incompetent; e.g. 
Florida H.B. 3184 (1969); Montana H.B. 137 (1973); Oregon H.B. 2997 (1973); Wisconsin S.B. 670 
(1971); see Cole and Shea, 837, n. 80. Note also the legislation proposed by P. Small, 'Euthanasia -
The Individual's Right to Freedom of Choice' (1970) 5 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 190, 205; Steele and Hill, 343-
346; Brandt et al, 163-174. Although providing a different mechanism, note should also be made of the 
Californian Humane and Dignified Death Act and the more recent legislative proposal for California, 
the Death with Dignity Act, which make provision for the appointment of a durable power of attorney 
with the power to seek aid-in-dying on behalf of a formerly competent patient. See chapter VII, 343. 
103 One possible precondition which could be imposed is that the request for active euthanasia must 
originate from the patient and must not be the product of suggestion by any other person. Although 
such a requirement might provide some assurance that the patient's request is voluntary, it would appear 
to be somewhat limiting . Circumstances can readily be envisaged where a doctor bona fide discusses 
options with the patient, including the possibility of an early release from suffering by the 
administration of active euthanasia and once informed of the possibility, the patient genuinely and 
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gravity of the decision. The patient's decision-making capacity should be assessed professionally, 
either by the patient's attending doctor, or if thought necessary, by a psychiatrist.104 Second, in view 
of the seriousness and finality of active voluntary euthanasia, it is appropriate to impose an age 
limitation, such that only an adult, (i.e. a person over the age of 18 years) is eligible for its 
administration. I 05 Third, the patient's decision to request active euthanasia must be an informed one. 
In order for the patient to make an informed choice the patient must be given full information about 
his or her condition and prognosis including any element of uncertainty in diagnosis or prognosis. I06 
Full disclosure is essential to the unfettered exercise of the right to self-determination. I 07 This 
requirement features prominently in the Netherlands criteria which require that: the decision to die 
must be the voluntary decision of an informed patient; that the patient must have a correct and clear 
understanding of his or her condition and of other possibilities (the results of this and that treatment 
and of no treatment); that the patient must be capable of weighing those options and must have done 
so. Fourth, the patient's request for active euthanasia .must be durable. Here again, the Netherlands 
criteria are instructive, with the inclusion of the requirement that the patient's desire to die must be 
lasting. The durability of the patient's request can be confirmed by requiring that the request be 
repeated over an extended period of time before it is acted upon. I 08 This would ensure that there is 
ample opportunity for the patient to reflect upon his or her decision. It also provides some guarantee 
that the patient's request for active euthanasia is made earnestly and is enduring and not the product of 
a hasty and ill conceived decision. A related requirement is that the patient must be given the 
opportunity to revoke the request at any time, regardless of the patient's physical or mental 
condition.109 Fifth, provided the patient's decision is voluntary and made free of coercion, and the 
patient has satisfied the other relevant criteria for a euthanasia request, the patient's reasons or motive 
for making that decision should be irrelevant. I 10 There should be no additional requirement that the 
patient's decision is objectively reasonable. Finally, certain formalities with regard to evidencing 
patient consent are essential. The patient's request for active euthanasia should be in writing and 
voluntarily wishes to proceed with this option. This practice occurs in the Netherlands and is accepted 
as active voluntary euthanasia; see chapter vm. 
104 Wolhandler, 381 suggests that two independent psychiatric opinions must confirm the patient's 
competence. See also G. Benrubi, 'Euthanasia: The Need for Procedural Safeguards (1992) 326 New 
Eng.J.Med. 197, 198. Some commentators assume that the treating doctor confirms both the patient's 
medical condition and the patient's mental competence; e.g. Samek, 115. For a discussion as to 
whether a psychiatric evaluation should be necessary in all cases, see Carl, 544-546. 
105 This requirement has appeared in a number of the legislative proposals; see, for example, the Humane 
and Dignified Death Act proposed in California and the Washington Initiative 1 I9 (see chapter VII, 
339-342) which refer throughout to an 'adult' person, and the I936 and the I969 voluntary euthanasia 
Bills proposed in the United Kingdom dealing with persons over the age of majority, (then 2I years of 
age); see chapter VII, 3I8-3I9. It should be noted that in some of the proposals for active voluntary 
euthanasia, the right to be euthanased has been extended to all persons capable of choosing such a 
course of action regardless of age; e.g. Cole and Shea, 847-849. Note also the euthanasia Bill 
introduced into the Wisconsin Legislature (H.B. I207) which allowed for a person of seven years of age 
to request active euthanasia; see Browne, 54. 
106 J. Arras, 'The Right to Die on the Slippery Slope' (1982) 8 Social Theory & Practice 285, 301-302. 
107 Wolhander, 382. . 
108 See, for example, A. Morris, 'Voluntary Euthanasia' (1970) 45 Wash.L.Rev. 239, 267 where he 
suggests that a request for active euthanasia should come into force 30 days after being made. Note, 
however, the criticism of this requirement by Moore, 339. 
109 Arras, 300. 
110 Wolhandler, 380. 
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signed by the patient.111 Further, the request should be witnessed by two independent witnesses, who 
can testify that to the best of their knowledge, the patient is acting voluntarily and in an informed 
manner. Although these requirements may attract the criticism of excessive formality, they are 
important safeguards in the active euthanasia procedure.112 If a patient is required to make his or her 
request in writing, it is more likely to be the product of serious thought and reflection. Moreover, a 
written request for active euthanasia constitutes evidence of a patient's voluntary request and thereby 
provides some protection to both patients and to doctors performing active euthanasia A number of 
commentators have suggested that the procedural requirements for the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia should include written proof of the patient's medical condition and of the patient's decision-
making capacity to request euthanasia fiom the attending doctor.113 This would appear to be a prudent 
requirement ensuring that there be verification with regard to these key matters.114 
The foregoing requirements and safeguards are all designed to ensure that the patient has decision-
making capacity and that the patient's choice is fully informed and voluntary and accordingly 
represents a true exercise of patient self-determination.115 
Status of Adyance Directiyes and Other Mechanisms for future Consent 
A difficult question which must be addressed in framing any legislation for the legalisation of active 
voluntary euthanasia concerns the possible role of advance directives or living wills116 and other 
mechanisms for future consent such as the enduring power of attorney. 
Considering first of all the use of advance directives, the question which must be addressed is whether 
a patient's request for active euthanasia in such a document, made at a time when the patient had 
decision-making capacity, should be recognised as a voluntary request, empowering a doctor to 
perform active euthanasia provided the other. eligibility criteria are satisfied. Some of the legislative 
proposals for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia have made provision for the use of 
advance directives or living wills.117 For example, the 1969 Voluntary Euthanasia Bill proposed in 
111 Although a signed request from the patient is not included in the criteria developed by the courts in the 
Netherlands, it is one of the requirements under euthanasia protocols adopted by some of the hospitals. 
See chapter VIII, 371. 
112 One suggestion which has been made which goes even further, is for the video recording of voluntary 
euthanasia decisions. See B. Mettyear, 'Video Recording as a Safeguard in V.E.' (1991) Vol. 8 No. 4 
S.A. V.E.S. Bull. 5. 
113 For example, Samek, 115. The various proposals for a judicial hearing for the investigation of 
euthanasia requests also included a requirement of written evidence from the physician(s). See, for 
example the 1936 and 1969 voluntary euthanasia Bills proposed in the United Kingdom; see chapter 
VII, 318-319. . 
114 In framing the legislation, it would be advisable to avoid imposing on doctors an absolute standard of 
certainty in determining patient decision-making capacity, diagnosis, prognosis etc.; see Cole and 
Shea, 840-841 for reference to their proposed Bill which imposes 'reasonable certainty' as the criterion 
of liability. 
115 D. Brock, 'Voluntary Active Euthanasia' (1992) 22 Hastings Center R. 10, 20. 
116 See chapter VII for analysis of developments in Australia and other jurisdictions with regard to advance 
directives or living wills as a mechanism for refusing medical treatment 
117 For example, the 1969 Voluntary Euthanasia Bill (U.K.) and the proposals under the Californian 
initiatives for physician aid-in-dying (the 1988 Humane and Dignified Death Act and the Death with 
Dignity Act proposed for the 1992 referendum.); see chapter VII, 319 and 339-341, 343. Note also the 
proposals suggested by Morris, 266-271 (based on the 1969 U.K. Bill); Wolhander, 381; Brandt et al, 
147-162. 
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the United Kingdom made provision for persons to request in advance the administration of active 
euthanasia in the event of their suffering from an irremediable condition.118 Under such proposals, 
the advance declaration only comes into effect if the patient no longer has the decision-making 
capacity to express bis or her wishes. 
There are a number of competing considerations which must be carefully weighed in determining 
whether advance directives should be recognised in this area Recognition of some form of advance 
directives would have the advantage of maximising patient autonomy by enabling patients to indicate 
their wishes in advance in the event that they have a terminal or incurable condition and no longer 
have the decision-making capacity to request active euthanasia. This would, in tum, provide 
considerable reassurance to many patients.119 There are, however, serious problems inherent with 
advance directives or living wills, particularly where they make provision for active voluntary 
euthanasia.12° As noted earlier, the voluntariness of the patient's request is fundamental to any 
proposal for reform of active voluntary euthanasia.12l Although a patient's advanced request for 
active euthanasia expressed in a document of this kind does constitute a form of consent, it is 
undeniably not as certain and reliable as the request of a patient expressed at the time of the patient's 
condition, repeated over a period of time and which is capable of verification. It is certainly true that 
legislation permitting active voluntary euthanasia could impose requirements to establish the 
voluntariness of the patient's request at the time the directive or living will is executed. There is, 
however, no guarantee that this request continues to accord with the wishes of the patient once be or 
she loses decision-making capacity. Moreover, since advance directives inevitably involve some 
speculation about future circumstances, it is simply not feasible for a patient to make an informed 
decision about a hypothetical future condition.122 As a result, advance directive entail an increased 
risk that decisions are made which do not in fact accord with the patient's wishes. Further, since there 
is no practical means of confirming the voluntariness of the patient's decision at the time the decision 
is to be acted upon, there is also a greater risk of abuse. 
For the same reasons, the possibility of empowering a health care power of attorney or other agent to 
choose active euthanasia on one's behalf in the event of loss of decision-making capacity must also 
be rejected.123 The legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia is a serious undertaking and any 
118 See cls. 2(1) and (2). Under these provisions, a declaration signed by an adult and re-executed within 12 
months would remain in force for life unless revoked. Note also the terms of the proposed legislation 
under the Californian initiatives for physician aid-in-dying which make provision for the appointment 
of a durable power of attorney, with the power to seek aid-in-dying on behalf of a formerly competent 
patient. See chapter VII, 339-341, 343. The Euthanasia State Commission in the Netherlands also 
recommended reliance on an advance directive in certain specified circumstances. See chapter VIII, 374. 
119 For general commentary regarding the benefits of advance directives (in the context of refusal of 
treatment) see the Age Concern Institute of Gerontology and Centre of Medical Law and Ethics, Living 
Will, Working Party Report (1988) 46-47. See also D. Lanham and B. Fehlberg, 'Living Wills and the 
Right to Die with Dignity' (1991) 18 Melbourne U.L.Rev. 329, 331-335. 
120 For consideration of some of the general problems with living will legislation see chapter VII, 331-
333. 
121 See above, 417. 
122 This was also the view of the Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan v Harmon 160 S.W. 2d 408, 417 
(1988). 
123 See chapter VII for coverage of this mechanism in the context of refusal of treatment decisions. Note 
also the 1988 Californian proposal, under the Humane and Dignified Death Act which provided for a 
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proposal for reform should therefore err on the side of caution. So, despite the undoubted benefits of 
advance directives and other mechanisms for having health care decisions made on behalf of patients 
who lack decision-making capacity, legislation providing for active voluntary euthanasia must be 
limited to patients who presently have decision-making capacity and who personally request active 
euthanasia because of a current condition. The decision to seek active euthanasia requires a level of 
self-determination which can only be exercised by individuals acting on their own behalf. This does, 
admittedly, significantly confine the availability of active voluntary euthanasia but this is necessary 
in order to ensure that the patient's request is truly voluntary and informed and to minimise the risk of 
error and abuse.124 
The Role of the Poctor 
Doctors will inevitably have some role to play in the event that active voluntary euthanasia is 
legalised. Verification of a number of the eligibility criterion for the performance of active voluntary 
euthanasia discussed above, 125 necessarily rely on the participation of the medical profession.126 
First, a determination must be made as to the patient's decision-making capacity. Although the 
decision-making capacity of the patient could, in many cases, conceivably be determined by someone 
other than a doctor, on balance, doctors are probably the most appropriate persons to make this 
assessment and in difficult cases, the expert knowledge of psychiatrists, and or psychologists, would 
in any event need to be called upon. Second, medical knowledge is required to determine the condition 
of the patient (physical or mental) and to provide information to the patient about diagnosis, likely 
prognosis and available medical options. 
One of the major arguments which has been advanced by opponents of active voluntary euthanasia 
relates to the difficulties in ascertaining patient decision-making capacity and the voluntariness of the 
patient's request.127 Euthanasia opponents have also focused attention on the risks of mistaken 
diagnosis or prognosis. 128 An important safeguard to miniinise the risks of error or abuse is the 
involvement of an independent doctor to verify the patient's decision-making capacity and the 
voluntariness of the patient's request and to confirm the diagnosis and prognosis of the patient's 
condition.129 Significantly, under the guidelines for active voluntary euthanasia applicable in the 
Netherlands, consultation with another doctor is considered to be an important factor.130 It is 
therefore recommended that legislation for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia should 
nominated power of attorney to seek aid-in dying on behalf of the patient, subject to the review of a 
three person ethics committee; see chapter VIl, 340. 
124 M. Angell, 'Euthanasia' (1988) 319 New Eng.J.Med. 1348, 1350. Note also the argument considered by 
Angell that incompetent patients, particularly those in a persistent vegetative state, do not suffer to 
the same extent as competent patients. See also Browne, 55, n. 79. Although the issue is not 
specifically addressed in the criteria for active voluntary euthanasia which have been developed by the 
Dutch courts, in practice, doctors have relied on the advance directives of formerly competent patients; 
see chapter vm, n. 232. 
125 See above, 412-419. 
126 This is accepted even by those commentators who are opposed to doctors being involved in the 
administration of active voluntary euthanasia; see, for example, Richards, 418. 
127 See chapter V, 207-209. 
128 See chapter V, 211-212. 
129 Williams, 'Euthanasia,' 666-667; Samek, 115. 
130 See chapter VIII, 359, 369, 373. 
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include a requirement of consultation with another doctor to confirm the patient's decision-making 
capacity, the voluntariness of the patient's request. and the diagnosis and prognosis of the patient's 
condition. There should be a further requirement of full documentation of both practitioners' 
findings.131 
Whilst there may be little dispute with medical involvement in ascertaining the eligibility of a 
patient for active voluntary euthanasia, the more controversial issue is whether doctors should be 
involved in the actual administration of active voluntary euthanasia. The essence of the opponents 
arguments on this point is that the deliberate taking of life is completely contrary to the whole ethics 
and training of the medical profession and would seriously undermine the doctor/patient relationship. 
These arguments have already been considered in an earlier chapter where it was argued that these 
concerns are largely unfounded.132 Realistically, the alternatives are limited. The possibility of 
friends or relatives performing active euthanasia at the request of a loved one can be readily 
discounted. As one commentator has pointed out. friends and relatives are likely to be emotionally 
involved with the patient and are consequently more likely to be traumatised by the experience if they 
participate directly in bringing about the patient's death.133 Moreover, active euthanasia is a medical 
procedure requiring medical and pharmacological expertise. The very nature of the act would therefore 
suggest that it be performed by a registered medical practitioner It is certainly true that lay persons or 
para-professionals could be trained to administer a painless death. However, this would entail its own 
dangers and problems.134 Another possibility would be for health care professionals other than 
doctors to perform active voluntary euthanasia, for example nurses. There are good grounds though 
for suggesting that the responsibility for this practice should be confined to doctors. Prominent 
amongst these considerations is the fact that doctors have the most extensive medical and 
phannacological expertise and already have the responsibility of making what are, in effect, life and 
death decisions. Given the inevitable involvement of the medical profession in ascertaining 
compliance with the eligibility criteria it would be far preferable for members of the medical 
profession to also be vested with the responsibility of administering active voluntary euthanasia. 
And, as was suggested in an earlier chapter, there are other valid reasons why doctors are the most 
appropriate group to administer active voluntary euthanasia.135 Doctors are in close contact with the 
patient and have direct knowledge of the patient's medical circumstances. Moreover, they are subject 
to strict codes of professional conduct and medical ethics and can be assumed to be acting in the best 
interests of the patient.136 
One interesting suggestion which has been made in order to avoid the involvement of ordinary doctors 
in the practice of active voluntary euthanasia, is that euthanasia be developed as an area of 
131 See above, 421 for relevant matters which could be covered. 
132 See chapter V, 217-220. 
133 Crisp, 75-76. 
134 There is, for example, very real concern about extending this kind of knowledge beyond the medical 
profession because of the risk that it may be misused. 
135 See chapter V, 218. 
136 R. Risley, 'In Defense of the Humane and Dignified Death Act' (1988-89) Free Inquiry 10, 11-12. 
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specialisation in medicine.137 According to this proposal, active voluntary euthanasia could become 
an important part of the care provided to the terminally ill. Whilst there would appear to be no major 
problems in principle with this proposal, its feasibility in practice would depend on the willingness 
of sufficient numbers of doctors to pursue this area of specialisation. There is also the consideration 
that if the practice of active voluntary euthanasia was confined to an area of medical specialisation, 
fewer physicians would be involved in the practice, but they would be called upon to administer 
active voluntary euthanasia more frequently than if the practice were distributed amongst the medical 
profession. It is therefore necessary to weigh up the potential advantages of specialisation against the 
argument that given the extraordinary nature of active voluntary euthanasia, it would be preferable if 
the practice by any individual doctor would be kept to a minimum. 
On balance, the most preferable and realistic proposal is for doctors to be involved in the 
administration of active voluntary euthanasia As noted in a previous chapter, there is evidence from 
survey results indicate that a significant proportion of the medical profession not only support the 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia, but would be willing to engage in the practice if it were 
legal.138 In order for there to be an appropriate balance between personalised knowledge of the patient 
and objective consultation and decision-making, it would be desirable for this requirement to be 
framed in terms similar to that presently in operation in the Netherlands; that a medical doctor who is 
familiar with the relevant circumstances of the case is involved in the decision and the prescription 
and administration of the correct drugs and that there is consultation with another doctor.139 
Moreover, the involvement of another doctor would go some way to overcome the objection raised by 
some commentators of permitting private killings, involving a private transaction between a doctor 
and his or her patient.140 
If it is decided that it is appropriate for do~tors to be involved in the practice of active voluntary 
euthanasia, either as specialists, or more likely, within the normal course of medical practice, careful 
consideration would have to be given to the position of those doctors who do not wish to participate. 
It was argued in an earlier chapter, that under no circumstances should doctors be under a legal 
obligation to perform active euthanasia at the patient's request 141 This principle could be reflected in 
the legislation by the inclusion of a conscience clause, making it clear that doctors are free to refuse 
to participate in the practice of active euthanasia.142 Alternatively, legislation providing for active 
137 Crisp, 77; Benrubi, 198. See also Crisp, 77-78 for consideration and rejection of some of the possible 
arguments against this proposal. Other commentators have also argued that if active voluntary 
euthanasia is going to be performed by doctors it would be preferable to create a separate profession 
specifically for this purpose; e.g. D. Vere, Voluntary Euthanasia (1971). 
138 See chapter VI, 265, 266, 277, 282. 
139 See chapter VIII, 359. 
140 For example, D. Callahan, 'Aid-In-Dying: The Social Dimension' (1991) 118 Commonweal 416, 477. 
141 See chapter V, 185-187, 201. See also Cole and Shea, 851. 
142 See, for example, the 1969 Voluntary Euthanasia Bill (U.K.) cl. 4(3) which provides that 'No person 
shall be under any duty, whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to 
participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious objection' and the 
Californian Humane and Dignified Death Act cl. 2525.8 which states that 'Nothing herein requires a 
physician to administer aid-in-dying if be or she is morally or ethically opposed'. The Californian 
initiative also granted the physician immunity from civil, criminal and administrative liability for 
failing to effectuate the directive of a qualified patient, unless be or she wilfully refuses to transfer the 
424 
voluntary euthanasia could be framed in permissive terms only, making it clear that doctors who 
administer active euthanasia at the request of a patient in accordance with the legislation will not be 
criminally liable, but in no way creating an obligation to comply with a patient's request for active 
euthanasia. A related consideration is whether a doctor who chooses not to be involved in the practice 
of active voluntary euthanasia should be under a statutory obligation to transfer the patient or refer the 
patient to another doctor. Some of the legislative proposals for the legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia specifically provide for the transfer of patients in these circumstances.143 Although such a 
requirement would maximise the patient's opportunity to have his or her euthanasia request granted, 
doctors strongly opposed to the concept of active voluntary euthanasia may find a requirement of this 
kind to be against their principles.144 It is therefore probably preferable not to enshrine this in 
legislation but to leave it to the guidelines for medical practice. 
In the light of the current criminal law prohibition of active voluntary euthanasia, an important feature 
of any proposal for legalisation is the introduction of an immunity to protect doctors from liability 
when acceding to the patient's euthanasia request. Moreover, doctors engaged in the practice of active 
voluntary euthanasia must also be protected from civil and disciplinary proceedings. Such immunities 
have been an integral feature of most of the legislative proposals.145 Alongside such an immunity, 
the legislation should also contain a saving provision unequivocally declaring the limits of the 
legislation, to the effect that nothing in the legislation shall be construed to authoris~ or permit the 
deliberate taking of life other than in accordance with the legislation.146 Provided that there is some 
provision to this effect making it abundantly clear that the current criminal law prohibitions continue 
to apply to cases falling outside the legislation, it is probably unnecessary to include specific penalties 
in the legislation.147 
patient upon request. A similar provision was contained in the legislation proposed under the 
Washington Initiative 119 and in the proposal for physician aid-in-dying in the 1992 California 
campaign. See further, chapter VII, 341-343. Note also the legislative proposal of the State 
Commission on euthanasia in the Netherlands; see chapter Vffi, 373. 
143 See, for example, the Californian Humane and Dignified Death Act cl. 7191 which provides 'A failure by 
a physician to effectuate the directive of a qualified patient pursuant to this division shall constitute 
unprofessional conduct if the physician refuses to make arrangements, or fails to take reasonable steps, 
to effect the transfer of the qualified patient to another physician who will effectuate the directive of the 
qualified patient; see R. Risley and M. White, 'Humane and Dignified Death Initiative for 1988' (1986) 
1 Euthanasia Rev. 226, 230-231. Note also Brandt et al, 194, 199-200. 
144 D. Shewmon, 'Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Needless Pandora's Box' (1987) 3 Issues Law & Med. 
219, 212. 
145 See, for example, the 1969 Voluntary Euthanasia Bill (U.K.) cl. 5(1) which provides that a physician or 
nurse who, acting in good faith, causes euthanasia to be administered to a qualified patient in 
accordance with what that person so acting believes to be the patient's declaration and wishes, shall 
not be guilty of any offence. Clause 5(2) states that physicians and nurses who have taken part in the 
administration of euthanasia shall be deemed not to be in breach of any professional oath or 
affirmation. See also the Californian Humane and Dignified Death Act cl. 7190 which provides for an 
immunity from criminal, civil and administrative proceedings. Note also cl. 7195; see Risley and 
White, 230, 232. A similar provision was contained in the Washington Initiative 119 and appears in 
the 1992 Californian proposal. For a discussion of these legislative proposals, see chapter VII, 319, 
339-343. Note also Brandt et al, 196-197; Cole and Shea 856. 
146 See cl. 2443 under the Humane and Dignified Death Act proposed in California; see Risley and White, 
232. 
147 For an example of a proposed Bill with comprehensive penalties for non-compliance with the 
legislation, see Brandt et al, 198-202. Note also the recommendations of the Netherlands State 
Commission on euthanasia; see chapter Vffi, 373. 
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Witnessin2 ReQuirements for the Administration of Actiye Yoluntarv Euthanasia 
A procedural safeguard included in a number of the proposals for legislative reform is that the 
administration of active voluntary euthanasia must be performed in the presence of witnesses.148 This 
requirement has considerable merit. One of the principal arguments for the legalisation of active 
voluntary euthanasia is that the practice can be brought into the open and appropriately regulatect.149 
A requirement that active voluntary euthanasia be performed in the presence of suitable witnesses 
would provide an important check on the procedure and provide some protection against the possibility 
of error and abuse. 
Reportin2 ReQuiremeuts 
A final matter that needs to be addressed is whether there should be any formal reporting requirements 
imposed under the legislation which must be complied with by a doctor who has performed active 
voluntary euthanasia As noted above, one of the key arguments for the legalisation of the practice is 
that it can be performed openly and subject to public scrutiny.150 Consistent with this objective, 
doctors should be required to keep proper records with regard to the administration of active voluntary 
euthanasia However, in developing an appropriate reporting procedure, caution must be exercised in 
avoiding a procedure that is unnecessarily intrusive and bureaucratic. A fundamental requirement would 
be that the cause of death recorded on the patient's death certificate would be medically administered 
active voluntary euthanasia as opposed to natural causes. It also follows from the foregoing 
recommendations that there would be documentation of the patient's request for active voluntary 
euthanasia151 as well as documentation from the patient's doctor and the consultant doctor regarding 
the patient's decision-making capacity, the voluntariness of the patient's request, and the diagnosis and 
prognosis of the patient.152 One could go further and require the routine investigation or review of all 
cases of medically administered active voluntary euthanasia by the police or other investigative body, 
but in the light of the strict safeguards which have been suggested which necessarily entail independent 
scrutiny of the doctor's practices153 such a requirement would be unwarranted. In the event that a 
complaint or allegation is made that some aspect of the legislation has not been complied with, an 
independent investigation would of course be necessary. 
148 See, for example, the Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 1936 (U.K.) which required that active 
euthanasia must be administered in the presence of an 'official witness'. The latter must be a justice of 
the peace, or a barrister, solicitor, medical practitioner, clergyman or other minister of religion, or a 
State registered nurse. Note also the 1938 New York Bill which required that active euthanasia be 
administered in the presence of the euthanasia committee, or two members thereof; see Levisohn, 70. 
149 See chapter N, 149-150 and chapter V, 191-192. 
150 See above, text accompanying n. 149. 
151 See above, 418-419. 
152 See above, 422. 
153 For example, the requirement of consultation with another medical practitioner and the witnessing 
requirements with regard to both the patient's request and the actual administration of active euthanasia. 
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Copclusjon 
The object of this chapter has been to critically evaluate the various possible models for change with 
regard to the law dealing with active voluntfll"Y euthanasia. In addition to the useful guidance and 
direction available from the many proposals which have been advanced over the years, particular 
assistance has been derived from a consideration of the Netherlands model for the practice of active 
voluntary euthanasia 
After considering a number of possible legislative solutions, it is suggested that outright legalisation 
of active voluntary euthanasia would be the most appropriate course, subject to strict safeguards. The 
criteria and safeguards for the performance of active voluntary euthanasia recommended in this chapter 
mirror, to a large extent, the criteria presently in use in the Netherlands for the practice of active 
voluntary euthanasia.154 They are both practicable and workable155 and this is borne out by the 
experience in the Netherlands. It is therefore possible to provide adequate safeguards for the 
performance of active voluntary euthanasia without bureaucratizing the sick room and invoking 
cumbersome safeguard machinery. 
It is readily acknowledged that a number of the criterion and safeguards which have been recommended 
considerably limit the scope of any reform, by, for example, stipulating that the availability of active 
voluntary euthanasia be confined to patients who presently have decision-making capacity, and who 
have a serious incurable condition which the patient finds unbearable. However, safeguards of this 
kind are necessary for the protection of both doctors and their patients. Given the significance of any 
change in this area it is appropriate to proceed cautiously and to set clear parameters which confine the 
practice. Whilst it is argued here that legislative measures should be introduced which permit the 
performance of active voluntary euthanasia in clearly specified and carefully regulated circumstances, it 
is at the same time, strongly recommended that suitable barriers are maintained against the deliberate 
taking of human life. 
With regard to implementation of the proposed legislative reforms, there is much to be said for 
keeping the legislation as simple and streamlined as possible. It should consist of a concise legislative 
statement containing the key elements of the foregoing recommendations, leaving the finer details to 
regulations and guidelines for medical practice. By its very nature, euthanasia reform is an area where 
an interdisciplinary approach is essential and the medical profession has an important role to play in 
providing input into this process. 
As a final rider to legislative reform in this country, it should be noted that because the area of 
criminal law comes within the jurisdictions of the Australian States and Territories, implementation 
154 As explained in chapter VID, 355, in the Netherlands these criteria are not presently in statutory form. 
155 See, however, the claims of opponents, such as Y. Kamisar ('Some Non-Religious Views Against 
Proposed Mercy-Killing Legislation' (1958) 42 Minn.L.Rev. 969, 982) to the effect that it is 
impracticable to devise a suitable proposal for the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia; see 
chapter V, 213-214. 
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of any reform would have to occur at the State and Territory level. This presents practical difficulties 
in securing uniformity throughout Australia with regard euthanasia legislation, and success can only 
be achieved through the co-operative efforts of all Australian jurisdictions. 
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CONCLUSION 
Active voluntary euthanasia is a notoriously complex and controversial issue. This thesis is by no 
means the last word on the subject but simply a contribution in a vast debate which is developing at 
an accelerating pace and becoming increasingly prominent 
On the basis of the analysis in the foregoing chapters, some matters can be stated with relative 
certainty. It is clear from the analysis of the criminal law that there is a sharp distinction in the law's 
approach to passive and active euthanasia. Whilst the law recognises the patient's right to refuse 
treatment and permits passive euthanasia in certain circumstances, active voluntary euthanasia is 
unequivocally prohibited as murder regardless of the special mitigating circumstances usually existing 
in such cases. Notwithstanding the legal prohibition, there is substantial evidence that active 
voluntary euthanasia is already being performed by doctors in Australia, although it is largely a hidden 
practice. No doctor in Australia has been prosecuted for performing active voluntary euthanasia and, 
from the experience in other jurisdictions, there is every possibility that if a prosecution did arise in a 
genuine euthanasia case, the doctor would escape the full rigours of the criminal law. However, as the 
recent prosecution of Dr Cox in the United Kingdom has shown, 1 this cannot be relied upon as a 
certainty, and doctors who compassionately assist their patients to die run the risk of incurring serious 
criminal liability. Against this background, there is incontrovertible evidence of increasing support for 
active voluntary euthanasia amongst the medical profession and in the community generally. It also 
appears to be beyond dispute that problems ru:ise when a particular law no longer commands respect or 
support. On the basis of these findings, it can be concluded that there is now a definite body of 
evidence which suggests that the present law does not meet social needs and that change is in the 
community interest. There is, therefore, a strong case for the reappraisal of the present legal 
prohibition of active voluntary euthanasia. 
In assessing the appropriateness of reform in this area, valuable assistance has been gained from the 
experience in the Netherlands. Although_ not actually legal, active voluntary euthanasia has been 
openly practiced in that country for some years and has been officially sanctioned by the courts and the 
prosecuting authorities. This is clearly not equivalent to legalisation of the practice, but the 
Netherlands experience does, nevertheless, provide some opportunity for empirically testing claims 
about the harmful effects of State sanctioned active voluntary euthanasia. A careful examination of the 
practice in the Netherlands does not support the assertions made by opponents of euthanasia, and in 
fact demonstrates that active voluntary euthanasia can be safely incorporated into medical practice, 
subject to certain well defined criteria. It must be recognised however, that regardless of its intrinsic 
1 See chapter IV, 126-127. 
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merit, the model for the practice of active voluntary euthanasia which has been developed in the 
Netherlands is not necessarily the appropriate solution for other countries contemplating reform in 
this area. It is, therefore, vital to view the Netherlands' practice in its wider context and to be 
culturally sensitive in developing solutions to the problem of active voluntary euthanasia. So, whilst 
acknowledging that the practice of active voluntary euthanasia developed in that country may not be 
the answer for all jurisdictions, it has been demonstrated that it provides an appropriate model for law 
reform in Australia. It may also be a suitable model for consideration in a number of the other 
jurisdictions under consideration, including the United Kingdom, but serious reservations must be 
raised regarding its suitability in the United States due to significant differences in that countries 
health care and legal systems.2 
Examination of options for reform in this area requires consideration of legislative solutions. This 
is by no means to suggest that legislation should be the inevitable response to a legal problem, 
particularly in the field of law and medicine where a myriad of complex ethical and professional 
issues are involved. Clearly, legislation is not a universal panacea or omnipotent force, and there 
are, in fact, many difficulties and limitations associated with legislative solutions. To begin with, 
the legislative process is subject to many pressures and constraints3 and the outcome of this process 
is often the product of political compromise. This may, in many instances, jeopardise or even 
undermine the integrity of the legislation. Moreover, legislation can never hope to be exhaustive, 
and the potential always exists for difficulties in the interpretation of the legislation. There are also 
problems with the inflexibility of legislative solutions. Once enacted, statute law is in force until 
such time it is amended or repealed and is far less amenable to change than judge made law which 
can be more directly responsive to the fluctuating demands of society.4 A further limitation on the 
operation of legislation is that it is often, on its own, not a complete answer to the difficulties 
raised. In many instances, legislation will only be successful in achieving its aims if it is 
accompanied by an educational campaign and the allocation of appropriate resources. 
In view of these various limitations, there is every reason to reflect carefully before proceeding to a 
legislative solution and to give due consideration to alternative remedies such as changes in 
institutional practices or the introduction of voluntary codes of self-regulation.5 However, 
notwithstanding its shortcomings, in some instances legislation is a necessary and, indeed, an 
appropriate response. With regard to the present subject of active voluntary euthanasia, in view of 
the unequivocal prohibition of the practice under the criminal law, any substantive change could 
only be achieved through legislation. Nothing short of legislative reform would suffice to provide 
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liability. Moreover, there are strong arguments (summarised below6) to support the view that 
legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia by legislative enactment would be beneficial. The 
conclusion of this thesis is, therefore, that on balance, after carefully weighing up the advantages 
and disadvantages of a legislative solution, legislative reform is both necessary and appropriate. 
In the formulation of legislative reform in this country, considerable guidance can be derived from 
the guidelines for the practice of active voluntary euthanasia which have been developed by the 
Dutch courts. However, the practice in that country has not been given statutory force so the 
introduction of legislation permitting active voluntary euthanasia will still be largely 
experimental.7 Nevertheless, it has been argued that there are compelling reasons why we have an 
obligation to try and secure reform in this area. It is recommended that a very limited exception to 
the homicJde laws be introduced conferring on doctors an immunity from liability, provided active 
voluntary euthanasia is performed in accordance with strict criteria and safeguards. It must be 
emphasised that this would not create a 'right' to active voluntary euthanasia but would simply 
empower doctors to comply with patients' requests in appropriate cases. It is of vital important that 
the parameters of any such reforms are clearly defined and that the existing prohibition on taking of 
life remains to protect individuals from being killed without their consent 
The legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia through legislative reform is unquestionably a 
significant step for a society to take, and concerns have understandably been raised about the 
implications of incorporating into law and public policy a practice which allows doctors to kill 
their patients. Indeed, we have seen that many people who are in principle prepared to accept the 
legitimacy of active voluntary euthanasia in some circumstances are opposed to the prospect of 
introducing legislation which would legalise and thereby institutionalise the practice. They are, 
instead, prepared to tolerate the existing discrepancies between law and practice and the subterfuge 
which occurs with the practice of active voluntary euthanasia. The essence of this thesis is that the 
present problems which have been identified must be more honestly and directly addressed, and we 
need to overcome what is an understandable resistance to contemplate the deliberate taking of life. It 
is certainly true that legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia implies ethical approval of such 
conduct, 8 but the practice of active voluntary euthanasia in appropriate circumstances already enjoys 
widespread ethical approval, so legalisation would simply be formalising the present situation. 
Moreover, it has been argued that there are significant advantages to be gained from legalisation of 
active voluntary euthanasia. It will promote the autonomy and self-determination of patients by 
giving eligible patients the freedom to choose active voluntary euthanasia. Although only a small 
minority of patients are likely to exercise this option, it is important that the option is made 
available and that patient choice is maximised. Another advantage to be gained from legalisation of 
active voluntary euthanasia is that it will instil some equilibrium into the law; a suffering patient 
6 See below, 430-431. 
7 
8 
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will not only have the choice of refusing treatment which may bring about his or her death, but 
may seek more active assistance in dying. Legislative reform will thereby address the present 
inconsistency in the law which gives a patient the legal authority to direct that no further treatment 
be administered but holds that a patient cannot give a legally effective consent to having his or her . 
life terminated. 
There will also be significant benefits for the medical profession if active voluntary euthanasia is 
legalised which are ultimately in the interests of good medical practice. Doctors who are already 
involved in the practice would no longer need to fear the possibility of criminal prosecution, 
provided they comply with the statutory criteria. Other doctors, who presently refrain from the 
practice for fear of prosecution, would be free to respond to patients' requests for active euthanasia in 
appropriate circumstances. Indeed, there is already evidence to suggest that a significant proportion 
of doctors would be willing to participate in the practice if it were legalised. One of the important 
advantages of legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia is that it would encourage greater visibility 
and more open scrutiny of the practice. So long as the practice remains illegal, it is likely to be 
performed in secrecy, without the benefit of professional discussion and guidance, essential for good 
medical practice. By specifying criteria and procedures for the lawful performance of active voluntary 
' 
euthanasia, legislative reform would reduce the risk of unacceptable practices and abuse and patients 
would, therefore, have a greater measure of protection than they presently have. Doctors who feel 
compelled to respond to a patient's plea for active euthanasia would be given appropriate legal 
immunity and there would generally be greater certainty and predictability in the law. It would, 
however, be naive to assume that the introduction of legislation would remove all difficulties. 
Obviously, one cannot completely eliminate the possibility of unacceptable practices and abuse, and 
cases will undoubtedly arise falling outside the statutory exception. Such cases should continue to 
be dealt with according to the existing criminal law prohibition. There is no evidence to suggest 
that the legalisation of active voluntary euthanasia would increase the incidence of such cases; to the 
contrary, there are good grounds for the belief that the risk of unacceptable practices would be 
reduced 
Whilst some propositions can be stated with certainty, some areas of uncertainty remain. The 
limitations of the legislative solution which has been proposed must be recognised. Its scope is 
restricted to active voluntary euthanasia and only provides relief to presently competent adult 
patients in certain carefully defined circumstances. This admittedly leaves many areas unresolved, 
including the difficult question of incompetent patients. Whilst detailed consideration of this 
category of patients (including the crucial question of determining whether a patient has decision-
making capacity) falls outside the scope of this thesis, indications are that it would be inappropriate 
and potentially dangerous to attempt to extend any proposal for legalisation of active voluntary 
euthanasia to incompetent patients. It is evident from the experience with regard to passive 
euthanasia that even in circumstances where a formerly competent patient has expressed his or her 
wishes in an advance directive or living will, problems frequently arise. The difficulties are even 
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greater if the decision-making responsibility falls upon others, particularly in circumstances where 
the patient has never been competent and the wishes of the patient can therefore not be known. In 
these circumstances, decision-making almost inevitably involves assessment of the patient's 'quality 
of life' and requires a subjective determination of when a person's life is devoid of value, with the 
inherent difficulties and dangers which that entails. 
There are a number of other areas of uncertainty which have been identified but the detailed 
resolution of which falls beyond the scope of this thesis. In developing the arguments in this 
thesis, attention was drawn to two particular areas of medical practice which reveal the 
inconsistencies between the law and practice in this area; the termination of life-support equipment 
and the administration of pain-relieving drugs which hasten death. Consideration of these areas was 
incidental to the central issue of active voluntary euthanasia, but nevertheless highlighted the 
possible need for legislative reform also in these circumstances. Although there has been a tendency 
toward characterising these medical practices in such a way as to avoid the imposition of criminal 
liability, the possibility remains that doctors may face criminal prosecutions for acts which are 
widely regarded as appropriate medical practice. It is, therefore, suggested that there is a case for 
clarifying the law with regard to these matters, and bringing it into line with common 
understanding and existing medical practice. This could be achieved by the introduction of a simple 
legislative provision.9 
Another unresolved issue raised in this thesis is the question of mercy killing cases outside the 
medical context. Such cases certainly place a strain on the legal system as discrepancies inevitably 
arise between law on the books and the law in practice. It is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis 
to present a conclusive statement as to what should be done in this area, but it is perhaps 
appropriate for certain words of caution to be expressed. Mercy killings in the family context are 
quite distinct from medically administered euthanasia and have their own peculiar difficulties. 
Because of the possibility of self-interest being the motivating factor behind such killings, care 
must be taken that any proposal for reform does not encourage killings of the sick and elderly, 
performed mala fides under the guise of mercy killing. Moreover, it should be noted that if, in 
accordance with the recommendations in this thesis, medically administered active voluntary 
euthanasia was a legally available option, the justification for many of the mercy killing cases 
would disappear. In these circumstances, reform of the law specifically with regard to mercy killing 
may well be unnecessary, other than perhaps to ensure that a sentencing discretion exists in all 
jurisdictions, allowing for the lenient treatment of mercy killers.10 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the time has come for the issue of medically administered active 
voluntary euthanasia to be squarely confronted and for suitable legislative reform to be developed. It 
9 With regard to the issue of administration of drugs which may hasten death, a number of legislative 
formulations have been advanced for consideration. See, for example, the proposals made by the West 
Australian and Canadian Law Reform Commission discussed in chapter VII, 313 and 347 respectively. 
10 For consideration of proposals for reform in this area, see the discussion in chapter VII, 291-293 and 
321-322. 
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must, however, be acknowledged that irrespective of how well or carefully a legislative solution is 
formulated, it can at best be a partial response to the i:lifficulties which are encountered by many 
patients, and the importance of non-legal solutions must not be underestimated. Active voluntary 
euthanasia should not be a substitute for alternative forms of care such as palliative and hospice 
care, but rather should be seen as a last resort available to patients in circumstances where all other 
available options have been carefully canvassed. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the 
developments in palliative and hospice care be continued in order that patients are assured of 
adequate pain relief, control of symptoms, and treatment of psychological distress.11 There should 
also be continuing attention given to the needs of the sick and dying generally, with emphasis on 
better training of health care professionals and improved communication with patients. The 
development of optimal palliative and hospice care obviously requires appropriate government 
expenditure in these areas, but society has an obligation to do all that is reasonably possible to 
improve the situation of dying and suffering patients. The provision of comprehensive care would 
certainly go some way towards minimising the need for active voluntary euthanasia and ensuring 
that lives are not unnecessarily terminated. It cannot, however, provide a solution in all cases and 
active voluntary euthanasia must be an option available to all patients. 
11 K. Foley, 'The Relationship of Pain and Symptom Management to Patient Requests for Physician-
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